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From the Polis to Facebook: Social Media and the Development of a New 
Greek Public Sphere 
Michael Nevradakis, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
Supervisor: Sharon Strover 
Abstract: The objective of this research project is to critically examine how social and 
new media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and online radio have influenced the potential 
development or rejuvenation of public sphere, civil society, and public discourse in Greece 
during the years of the country’s economic, political, and social crisis. The project attempts to 
answer how social and new media have impacted the public sphere and civil society, how social 
and new media have contributed to the formation of new political and social movements, how 
social and new media have contributed to the formation of alternative online news sources, and 
whether social and new media are considered to be more credible sources of news and 
information compared to mainstream media institutions. Greece was selected as the site for this 
research project in response to the prevailing view found in the body of academic literature that 
Greece’s public sphere and civil society have historically been underdeveloped when compared 
to the countries of Western Europe and the United States. In addition, the political and economic 
upheaval which accompanied the Greek economic crisis and the country’s location at the 
viii
intersection of Western and Eastern Europe and the Middle East, presented intriguing 
possibilities for research and for examining the role that new technologies can play in the 
redevelopment of the public sphere and civil society during a time of crisis. Interviews were 
conducted with over 120 individuals, including elected officials and political personnel, 
journalists, media professionals, bloggers, academics, opinion leaders, activists, and 
representatives of organizations active within civil society. Five illustrative examples of 
organizations with a prominent social media presence, including a non-governmental 
organization, a political party, a mainstream media corporation, an online news portal, and an 
alternative online radio station were examined. Electronic survey research was also performed 
across three sample populations, including Greece’s representatives in the European Parliament, 
editors of major Greek newspapers, and representatives from organizations operating in the civil 
society sector. This dissertation is based on longitudinal, multi-year research performed in 
Greece between September 2012 and August 2017. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 – INTRODUCTION 
The 2010s have been a turbulent decade on a worldwide scale. In recent years, the global 
community has witnessed a number of large-scale protest and activist movements, including the 
Arab Spring revolts in Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries of the Arab world; the Occupy Wall 
Street movement in the United States and in major financial centers throughout the world; the 
Taksim Square uprising in Turkey; the so-called “Green Movement” in Iran; and the protest 
movement of the “Indignados” all across Spain in 2011. 
One of the primary attributes all of these movements share in common is the significant 
role played by new information and communication technologies (ICTs), particularly social and 
new media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogs, in their development and growth. Social 
and new media have played a preeminent role in the dissemination of news and information 
about these movements to participants and to the wider public at large, and have frequently 
allowed these movements to bypass traditional media gatekeepers and to portray themselves and 
deliver their message without the mediation of the mainstream media. Furthermore, social and 
new media tools have allowed for participants in these movements to communicate efficiently 
and instantaneously, coordinating their actions on the fly and transcending, in many instances, 
previously fixed boundaries of space and time. 
While the aforementioned examples of protest and social movements, such as the 
“Indignados” of Spain and the Occupy Wall Street movement, have received a great deal more 
attention in the media (and by scholars), one of the most significant and widespread protest 
movements of this decade developed in Greece, where in the spring and summer of 2011, 
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hundreds of thousands of Greek citizens organized and protested in central squares and plazas 
throughout Greece, with the most prominent of these protests being organized in Syntagma 
(Constitution) Square in central Athens directly across the street from Greece’s Parliament 
building on one end and Greece’s Ministry of Finance on the other end. The movement of the 
Greek “Indignants,” as they came to be known, mirroring the terminology used by the 
“Indignados” in Spain, occupied Syntagma Square and other prominent public spaces throughout 
Greece for two months, from late May to late July 2011, and were, by the standards of post-war 
Greece, unprecedented in their size and longevity (Pantazidou, 2013: 762; Panagiotopoulou, 
2013: 422-424). The choice of Syntagma Square, across the street from Greece’s seat of 
government and “ground zero” of economic decision-making, as the “heart” of this new 
movement, could not have been more symbolic in light of the severe economic crisis and 
contraction the country has experienced since 2008. 
 It is this monumental moment in modern Greek history which serves as the starting point 
for this study. Specifically, this research project will focus on Greece during the period of its 
economic, political, and social crisis, and the impact that social media and other forms of new 
online media have had on Greece’s public sphere and civil society, including the influence of 
such mediums on the development of new social movements and forms of protest, new political 
parties, and on public discourse more broadly. 
1.2 – GREECE TODAY 
 Greece, following the downfall of the military regime which governed the country 
between 1967 and 1974, has established a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral 
legislature, and where the head of government is the prime minister, while the head of state, the 
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country’s president, holds a largely ceremonial role. While electoral politics in Greece are robust, 
with dozens of political parties participating in national, regional, local, and European elections, 
for most of the post-junta period (known as the “metapolitefsi,” or Third Hellenic Republic) from 
1974 until 2011), power alternated between two dominant parties: the center-left “PASOK” 
(Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and the center-right “Nea Dimokratia” (New Democracy) 
party, with one brief period in 1989 when New Democracy co-governed with the KKE, the 
Communist Party of Greece. Greece has been a member of the European Union (known 
originally as the European Community) since 1981, and a member of the Eurozone since 2002. 
 The time period between the fall of the military junta and the mid-2000s saw tremendous 
economic growth in Greece, perhaps best signified by Greece’s hosting of the Summer Olympic 
Games in 2004. Beginning in 2008, however, Greece experienced a financial crisis of almost 
unprecedented scale. Greece’s economic figures have reached depression-level proportions not 
seen in the West since the Great Depression, with the unemployment rate approaching 30 
percent, gross domestic product reduced by approximately 25 percent, and sharp declines in the 
average income and standard of living of most Greek citizens. The crisis has been accompanied 
by the implementation of strict economic austerity measures which have included reductions in 
wages and pensions, cuts to social services, tax increases, and the imposition of capital controls 
limiting the amount of money which can be withdrawn by depositors at Greek banks. 
 A short background of political events that have taken place in Greece in the past decade 
will help the uninitiated reader understand the breath and depth of the country’s economic and 
political crisis, and the major changes that have occurred in the country’s political landscape. In 
October 2009, after a campaign in which voters were promised that Greece’s finances were in 
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order1, the U.S.-born Giorgos Papandreou, son and grandson of former prime ministers, was 
elected. Within months, and after Greece’s deficit figures were allegedly altered and augmented, 
making Greece’s deficit seem much worse than initially projected.2 This set into motion the 
passage of a first round of strict economic austerity measures in May 2010, as conditions of the 
loans provided as a “bailout” to Greece by the “troika” of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), European Central Bank (ECB), and European Commission. In November 2011 in the 
midst of the deepening economic crisis and under pressure from the European Union and 
Greece’s lenders, Papandreou’s government was replaced, without elections being held, by a 
government led by technocrat Loucas Papademos and a cabinet consisting of representatives 
from PASOK, New Democracy, and LAOS (the Popular Orthodox Rally, a minor right-wing 
party). In early 2012, a “mid-term program” of new and highly unpopular austerity measures was 
approved by Parliament. In May 2012 this was followed by the fall of the Papademos 
government and the declaration of early parliamentary elections. These elections resulted in a 
tremendous shakeup of the electoral map and significant declines for Greece’s previously 
dominant political parties as well as the increased electoral share of many smaller parties, most 
notably SYRIZA (the “Coalition of the Radical Left”). Nevertheless, no party could formulate a 
parliamentary majority or coalition, and follow-up elections were held in June 2012. Out of these 
new elections, a coalition government comprised of New Democracy (majority partner), 
                                               
1 See http://www.ekathimerini.com/215122/article/ekathimerini/news/former-pm-papandreou-stands-accused-of-
making-false-pledges for more. 
2 Refer to interview with professor Zoe Georganta former board member of the Greek Statistical Authority 
(ELSTAT), aired on Dialogos Radio on May 10-16, 2017 and published at 
https://www.mintpressnews.com/whistleblower-greek-debt-crisis-manufactured-unscrupulous-accounting/228076/. 
Original audio available at http://dialogosmedia.org/?page_id=15. Additionally, refer to interview with Nicholas 
Logothetis, former ELSTAT board member, aired on Dialogos Radio on November 8-14, 2017 and published at 
https://www.mintpressnews.com/trials-andreas-georgiou-fraud-drove-greece-austerity/235102/. Original audio 
available at http://dialogosmedia.org/?page_id=15. 
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PASOK, and DIMAR (the “Democratic Left” party) was formulated. This government remained 
in office until December 2014, when it was dissolved after the Parliament’s inability to elect a 
new president of the Hellenic Republic. Parliamentary elections held in January 2015 mirrored 
the results first seen in the European parliamentary elections of May 2014, bringing SYRIZA to 
power in a coalition government with the populist-right “Anexartitoi Ellines” (Independent 
Greeks), which first entered parliament in the May 2012 elections. In July 2015, a snap 
referendum held by the SYRIZA-led government overwhelmingly rejected a new austerity 
package demanded by the European Union. This result of the referendum was nevertheless 
ignored, as an arguably harsher austerity package was approved by the SYRIZA-led government 
in July and August of 2015. Nevertheless, snap parliamentary elections held in September 2015 
brought the SYRIZA-Independent Greeks coalition back to power, amidst increasing electoral 
abstention.3 In May 2017, a fourth set of strict austerity measures was placed before parliament 
by the SYRIZA-led government and ratified. Throughout this period, Greece’s economic crisis 
continued unabated, with salaries and pensions sharply reduced, quality of life plummeting for 
most Greek citizens, a sharp rise in unemployment, and a large “brain wave” of Greeks 
emigrating out of the country.4 
 This same time period large-scale protest and social upheaval in Greece accompanied the 
broad changes in Greece’s electoral landscape. Large protests followed the enactment of the 
initial package of austerity measures in 2010 as part of the loan package the Greek government 
agreed to with its lenders. The summer of 2011 saw the large-scale movement of the 
                                               
3 Greek election results dating back to 1996 can be found at http://ekloges.ypes.gr/. 
4 A wide range of sources exist detailing the Greek economic crisis in further detail, though it is difficult to find one 
all-encompassing source which provides a complete picture of the crisis and its impact on the country. A discussion 
of the economic indicators of the crisis is, however, outside the source of this dissertation. 
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“Indignants,” centered in Syntagma Square in Athens and in major cities and town squares 
throughout the country. Further large protests accompanied the package of a second set of 
austerity proposals in February 2012, and the sudden shutdown of Greek national public 
broadcaster ERT in June 2013. Large demonstrations both for and against a new round of 
austerity proposals from Greece’s European lenders occurred in the days leading up to the 
sudden July 2015 referendum on these very proposals. Since then, protest activity in Greece has 
been sporadic and ephemeral at best, while the economic crisis persists. 
 It could be argued that the severe economic downturn suffered by Greece is an extreme 
case of the financial difficulties and systemic failures experienced throughout much of the 
western world in the past decade. As stated by Purcell (2013: 7), the global economic recession is 
the culmination of political processes which began in the 1970s and 1980s when neoliberal 
doctrine triumphed in the West (via the election of such figures as Ronald Reagan in the United 
States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom) and was imposed in the global south via 
foreign direct investment and undemocratic, unaccountable institutions such as the IMF. 
According to Purcell, the fall of the Berlin Wall further accelerated this neoliberalization process, 
with such policies attaining “common sense” status in the political sphere. It was only when the 
global economic recession began in 2007, following the financial crash which began in the 
United States, that the “neoliberal consensus” began to weaken (Ibid., 8). In response to this 
unprecedented financial crisis, the economic austerity approach which previously had been 
imposed by the world’s wealthiest countries on the countries of the global south began to be 
implemented in countries of the northern hemisphere, making its way to Europe and in 
particular, to countries such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Greece. 
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1.3 – FROM THE ANCIENT GREEK POLIS TO THE “POLIS 2.0” 
 Much has been written about the economic crisis in Greece and throughout much of the 
Western world in previous years. Notably though, the original Greek word “krisis,” in both its 
ancient and modern definitions, contains within it a far more positive connotation, referring to a 
decision (in the judicial sense), and subjective opinion and criticism, or reflection (Siapera et al., 
2015: 451). Following in this logic, in ancient Athens of the fifth century B.C., the citizenry—the 
“demos”—gradually was recognized as the sole legitimate ruling authority in society, from 
which the word “demo-cracy” was derived (Dahl, 1989: 14). The demos would then congregate 
to handle the management of public affairs for the greater good of the “polis,” or what is 
commonly referred to as the city-state, but which largely denotes a specific form of social 
organization (Papacharissi, 2011: 28). Dahlgren (1995: 7) marks this period as the time where 
notions of the public space, or public sphere, were first conceived. 
 It is true, of course, that these spheres were open only to citizens, itself a rather exclusive 
and elitist category during the era in question (Ibid., 12). Nevertheless, these early conceptions of 
the demos and the polis set the standard for the future growth of democracy and development of 
democratic thought. Contogeorgis (2013: 199) points out that prior to the Greek Revolution and 
the birth of the modern Greek state in 1827, Greek society under Ottoman rule continued to be 
organized around the polis, or public, inherited from the Byzantine period. This polis was based 
on historic roots of democratic self-governance, in which the Greek community handled internal 
issues, even of a personal nature, in a communal fashion. Contogeorgis has described this form 
of societal organization as a “cosmosystem.” 
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 If what’s old is new again, this is certainly the case with the concepts of the polis and the 
demos, which helped develop the modern-day conceptualization of the public sphere and the 
related concept of civil society. The same, however, could also be said about new forms of 
communication and their democratizing or revolutionary potential. As Castells (1996: 30-31) 
points out, the characterization of the current information technology “revolution” as a 
phenomenon that is indeed revolutionary, parallels the lofty claims that were made during 
previous technological revolutions. It is therefore no surprise to see modern-day technological 
parallels made to the ancient Greek polis. Papacharissi (2011: 94) refers to the development of 
the modern-day virtual (online) sphere of digital communication as a “mediapolis,” one that is 
not grounded in a specific location but exists virtually and the site where contemporary civic 
activity unfolds. These global networks converge to form what Papacharissi terms a “global 
networked polis” (Ibid., 98), which I would further characterize as the “polis 2.0,” as a result of 
the preeminent role of interactive, digital web 2.0 technologies in this mediapolis. 
1.4 – WHY GREECE? JUSTIFYING COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 
 The protest movement of the “Indignants” in Syntagma Square and in public spaces 
throughout Greece is said to have developed following a Facebook invitation which went “viral,” 
calling upon the populace to peacefully congregate at Syntagma Square and other centrally-
located public spaces throughout Greece, following in the example of the Spanish “Indignados” 
who had launched their movement just a few days prior (Giovanopoulos, 2011b: 42). Notably, 
though, this is not the only instance where social and new media outlets have played a prominent 
role in shaping social and political developments in Greece. From the middle of the previous 
decade, news blogs became a prominent alternative source of news and information for many 
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Greek online users, while a series of demonstrations and protests, such as the massive uprising 
which followed the shooting death of a 15-year-old high school student at the hands of a police 
officer in December 2008, and the protests following the sudden and unprecedented shutdown of 
Greek national public broadcaster ERT by the then-government in June 2013, have prominently 
involved the usage of social and new media tools. 
 It is this phenomenon that I investigate in this research project. Specifically, the aim of 
this research is to examine social and new media outlets, such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and 
other tools and applications (such as online radio), and the contribution of these outlets towards 
the development of a new Greek public sphere (or spheres), the formation of new spaces of 
public discourse in Greek society, and the possible rejuvenation of the public sphere and civil 
society in Greece during a period of intense economic, political, and social crisis. 
 The public sphere and civil society, which will be discussed in upcoming sections of this 
paper, were not selected by accident. The prevailing view found in the existing academic 
literature on these two concepts adopts the position that the public sphere in Greece never had 
developed fully independently of the state, successive governments, or the partisan system 
(Komninou, 2001: 37). Similarly, the established view in the existing literature holds that Greek 
civil society is atrophic, never having developed fully as a result of the clientelism and patronage 
which has been ubiquitous all throughout Greece’s modern history (Kavoulakos & Gritzas, 2015: 
338-339). The point of view commonly found in the existing literature holds that partisan-based 
clientelism and a Greek form of this phenomenon, “diaploki,” are highly prevalent in Greece, 
more so than in most other Western societies. Therefore, the extent to which this is still the case, 
or the degree to which social and new media may have helped influence societal changes which 
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have led to the development of a new public sphere (or spheres) independent of the clientelist 
system, and the possible reinvigoration or redevelopment of Greek civil society, are main areas 
of inquiry of this research project. With the usage of social media and new media, and the 
internet more broadly, having significantly increased in Greece in recent years, in spite of the 
crisis, and in light of the prominent role that such technologies have played in social and protest 
movements during this period, it is useful to examine the impact of these technologies on the 
public sphere and civil society in Greece.  
 In addition to theories of the public sphere and conceptualizations of civil society, this 
research will also be based in part on concepts and theorizations of alternative, radical, 
community, and citizen’s media and of new social movements and the role of technology in these 
movements. For instance, Greece can serve as a comparison case with other countries which 
experienced widespread social and protest movements in the past decade, including Spain (with 
the “Indignados” movement), the United States (“Occupy Wall Street”), several Middle Eastern 
countries which experienced the “Arab Spring,” and countries which have experienced social 
media-inspired “color revolutions,” such as the Ukraine. 
Furthermore, the existing mainstream media environment in Greece is studied to 
determine to what extent social and new media have differentiated themselves from the major 
media outlets, or alternately, have reproduced dominant media narratives. This is significant, as 
Greece’s media system has developed in a different manner from the media systems in most of 
the Western world and has itself been subject to the consequences of the prevalent patron-client 
system. Theoretical research on European media systems, and in particular those of Southern 
Europe and specifically focusing on Greece, will inform this analysis, providing the necessary 
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context which will permit examination of social and new media and the ways in which such 
outlets may signify a break with tradition and differentiate themselves from the mainstream 
media (television, radio, and the press) of Greece. 
 But why Greece? What is it about the country itself that makes it worthy of a scholarly 
examination of the aforementioned topics? There are several reasons. The atrophic development 
of the Greek public sphere and Greek civil society, as mentioned earlier, and the potentially high 
degree of clientelism and partisanship, differentiate Greece from most other European and 
Western countries, which might be said to have more fully developed public spheres and civil 
societies. This relates to another reason: culture, and specifically, the unique case of Greece. As 
described by Vatikiotis (1974: 11): 
Greece is a European country but it comprises a society that in perceptions, values, and 
social and cultural attitudes remains essentially near Eastern and Ottoman. Yet it is not 
Muslim or Turkish. Nor is it Western… it is a Balkan country but not Slavic…  
 
Certainly much has changed in Greece since 1974. At the time, Greece was emerging from the 
seven-year rule of an autocratic military dictatorship and was still seven years away from 
becoming a member of the European Community (today’s European Union). Greece witnessed 
rapid economic development from the 1980s until the 2000s and the onset of the economic crisis, 
and a tremendous process of modernization and indeed westernization. Yet today, it remains 
sharply differentiated in many ways from its Northern and Western European counterparts, while 
sharing more in common with other Southern European democracies such as Italy and Spain (as 
will be seen in the discussion on southern European media systems and the Greek case). Greece 
is located at the cultural and political boundaries of Europe (Clarke et al., 2015: 1), a country 
with little relation to its neighboring Balkan states (Giagkoglou, 2014: 470). At the same time, 
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Greece can also be said, as a European country, to be culturally distinct from the countries of the 
Middle East and the Arab world, including Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Turkey, which saw the rise 
of the “Arab Spring” in the period between 2009 and 2013. Greece is in a category of its own, 
meriting further study. As stated by Alexandros Baltzis (personal communication, February 23, 
2013), an assistant professor in the School of Journalism and Mass Media Studies at the Aristotle 
University of Thessaloniki, Greece is:  
... a good laboratory to see the role of social media in such circumstances…we have seen 
that in the Arab countries, we have seen it in some occasions in Western European 
countries as well, but we have not seen it yet in the Balkans, except for the case of 
[Alexandros] Grigoropoulos (referring to the shooting death of a 15-year-old teenager in 
Athens, sparking major riots in Greece in December 2008). 
 
 Greece’s mainstream media landscape also differs significantly in a multitude of ways, 
when compared to the media landscape of most Western European or North American countries. 
Described by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as a “Polarized Pluralist Model” or “Mediterranean 
Model,” the Greek media landscape is marked by the predominance of television, a weak press, a 
large amount of outlets compared to the size of the media marketplace, and strong interplay 
between media owners, who also possess significant holdings in other sectors of the Greek 
economy, and politicians and political parties on the other hand. 
 Another reason why the Greek case is worthy of further research is the fact that the 
country remains underrepresented and under-researched in the existing academic literature across 
a wide range of topic areas, including media studies, social movements, and the usage of social 
media. There is a general lack of research of Greek and southern European media systems 
(Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 158), and notably the only complete English-language academic 
volume on any topic relating to the Greek media landscape was published in 1993 (Zaharopoulos 
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& Paraschos, 1993). Furthermore, there is also a recognized lack of research on the relationship 
between the crisis in Greece and the media in terms of how the Greek media may have helped 
create conditions that allowed the crisis to develop and also in terms of the coverage by these 
same outlets (Pleios, 2013: 15-17). In addition, a lack of research on specific mediums, such as 
television in Greece, has been identified (Leventakos, 2004: 5). 
 The Greek social media realm is another area which is said to be underrepresented in the 
existing body of academic research. This includes a lack of studies on Twitter usage in Greece in 
any form (Galani, 2013: 47), as well as a dearth of studies on the Greek political blogosphere or 
Greek news blogs (Touri and Kostarella, 2016: 7; Zafiropoulos, 2012: 722). The development of 
civil society in Southern Europe is another field of study that has been identified as being under-
researched (Huliaras, 2015: 16), as is research on clientelism and its relationship to the media in 
Greece (Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 145, 154). Moreover, research focusing on the full range of 
solidarity initiatives in Greece is also underrepresented (Vathakou, 2015: 168), as is research on 
online political participation (Theocharis, 2011: 208). Aspects of Greek protest movements 
themselves are also underrepresented in the body of existing research, including a lack of studies 
specifically about the “Indignants” movement in 2011 (Filippopoulos, 2013: 6) or specifically 
about the social and new media aspects of this movement (Chrisanthakopoulou, 2013: 113; 
Filippopoulos, 2013: 105). Even works by preeminent scholars such as Castells (2012), while 
having focused on the protest movements in countries such as Spain, Egypt, Tunisia, and Iceland, 
in addition to the Occupy Wall Street movement, have made only cursory references to the 
protests of 2011 in Greece (see also Purcell, 2013). This is despite the fact that the “Indignants” 
movement of Greece has been identified as a unique case when compared to the Occupy Wall 
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Street movement or the protests in Spain due to the fact that a concrete set of policy proposals, 
the “Midterm Economic Program,” containing a barrage of new economic austerity measures 
and cuts was being debated by the Greek parliament during the same period that the “Indignants” 
were protesting outside its doors (Sotirakopoulos & Sotiropoulos, 2013: 448). This overall lack 
of research on the Greek case from many standpoints, ranging from social and new media to 
social and protest movements, is another reason why the Greek case warrants further attention. 
 An additional characteristic which made Greece worthy of further study is the fact that, 
despite rapid growth in recent years, the country remains in the lowest ranks of the EU-28 
member-states in terms of the percentage of households and businesses which possess internet 
access, as well as the percentage of its population which use the internet on a daily basis as 
opposed to a less frequent basis. Therefore, examining the influence and impact of online (social 
and new media) tools in a national context where internet usage remains, to an extent, more 
limited than other Western societies, adds another dimension that is worthy of further research 
and examination (Eurostat, 2016; Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2016). 
 Greece can also provide insights as to how social and new media may impact public 
discourse in a country experiencing a severe and protracted economic crisis—some would say 
depression—and in a societal context where there are low levels of trust in major national 
institutions and in the mass media and where there is, at the very least, a perception that the 
public sphere and civil society have developed in a less than robust fashion and where 
clientelism, corruption, and the phenomenon of “diaploki” are highly prevalent. 
 Ultimately though, this study is also important for what answers it can provide in a 
broader context, relevant both to Greece and other societies. How effective can social and new 
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media be in enabling a society to overcome issues of clientelism and entrenched barriers to entry 
in the media landscape? Can issues such as the prevalent interplay of media, business, and 
political/state forces—known in Greece as “diaploki”—be overcome, or is the existing media 
order ultimately replicated as a new, online form of “diaploki”? Is a new public sphere created or 
is the existing public sphere rejuvenated and expanded, and to what extent are such new spaces 
of public discourse free of the pathologies of the incumbent official sphere? Can genuine 
alternatives to existing mainstream media develop and flourish, or will such new outlets 
ultimately be captured and co-opted by the hegemonic media system? Is there room for civil 
society to expand and develop, and how can social and new media help enact such development? 
Finally, to what extent will a potentially new or rejuvenated public sphere and civil society, and 
new alternative media and civil society institutions, attain longevity or remain ephemeral? 
 It bears noting here that I am not a dispassionate observer vis-à-vis Greece and the 
country’s media landscape and political, economic, social, and cultural environment. Since 2010, 
I have covered the ongoing Greek economic crisis and its many political, social, and cultural 
derivatives as a journalist, via the production of a weekly radio program, Dialogos Radio. 
Through this program, I have had the opportunity—and indeed the obligation—to maintain a 
daily connection with the pulse of Greek society and developments within the country. 
Furthermore, I have had the opportunity to perform several hundred interviews with notable 
personalities—both Greek and non-Greek and from both within and outside of Greece—on a 
wide range of topics pertaining to the economy, political developments, social and activist issues, 
and cultural production during a time of crisis. These interviews represented a wide swath of 
ideological backgrounds and positions, and enabled me to develop a stronger understanding of 
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the nature of public discourse in Greece during this period of time. In addition, some of the 
individuals who were interviewed later were incorporated into this study as interview subjects, or 
served as useful native contacts and informants. 
 My work with Dialogos Radio has been accompanied by work in print and online 
journalism, which has included the republication of many of the interviews that were initially 
broadcast, as well as the publishing of a number of journalistic articles and analyses on the Greek 
case, often based on my own knowledge of the country and culture and my experiences on the 
ground in Greece. These articles have been published since 2011 in such outlets as Hellenic 
Insider, Mint Press News, Truthout, The Daily Kos, The Huffington Post, and The Daily Texan, 
in addition to Greece’s Hot Doc Magazine, freepen.gr and toperiodiko.gr. 
 Moreover, my interest in Greece has broadly expanded to its media landscape, which has 
been the subject of a published book chapter on Greek radio from a regulatory, financial, and 
programmatic perspective (Nevradakis, 2012), a published academic paper on Greek satellite 
television and its role in maintenance of cultural ties and an “imagined community” in the Greek 
diasporic community of New York City—where this author was born and raised—published in 
2011, and, since 1997, through the administration and maintenance of a website, 
www.media.net.gr, which serves as an online catalog of Greek broadcast media in Greece, 
Cyprus, and worldwide, in addition to providing a live feed of news relating to Greek media. 
 Finally, growing up in a Greek immigrant household in a heavily Greek community of 
New York City (Astoria, Queens) allowed me to develop a significant degree of cultural capital, 
including native-level fluency in the Greek language, which resulted in my certification as a 
native Greek speaker by the Greek Ministry of Education via examination in 2010. This cultural 
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fluency was bolstered by regular visits to Greece with my family, experience as a volunteer at the 
Athens 2004 Summer Olympics, experience conducting research on the ground in Greece in the 
spring and summer of 2010 for my aforementioned book chapter on the Greek radio landscape, 
and a 2011 visit to Greece for the purpose of conducting pilot interviews for this research project 
and developing local contacts. This latter visit exposed me to the “Indignants” protest movement, 
which I also had the opportunity to cover as a journalist. However, my stay in Greece for the 
purposes of this dissertation project was my first experience residing in the country for an 
extended period of time. 
1.5 – RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
 The objective of this research project is to critically examine the role that social and new 
media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and online radio have played in Greece’s political, 
social, and civil society discourses during the country’s financial crisis. It focuses specifically on 
the time period between 2011 (the year of the large-scale protests of the “Indignants”) and 
August 2017, following over two full years of Greece’s SYRIZA-led coalition government and 
as the economic crisis in the country continued to persist. The public sphere, civil society, and 
social and new media provide the conceptual foundations of this study. Specifically, social and 
new media will be examined with regard to their role in the potential rejuvenation of both the 
Greek public sphere and Greek civil society and their impact and potential differentiation from 
Greece’s mainstream media institutions. The manner in which social and new media have been 
utilized in Greece by individuals and organizations (including political parties, civil society 
initiatives, and alternative media outlets) and their potential contributions to political or social 
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change, such as the formation of social or protest movements, the establishment of new political 
movements, or changes in political behavior is a special concern. 
 This project will be based on longitudinal, multi-year research that I have performed on 
the ground in Greece between September 2012 and August 2017, focusing on the time period 
between May 2011 (when the protest movement of the “Indignants” was launched) and August 
2017. Conceptually, this study will focus on the Greek public sphere and Greek civil society. 
These concepts have been selected in response to the prevailing literature on Greece, which in 
large part suggests that the Greek public sphere and Greek civil society have historically not 
developed as fully as in the countries of Western and Northern Europe, and North America. 
While these two concepts will be defined and examined in more detail in the literature review, 
the “public sphere” conceptually refers to institutions such as political parties and mainstream 
media institutions, while “civil society” conceptually refers to the “third sector” which includes, 
for example, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and volunteerism. These two concepts 
will then be tied in to the accompanying concepts of “clientelism” and “diaploki,” which will 
also be further defined in the literature review. The “public sphere” and “civil society” can then 
be operationalized, for example, in terms of the number of voices participating in public 
discourse or the number of grassroots organization or volunteer initiatives that are in operation, 
and the potential role of social and new media in helping to deliver this change. 
 To accomplish this, the following methodological tools are employed: interviews with 
individuals who have some relation to social and new media in Greece and the Greek public 
sphere or Greek civil society (including journalists and media professionals, bloggers, opinion 
leaders, academics, politicians, and activists), five illustrative examples of focus organizations (a 
 19 
political party, a non-governmental organization, and three distinct media outlets, with interviews 
from multiple representatives of each entity), survey research (conducted across three sample 
populations, including politicians, journalists, and civil society representatives), and historical-
descriptive research of relevant phenomena, including the rise of blogging in Greece and the 
development and operation of the Greek mainstream media.  
The analysis will be foregrounded in a theoretical backdrop which includes literature on 
the public sphere, civil society, clientelism and institutional credibility, social movements, social 
media, alternative media, and mass media in the Greek and Southern European context, to be 
presented in the literature review in chapter 2. This broad literature review will also help us 
understand and navigate how these various threads are connected, and what are the multiple 
potential obstacles—such as corruption, clientelism, patronage, and institutional or regulatory 
factors—which may exist and which may stymie a broader development and flourishing of the 
public sphere, civil society, public discourse, social and political movements, and alternative 
media, while impacting the credibility of incumbent societal institutions, including the 
mainstream press and mass media.. 
 The following central research questions and subquestions will guide this project: 
RQ1: How have social and new media challenged clientelism and diaploki in Greece via 
contributing to the expansion or rejuvenation of the public sphere and civil society in 
Greece during the years of the economic crisis? 
 
RQ2: How do public institutions, as well as civil society, citizen, and activist 
organizations and movements employ social media to engage with the public, to spread 
their message and to organize political or social movements? 
 
SQ1: How have social and new media contributed to political change, changes in 
political behavior, or the formation of new political movements in Greece during 
the crisis? 
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SQ2: How have social and new media been used towards the formation of social 
movements and protest movements in Greece during the crisis? 
RQ3: Do social and new media differentiate themselves from the mainstream media in 
Greece, and if so, how? 
 
SQ3: How have social and new media contributed to the formation and 
development of alternative or community-oriented media outlets in Greece? 
SQ4: Are social and new media in Greece considered to be more credible sources 
of news and information compared to traditional, mainstream media institutions? 
These research questions closely relate to each other, and collectively they cover all of the 
conceptual areas which are being utilized in this research, including the public sphere and civil 
society, social and new media, and alternative and community media. The guiding concept 
behind these research questions is to specifically examine the impact of social and new media on 
Greece’s social and political institutions (including the public sphere, civil society, political 
parties, and the mass media), while also investigating the extent to which social and new media 
have fostered the creation of the (previously lacking) alternative, radical, or community-oriented 
media sector or have ended up replicating the incumbent, hegemonic media system and 
associated “diaploki.” Additionally, the extent to which societal institutions themselves 
(including political parties, the mass media, and civil society organizations) have engaged with 
social and new media tools will also be examined. Finally, because this research project has 
spanned several years during which the economic, political, and social crisis in Greece has 
continued and arguably deepened, one of the research questions that the project will attempt to 
address is what, if anything, has changed during this time and whether the influence and 
prevalence of social and new media tools have increased within this period. 
 Overall, the “master narrative” of this dissertation aims to examine the role and ability of 
social and new media to help a society overcome barriers—institutional and otherwise. Such 
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barriers may prevent broader participation in public discourse, the public sphere, and civil 
society, via the broadening of the space of public deliberation, development of a rejuvenated or 
new public sphere (or spheres) and new civil society organizations, and the development of new 
alternative media outlets. Furthermore, the extent to which this “new” public sphere and these 
new societal institutions may be free of previously-existing pathologies or the possibility that 
they may, in turn, be co-opted or “captured” by the existing hegemonic system will be examined. 
Continuing along this theoretical thread, this dissertation will probe to what extent a new public 
sphere, or multiple or subaltern public spheres, may develop, reflecting a later Habermasian 
notions of communicative action, a radical democratic framework, the “lifeworld” and potential 
development of a “plebian” public sphere, as well as a Gramscian notion of a civil society that is 
a space of contestation via a “war of position” between the hegemonic state apparatus and groups 
and individuals from below, including “organic intellectuals.” In addition, the extent to which a 
pre-existing media framework (such as Greece’s “Polarized Pluralist” or “Mediterranean” model) 
and a culture of “diaploki” ultimately is or is not replicated in this new online space, and the 
extent to which this new space is permanent or ephemeral and remains distinct or is co-opted and 
absorbed by the existing order, will be investigated. Will a potential “Polis 2.0” lead to what 
could be described as “diaploki 2.0,” and to what extent can the Greek case contribute to a wider 
understanding of how social media might impact public discourse in a non-Greek context? 
 Looking ahead, in chapter 2, the review of the relevant literature, the theoretical backdrop 
of this research as described previously, and the topic areas which this project will focus will be 
presented. Chapter 3 will present the methodological approach employed in this study. In chapter 
4, the Greek media landscape, Greek blogosphere, and pre-crisis protest movements will be 
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introduced, providing important contextual information on the media landscape in Greece at 
present and in the years leading up to the economic crisis, as well as societal changes and 
movements in the immediate pre-crisis period which set the stage for events and developments 
which followed. Chapter 5 will focus on social and new media and their impact on the Greek 
public sphere and Greek civil society. In chapter 6 examine social and new media’s influence on 
political and social movements in Greece will be analyzed. Chapter 7 will look at social and new 
media and their impact on Greece’s media landscape. Finally, chapter 8 will analyze the findings 
and conclusions of this research project, including the theoretical implications and broader 
applicability of the findings of this study to our understanding of the public sphere, civil society, 














Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 – INTRODUCTION 
 The literature review will cover a wide range and scope of conceptual and theoretical 
areas. These conceptual and theoretical areas will include the public sphere; civil society; 
literature pertaining to institutional credibility in Greece; literature pertaining to the Greek 
mainstream media landscape; research on alternatives to mainstream media (alternative, 
community and radical media theory, literature on social and new media); and research about 
social movements and protests. In addition to examining some of the most significant literature 
which exists in each of the aforementioned categories from a global context, the literature review 
will also analyze in detail the body of research within these topic areas that pertains specifically 
to Greece, as well as the gaps in the existing literature which this research project will address. 
There are several reasons why such a broad range of prior literature is being examined for the 
purposes of this research project: 
 To define the concepts of the “public sphere” and “civil society” and to present 
the prevailing review in the existing literature, with regard to the development of 
these two concepts in the Greek context. 
 To examine institutional credibility in Greece and the factors which may 
contribute to the lack of a robust public sphere and civil society. The associated 
concepts of “pluralism” and “diaploki” will also be defined. 
 To examine the existing literature on the Greek media landscape, in order to 
ascertain how the operation and development of Greece’s media has been viewed 
and defined by scholars. 
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 To analyze how social movements and protests in Greece have been studied and 
presented in prior scholarship, gaining a sense of the history of such movements 
in Greece, providing a framework for looking at social movements and protests in 
contemporary Greece, and connecting present-day movements to broader 
scholarship on social movements on a global scale. 
 To examine alternatives to mainstream media, to define the concept of 
“alternative media,” and to examine literature on social media and new media, 
including blogs, as potential alternatives to mainstream media. 
 To ascertain gaps in the existing body of research and the extent to which there 
exists or doesn’t exist research in all of the above areas, in relation to Greece. 
 As mentioned previously, the public sphere and civil society comprise two discrete, 
separate, but related categories of study for this research project. The public sphere is viewed as 
the sphere of political and social discourse, at both the individual level (citizens) and the 
institutional level (comprising such institutions as political parties and media outlets). In turn, 
civil society is viewed for the purposes of this study as the “third sector” which straddles the 
boundary between the public and private sectors, encompassing NGOs, citizens’ and social 
movements, and volunteer initiatives. There is certainly some overlap between the public sphere 
and civil society—for instance, social movements can be said to very much be a part of the 
public sphere, though a distinction can be made here between discourse and dialogue which may 
relate to a social media or influence it in some way (which can be viewed as being more 
distinctly a part of the “public sphere” realm), and the actual operations of this movement or 
entity (which could be argued to be more distinctly part of the “civil society” realm). In turn, 
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academia is institutionally part of the public sphere with regard to its role in the exchange and 
dissemination of knowledge and ideas, but can also be viewed as an institution of civil society 
that is not distinctly a part of the public sector or the private sector. For the purposes of this 
research project, “public sphere” and “civil society” relate to two separate, but related, 
categories, with separate bodies of theory and literature. The table below illustrates the 
components of the public sphere and civil society, and the defining characteristics of both in the 
Greek case, leading up to the start of the Greek economic crisis in 2009-2010. 
Table 1: Comparison of the Public Sphere and Civil Society: 
Public Sphere Civil Society 
What comprises it? 
What were its 
characteristics? 
What comprises it? 
What were its 
characteristics? 
 The government 
and state 
 Political parties 
and movements 




 Mass media 
(television, radio, 
the press, online 
media) 







 Low levels of 
institutional trust 
 High degree of 
clientelism 










 High degree of 
political patronage 














 Volunteer groups 




 Consumer groups 
 Private voluntary 
organizations 
 Religious groups 
 Foundations 
 Low levels of 
participation 
 Low levels of 
trust 
 Low levels of 
volunteerism 
 Lack of awareness 
of their existence 
and activities 
 Political 
patronage and ties 
to political parties 
and movements, 
the government, 




The public sphere and civil society will be further examined and defined in the 
subsections which follow. However, the literature review will begin with an examination of 
institutional credibility in Greece and will introduce the concepts of clientelism and “diaploki,” 
as well as their relevance to the Greek case. The background information and literature on 
institutional credibility in Greece will then help guide further discussion and analysis of the 
Greek public sphere and Greek civil society. 
2.2 – INSTITUTIONAL CREDIBILITY, CLIENTELISM, AND DIAPLOKI 
 This subsection will begin with a review of institutional credibility in Greece, present-day 
indicators, and potential factors affecting it. In subsequent subsections, the idea of clientelism 
will be defined and explored, and the relevant literature on the Greek case will be reviewed. 
Finally, the Greek phenomenon of “diaploki” will be defined and relevant literature analyzed. 
2.2.1 – Institutional Credibility 
 A key factor when examining the public sphere, civil society, politics, and the media in 
Greece, particularly during the economic crisis, is institutional credibility. This category hovers 
over many other related categories (public sphere, civil society, the Greek media system, social 
movements, etc.) in Greece, and encompasses both domestic and global components. As the 
literature on institutional credibility and clientelism on Greece in particular will demonstrate, a 
perceived lack of a strong public sphere and strong civil society are related to a perceived lack of 
credibility of national institutions, such as the state, the government, political parties, and the 
mass media. Social and new media, in potentially rejuvenating the public sphere and civil society 
in Greece, might foster conditions which encourage reform, improvement, or the increased 
transparency of these institutions and could also potentially allow citizens to bypass institutional 
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structures which are considered corrupt or untrustworthy. This subsection will examine relevant 
Greek and global literature on institutional credibility and factors which may diminish it, as well 
as literature and research on clientelism, its relevance to the case of Greece, its potential impact 
on the Greek public sphere and Greek civil society, and the Greek phenomenon of “diaploki.”                                                       
 Blumler and Gurevitch highlighted the ways in which traditional systems of political 
communication in the West are being destabilized by societal changes. These factors include 
increased social and cultural heterogeneity, the massive growth in media outlets and generals and 
the erosion of the distinction between journalism and entertainment, the increased number of 
political “professionals” and spin doctors, the weakening of national borders, and increasing 
cynicism and apathy among citizens (2000: 155-172). These views are mirrored by Purcell, who 
identifies the growth of neoliberalism and its “taken-for-grantedness” as factors which led to the 
global recession of 2007 (2013: 4-8). The neoliberal response which followed, particularly in the 
crisis-hit countries of Europe, including Greece, delegitimized the political and economic system 
still further and fueled protest and opposition to the austerity measures being imposed by the 
“Troika” (European Commission, European Central Bank, and the IMF) (Ibid., 8-9). Purcell 
argues that today, democracy has been almost completely absorbed by the liberal-democratic 
state which has formed an alliance with neoliberal capital (Ibid., 29). This development has 
fostered experiments with “autogestation” and self-rule, as seen in the social movements in 
Spain, Greece, the Arab world, and elsewhere, which have attempted to operate based upon the 
principles of “direct democracy” or “true democracy” (Ibid., 116-117). 
Continuing this line of thinking, Mann uses the examples of the Greek and Spanish 
protests of 2011 and the protests outside the state capitol in Madison, Wisconsin during that 
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period, as examples which suggest a common response to current trends in global capitalism. 
This response includes the deep alienation of workers from traditional center-left parties and 
labor organizations who have lent their support to the austerity policies being implemented, and 
new forms of collective action (2012: 182). In the Greek context, Mann highlights the currently 
active “I Don’t Pay” movement and its direct actions of mass civil disobedience, including not 
paying for public services such as subway fares and highway tolls, in protest of poor public 
services and the austerity measures being imposed on society (Ibid., 189). 
 Looking at the Greek case, a useful starting point is a recent survey performed by the 
major Greek polling firm Kapa Research on behalf of the To Vima newspaper. This survey, 
conducted with a sample of 800 individuals nationwide on October 25-26, 2016, found very low 
levels of trust in most societal institutions, with sharp declines almost entirely across the board as 
compared to the same survey conducted in 2003. While the military was ranked as the most 
trusted national institution at 53.5 percent, this represented at 13.5 percent decline from 2003. 
Private businesses were the second most trusted institution, and the only one for which trust 
increased compared to 2003, rising by 18.5 percent during this period. Levels of trust were very 
low for the justice system (36 percent, decline of 20.5 percent since 2003), local government 
(21.5 percent, decline of 44 percent since 2003), the national Parliament (12.5 percent, decline of 
32.5 percent since 2003), the national government (11.5 percent, decline of 26.5% since 2003), 
and political parties (4.5 percent, decline of 44 percent since 2003) (Kapa Research, 2016: 6). 
Furthermore, in the Kapa Research study, even lower levels of trust were detected 
amongst respondents who stated that they would not vote or probably would not vote in the next 
national elections, as compared to those who stated that they would vote or probably would vote. 
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Only 2 percent of probable non-voters trusted the national government and parliament (compared 
to 15.5 and 17 percent for probable voters), 3 percent trusted trade unions (versus to 6.5 percent 
of likely voters), 13 percent trusted local government (as compared to 25 percent of likely 
voters), and 18.5 percent trusted the justice system (versus 43.5 percent of probable voters) 
(Ibid., 7). Among those who stated that they will not or likely will not vote in the next national 
electoral contest, 58 percent cited as a determining factor a feeling that their beliefs were not 
reflected by any political party, 40 percent cited corruption in public life as a determinant, 35.5 
percent did not feel that they were represented by current political leaders, 24.5 percent stated 
that they would not vote as a protest against the economic austerity measures and memorandum 
agreements that have been ratified, and 15 percent stated, as a determining factor in their 
likelihood not to vote, that the political parties are too similar to each other (Ibid., 5). 
Similarly low levels of institutional credibility can be ascertained from the results of 
Gallup International’s end-of-year survey for 2014. Out of a nationwide sample of 1,000 
respondents, 62 percent did not consider elections in Greece to be free and fair, and 73 percent 
fully or somewhat disagreed with the statement “Greece is ruled by the will of the people.” In 
addition, 58 percent of respondents stated they distrusted judges, 91 percent distrusted 
politicians, 95 percent distrusted journalists, 74 percent distrusted businesspeople, 51 percent 
distrusted the police, 88 percent distrusted bankers, and 72 percent distrusted religious leaders, 
while the military enjoyed the trust of 55 percent of respondents (Gallup International, 2015). 
Similar results were also shown in the “Government at a Glance 2017” factsheet for 
Greece, prepared by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
According to the OECD’s figures, merely 13 percent of Greek citizens expressed confidence in 
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the national government, compared to an OECD average of 42 percent. Confidence in the 
judicial system was measured at 42 percent (compared to an average of 55 percent), and was at 
44 percent for the education system (versus an OECD average of 67 percent), and 69 percent for 
the police (compared to 77 percent, on average, in the OECD). Just 26.0 percent of citizens used 
online e-government applications to file paperwork with public authorities via their websites in 
2016, compared to a 35.6 percent average across OECD member-states (2017: 1-4). 
Providing further insights specifically into the opinions and perceptions of Greece’s 
youth was a survey conducted by the “DiaNEOsis” think tank in conjunction with polling firm 
MRB between September and November 2016. The nationwide sample consisted of 1,538 young 
adults aged 18-35, as well as 500 parental figures of these young adults. The results generally 
showed low levels of institutional trust amongst the youth—lower than among their parents. For 
example, 75.5 percent of youth responded that they somewhat or fully disagreed with the 
statement “the political system provides the opportunity to individuals like myself to have a say 
in the government’s actions,” while only 10.3 percent of youth respondents stated that they 
agreed with the statement “politicians care about what people like me think about.” These 
percentages tended to decline as the educational level of respondents increased. When asked to 
rank their level of trust in the following societal institutions, with 0 representing total distrust and 
10 representing full trustworthiness, the Greek parliament earned a ranking of 1.6 (2.3 among 
parents), the political system earned a 1.1 (1.5 from parents), the mass media was ranked at 1.7 
(3.1 among parents), the police were ranked at 4.1 (6.0 among parents), the justice system earned 
a 3.8 ranking (5.1 among parents), the European Union was ranked 2.7 (3.5 among parents), 
while the church earned a ranking of 2.9 (5.1 among parents). Only 18.9 percent of youth polled 
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stated that they reached out to an elected or government official (as did 21.0 percent of parents), 
6.5 percent stated that they worked for a political party or movement (as opposed to 2.6 percent 
of parents polled), while a mere 10.2 percent provided monetary donations to a political cause or 
movement (compared with 4.2 percent of parents polled) (2017: 11, 30, 43, 50). 
From a scholarly perspective, Contogeorgis extensively references issues pertaining to 
the credibility of the Greek state and the domestic political system. Writing that it operates as an 
“oligarchic gang” which excludes society, he describes the system as an “elected monarchy” 
(2013: 58-59, 246) and “partyocracy” (2012: 55). He writes, for instance, that Greek civil society 
was not consulted with the austerity (memorandum) agreements agreed to by successive 
governments, which Contogeorgis argues are delegitimized as a result (2013: 124). The rapid 
electoral rise of the far-right Golden Dawn party serves as a further example of the credibility 
crisis and the reactions of the Greek citizenry, as ordinary citizens felt they tried all other options, 
including protesting on the streets, in other to improve the political system (Ibid.: 162). 
Meanwhile, the political rhetoric of all of the political parties is, according to Contogeorgis, 
identical, further fueling the credibility crisis (2012: 57). Instead of change, politicians have 
attempted to shift blame onto the populace through public statements such as “we ate it all 
together,” increasing voter disgust still further (Ibid., 65-66). A final factor which Contogeorgis 
highlights is the parliamentary immunity law and system of parliamentary “self-investigation” 
for alleged wrongdoings, which he states is unparalleled elsewhere in the world and which has 
insulated Greece’s political class from any accountability for its actions (Ibid., 58-59). Together, 
these factors help explain the low levels of institutional credibility observed in Greece, while this 
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lack of credibility may lead people to seek out new or alternative political movements, social 
causes, and sources of news and information. 
 Danopoulos continues Contogeorgis’ line of thinking, writing that despite the appearance 
of many and varied vehicles for combating corruption and increasing accountability and 
transparency, the accountability of the Greek state remains at a low level compared to the 
countries of Western Europe and even some former Warsaw Pact countries (2015: 112). He 
highlights the lack of effective penalties for politicians who violated the law and the tremendous 
level of immunity afforded to government ministers and members of parliament, a level of 
protection which all parliamentary political parties wholeheartedly support (Ibid., 117, 121). 
These factors combine to foster an environment where the citizenry lacks any faith in the 
accountability of the political system. This last point is highlighted by Jones et al., who point out 
that while prior to the crisis (2008), the Greek public maintained the highest level of institutional 
trust in the EU, this has been reversed following the onset of the crisis, with a sharp decline in 
institutional trust towards both the national Parliament and EU institutions. Conversely, social 
trust, which pre-2008 was ranked lowest in the EU, has demonstrated an upward trend over the 
past decade (2015: 33-34). This result indicates a potential rejuvenation of the Greek civil society 
and efforts on the part of the populace to form new institutions and movements. 
 The decline in faith in the political system is further demonstrated in two articles which 
together report upon the results of two identical studies, performed in 1988 and 2005. The 2005 
study shows a significant increase in voter cynicism and mistrust, and in parallel, a sharp decline 
in ideological identification and overall political interest as compared to 1988, plus a sharp 
decline in press usage (Diakoumakos, 2009: 96-103; Kakepaki, 2006: 115-121). However, 
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Diakoumakos points out that those who reported an interest in politics in 2005 reported an 
interest at deeper levels compared to the 1988 panels, with lower levels of self-interest and 
clientelistic motives, and a sharply increased understanding of their role as citizens 
(Diakoumakos, 2009: 104-111, 115, 119-120). Furthermore, those displaying disinterest in 
politics were targeting it towards the existing political system while still maintaining a high level 
of interest in politics overall (Ibid., 92). This demonstrates a sentiment which questions the 
credibility and legitimacy of the domestic political system, a result further displayed by some of 
the respondents of the 2005 panel who attributed the lack of credibility of the domestic political 
system to the fact that much policy-making is now performed outside the country by the EU 
(Ibid., 113). Notably, the 2005 panel was organized three years before the onset of the Greek 
economic crisis in earnest, indicating that such sentiments have likely deepened since then. 
 Pantazidou argues that the Greek political system lost much of its legitimacy in the 
aftermath of the widespread December 2008 protests which occurred following the shooting 
death of 15-year old Alexandros Grigoropoulos by a police officer. In response to this incident, 
the Greek government responded with further cynicism, abandoning any effort at attaining social 
consensus, instead imposing measures which successive governments have since admitted are 
unjust while subsequently utilizing police repression and scare tactics to obtain compliance. 
Pantazidou adds that this situation has been referred to as a “meta-democracy” (2013: 762). 
 Highlighting this point, Pappas and O’Malley compared civil compliance in Greece and 
Ireland, two countries which simultaneously experienced very similar economic crises. The 
authors found that Greek and Irish societies reacted in highly different ways to the onset of the 
crisis, a difference which is attributed to the Greek state’s inability to continue providing basic 
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public goods as well as privileges and economic rents to beneficiaries of state clientelism. This is 
in contrast to the Irish case, where the state was able to continue providing services despite 
declining average incomes (2014: 1595). Declining trust in public institutions and a search for 
alternatives is therefore a more likely outcome in Greece, as compared to Ireland. 
 Much research has focused on crisis narratives in the Greek mass media, particularly the 
press and television. Mylonas, in an analysis of coverage of the crisis by the English-language 
eKathimerini daily, found that the newspaper reproduced the hegemonic definitions of the crisis 
in various ways, including interviews with authoritative public intellectuals who favored the 
austerity policies and who moralistically laid the blame for the crisis on the deficiencies of Greek 
society, and through the usage of stereotypes, which were often presented as facts; the narrative 
employed by the newspaper suggested that there was no other solution for Greece (2014: 308-
316). Leandros et al., in a similar study which examined two major daily newspapers, found a 
similar tendency to naturalize and legitimize the economic austerity policies being implemented, 
while emphasizing the “necessity” of such policies for “saving” Greece despite the “high cost” 
(2011: 249-252). Doudaki further highlighted this tendency in a study of the discursive 
mechanisms employed by the Greek press in its coverage of the crisis. She identified two 
primary methods used by the media to accomplish this objective, including naturalization (where 
the austerity policies were portrayed as inevitable, with no available alternatives), and 
objectivation (where specific ideologies were portrayed as real and objective facts) (Doudaki, 
2015: 5-10). This was further mirrored in a study of crisis coverage in the Greek press by Pleios, 
finding that the Greek press largely adopted elite neoliberal views (2013b: 113-117). In their 
study of topics covered on Greek television newscasts, Papathanassopoulos et al. found, that 
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societal groups who were most likely to be impacted by the austerity policies were usually not 
mentioned at all (2014: 99). Together, these studies highlight factors that may contribute to 
reduced media credibility during Greece’s economic crisis, as do the studies which follow. 
 In a 16-day sample of 107 main evening television newscasts from 2005 performed by 
Kenterelidou which tested for “infoganda” methods, she found that only one-tenth of the 
newscasts did not contain any stories or reporting which could be classified as “infoganda” 
(defined by the author as the constant repetition of specific political positions and messages 
within news items) (2014: 124-125, 132). Papathanassopoulos argues that the Greek clientelist 
system is a key factor in diminishing media credibility, including television’s “watchdog role” 
(2004: 166). The overall quality and content of newscasts, accordingly, has come into question, 
as evidenced by a content analysis of 1,015 television news reports from 2005 conducted by 
Kenterelidou and Doulkeri. They found that 46 percent of the content of the televised newscasts 
studied could be classified as commentary instead of news, with an almost even split in the time 
devoted to news reporting versus commentary for each specific story, and with the commentary 
frequently airing before the reporting of the “hard” news story (2011: 198-199). A similar content 
analysis analyzing main evening newscasts on major television stations from 2008, found that 38 
percent of their content could be classified as commentary (Pleios, 2009: 254). 
 In a 10-year study of audience reactions to television newscasts in Greece, Maniou found 
a high percentage of disgust with news programming, and in particular with the opinionated 
“panel discussions” which are a prominent feature of Greek television newscasts, with a steady 
decline in the reported credibility of television since 1997 and an increasing number of 
respondents stating that watching newscasts on television would be a “waste of time” (2014: 
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150, 157-161, 167-169). Samaras and Papathanassopoulos, in an content analysis of two weeks’ 
worth of television newscasts on three major stations during the pre-election period of 2004, 
found that 77 percent of the exchanges on a sample of televised “panel discussions” on 
newscasts consisted of personal and partisan attacks, while panelists were rarely non-journalists 
or non-politicians and almost never ordinary citizens (2005: 61, 66-67, 75-76). A content analysis 
of 228 newscasts from the five top-rated television stations during a four month period in 2001-
2002 by Demertzis et al. found that television newscasts have eschewed their role in providing 
coverage of parliamentary proceedings, providing limited amounts of coverage (2005: 42-46). 
 An additional indicator demonstrating of the credibility crisis in Greece comes from 
recent surveys of media usage and news consumption. In the 2016 Reuters Institute report on 
digital news consumption, based on YouGov survey data gathered in early 2016 from 26 
countries, including Greece (based on a sample of 2,036 individuals), a number of significant 
findings are revealed. 66 percent of respondents stated a strong or very strong interest in current 
events, 56 percent read news online more than once per day while an additional 30 percent read 
online news once daily, 55 percent discovered news stories via social media while 44 percent 
directly visited news websites, 72 percent accessed online news via personal computers and 63 
percent via smartphones and tablets (Kalogeropoulos et al, 2016: 16-19, 23). Regarding media 
use practices, news websites and apps were most commonly cited as the respondents’ main 
source of news (34 percent), followed by social networking sites at 27 percent, while 
conventional media forms such as television (21 percent), the press (5 percent), and radio (3 
percent) ranked lower. Notably, 8 percent of respondents cited blogs as their most commonly-
favored news source (Ibid., 24-25). In terms of social media usage, Facebook was the most 
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commonly used tool (80 percent) and most commonly used social medium for news (68 percent), 
with YouTube finishing at 75 percent and 34 percent for these two measures, and Twitter at 25 
percent and 14 percent (Ibid., 26). Significantly, Greeks were the third most active users of news 
content online (defined as sharing news items via social media or on a blog, voting in online 
surveys, or “liking” or commenting on stories) at 73 percent, behind Turkey at 81 percent and 
Brazil at 80 percent, and ahead of countries such as the United States (56 percent) and the United 
Kingdom (39 percent), with 48 percent of Greek users sharing news online, 48 percent in face-
to-face conversations, 38 percent leaving online comments, and 25 percent discussing news 
online with friends (Ibid., 28). Greece was the country with the highest usage of online-only 
news websites in the sample (85 percent), the highest level of consumption of “hard” news 
stories online (81 percent) and the lowest level of consumption of “lifestyle” news (10 percent) 
(Ibid., 39, 45). Notably, Greece was also the country with the lowest levels of trust in mainstream 
news media and journalism across the 26 countries surveyed. Only 20 percent of respondents in 
Greece said that they trusted the news media, 16 percent stated that they trust the mass media in 
general, 11 percent trusted journalists, 7 percent of respondents felt that the news media were 
independent of undue political influence, and 5 percent believed that the news media were free of 
undue economic influence (Ibid., 35-36). The 18-24 age bracket demonstrated the lowest levels 
of trust in the news media (15 percent), but the figure was not much higher for the most trusting 
age group, ages 55 and over, at 23 percent (Ibid., 37). One final notable finding is that a news 
blog, tro-ma-kti-ko.blogspot.com (a spinoff of the popular blog Troktiko, mentioned later in the 
literature review), was included among the top ten most visited news websites (Ibid., 43). 
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 Similarly, in Eurobarometer’s 2015 survey, conducted across the European Union, Greece 
had the lowest level of trust in the EU for radio (37 percent), television (20 percent), third-lowest 
trust in the press (32 percent), and fifth lowest trust in the media overall (49 percent with low or 
no trust). Greece’s overall level of trust in the media, as measured by the Eurobarometer 
statistics, stems from the higher average levels of trust of the Greek public for the internet and 
social media, as compared to television, radio, and the press (Eurobarometer, 2015). Finally, low 
levels of trust in the mass media as an institution were also reflected in the aforementioned 
nationwide Kapa Research survey, conducted in October 2016. Only 6.5 percent of respondents 
stated that they trusted the mass media, representing a decline of 22 percent since 2003, with 
only 3 percent of likely non-voters in the next national parliamentary election stating that they 
trusted the mass media, and 8 percent of likely voters (Kapa Research, 2016: 6). 
2.2.2 – Clientelism and Diaploki 
 A systemic and cultural factor closely related to institutional credibility is clientelism. 
Much of the existing literature highlights the long history and tradition of clientelism in Greece, 
as well as the prevalence of a related phenomenon, “diaploki,” both of which will be defined. 
 Clientelism is defined as follows: 
…a personalized and reciprocal relationship between an inferior and a superior, 
commanding unequal resources; moreover, in contrast with the ‘ideal type’ of 
bureaucratic relationship, the norms of rationality, anonymity, and universalism are 
largely absent from the patron-client nexus. (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972: 151) 
 
“Diaploki” could then be said to be the media-centric version of clientelism. It is defined as the 
“interplay between media owners and politicians...that determines who will influence public 
opinion and apply pressure in the political arena” (Sims, 2003: 203). This interplay is highly 
evident in the Greek media landscape, and is an attribute of the “Mediterranean” or “Polarized 
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Pluralist” model developed by Hallin and Mancini. According to Hallin and Mancini, the 
traditional centrality of the state in Southern Europe has resulted in the relatively frequent 
intervention of the state in media institutions—but also, the reverse as well. Since the state is 
such an important actor in the economy, the media becomes a battleground for influence, and for 
preferential access to state contracts, subsidies, relaxed regulations, and other benefits (2004: 
134-135). This situation is the result of the delayed development of liberal, market institutions in 
Southern Europe and the resulting importance of patronage and personal relationships, where 
access to information is treated as a private good and not shared publicly (Ibid., 135-137). 
 This situation is perhaps best articulated in a common threat that was said to be 
traditionally used by newspaper publishers in their dealings with the government: “Give me a 
ministry or I will publish a newspaper!” (Papathanassopoulos, 1999: 381; Papathanassopoulos, 
2004: 59). Papatheodorou and Machin, in their examination of the intimacy between the political 
and media elite in Greece and Spain, describe this relationship as “the umbilical cord that was 
never cut” (2003), mirroring previously-seen historical explanations regarding the weakness of 
domestic civil society, the historical lack of a mass-circulation press, and a system of state 
subsidies for the press, which resulted in preferential treatment (and frequent secret dealings) for 
publications favorable towards the government of the day (2003: 34-37). Indeed, the press 
subsidy system remains commonplace in Greece, with no clear law regarding the allocation of 
funding and state advertising (Pleios & Papathanassopoulos, 2008: 56; Tsene, 2012: 61). One 
final form of subsidy for the mass media in general is mentioned by Tsene, who brings up the 
cozy relationship that media outlets have, at times, developed with advertisers, which has 
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impacted their coverage, as highlighted by the relationship of the now-defunct national television 
broadcaster Alter Channel with Greece’s milk cartel (Tsene, 2012: 63). 
 Contogeorgis, in turn, indicates that clientelist politics—within and beyond the media 
realm—serve the interest of party loyalists and specific interest groups, instead of targeting the 
society as whole. He describes the clientelist system in Greece as one that has existed since the 
earliest days of the modern Greek state and a phenomenon which is the norm, not the exception, 
at the present time and a defining feature of the relationship between politics and society (2013: 
55-56, 85). Danopoulos names clientelism as the major contributor in Greece’s current crisis and 
the country’s inability to recover from it, the result of a dysfunctional, corrupt, and chaotic 
bureaucratic apparatus and a political system which lacks any accountability (2015: 111-125). 
 In sum, the above review of literature pertaining to institutional credibility, clientelism, 
and diaploki illustrates the many and varied factors which may contribute to a lack of trust in 
public institutions and the media in Greece, and a further decline in levels of trust during the 
years of the Greek economic crisis. These low levels of trust in the media and in public and 
societal institutions may, in turn, result in alternatives to these public institutions and media 
outlets being sought out (or developed) by members of the general public. 
2.3 – THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 In this section, my review of the existing literature on the public sphere—both pertaining 
to Greece and to a global context—will briefly examine the development of the idea of the 
“public sphere” over time, as well as the historical development of the public sphere in the Greek 
context and trends that are relevant to our study of the public sphere in Greece. Furthermore, a 
 41 
definition of the public sphere which will guide the research will be developed and presented, 
and gaps in the existing body of research, particularly in the case of Greece, will be identified. 
2.3.1 – Public Sphere Theory 
 The present-day conceptualization of the public sphere has traditionally been associated 
with the writings of Jürgen Habermas. Accor ding to Habermas (1989: 27), the public sphere 
emerged in Western Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries as a means for bourgeois society to 
articulate its economic interests and to assert its political autonomy from the state. It is the forum 
in which private individuals engage in rational-critical debate to address issues of public concern, 
in a self-organized, rational, and civil fashion. As further described by Dahlgren  
(1995: 7), the public sphere is the realm of social life where the exchange of information, and 
views on questions of common concern can take place in order for public opinion to be formed. 
This public sphere “occurs” when citizens, exercising their rights of assembly and association, 
gather as public bodies to discuss issues of concern, particularly of a political nature. Still 
another definition of the public sphere, based on the Habermasian conceptualization of the term, 
comes from Curran (1991: 29), who writes that in classical liberal theory, the public sphere is 
defined as the space between government and society, in which private individuals exercise 
formal (through elections) and informal (through public opinion) control over the state. 
 According to Habermas, the public sphere was a space of private autonomy that stood 
opposite from the state (1962/1989: 12), a space which provoked the critical judgment of a 
public through the use of reason (Ibid., 24). It was a space separate from the private, intimate, 
domestic sphere of family and ordinary life whilst also being detached from the state (Ibid., 28, 
48). It was comprised of members of the bourgeois; privatized individuals who were owners of 
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goods and who were the patriarchal heads of their households, who emerged from their private, 
intimate sphere to participate in the public sphere (Ibid., p. 48, 55). Initially, it was borne as a 
literary public sphere of the arts and letters, where issues of cultural interest were discussed in 
public spaces such as salons and coffeehouses (Ibid., p. 29, 50). It was out of these literary public 
spheres that discussion about trade and other “public” matters of concern began to emerge. In 
Habermas’ formulation, the bourgeois public sphere institutionalized the practice of rational-
critical discourse on political matters, undistorted by particular interests (Ibid., 27). 
 Notably this conception of the public sphere was eventually undermined. His ideas 
foresaw a strict separation of the public and private realms, but the two realms began to blur as 
private organizations began to increasingly assume public roles, while the state and public 
institutions began to encroach upon the private sphere, as was the case with the development of 
the welfare state (Ibid., 175-176). According to Habermas, society becomes refeudalized, and 
inequalities cease to be “bracketed” (Ibid.). In his vision, rational-critical debate was supplanted 
by consumption and the messages transmitted by the newly-developed mass media (Ibid., 161, 
171). The mass media, in Habermas’ view, created a “secondary realm of intimacy,” and through 
their messages, began to impact public opinion and to engineer “consent” in society, leading to 
the formation of a false consciousness amongst the public, who were now consumers of content 
and messages, instead of operating in the role of citizen (Ibid., 172, 194-195).  
 Looking at modern-day societies, Habermas later moved away from the possibility of 
creating a unified, institutional public sphere, instead focusing his attention on the potential of 
“communicative action” to “bring into the open the rational potential intrinsic in everyday 
communication practices” (Habermas, 1992: 442-444). This would occur within a radical 
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democratic framework which would seek to protect what he calls the “lifeworld,” or realm of 
personal relationships in society, from the “system” (based on the ever-pervasive, all-powerful 
media) (Calhoun, 1992: 30). He views present-day societal struggles as occurring in what he 
calls the “political public sphere,” between the “communicative generation of legitimate power” 
on the one hand, and the manipulative deployment of media power with the goal of securing 
mass loyalty, consumer demand, and public compliance. Out of this struggle, and the 
communicative action which results, the “rationalization of the lifeworld” arises (Habermas, 
1992: 452-453). Notably, in his later conceptualization of the public sphere, and in response to 
the many criticisms his original theory received, Habermas opens the door to the possibility of 
the existence of multiple public spheres—namely, a “plebian public sphere” consisting of the 
culture of the common people—instead of a single and all-encompassing public sphere (Ibid., 
426-430). While Habermas’ original definition of the public sphere provides a starting point for 
understanding the existence of a sphere of public discourse in which public institutions are 
located, his later revisions bring media institutions into the picture. This is particularly useful to 
this study and to the examination of the Greek media’s role in development of the Greek public 
sphere, and the role potentially played in contemporary times by social and new media. 
 Habermas’ original conceptualization of the public sphere did indeed draw numerous 
criticisms, and resulted in the formation of new theoretical constructions of the public sphere. 
Fraser (1992: 122-124) harshly critiqued the “idealized” liberal public sphere of Habermas, 
arguing that difference, in reality, was never “bracketed,” and that social groups which were 
excluded from the hegemonic public sphere formed a plurality of competing public spheres. 
These “subaltern counterpublics” exist in a contested relationship with the dominant publics 
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(Ibid., 128). Fraser further disputes Habermas’ strict separation of the public and private spheres, 
arguing that the issues which count as matters of common concern are decided through a process 
of “discursive contestation” (Ibid., 129). More critiques of Habermas’ original conceptualization 
of the public sphere come from scholars such as Benhabib, who argues in favor of the existence 
of multiple public spheres which can come into existence at any time and which can exist 
autonomously (1992: 87), and Eley (1992: 319), who points out Habermas’ omission of issues 
relating to the nation-state. These alternative formulations of the public sphere are relevant to this 
study. For instance, Frasers’ conceptualization of “subaltern counterpublics” and Benhabib’s 
conceptualization of multiple public spheres serve as a useful tool for potentially understanding 
those elements of the Greek populace who are dissatisfied and distrustful of official public 
institutions and mainstream mass media, in terms of potentially acting as a “counterpublic” to 
Greece’s hegemonic public sphere. Eley’s emphasis on the role of the nation-state, in turn, helps 
anchor this study’s own look at the specific case of the public sphere of Greece in particular. 
 More recently, several scholars have looked at the idea of the public sphere in an online 
context. These examinations are useful to this study’s examination of the role of online tools, 
such as social media and other forms of new media, on the Greek public sphere. Dahlgren first 
defines the public sphere as a “constellation of communicative spaces” which “permit the 
circulation of information, ideas, debates—ideally in an unfettered manner—and also the 
formation of political will (i.e., public opinion)” (Dahlgren, 2005: 147-148). These are spaces 
where, according to Dahlgren, the mass media and new, interactive media maintain a prominent 
presence and “facilitate communicative links between citizens and the power holders of society” 
(Ibid.). Dahlgren writes that the public sphere consists of three constitutive dimensions: the 
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structural dimension (formal institutional features such as media organizations and legal 
frameworks and constraints on communication), the representational dimension (media output), 
and the dimension of interaction (citizens talking with each other) (Ibid., 149). Specifically 
regarding the internet, Dahlgren channels the formulation put forth by scholars such as Fraser 
and Benhabib that the idea of a single, integrated public sphere is outdated in light of the realities 
of modern-day society (Ibid., 152). Dahlgren argues that we must take into account “specialized 
communicative spaces,” or “alternative or counter public spheres,” noting that it is here where 
the Internet makes its most obvious contribution to the public sphere (Ibid.). Bennett adopts a 
similar view in his conceptualization of the impact of the internet on the public sphere, stating: 
The public spheres created by the Internet and the Web are more than just parallel 
information universes that exist independently of the traditional mass media…[n]ew 
media provide alternative communication spaces in which information can develop and 
circulate widely with fewer conventions or editorial filters than in the mainstream media. 
(Bennett, 2003: 161) 
 
 Finally, Papacharissi (2011: 131-137), in her own look at the relationship between the 
internet and the public sphere, adopts a different theory. She argues that the internet has created a 
private, virtual sphere, one where the citizen is “alone, but not isolated,” entering the public 
spectrum on his/her own terms, performing atomized actions with the self as the primary point of 
reference, and continuously (re-)negotiating his or her privacy within this space. Papacharissi 
describes this new phenomenon as “mobile privatization,” with the internet serving as a new 
hybrid public-private commercial space (Ibid., 123-128, 133). 
2.3.2 – The Public Sphere in Greece and Public Involvement 
 One of the traditional social spaces of (masculine) Greek society was the kafeneio, or 
coffee house (Zaharopoulos & Paraschos, 1993: 5), even if it is declining in popularity and 
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number. It was the meeting point of the men of the village, town, or urban neighborhood where 
the issues of the day ranging from politics to the economy to sports would be discussed. In some 
ways, the kafeneio bears resemblance to Habermas’ idealized liberal public sphere, with its own 
coffeehouse culture and gendered nature, although the kafeneio was much more akin to a 
“plebian public sphere,” the domain of the common man, than to the literary public sphere which 
Habermas detected within the realm of early bourgeois society. 
 Nevertheless, the kafeneio and similar spaces continue to play a role in Greek society 
today. Sotiropoulos (2004: 148) references the kafeneio as one of the spaces of the informal 
public sphere in Greece. Bresta (2011: 92) refers to the traditional landscape of cities, towns, and 
villages in Greece, each of which has a central square, or plateia, which has traditionally served 
as a gathering place and site of socialization and has been the home of the local kafeneio. The 
role of the plateia as a central gathering point for political activity is evident in the protest 
movement of the “Indignants” in 2011. The kafeneio and the plateia could therefore be said to 
have served as venues which provided a “voice to the voiceless” through the years in Greece. 
 Urban space was also the subject of a study by Arampatzi and Nicholls, who focused on 
the neighborhoods of Athens as a “strategic site for producing radical subjects and 
subjectivities.” This process due to three factors identified by the authors: a reduced ability of the 
state to co-opt resistance to neoliberal politics, the formation of localized mobilizations and 
development of stronger ties and interactions amongst citizens of the same common lived space, 
and the development of broader ties, as some individuals from each community maintained 
relations with activists in other neighborhoods, cities, and regions, converting local movements 
into national protests. This process enabled the development of trust and solidarity, and the 
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formation of common interests and mobilization frames (2012: 2591-2592). Karaliotas, again 
using the “Indignants” protest movement as an example, highlights the role of squares—such as 
Syntagma Square—as a “political space in which the protesters enacted direct democratic 
practices and performatively traced new ways of being, saying and acting in common,” and as a 
space of friction between nationalist and “emancipatory” elements, as well as a hybrid site of 
horizontal (“leaderless”) and vertical (with the Athens protest serving as the primary node in the 
national movement of the “Indignants”) organizational practices (2017: 54-55). 
 Despite the prominence of public space in Greek society which is exemplified by the 
central square or plateia as a site of gathering, debate, political activity, and protest, multiple 
scholars argue that this has not been enough to foster a healthy and robust public sphere in 
Greece, fully independent of the state and leading societal institutions. As will be seen in the later 
sections on civil society and on clientelism and “diaploki,” this is a product of the historical 
development of the modern Greek state,. Contogeorgis (2013: 48) argues that Greece’s 
longstanding partisan system, instead of playing a mediating role in Greek society, has instead 
taken ownership of the political system and transformed public discourse into private discourse. 
He further argues that Greece’s public intellectuals, via their rhetoric, end up reproducing the 
hegemonic discourse of the state and legitimizing its actions, including the decisions of recent 
governments to enforce harsh austerity measures (Contogeorgis 2012: 53). Contogeorgis 
describes these intellectuals as “organic legitimizers” of the existing system (Ibid., 237-238). 
 Komninou, in her examination of the historical development of the public sphere, argues 
that the public sphere in Greece did play an important role in nation-building for the nascent 
Greek state, but developed in parallel with the country’s clientelist system, adding that the 
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attempt to graft rational discourse and Enlightenment ideals to a pre-capitalist, pre-industrial, 
agrarian society with a weak economy was doomed to fail (2001: 37-38). Over the course of 
Greece’s history, numerous counter-spheres have developed, always in response and opposition 
to the often authoritarian hegemonic public sphere (for instance, during the Greek civil war of 
1947-1949 and the military junta of 1967-1974 (Ibid., 62-64, 117-125). Indeed, Komninou 
argues that there was not one single counter public sphere but several, based on gender, civil war 
divisions, regional differences; and ideological affiliation during the years of military rule (Ibid.). 
Following the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1974, a new counter sphere with a 
“European orientation” developed, leading up to Greece’s ascension to the European Community 
(now EU) in 1981. However, with the re-emergence of the partisan system, and later with the 
commercialization and privatization of the mass media system, the public sphere was in large 
part commandeered by the political party system (Ibid., 136-140, 155, 176-179). Nevertheless, 
the Greek public sphere, in Komninou’s view, did manage to grow and develop during this time, 
to a level approaching that of Greece’s Western European counterparts (Ibid., 194-195). 
 Certain scholars argue that the advent of private radio and television broadcasting and 
deregulation of the airwaves allowed, at least in limited form, an oppositional public sphere to 
flourish in Greece for the first time. Vamvakas (2006: 109-110) argues that the post-junta public 
sphere was the first time that the opposition had access to the public sphere in Greece, via the 
(still state-controlled) airwaves. Rigou (2010: 50) argues that the epoch of “free radio” in the late 
1980s, when private broadcasting was legally permitted for the first time in Greece, was the first 
time that an oppositional public sphere existed. Kogen (2010: 342) makes a similar argument, 
arguing that the “savage deregulation” of the Greek airwaves did have one positive effect, which 
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was to provide the opportunity to those who were otherwise shut out of the official public sphere 
to be heard for the first time. In turn, Panagiotopoulou, looking at the usage of online tools by the 
“Indignants” movement of 2011, adopts the position that public spheres in Greece have been 
temporary and ephemeral, not necessarily possessing longevity (2013: 453-454). It can be 
argued, in looking at the low levels of trust in Greek media institutions today, that this initial 
oppositional sphere which developed following the onset of private broadcasting in Greece 
represents one such example of an ephemeral sphere, with a new sphere (or spheres) potentially 
developing in the realm of social and online media. 
 From the standpoint of public rhetoric and participation in public discourse, a study by 
Kaitatzi-Whitlock in 2005 looked at the Greek press and the number of newspapers which 
offered the opportunity for readers’ letters to be published in a “letters to the editor” section, 
finding that only approximately one-third of Greece’s major newspapers provided such an 
opportunity to their audience (2005: 85-90). Finally, a study by Boukala (2014) looked at the 
rhetoric of Greece’s two current major political parties, SYRIZA and New Democracy, on the 
occasion of the fourth anniversary of the 2008 police killing of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, and 
the sudden shutdown of national public broadcaster ERT in 2013. Her analysis found that the 
rhetoric of both parties, from corresponding left-wing and right-wing perspectives, reproduced 
the polarizing rhetoric of the Greek civil war period and the military dictatorship via the process 
of drawing parallels between the incidents in question and old societal divisions stemming from 
the previously-mentioned painful eras in modern Greek history (2014: 492-493). 
 Some useful insights into the participation of Greek youth (and their parents) in the 
public sphere can be gleaned by the aforementioned DiaNEOsis/MRB poll, conducted 
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nationwide in the autumn of 2016. In this poll, 18.9 percent of young adults and 21 percent of 
parents surveyed stated that they had contacted an elected or governmental official in the prior 12 
months, while 31.2 percent of young adult respondents and 19.4 percent of parents stated that 
they had signed a petition during this same period. 71 percent of young adult respondents stated 
that they discuss social and political issues with friends often or some of the time, while 60.3 
percent said that they often or sometimes discuss such issues with their parents, 42.5 percent 
with other relatives, 41.2 percent with work colleagues, 38.4 percent with other students, and 
19.0 percent with neighbors (2017: 43, 53). 
2.3.3 – Summing up the Public Sphere 
 Having examined the relevant literature regarding the public sphere in both a global 
context and a Greek context, it will be useful to develop a definition of the public sphere which 
will guide this study. A definition of the public sphere presented by Reddy nicely sums up the 
concepts addressed in the literature. According to Reddy, the modern public sphere refers to 
“those institutions open to the public and those practices, which any member of the public may 
engage in, that are characteristic of modern societies…to museums, theaters, libraries, galleries, 
schools, and universities; cafés, stores, stock exchanges (and, in general, markets); courts, 
legislatures, town halls; the print and, more recently, electronic media (1992: 136). 
The existing literature on the public sphere in the context of Greece focuses mostly on its 
historical development. There is very little research on the public sphere vis-à-vis the mainstream 
media, and even less research on the relationship between social media or new media and their 
relationship to the Greek public sphere. Additionally, there is a lack of research on oppositional 
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public spheres which may have developed in Greece during the time period of the economic 
crisis. This research project addresses many of these gaps in the existing body of research. 
2.4 – CIVIL SOCIETY 
 In the section which follows, my review of literature relating to civil society—both on a 
global basis and in Greece—will examine and define the very concept of the “civil society” (or 
“third sector,” as it is often referred to in Europe), its historical development in Greece, and 
possible factors which have contributed to its potentially less than robust development, 
particularly in relation to issues of institutional credibility, clientelism, patronage, and diaploki. 
The existing literature on the Greek civil society will also be examined, particularly with 
reference to trends which may point towards a rejuvenation or growth of the civil society sector 
in contemporary Greece, and the potential impact of social media and online tools. Finally, gaps 
in the existing research, in particular with relation to Greece, will be highlighted. 
2.4.1 – Civil Society Theory 
 The concept of “civil society” is hardly new within liberal political theory. It is originally 
derived from two major traditions, which are separate and distinct from the historical origins of 
public sphere theory, even though the two concepts are related. One tradition derives from John 
Locke and his concept of natural law, where individuals would contract amongst themselves to 
establish government while retaining the right to change the government if it failed to serve its 
purpose. In this regard, civil society would be based on a self-directing society of individuals 
who would legitimize but also provide resistance to a limited government (see Elliott: 2015, 5). 
The second tradition stems from the eighteenth-century French intellectuals Montesquieu and 
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Alexis de Tocqueville, who believed in the power of associanism—the formation of a multitude 
of independent, local associations—to limit the absolutist state (Ibid., 5-6). 
 In the 19th century, Hegel added a third—and significantly different—tradition to the mix. 
In Hegel’s third view, civil society as the fragmented, selfish, hedonistic space where individuals 
pursue their particular interests (Ibid., 6). Habermas, in the 20th century, adopted a more 
traditional view, defining civil society as a private sphere emancipated from public authority, but 
also separate from the public sphere (1962/1989: 79). For Gramsci though, civil society was the 
site where hegemony operates: the space where the ruling class extends and reinforces its power 
over citizens via nonviolent means (Buttigieg, 1995: 27). Furthermore, this process would occur 
non-coercively, with the apparatuses of hegemonic power camouflaged within the institutions of 
civil society (including the press, libraries, schools, associations, the Catholic Church, and even 
urban architecture) assuming a “matter-of-factness” in daily life, creating a tacit, manufactured 
consent (Ibid., 6-7, 22, 26-27). Civil society, for Gramsci, consisted of three components: the 
state, the economy, and society (Dahlgren, 1995: 126-127). In Gramsci’s view, there was nothing 
“matter-of-fact” regarding civil society, which he viewed as an arena that was very much up for 
grabs and which held within it the potential conditions through which citizens, including 
“organic intellectuals” arising from below, could, via a “war of position,” disable the coercive 
state apparatus and overcome self-censorship on the part of the hegemonic media outlets 
(Buttigieg, 1995: 6-7; Downing, 2001: 15-16). In the case of Greece, a Gramscian view of the 
civil society is particularly relevant, in light of the credibility crisis suffered by “taken for 
granted” state and public institutions, as well as the press and mass media. 
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 Dahlgren’s understanding of civil society is intricately tied to conceptions of the public 
sphere, which he argues requires “publics” (with the capacity to interact) instead of passive 
audiences. Such “publics” are not audience members, but citizens, found in civil society 
(Dahlgren, 1995: 120). In a country with what is said to be a weak public sphere and weak civil 
society though, do such “publics” exist? This point bears noting with regard to Greece. 
A more contemporary view is expressed by Castells. While broadly defining civil society 
as the organized expression of the views originating out of the public sphere (2008: 78-79), he 
makes the case for the development of a global civil society in our contemporary world today. 
Referencing the diminished ability of national political systems to manage problems of a global 
nature, he identifies various trends. One such trend is the growth and increased prominence and 
visibility of global and international NGOs which take over an advocacy role on behalf of the 
public within the auspices of a “global public sphere” while undermining the traditional role of 
the government. Other trends include the development of global social movements that are 
attempting to counteract the forces of globalization, and the formation of a new global public 
opinion, derived from autonomous (digital) networks of communication enabled by the Internet 
and wireless communications systems (Ibid., 83-87). With relevance to Greece, it could 
potentially be argued that the economic crisis plaguing the country, as well as protest movements 
which have arisen in response to the crisis, such as the movement of the “Indignants,” which 
were also seen in Spain and other countries, reflect such trends. Conversely, Papacharissi, within 
the context of the privatized virtual sphere that she has conceptualized, foresees the breakup of 
civil society into consumer-driven citizen spheres, serving the public good via participation in 
the private marketplace (2013: 19, 91). Perhaps such a breakup is underway in the Greek case. 
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 Numerous definitions of civil society exist without there being an apparent consensus. A 
simple definition of the civil society, or “third sector” (as it is alternately called, especially in 
Europe) refers to “a realm of activity that is independent from both market and state” (Clarke et 
al., 2015: 2). Mavrikos-Adamou defines civil society “as the space between the state and 
individual which is occupied by autonomous citizens’ organizations and associations whose 
activities are organized and have a collective character” (2015: 45). Finally, Close highlights 
three characteristics of civil society: general respect for the law; developed and active respect by 
citizens for the common good and high valuation of public goods; and readiness among citizens 
to form voluntary organizations, particularly with objectives of public benefit (2014: 53). 
2.4.2 – Civil Society in Greece 
 As seen previously with the case of the public sphere, civil society in Greece is viewed 
by many, if not most, commentators and scholars as having developed only partially or in an 
atrophic manner. This stunted development is largely attributed to the long history of clientelism 
and partisan dominance in all aspects of social and economic life in Greece, from the earliest 
days of the modern Greek state up until the present time. 
 Contogeorgis makes extensive reference to this history in his analysis. Going back to the 
early days of the fledgling Greek state, he argues that the new state was developed with non-
representative, non-democratic structures which did not resemble in the slightest the communal 
polis with which Greek society traditionally operated, even under Ottoman occupation. 
According to Contogeorgis, this created a “society of subjects” (2013: 66). In the Greek context 
today, he views civil society as consisting of interest groups that hold a position of authority in 
society and influence within the political process. These groups represent interests which 
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contradict those of society at large, or which are dependent on corrupt relations with the state—
an attribute he ascribes to most NGOs (2012: 111). These factors may help explain the low 
credibility of such institutions in Greek society. 
 Komninou looks at the development of the public sphere and civil society in Greece from 
a historical perspective, identifying the traditional strong state and intense party clientelism in 
Greece as an obstacle for the formation of a strong, autonomous civil society (2001: 55-62). She 
points out that in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the military junta, there was a blossoming 
of civil society groups—particularly environmental and feminist groups—which, however, faced 
fierce opposition from the established political parties, even those of the left, and which in the 
1980s managed to successfully absorb most of these groups (Ibid., 176-179, 195). 
 Danopoulos provides a similar view in his review of democratic accountability in Greece 
today. He attributes a host of deficiencies in the Greek system today, including lack of state and 
government accountability, to Greece’s extensive history of clientelism, patronage, and partisan 
rule. Weak civil societies are characterized by factors such as the absence of internal democracy, 
lack of intergroup cooperation, and low levels of pluralism, arguing that Greece displays many of 
these attributes, as well as high in-group collectivism, pervasive localism, and ambiguous 
attitudes towards merit, characterizing civil society in Greece today as “feeble” (Danopoulos, 
2015: 128). He adds that NGOs suffer from similar ills as a result of their financial dependence 
on the state and lack of internal democracy, in addition to low levels of credibility and trust 
among the general public (Ibid., 129). This implies that civil society is not free of the credibility 
crisis which also plagues public institutions and the mass media in Greece. 
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 Close identifies the reluctance of Greek citizens to form voluntary associations for public 
benefit and the “irresponsible” way in which political parties, trade unions, and municipal 
authorities co-opt civil society organizations for their own ends (2014: 53), but nevertheless 
identifies successes of the environmental movement in Greece, including preventing the 
construction of a nuclear power station in the late 1970s (Ibid., 56-60). Simiti points at one of the 
dominant aspects of traditional Greek society, the immediate and extended family, and their role 
in filling gaps in the provision of social welfare services by the state (2015: 14). She extensively 
references the actions of civil society groups, both formal and informal, during the economic 
crisis, identifying an increase in the number of NGOs during the crisis and closer cooperation 
between NGOs and local authorities, but not with the Church of Greece or trade unions. Simiti 
also highlights the fragmented nature of the Greek NGO sector due to competition for limited 
state funds and due to their close relations with political parties (Ibid., 17-19).  
On the other hand, “alternative” or informal networks have also shown signs of increased 
activity, often operating without a legal basis but with the informal acceptance of local 
authorities (Ibid., 24-29). Similarly, Clarke identifies a new wave of “crisis volunteering” in 
Greece, distinct from previous patterns of volunteering as it originates in a bottom-up, instead of 
top-down, manner (2015: 68). Clarke adds that most organizations in Greece report an increase 
in volunteers during the crisis, and that there is a paradoxical rise in social solidarity despite 
declining levels of social trust (Ibid., 72-73). She points out that Greek volunteerism today shares 
characteristics with examples of volunteering in other difficult periods, but warns that 
volunteerism may decline when the crisis subsides (Ibid., 79). Jones et al., however, contradict 
these findings, arguing that while there has been a decrease in institutional trust towards actors 
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such as the EU and the Greek Parliament, there is a trend of increasing social trust in Greek 
society, which prior to 2008 was measured as the lowest in Europe (2015: 33-35). Mavrikos-
Adamou identifies particularized trust as an important factor, with “unsocial” capital (defined as 
lowered civil engagement as a result of distrust towards politicians and political parties) and 
localized, informal bonding networks playing a preeminent role in Greek civil society (2015: 46-
48). Mavrikos-Adamou adds that such forms of civil society are incompatible with existing 
measures of civil society activity (Ibid., 61). An argument could therefore be put forth regarding 
the increased robustness of the Greek civil society during the crisis, which however is not being 
captured by traditional methods of measuring civil society’s activity and effectiveness. 
 Huliaras (2015) argues that there were high expectations for the growth of Greek civil 
society in the period between 2010 and 2012 as a result of the worsening crisis, but expectations 
have not been met, as civil society is still unable to provide reliable and large-scale social 
services (9-10). Huliarias highlights examples of increased volunteering, such as during the 
Athens 2004 Olympic Games, in the aftermath of the destructive earthquake of 1999 in Athens, 
and after the widespread forest fires outside of Athens in 2007, but describes these examples as 
“fleeting” (Ibid., 18-20). He does, however, identify a discernible civil society separate from 
traditional political actors developing in Greece for the first time via virtual activism. This new 
civil society, says Huliaras, largely pertains to human rights issues, is mainly left-wing 
politically, tends to be secular, and typically attracts youth and young adults (Ibid., 23). It, too, 
can be fleeting, however, much like Greece’s ephemeral public spheres discussed earlier. 
 Afouxenidis and Garidaki, in their study, map Greek civil society organizations and 
identify two primary categories: NGOs and officially established groups, and informal citizen 
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initiatives such as local solidarity groups, the latter of which operate without legal standing and 
typically on a localized level, in an activist fashion, and in many cases on a purely ad hoc basis 
(2014: 137-138). Pantazidou also identifies the role of such informal civil society groups, stating 
that an unprecedented number of citizens have moved away from traditional, representative, 
recognized forms of citizen organization towards citizen-led, anti-hierarchical, horizontal 
networks which resist the impacts of the crisis on a citizen-to-citizen basis, including open 
popular neighborhood assemblies (2013: 758, 763-765). Kallas further identifies this informal 
civil society sphere, highlighting the significant role they played in the aftermath of the 1999 
Athens earthquake, where 90 percent of groups which were active in rescue and recovery efforts 
were of such an informal nature (2004: 218-226). Kallas argues that there is not a steady civil 
society sector in Greece, but it has shown the capability to respond in times of crisis (Ibid., 227). 
Sotiropoulos further identifies the existence of such an unofficial civil society, including in the 
aftermath of the 1999 earthquake, arguing that there is limited space in the official Greek public 
sphere for civil society, but that such groups exist outside the official sphere and are an area of 
civil society strength for Greece (2004: 145-146, 155), while in another paper, Sotiropoulos 
highlights the role of informal groups in the protests that were organized following the 
destructive forest fires of 2007 and the police shooting of Grigoropoulos in December 2008 
(2013: 164-167). In turn, Vathakou highlights the many informal civil society initiatives which 
emerged in the aftermath of the protest movement of the “Indignants,” and an overall rapid 
increase in citizen initiatives, including a citizen-organized referendum against the privatization 
of the municipal water utility in the city of Thessaloniki in 2014 (2014: 167, 179). She, however, 
identifies the lack of a mature culture of dialogue and cooperation in Greece as a challenge for 
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civil society (Ibid., 182). Kavoulakos adds to this view, pointing out the influence of the 
December 2008 protests in forming new civil society groups, such as the “I Don’t Pay” 
movement and other groups, while questioning whether these groups have a post-crisis 
expiration date (2015: 340, 350-351). What these studies all ultimately question is the longevity 
of these new civil society initiatives, in light of prior fleeting examples of civil society 
organizations and ephemeral counter public spheres in Greece. It therefore follows that any 
increased robustness of Greek civil society during the crisis could also be questioned as to 
whether it signifies a permanent societal shift, or represents a repetition of past trends. 
 Boulgaris adopts a viewpoint contrary to that of most scholars, arguing that Greek civil 
society is stronger than portrayed, that the interventionist role of the state has been overstated 
and that the robust existence of opposition movements has been ignored, while warning against 
judging the quality of civil society purely on quantitative measures (2006: 6, 24-29). Similarly, in 
looking at the number of civil society organizations in operation, Botetzagias argues that a higher 
number of such groups does not necessarily equate to a better civil society, due to the risk of 
professionalization, homophily, and development in a formalistic manner (2006: 72-75). 
 In 2013, a survey conducted by the HumanGrid non-governmental organization in 
conjunction with polling firm QED, consisting of a sample of 1001 individuals nationwide, 
found a sharp increase in the participation of Greeks in volunteer initiatives since the beginning 
of the economic crisis in 2010. 44 percent of respondents who volunteered said that they began 
after 2010, with a 13 percent increase in volunteerism in 2010, a 7 percent increase in 2011, and 
a 20 percent increase in 2012, the year that Greece’s second memorandum of understanding was 
signed with its “troika” of lenders. Nevertheless, only 3 percent of respondents stated that they 
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participated in an official volunteer organization, perhaps reflecting the mistrust of Greeks 
towards non-governmental organizations. Similarly, a mere 5 percent of the sample stated that 
they consistently participated in volunteer initiatives, while an additional 7 percent said they 
participated on occasion. Conversely, 85 percent of respondents answered that they had never 
previously volunteered, though 34 percent of respondents said that it was likely they would do so 
in the future and 38 percent stated that they themselves might be in need of help from a volunteer 
organization in the near future, with the largest percentage coming in the 35-44 age bracket. 
Further reflecting the aforementioned likely mistrust towards NGOs, 52 percent of respondents 
stated their belief that mistrust in official volunteer organizations was to blame for low levels of 
volunteerism in Greece in comparison to the EU norm, while an additional 40 percent stated their 
belief that NGOs represent other interests. A further 36 percent blamed low participation on the 
individualistic nature of the Greek people, 35 percent felt that it was the state’s responsibility to 
provide such services, 32 percent blamed a low level of information and knowledge about such 
activities, while 9 percent stated their belief that Greek society has other mechanisms in place to 
deal with the issues handled by NGOs and volunteer organizations. 
 Further results from the HumanGrid/QED survey showed that the most significant 
increase in volunteer activity and participation came in the following areas: food and clothing 
drives, providing health care services for the poor and uninsured, participation in an exchange or 
barter economy, involvement in human rights initiatives, and participation in environmental 
causes and neighborhood groups. Overall, 83 percent of respondents expressed a favorable view 
of volunteerism, but only 50 percent provided a positive view of NGOs and 46 percent 
responded favorably towards the activities of activist groups (2013: 1-19). 
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 A more recent poll seems to confirm a continued increase in volunteerism in the midst of 
the economic crisis, as compared to the 2013 HumanGrid/QED poll. A nationwide poll 
conducted by the aforementioned DiaNEOsis provides an insightful look into the attitudes of 
young adults and their parents on various aspects of participation in civil society. In this poll, 
conducted in the autumn of 2016, 54.7 percent of young adult respondents stated that they 
participated in volunteer activities, with 25 percent participating for less than one hour per week, 
18.1 percent for 1 to 3 hours weekly, 7.6 percent for 4 to 7 hours weekly, and 4 percent for more 
than 8 hours per week, while the overall average time of participation averaged 143.28 minutes. 
In contrast, 44.8 percent of parents polled stated that they engaged in volunteerism, but for an 
overall average of 155.36 minutes per week. Only 13 percent of young adult respondents stated 
that they participate in a labor union or organization (compared to 20.5 percent of parents), while 
a mere 9.9 percent of youth surveyed said that they volunteer for a political party (with a similar 
figure for parents, at 10.3 percent) (2017: 22-23). In the same survey, young adults provided a 
trustworthiness level of 3.7 out of a scale of 10 for non-governmental organizations, mirroring 
the 3.8 ranking provided by parents who were polled. 21.0 percent of young adults polled stated 
that they had worked for some kind of non-profit group or organization in the preceding 12 
months (along with 16.0 of parents surveyed), 44.5 percent had donated to a charitable cause 
within the prior 12 months (compared to 52.8 percent of parents), while 21.8 percent of young 
adults (and 20.8 percent of parents) said that they had participated in “alternative” social causes, 




2.4.3 – Summing up civil society 
 Having looked at the existing body of research on civil society from both a global and a 
Greek perspective, and having examined the various conceptualizations of civil society presented 
in the relevant literature, it is useful to develop a definition of civil society that will anchor this 
research project. For the purposes of this study, Clarke et al’s simple definition of civil society—
also referred to as the “third sector” which lies between the public and private realms—as “a 
realm of activity that is independent from both market and state,” is the most suitable (Clarke et 
al., 2015: 2). This definition effectively covers the range of activities which take place outside of 
the official public sector and beyond the private sphere of home and family, and includes non-
profit organizations and NGOs, volunteer initiatives, trade unions, social movements and other 
activist and grassroots movements, community groups, consumer groups, religious groups, 
foundations, and private voluntary organizations. We can also adopt Close’s three characteristics 
of civil society, which include general respect for the law; developed and active respect by 
citizens for the common good and high valuation of public goods; and readiness among citizens 
to form voluntary organizations, particularly with objectives of public benefit (2014: 53). 
Similarly to the body of literature on the public sphere in Greece, existing research on 
Greek civil society has generally not examined the relationship of social and new media to civil 
society. In addition, other than research which relates to clientelism and, in particular, to the 
phenomenon of “diaploki,” there is not much research which looks at civil society and its 
relationship with the mainstream mass media. While there does exist a fair amount of literature 
which looks at the growth of civil society in Greece in recent years, and in particular during the 
early years of the Greek economic crisis, there is not nearly as much research that has examined 
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the longevity (or lack thereof) of civil society groups which arose specifically during the crisis, 
or how social and new media may have been utilized by such groups. These gaps will, in part, be 
examined as part of this research project. 
2.5 – GREEK MAINSTREAM MEDIA LANDSCAPE 
 In order to comprehend the framework in which social media and new online media have 
entered the picture in Greece, as well as understanding what they may be serving as an 
alternative to, it is imperative that the Greek mainstream media and its history and development 
are examined. This review becomes even more important when considering that the media, and 
particularly the traditional, mainstream media, can be considered pillars of the hegemonic public 
sphere, while their diminished credibility in Greece has potentially opened the door to alternative 
media to supplant them as trusted sources of news and information. 
2.5.1 – The Greek Mainstream Media 
 The concepts of clientelism and “diaploki” in Greece directly apply to the Greek 
mainstream media landscape, as “diaploki,” by definition, refers to the interplay between strong 
media and business moguls in Greece, and the state, the government of the day, and major 
political parties. There is much that can be said about the Greek media landscape, from a legal, 
economic, political, and programmatic perspective, and this literature review does not profess to 
be exhaustive. Some of the key aspects of the Greek media system are nevertheless highlighted. 
 According to Hallin and Mancini, the Greek media system, just like the media systems of 
the other Mediterranean countries of Southern Europe such as Spain and Portugal, can be 
classified under the “Mediterranean” or “Polarized Pluralist” model. While this model will be 
described in further detail in a later chapter, it should be noted that the four dimensions which 
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Hallin and Mancini use to develop their media models include the following: the development of 
media markets (via the existence of a strong or weak mass circulation press), the degree of 
political parallelism (the degree and nature of links between the media and the political parties, 
or the degree in which the media reflect the major political divisions in society), the development 
of journalistic professionalism, and the degree and nature of state intervention in the media 
system (2004: 21). The system of “polarized pluralism,” according to the authors, has a tendency 
to be more common in countries which have seen a weaker development of civil society, with a 
tendency of political parties to fill the organizational void (Ibid: 54). The polarized pluralist 
model’s key characteristics include the existence of an elite-oriented press with a relatively small 
circulation and media outlets which tend to be economically marginal and in need of state 
subsidies, a centrality of electronic (broadcast) media, and a public broadcasting system that 
tends to be directly state-controlled (Ibid., 73). With a weak, small-circulation press, the public in 
these countries is much more reliant on electronic media and television tends to be king, with a 
preeminent role in the formation of mass public opinion (Ibid., 24-25, 97). As indicated earlier in 
the literature review, this is of direct relevance to the case of Greece, where civil society and the 
public sphere, including the institution of the press, are viewed as being atrophic in comparison 
to most other countries in Western Europe and North America. 
 Hallin and Mancini cite countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece as exemplifying 
this model. These countries were the last authoritarian regimes in Western Europe and the last to 
transition to liberal democracy (Ibid., 89). In turn, freedom of the press and the development of 
commercial media generally arrived later (Ibid., 73). In these countries today, social consensus 
tends to be low while social cleavages are likely to be deeply rooted, alongside wide questioning 
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of the legitimacy of the political system, and a history of political conflict and regime change 
(Ibid., 59). Furthermore, a common characteristic of these countries has been the traditional 
deployment of media outlets as instruments in political and power struggles. Even after these 
countries achieved a democratic system of governance, political factionalism remained strong, as 
did the longstanding tradition of media outlets being utilized as a means of ideological 
expression and political mobilization (Ibid., 60-63, 89-90). 
Hallin and Mancini point out that the late development of liberal institutions in these 
countries is closely connected to the significant degree of clientelism and the relatively slow 
emergence of rational-legal authority (Ibid., 135-136). According to the authors, political 
clientelism remains persistently strong in Southern Europe (Ibid., 58). This directly relates to the 
questions regarding institutional credibility, clientelism, and “diaploki” in the Greek context. 
Relating to this point, Hallin and Mancini further point out that in “polarized pluralist” countries, 
there is a high degree of political parallelism, where the media system tends to parallel the 
political party system (Ibid., 26-28). In such a system, there are strong traditions of advocacy and 
commentary-oriented journalism, and a strong media focus on political life (Ibid., 60-61, 73). 
 Another characteristic of the “polarized pluralist” model is the high degree of 
instrumentalization of the press and mass media by the government, the political parties, and/or 
by industrialists and economic actors with strong political ties and who seek to bolster their 
political influence and to gain access to lucrative state contracts (Ibid., 37, 73, 113-115, 134-
135). The state itself intervenes heavily in the media, via control of public service broadcasting, 
the (often partisan-tainted) distribution of press subsidies, and through the selective enforcement 
of laws and regulations regarding media concentration and ownership, broadcast licensing, 
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political communication, libel and slander, and media content (Ibid., 43-44). A credibility crisis 
often stems from this; in “polarized pluralist” countries Hallin and Mancini identify a tendency 
for journalists and media personnel to be active in political life, to hold parallel employment with 
political parties, or for their career paths to be shaped by their political affiliation (Ibid., 28). In 
the case of Greece, it can be said that this is recognized by the public, as evidenced by survey 
data which indicates particularly low levels of trust in journalists and the news media, and an 
extremely strong perception that the media are neither free of political nor economic influence. 
From a regulatory point of view, Hallin and Mancini point out that where clientelism is 
strong, as is the case in “polarized pluralist” countries, adherence to legal norms is generally 
weaker: powerful actors in the media landscape utilize their political connections to avoid 
inconvenient regulations. A vicious cycle ensures where politicians pressure media owners with 
threats of selective enforcement of the law while media owners and prominent journalists 
pressure public officials by threatening to selectively expose wrongdoing (Ibid., 58-59). This is 
reflective of a concept originating from political science, “capture theory” or “regulatory 
capture,” which in a media studies context is defined as “the view that regulators are influenced 
by the interests of the industries they regulate” (Danesi, 2009: 54; Etzioni, 2009: 319-320). 
Specifically in the case of Greece, Hallin and Mancini point out that newspapers in 
particular have always been used as political instruments above all, often with close ties to the 
state or political parties which have provided financial subsidies and other forms of support. As 
is typically the case in “polarized pluralist” countries, Greek journalists tend to be strongly 
opinionated and politically engaged, with a strong tradition of advocacy journalism (2004: 98). 
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 Hallin and Mancini characterize the development of the commercial broadcast sector in 
the countries of Southern Europe, including Greece, as an example of “savage deregulation,” a 
term introduced by Traquina (1995) to describe the phenomenon in Portugal. In Southern 
Europe, commercial radio and television was introduced in an uncontrolled way, without the 
imposition of significant public-service requirements or other regulations. According to the 
authors, Greece fits this model well, since private radio and television stations proliferated in the 
late 1980s, led by the then-opposition parties and operating on a pirate basis, forcing the then-
government to deregulate the airwaves after the fact. Subsequent attempts to regulate the 
airwaves were largely ineffective. In the Greek case, state broadcaster ERT, a cornerstone of the 
hegemonic public sphere, was particularly battered by this transition. Its television audience 
share dropped to the lowest percentage of any public broadcaster in Europe following 
deregulation (Ibid., 125; Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 154). This situation led to the development 
of a “prima facie” pluralism (Daremas, 2004: 36) as also pointed out by Komninou, who argued 
that the number of different choices available does not equate, on its own, to pluralism (2004: 
185). This point was further echoed by Smyrnaios, who argued that the high competition of the 
Greek media landscape has resulted in homogeneity instead of pluralism, since broadcasters 
struggle to survive and maintain their footing in a highly fractured marketplace (2009: 154). 
Papathanassopoulos has described this as a situation where the mass media are driven by supply 
than by demand, rather than the other way around (2001: 113). Indeed, in the case of the press, 
despite continuous declines in sales and circulation figures, the number of titles in circulation has 
shown a tendency to increase (Ibid., 120). State subsidies (typically in the form of government 
advertising) is one factor explaining this phenomenon, as well as the usage of these publications 
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as loss leaders, subsidized by the other business endeavors of their respective owners with the 
goal of providing a public platform for their point of view. The “prima facie” pluralism that has 
resulted belies a lack of diversity heard in the press and on the airwaves, and offers a potential 
opening for alternative media, as well as social and new media, to fill the void. 
 Conversely, Vovou argues that the deregulation of broadcasting in Greece was not an 
example of savage deregulation and did not occur in conditions of “anarchy,” but rather was the 
result of political battles which transpired in Greece during the late 1980s, a time of political 
instability and frequent changes of government (2009: 117-119). Similarly, Kogen, in a study 
examining broadcast deregulation in Greece and Thailand, argues that Greece does not represent 
an example of savage deregulation. Instead, deregulation occurred in both countries as a result of 
the actions of civilians and oppositional political actors, who were shut out of the existing 
broadcast landscape and sought a presence on the airwaves in order to fill this gap. Unlike the 
cases of Italy and Portugal, there was nothing “legal” about this deregulation, as it occurred prior 
to the changing of the regulatory regime for broadcasting (2010: 340-342). What this debate does 
illustrate, in any event, is the very different manner in which the broadcasting landscape was 
deregulated and subsequently developed in Greece, as compared to most other countries of 
Western and Northern Europe, as well as North America. 
 Indeed, when the first attempts at regulation finally occurred in the late 1980s, the initial 
legislation permitting the licensing of privately-owned television broadcasters provided a clear 
advantage for publishers and those with existing media experience, as well as for local municipal 
authorities (Frangiskou, 2015: 480; Komninou 2001: 182-183; Papathanassopoulos, 1993: 250). 
This indicated the level of politicization which was incorporated into the private broadcasting 
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landscape from day one, essentially reproducing the hegemonic public sphere of the press on the 
deregulated airwaves. The high level of politicization was further evident from the fact that the 
oppositional political voices who called for the deregulation of the airwaves and who launched 
Greece’s first non-state radio stations in 1987 were the then-mayors of Greece’s three largest 
cities, all members of the New Democracy party, which at the time was Greece’s main 
opposition party (Zaharopoulos, 2003: 234).  
 This politicization, as well as clientelist relations, are likely factors in the inability for 
multiple, successive governments to fully allocate broadcast licenses ever since deregulation first 
occurred in the late 1980s (Psychogiopoulou & Kandyla, 135). Indeed, this situation seems to 
have replicated itself with the transition to digital television broadcasting, where once again, a 
formal licensing framework has not been established, once again reproducing the existing 
hegemonic public sphere (2010: 28-38). When spasmodic attempts at regulation have been made 
by various governments, the result has invariably been heavy-handed and undemocratic, lacking 
in transparency and resulting in tremendous controversy. One example is the licensing process of 
Athenian radio stations in 2001-2002, when the government used the excuse of interference with 
aviation frequencies to shut down, in one night, dozens of radio stations, while the stations that 
did remain on the air received their licenses under less-than-transparent circumstances 
(Nevradakis, 2014c; Nevradakis, 2012: 136-137; Sims, 2003: 203-213).  
 The emblematic example of such heavy-handed and spasmodic government regulation of 
broadcasting came, however, with the sudden and unprecedented shutdown of national public 
broadcaster ERT on June 11, 2013 via a so-called “act of legislative content” which was not 
initially reviewed by the Greek Parliament prior to being enforced (Psychogiopoulou & Kandyla, 
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142). ERT was replaced by a new, trimmed-down state broadcaster, NERIT, which nevertheless 
was beset by many of the same structural and operational problems of ERT (Iosifidis & Katsirea, 
2015: 6). After the SYRIZA-led coalition government entered office following the January 2015 
elections, ERT was reopened—but once again replicated the same structural anomalies, such as 
lack of independence from the state, as those of NERIT (Papathanassopoulos, 2015: 473). 
 It could be said that the example for anomie and double standards on the Greek airwaves 
is set by the government itself. For instance, current broadcast legislation in Greece has required 
all broadcast stations to classify their programming as either “news” or “entertainment.” Stations 
who are classified as airing “news” programming have the legal right to switch classifications to 
“entertainment” programming, but the same legal privilege is not afforded to “entertainment” 
stations— effectively creating a closed market for broadcast news, while conversely, radio and 
television stations operated by political parties are exempt from licensing requirements at all 
(Nevradakis, 2014d). This effectively limits access to the public sphere to a select few, at least 
via broadcast means. The failed and highly controversial attempt by the SYRIZA-led governing 
coalition, in September 2016, to auction off a limited number of television licenses for 
nationwide broadcast coverage, with the intention to shut down the remaining stations which 
would not be licensed, further demonstrates this point (Nevradakis, 2016). The haphazard nature 
of the Greek broadcast landscape, where most broadcast stations have, for decades, operated 
with, at best, provisional broadcast permits, has given rise to the saying that in Greece, “nothing 
is more permanent than the provisional” (Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 70). 
 Returning to Hallin and Mancini, the two authors revisited their comparative models of 
media systems in a recent paper, highlighting the persistence of these models despite widespread 
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predictions of a convergence towards the “Liberal” model. Replication of the existing system 
was highlighted as one possibility, while other possibilities were that national online media might 
converge with global economic and media systems and undermine national media systems, or 
that they might remain nationally rooted while becoming distinct from the incumbent national 
media model (Hallin and Mancini, 2016: 162-165). 
 In the meantime, a section of the Greek media landscape which continues to struggle, 
with potential implications for public discourse, is the print media sector. Circulation figures in 
Greece have been in a free-fall since the 1980s (Bakounakis & Papathanassopoulos, 2010: 62-64, 
67-68; Kokkinidis, 2018; Siapera 2015: 452). Recent Eurobarometer statistics show Greece was 
in the last place in the EU with regards to the percentage of the population which reads 
newspapers daily. The figure for Greece was 7 percent, the respective figure for Finland and 
Luxembourg (which were in first place) was 67 percent in 2015 (Eurobarometer, 2015).  
2.5.2 – Summing up Research on the Greek Media Landscape 
 Two broad conclusions can be drawn from the examination of relevant literature on the 
Greek media landscape, in relation to this study. First, it is clear that the strong interplay—or 
“diaploki”—between media owners and business interests, the state, and the government—has 
long anchored the media’s position in Greece’s hegemonic public sphere. However, these very 
same factors can also be argued to have directly contributed to the potentially atrophic 
development of the Greek public sphere and civil society, and to be directly contributing to the 
credibility crisis suffered by these same media institutions today. This, in turn, opens the door for 
the development of multiple or counter public spheres, in the form of alternative sources of news 
and information, many of which may exist online and which may be facilitated by social media. 
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In terms of the existing research, the existing body of literature on the Greek mainstream 
media has largely focused on television and the press. Much less research exists on the Greek 
radio landscape, and though there are frequent references in the body of research on the 
haphazard regulatory status of the Greek broadcast landscape, very little of this research is up-to-
date or complete. Even the hallmark Hallin and Mancini examination of southern European 
media systems paid far less attention to Greece than to the media landscapes in countries such as 
Italy or Spain. Examinations of institutional credibility in Greece have also not sufficiently 
addressed the credibility of the mass media as an institution. As far as can be ascertained, there 
exists only one book published which exclusively examines Greek mainstream media from an 
operational, regulatory, and societal perspective—and this book was published in 1993. While 
some general societal characteristics still remain relevant from that era, much more has changed. 
Background information regarding the present-day mainstream media landscape in Greece is of 
direct relevance to a study of the impacts of social and new media on the public sphere and civil 
society, as it allows us to examine the framework and context in which social and new media 
have developed, and what they might be serving as an alternative to. 
 Furthermore, and of direct relevance to this research project, there is little research which 
has examined the relationship of Greek mainstream media to social and new media, or, in turn, 
how the mainstream media in Greece have responded to “competition” from social and new 
media. Additionally, a surprisingly small amount of research exists pertaining to the shutdown of 
Greek national public broadcaster ERT in June 2013, the social and new media campaign which 
followed (along with protests), the launch of temporary public broadcaster “DT” and ERT 
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replacement “NERIT,” and the reopening of ERT in 2015. The social and new media reaction to 
the ERT shutdown, in particular, will be further examined later in this dissertation. 
2.6 – ALTERNATIVES TO MAINSTREAM MEDIA 
 This section will review the body of literature on various alternatives to traditional mass 
media such as television, radio, and the printed press. These alternatives include social media, 
new media, and the blogosphere; and what is broadly defined as “alternative,” “radical,” 
“citizens’” or “community” media. The purpose of examining these areas of research is to attain 
a stronger understanding of what “alternative” media might be alternative to and what makes 
them alternative in the first place, and whether online mediums such as social networking tools 
and blogs, can serve as venues or hosts for such alternative media efforts. Additionally, gaps in 
the existing research, particularly in relation to the Greek case, will be located. 
2.6.1 – Social Media, New Media, and the Blogosphere 
 boyd and Ellison define social networking websites as follows: 
Web-based services that will allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public 
profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share 
a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others 
within the system. (boyd & Ellison, 2007: 211) 
 
In turn, Papacharissi describes social network websites as sites which “extend the connectivity 
and mobility of the private sphere by providing online spaces that host offline and online 
networks of social relations” (2013: 139-140). These two similar definitions will guide our 
understanding of social media going forward. 
 Defining weblogs, or blogs, can be trickier, however. As noted by Garden, a precise 
definition of blogs is challenging to pin down because blogs can take on a great variety of 
attributes and characteristics. Two main categorizations that are prevalent in the attempts to 
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define blogs are those of affordances and design characteristics on the one hand, and genres of 
communication on the other. While there is general consensus that a blog is a type of website 
which uses blog software to simplify the creation and management of content, disputes arise in 
scholarly debates over whether a website can only be considered a blog if it contains links to 
other blogs, whether visitor comments are permitted or not, and whether they are professionally 
managed or not. Others base their definition on content, while still others dispute whether blogs 
comprise a medium or a genre (2011: 487-494). 
 For our purposes, the definition proffered by Wikipedia is considered sufficient: 
 
Blogs are “[a] type of website … with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of 
events, or other material such as graphics or video. Entries are commonly displayed in 
reverse-chronological order … Many blogs provide commentary or news on a particular 
subject; others function as more personal online diaries. A typical blog combines text, 
images, and links to other blogs, web pages, and other media related to its topic. The 
ability of readers to leave comments in an interactive format is an important part of many 
blogs. (Wikipedia, 2010, quoted in Garden, 2010: 490) 
 
For this study, blogs will be included in a broader category of “new media” outlets, alongside 
social networking websites (such as Facebook and Twitter) and web 2.0 applications such as 
online radio. Papathanassopoulos et al. list blogs as one of six types of social mediums, the 
others being social networking websites, wikis, podcasts, fora, and content communities (such as 
YouTube). The authors also highlight Twitter as an example of “microblogging” (2013: 23-24). 
 Papacharissi describes the online sphere as a social private sphere, arguing that a 
transition has taken place towards the formation of multiple private spheres. These are spheres of 
connection, or overlapping networked spheres, where private individuals negotiate their 
relationship with the “public” (Papacharissi, 2013: 21, 162-164). Papacharissi invokes 
Schudson’s conceptualization of the “monitorial citizen,” who employs technology in order to 
 75 
construct a self-determined subpolitical sphere, and Benkler’s optimism for the prospect of 
convergent online technologies and their ability to sustain a networked public sphere, one which 
would connect disparate and civically-inspired networks, actors, and publics on a global scale 
(Ibid., 102-104). Papacharissi argues that the internet, while providing a public space, does not in 
itself democratize or create a public sphere, listing three criteria for online technology to achieve 
democratizing potential: access to information, reciprocity of communication, and the 
commercialization (or lack thereof) of online space (Ibid., 120, 124-128). Of relevance to this 
project, it is worth examining, in the case of Greece, where there is a history of a relatively weak 
and ephemeral public sphere and civil society, as well as rising mistrust in public institutions, 
whether the public has increasingly moved towards private spheres—or whether online tools can 
rejuvenate activity in the public sphere and in civil society. 
 Dahlgren makes a similar argument as Papacharissi, pointing out that usage of the 
internet for political purpose is minor compared to the many other purposes to which it is put, 
adding that the political discussion which often does take place online is frequently isolated and 
does not always promote the civil ideal. Nevertheless, the architecture of the internet does, 
according to Dahlgren, offer a space for many possible civic initiatives (2005: 151). Along 
similar lines, Bennett and Toft argue that social technologies do not provide “magic solutions” 
for democracy, and list three contexts where activist campaigns can form: protests, campaigns, 
and social forms (2009: 246-247). Castells, channeling the idea of online isolation, points out 
that web 2.0 tools have “caused everyone to be their own media,” describing it as an unmediated 
“postmedia movement” that “has the capacity to overcome the media and create an event, and 
communicate this event …” (2012: 120-121). Castells refers to the movement of the Spanish 
 76 
“Indignados” as a “rhizomatic revolution,” consisting of hundreds of autonomous online and 
offline nodes, and a revolution that occurred primarily in citizens’ minds (Ibid., 140-145). 
 Iosifidis and Wheeler identify two waves of academic debates regarding social media and 
the public sphere, where initial utopianism about the ability of social media to formulate a virtual 
public sphere has been supplanted by doubts over whether social media can foster the 
development of democratic values. Examining political movements in the Arab world, Spain, 
and Greece, the authors emphasize the significant role played by social media for mobilization 
but argue that their ability to deliver lasting political change remains in question (2015: 16).  
Regarding literature relating to the Greek case, Theocharis, in a survey of 500 of Greek 
youth in 2008 on political participation and online postmaterialism, found that evidence from 
Greece suggests that the internet and social media tools can be an effective tool of political 
expression in countries which have weak civil societies and where young people have few 
opportunities for community involvement and organizational participation. Such digital tools 
stimulate the establishment of an informal online civil society which can potentially engage 
youth in social and political groups and communities (2011: 208-209, 217). Tsene analyzed the 
Greek media landscape from the point of view of social and civil responsibility and examined the 
intervention of social and online media in this sphere. Highlighting the examples of spontaneous 
protests which arose following the Greek forest fires of 2007, proposed legislation to grant wider 
tax exemptions to media owners, “bottom-up” online media initiatives such as tvxs.gr and 
Radiobubble, and the example of the “Dimiourgia, Xana!” (“Recreate Greece”) political party, 
which was founded via new media, Tsene underlines the role that social and online media can 
play in a country where civil society is in an “embryonic stage” (2012: 168-170, 198-204).  
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 From the perspective of Greek social media participants, Papathanassopoulos et al. 
surveyed a sample of 450 Greek Facebook users over a six month period in 2011-2012, finding 
that 74.9 percent of those surveyed used Facebook daily, 51.1 percent participated in one or more 
Facebook groups, 21.6 percent spend three hours or more per day on Facebook, 37.6 percent do 
not watch television on a daily basis while only 6.4 percent spend three hours or more watching 
television each day, while 56.7 did not purchase newspapers. The results further showed that 
49.1 percent used the medium to exchange information and material relating to their interests, 
13.5 percent used Facebook as a means of free speech, only 27 percent of those sampled felt that 
their voice was heard to a greater extent as a result of their usage of Facebook, and only 27 
percent used Facebook at least occasionally as a means of protest or political complaint (2013: 
28-40). Doulkeri, in a study of Facebook usage by a sample of 189 Greek university students 
performed in April 2011, found that 77.3 percent maintained Facebook profiles, 60.3 percent 
visited Facebook daily, 46.6 percent spent an hour or less per day on the site, while only 3.4 
percent used Facebook for news and information purposes (2014: 410-419). Looking at 
examples of the usage of YouTube by Greek youth, Triliva et al. found several themes which 
primarily defined their lived experiences, including that of a “sacrificed generation,” a blanket 
condemnation of society’s power brokers and their mediums and messengers (2015: 412-418). 
Mouzakiti, in a survey of 826 Greek Twitter users over a 24-hour period, and an accompanying 
content analysis of popular hashtags in Greece, found the Twittersphere to be much smaller than 
the Facebook sphere in Greece, moderately male-dominated, and largely comprised of young 
adults aged 18-44 who have completed bachelors or advanced studies, with over 90 percent 
accessing Twitter by computer and 70 percent via smartphones (2012: 24, 63-65, 71). 
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Approximately 85 percent logged on multiple times per day, 90 percent used Twitter to provide 
commentary on current events, 70 percent to obtain news, 70 percent had used Twitter as a 
means of protest, 50.5 percent had responded to a call to action via Twitter, 61.1 percent stated 
they would use Twitter to mobilize others in the future, 50 percent viewed Twitter as a suitable 
medium for enacting political pressure, 60 percent as a suitable medium for self-organization and 
community formation, and 80 percent as a suitable medium for dialogue, while 83.1 percent 
reported that Twitter helped them form an opinion on certain matters and 74.5 percent stated that 
Twitter had helped them reevaluate a position (Ibid., 71, 75-76, 84-89, 103). What the 
aforementioned studies together seem to indicate, with relation to this research project, is the 
likely uneven impact of social networking tools in influencing public discourse in Greece—and 
in particular, influencing political discourse and activism, as well as offline actions of a political 
or civil nature. Differences seem to exist across generations and across the gender divide, while 
frequent social media usage does not, on its own, seem to result in increased political activity. 
 A major focus of the literature on Greek social media usage focused on its role in protest 
and social movements, in terms of helping to foster these movements, as well as in terms of 
disseminating information about these actions and attracting participants. In a comprehensive 
volume detailing the first-hand experiences of participants in the movement of the “Indignants” 
in Athens’ Syntagma Square in 2011, several of the participants, including Giovanopoulos and 
Ceamor, stated that they learned about the planned protests and decided to participate as a result 
of the Facebook invitation that had circulated in the days prior to the launch of the movement 
(Ceamor, 2011: 23; Giovanopoulos, 2011b: 42). Two other participants, Papahadjis and 
Voulgarelis, both stated that they participated after receiving the invitation which was circulating 
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on Facebook, with Papahadjis noting that he had not previously been the “demonstration-going 
type” (Papahadjis, 2012: 160; Voulgarelis, 2012: 168). Panagiotopoulou examined the role of one 
of the primary websites used by the movement of the “Indignants,” real-democracy.gr, finding 
that the website was one of many online tools used by the protesters, who utilized all such tools 
which they had at their disposal. While the internet and social media tools were not identified as 
a catalyst for the protest movement and were unable to, on their own, deliver upon the promise 
of a new political movement, these technologies provided mass publicity for the protesters, 
global visibility for the movement, helped those who were unaffiliated with any social and 
political groups to self-organize, allowed for coordination of actions across different locations 
and cities and the publicity of these actions, and allowed the movement to enter the mainstream 
news agenda (2013: 452-454). Lambrakou highlighted the Greek blogosphere as an oppositional 
public sphere, offering examples including the “G700” (the “700 euro generation” of highly 
educated, underemployed and underpaid youth, which had already arisen before the onset of the 
Greek financial crisis), the role of social media in fostering spontaneous protests following the 
widespread forest fires of the summer of 2007, the protest movement of December 2008, the 
initial protests in the spring of 2010 against the austerity measures following the onset of the 
Greek crisis, and the usage of social media and online tools by the “Indignants” in 2011. 
Lambrakou notes that protest movements in Greece were late adopters of new technologies, but 
they have been effectively used in recent years as part of a variety of movements, including the 
burgeoning “Den Plirono” (“I Don’t Pay”) movement (2011: 56-57, 72, 82-91). While these 
studies clearly demonstrate the important role of social networking technologies in influencing 
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these protest movements, the longevity of this behavior and its lasting impact on the Greek 
public sphere and civil society remains an open question that is of great relevance to this study. 
 Tsaliki closely examines two other major protest movements which have occurred in 
Greece in recent years: the spontaneous protests which arose following the major forest fires of 
the summer of 2007, and the December 2008 protests. Tsaliki begins by pointing out the inverse 
relationship that exists in Greece regarding age and internet use, and discusses the strong feelings 
of political cynicism and mistrust a majority of Greek people feel towards politicians and the 
political system at large (2010: 152-153). She details the SMS text message which began to 
circulate in Greece almost immediately following the first of the major forest fires in July 2007, 
calling upon citizens to converge outside of Parliament and not to remain “uninvolved,” a text 
message which was then amplified by the Greek blogosphere (Ibid., 154). Foreshadowing the 
“Indignants” protests of 2011, this call to action was explicitly non-partisan, and was repeated 
the following month when a second wave of fires resulted in another SMS invitation circulating 
via text message and making its way onto the blogosphere. This message once again called upon 
citizens to converge outside of the Parliament building and in every public square in Greece 
(Ibid., 155-156). Analyzing the December 2008 protests, Tsaliki notes the significance of online 
technologies in mobilizing the public, but points out that the two protests should not be conflated 
with each other, due to the different social chain reactions at work (Ibid., 155-159). 
 Milioni and Panos argue that online and mobile technologies played a key role as tools of 
coordination and organization during the December 2008 protests in Greece. News about the 
shooting was transmitted almost instantaneously via mobile phone and the Athens Indymedia 
website, and the first demonstrations began within two hours. School occupations were 
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organized via text message, while the Indymedia website functioned as a coordinating hub for the 
various actions which were taking place. Twitter also played a key role in coordination, 
particularly in organizing responses to police tactics (2011: 236). The authors argue, though, that 
there are substantial limits to the ability of online and mobile tools to transfer the message of 
online alternative publics into the general public sphere (Ibid., 238). In turn, Psimitis argues that 
the December 2008 movement conducted an “information war” with the help of websites such as 
Athens Indymedia and the full gamut of social networking websites, ranging from Facebook to 
YouTube, arguing that these tools were decisive in the formation of the revolt, orchestrating an 
alternative public space which operated in contradiction to the mainstream media (2011a: 128-
129). This “information war” and usage of online tools to distribute information could be seen as 
a defining moment in Greece’s media history, where traditional media gatekeepers and the 
official public sphere were bypassed, as further evidenced by the examples before. 
 Papadatos-Anagnostopoulos highlighted the role that online media played in fueling the 
December 2008 protests in Greece. He pointed out that the death of Grigoropoulos was first 
reported on Athens Indymedia almost immediately, and that within days dozens of Facebook 
groups and occupation blogs had been created, which served as hubs for the protests and the 
student occupations of schools and university campuses (2009: 177-186). He points out, 
however, the emergence of far-right blogs which served as a counterweight to the protests which 
were occurring, the role of social media in inserting certain narratives of the protests into the 
mainstream media, particularly on televised satire programs, and finally, the role of social media 
in exposing the reasons why a photographer for a major newspaper was fired (for taking a 
photograph showing a police officer aiming his weapon at protesters) (Ibid., 66, 144, 186-192). 
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 Vasilopoulos looked at the role of social media in disseminating news about the shutdown 
of national public broadcaster ERT in June 2013 and how technologies such as live online 
streaming were utilized by the employees of ERT for their protest broadcasts. The latter were 
propagated with the help of the Twitter hashtag #ERT and the digital communities which formed 
to protest the closure (2013: 183-185). Also on the topic of the ERT shutdown, Kiki performed 
multiple content analyses of the postings made on the ERTSocial Facebook page over an 
approximate one year period, noting the important role that this community played in fostering 
political dialogue of this issue, particularly following the initial shutdown of ERT in June and the 
forced eviction of employees who were occupying ERT headquarters the following November. 
Kiki characterized participation of ERT employees and ordinary citizens on the ERTSocial 
Facebook page as a form of social action (2014: 44-45, 159-167). 
 Focusing on another prominent social movement, Smyrnaios (2013) performed a content 
analysis of Twitter usage following a major protest which occurred on October 21, 2012 in the 
Skouries region of northern Greece, concerning the controversial gold mining activities taking 
place in the area. This has been the site of repeated protests during the years of the economic 
crisis in Greece, and following this particular incident, Smyrnaios conducted a content analysis 
of 2,713 tweets using the #skouries hashtag, posted by 466 users across a 3.5 day period from 
October 21 to October 25, 2012. His main conclusions were as follows: first, dissemination of 
information about the protest and its aftermath stemmed largely from three central Twitter 
accounts. This news was then disseminated to a wider audience through the re-tweets of several 
specific opinion leaders in the Greek Twittersphere with a significant following. Second, only 
one professional journalist actively participated in the online discourse involving the #skouries 
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hashtag on Twitter. Third, a strong presence of non-Greek users in the online discourse was 
found, many of whom translated the news of the protest into languages such as English and 
French. Fourth, Smyrnaios found that despite the efforts of numerous users to tweet news using 
the #skouries hashtag to mainstream media entities, these attempts were largely ineffective. 
Finally, Smyrnaios detected a separate sphere of discussion about the Skouries protests involving 
established civil society groups such as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), who 
however did not actively participate in the online discourse using the #skouries hashtag. 
 Sioula-Georgoulea conducted a critical discourse analysis of the response of the Greek 
Twittersphere to the public naming of HIV-positive prostitutes who were accused of infecting 
multiple clients. This analysis was based on two relevant Twitter hashtags used during this 
controversy, and was accompanied by She noted that despite the emergence of virtual 
counterspheres which challenged the dominant narrative propagated by the government and by 
the mass media, not all of these counterspheres constituted a radical critique of the dominant 
discourse through the reproduction of common stereotypes and sexist rhetoric (2015: 4-8). 
Morikis surveyed 246 youth and young adults aged 15-35 in February 2014 to determine the 
relationship between their use of social networking sites and protest activity, finding that 76.2 
percent used social networking sites to disseminate protest news, with Facebook being the 
preferred medium for this practice and with teenagers being the most skeptical of its efficacy. 
The main protest goals were influencing global public opinion (69 percent) and domestic 
politicians (52 percent), while 78.6 percent said they would only protest via social media if a 
real-world protest was not sufficiently substantial and 66.1 percent stated that they would never 
sacrifice street protesting for exclusively online protests (2014: 20-23, 26-32). A similar study 
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conducted by Afouxenidis (2014: 1-3) surveyed a sample of 159 unemployed university lecturers 
in Greece, mostly under the age of 45, who were members of an online community of 
unemployed academics. The survey results showed that 76 percent of members never posted 
political content to the group, 74 percent had never been a part of a political party, 70 percent 
never participated in any civil society organizations, and 46 percent had never participated in any 
form of collective organizing, demonstrating a low level of offline political involvement. Of 
those surveyed, 47 percent nevertheless stated that they were more inclined to become politically 
active in a public context as a result of their participation in this online community. Afouxenidis 
concluded that the capacity of the internet to fully foster political participation was dependent on 
offline political experience, plus a degree of online technical competency (Ibid., 3). 
 A more recent survey, the aforementioned DiaNEOsis/MRB poll of young adults and 
parents throughout Greece, which was conducted over a three month period in the autumn of 
2016, provides an additional informative insight into the usage of social media tools for 
disseminating messages and content of a political or social nature. Specifically, 56.0 percent of 
young adults polled stated that they had publicly expressed their opinion or uploaded content 
pertaining to social or political issues to a social networking website such as Facebook or Twitter 
in the preceding 12 month period, as compared to 25.4 percent of parents polled (2017: 43).  
Picking up on the topic of the reproduction of dominant narratives, Afouxenidis argues 
that politics and political cultures are not necessarily re-negotiated via online and social media 
tools, which quite often serve to instead replicate the offline world. This can occur via the 
reproduction of extant offline activist communities, or through the reproduction of mainstream 
narratives, as was the case with the supporters of the “Menoume Evropi” (“We Remain in 
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Europe”) initiative, which opposed a “no” vote in the Greek referendum of July 2015, claiming 
that it would result in a Greek departure from the Eurozone (2015: 11-12). Similarly, Zarali and 
Frangonikolopoulos, in their content analysis and discourse analysis of five Greek news portals 
and five selected blogs, found that news portals mimic the televisual style of sensational news 
reporting, a characteristic also shared by many of the blogs that were studied, which end up 
reproducing the messages of the media and political system (2013: 278-283, 305-307). Similar 
findings were noted by Zeri in her qualitative content analysis of four selected Greek blogs 
during a ten-day period in 2012. While comprising a part of the virtual public sphere, Greek 
political blogs, regardless of ideology, reproduced extremely polarized political discourses which 
also predominate in Greek society (2016: 1582, 1591). Moreover, Zeri points out that political 
blogs constitute a small portion of the overall Greek blogosphere and have not played a decisive 
role in Greece’s political landscape (Ibid., 1580). Touri and Kostarella examined the ability of 
independent blogs to expand the boundaries of public range, finding that while blogs have begun 
to threaten the dominance of the mainstream news media, they have developed a tendency to 
operate as “echo chambers,” while utilizing sensational, polemical language, even for the 
presentation of the same news stories as the mainstream media (2016: 7-11).  
A social network analysis of the Greek far-right blogosphere was performed by 
Smyrnaios (2013), beginning with an initial sample of 18 blogs which increased to a total sample 
of 88 blogs which were closely interlinked. Smyrnaios’ observed that there was a very large 
number of far-right blogs in operation, mostly anonymously, and he posited that it is likely that 
despite their anonymity, the operation of so many far-right blogs belies the likely political 
organization and coordination of such blogs behind the scenes. These blogs were also found to 
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be highly insular, frequently linking to each other but rarely to mainstream news sources. They 
promoted a self-described “alternative” news agenda, focusing on the “real truth,” “alternative 
news,” and keeping the audience “on alert,” while traditionally left-wing political rhetoric, such 
as “resistance,” “popular sovereignty,” and “anti-capitalism” was also frequently adopted. 
Political parties such as SYRIZA and PASOK, as well as the “troika” of Greece’s lenders, were 
frequently the targets of these blogs. Finally, it was noted that almost all such blogs were hosted 
on the Blogger platform. Afouxenidis and Sioula-Georgoulea, in a content analysis of 18 far-
right and nationalist websites and blogs over the course of 2015, sought to examine the extent to 
which “old” far-right and extremist narratives such as Nazism and national socialism are 
reproduced by “new” communication mediums. They found that Greek far-right websites had 
effectively harnessed new mediums, particularly blogs, in order to disseminate fascist or 
nationalist messages, as well as far-right political actions and activities (2016: 3-7, 29). Put 
together, the findings of the aforementioned studies indicate the potential susceptibility of the 
social media and blogs towards the dominant narratives of the hegemonic public sphere. 
 Zafiropoulos et al. classified 10 categories of participation on political blogs, including 
campaigning, community building, deliberation, discourse, electioneering, information 
provision, polling, concern creation, media and book reference, and environmental issues (2013: 
44), while in another study, Zafiropoulos, in a sample developed in November 2010, employs 
social network analysis indexes to study 127 Greek political blogs which tagged one or more of 
the political parties represented in parliament, looking at bloggers’ efforts to form spheres of 
influence. His study found that only a small percentage of the blogs studied served as “authority 
blogs” (with many incoming links), while most other blogs try to expand their influence by way 
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of many outgoing links (2012: 722-725). Zafiropoulos adds historical background information on 
the Greek blogosphere, noting that political blogs emerged in Greece following the forest fires of 
2007 and an incident regarding the news of migrants who had been beaten in a central police 
station of Athens that same year; political blogs first began to exercise influence in Greek politics 
the following year with the December 2008 protests, and played a critical role in the sharing of 
information during the “Indignants” protests of 2011 (Ibid., 723). It could be said that even if the 
hegemonic public sphere is not replicated by blogs and social media, these technologies could 
foster the development of a new “elite” category of websites, pages, and users, limiting access to 
this new public sphere to those who are less influential. 
 Pleios found that in 2009, 42 percent of blogs sampled were self-classified by their 
owners as political blogs (2010: 87), while Karampasis conducted an early (2007) survey of 12 
Greek bloggers over a one month period, with demographic results showing the then-Greek 
blogosphere to be male-dominated (almost two-thirds of respondents), 88 percent of bloggers 
falling in the 18-44 age group, and 67 percent possessing a university degree (2008: 36-37, 45-
46). The survey further revealed that 85.2 percent watch television for fewer than 90 minutes per 
day (with television being the least-used mass medium amongst the bloggers surveyed), 52 
percent referenced current events on their blogs, 51 percent did not consider their blogging to be 
a form of journalism, 54 percent stating their belief that they were not contributing to the public 
sphere, while 75 percent of those surveyed maintained anonymity on their blogs (Ibid., 50, 63-
65, 71, 124). While the bloggers’ reasons for maintaining anonymity were not specified, it is 
possible that bloggers addressing potentially controversial issues, politically those in the political 
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realm, may have feared that they would be at risk of being charged under Greece’s strict libel and 
slander laws, being politically typecast, or being singled out personally or professionally. 
 Tsaliki and Kontogianni, in a long-term analysis of the tweets of 22 Greek elected 
officials and 10 other political personalities, examined their usage of Twitter, finding that social 
media tools are generally still unfamiliar territory for many such elected officials and candidates. 
Confirming this lack of sophistication, the authors noted that only a small percentage of 
politicians’ Twitter accounts were verified, while most politicians continued their familiar pre-
internet practice of using media simply as a “bulletin board” of announcements and press 
releases, with little to no interactivity with the broader community and with some politicians 
abandoning their Twitter accounts after the conclusion of their electoral campaigns. It was also 
pointed out that there are over 10 times more Facebook users than Twitter users in Greece (2015: 
546-552, 557-559). Galani performed a content and discourse analysis of the content of two 
prominent Greek Twitter accounts, those of George Mouroutis and Nikos Pappas, respective 
advisers to the leaders of the New Democracy and SYRIZA political parties, in the period 
leading up to the European parliamentary elections in May 2014. Her findings confirmed the 
narrative of polarizing rhetoric which is characteristic of Greek politics, with most tweets 
consisting of personal attacks, rebuttals, and arguments, rather than emphasizing policy issues 
(2013: 54-64). Galani adds that Twitter is not as “mass” a medium as Facebook in Greece, while 
the “elite” of the Greek Twittersphere has largely replicated the offline elite (Ibid., 67-68). In an 
older (2008: 88-91) study by Flesoura on the usage of mobile telephony by Greek politicians as 
part of their campaigns, a relatively high percentage (41.3 percent) used SMS text messaging in 
2004, while also finding that, as with other forms of media, Greek political candidates tended to 
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use text messaging as a “bulletin board” of announcements instead of in a more interactive 
fashion. This “bulletin board” usage of online media was further detected by Demertzis et al., in 
an early (2004) study which analyzed the websites of candidates in the 2004 parliamentary 
elections (2005: 109), and in an older study of websites of Greek and British political parties 
during electoral races in 2000 (Kotskikopoulou, 2002: 205). These findings reflect the highly 
politicized, polemic, and perhaps underdeveloped nature of the official public sphere in Greece, 
with these trends being transferred to an online medium. 
 Giannari performed a study which examined the presence of Greek mass media outlets 
(television stations, radio stations, newspapers) on three major social media websites (Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube). The results showed that a majority of newspapers lacked a social media 
presence at the time of the sample, with only 17 percent of outlets maintaining a presence on all 
three social media websites examined, while a notable highlight was that at the time of the 
sample (2012), no newspapers were found to maintain a YouTube account (2012: 73-88). A 
similar study was previously conducted by Spyridou and Veglis, finding that most television 
stations, radio stations, and newspapers used at most one to three web 2.0 tools, had a low uptake 
of on-demand services, and had low rates of social networking site usage at the time the sample 
was taken. The authors concluded that Greek media outlets displayed a slow adoption rate of 
new digital technologies (2010: 102-112). This low adoption rate may have left an opening for 
upstart online media efforts and news websites to gain a foothold among Greek internet users. 
 Deligianni and Dimitrakopoulou undertook a detailed exploration of the Greek legal and 
constitutional framework as it pertains to blogging, social media, and online media. They cited 
several legal and constitutional protections which protect freedom of speech, the freedom of 
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information (the right to be informed and the right to participate in the information society), the 
right to privacy, the right to judicial protection, and cases where online anonymity can be legally 
stripped. In addition, the authors analyzed the many areas of Greek law where uncertainty exists 
with regard to the regulation of all forms of online media—particularly whether they should be 
classified under Article 15 of the Greek Constitution (concerning broadcasting), or the more 
liberal regime of Article 14, governing the press (2012: 89-128, 134-138, 140-154, 179-193, 198-
220). The legal uncertainty that exists has, at times, resulted in controversial charges and legal 
battles, and may act as a “chilling effect” for individuals seeking to post potentially controversial 
news and information via an online medium. 
 Recent data from the Eurobarometer survey displayed strong indicators of the lingering 
digital divide in Greece and the low adaptation rate of certain digital technologies. To 
summarize, Greece ranked 23rd in the EU in internet usage, with 48 percent of those surveyed 
stating they used the internet on a daily basis. Conversely, Greece was in the middle of the 
rankings (15th place) in the category of daily social network usage, at 36 percent, though notably, 
Greece also ranked 3rd in terms of individuals who never used social networking sites (39 
percent). One final notable statistic showed Greece in last place in the EU in terms of the 
percentage of citizens who watch television via the internet (two percent) (Eurobarometer 2015). 
Van Dijk has pointed out that aside from economic factors and the relatively lower incomes of 
Southern European countries, including Greece, vis-à-vis Northern and Western Europe, other 
potential reasons for the lower adaptation rate of new technologies in Southern Europe may 
include cultural factors, such as the outdoor lifestyle as well as the political context and level of 
democracy prevalent in these countries (2009: 292). These factors can, in turn, serve as obstacles 
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for the full potential of social media and online tools to robustly contribute to or rejuvenate the 
Greek public sphere and civil society in Greece. 
 Eurobarometer’s findings are, however, contradicted by a survey conducted by polling 
firm Focus/Bari, titled “Focus on Tech Life.” In this survey of a sample of 5,000 respondents 
nationwide during the third quarter of 2017, internet usage was measured at 81.8 percent of the 
overall sample, being almost universal between ages 13 and 44, 88.4 percent of whom used the 
internet daily (as compared to 71.0 percent of the total sample). The average period of use was 
3.1 hours daily, and 4.3 hours for the 18-24 age bracket. 72.2 percent of those sampled owned a 
smartphone, with ownership ubiquitous up to age 34, while internet usage via smartphones was 
practiced by 67.7 percent of those sampled (the figure was 89.4 percent for those up to the age of 
44). 64.3 percent of the sample used mobile applications on their smartphones, with 44.5 percent 
using social media apps, in second place overall amongst applications used behind 
communications applications, and followed by news applications at 26.3 percent, ahead of music 
applications and map/location applications. In all, 69.2 percent of households were connected to 
the internet in some form, with 68 percent primarily connecting via smartphone, 51.3 percent on 
their laptop computers, and 36 percent via desktop personal computers. Notably, 78 percent of 
children aged 5-12 used the internet, including 89.3 percent of 10- to 12-year-olds (2017: 1-11). 
 Interestingly, there is an apparent lack of research in many potential areas of study 
pertaining to social and new media and the Greek context, including very little work on the 
impact and relationship with the public sphere and/or civil society; on online media and the 
highly charged July 2015 referendum in Greece; on the usage of social and new media by 
politicians, political parties, and by traditional mass media outlets; and on the legal framework 
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governing online and new media, including the often controversial issue of anonymity, which has 
been a matter of political debate in Greece in the past. 
 Finally, in examining a broader non-Greek context, Lessig introduces the issue of online 
architecture, and how “code” can serve as the perfect regulatory tool limiting free speech in 
cyberspace, even in the absence of official legislation governing online speech. As Lessig argues, 
“[l]eft to itself, cyberspace will become a perfect tool of control…not necessarily control by 
government” but by an “invisible hand, pushed by government and commerce” which “is 
constructing an architecture that will perfect control and make highly efficient regulation 
possible” (2008: 4). “Architecture” can refer to anything from algorithms used to determine 
search results on Google or what content might appear in a user’s “news feed” on Facebook, 
restrictions such as the character limit imposed on Twitter, or other policies and terms of service 
which could curtail freedoms and the ability to communicate online and via social media. 
2.6.2 – Alternative, Community, and Radical Media 
 Alternative media is a concept which underlies many of the issues being examined in this 
project. In a country such as Greece, where the media landscape has long been dominated by 
vested political and economic interests who tightly control the flow of news and information, 
what role can alternatives to such mediums play in informing the Greek populace? Social and 
new media, as well as other online technologies (such as internet radio) can provide new spaces 
where alternative media outlets can develop and operate. It is therefore important to define 
“alternative media” and to understand how they are indeed alternative to traditional media. 
In the body of literature and scholarly work that has developed over the years, a 
remarkably large number of terms and categorizations have been utilized in an attempt to name 
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and to pin down the category of media outlets and productions that is often described as 
“alternative" or “activist” media.5 Overall, the most commonly used terms for such media outlets 
are “alternative media,” “radical media,” “citizens’ media,” and “community media.” While there 
is much overlap between these terms and the manner in which they have been defined by 
scholars, for the purposes of this dissertation, the term “alternative media” will be used. 
According to Atton, alternative media are found outside mainstream media institutions, 
and can include the media of protest groups, dissidents, fringe political groups, or even fans and 
hobbyists (2007: 17-18). They tend not to be produced by professionals, but by amateurs 
operating in their capacities as citizens, members of communities, activists, or fans (Ibid). A 
great deal of the work of such outlets is devoted to the representation of the views, interests, and 
needs of underrepresented groups in society, in an attempt to counterbalance disparities in media 
power in the mainstream media, exhibiting clear biases and eschewing “balanced” or ”objective” 
reporting (Ibid., 18; Atton, 2004: 39). Atton adds that such outlets are also typically organized in 
non-mainstream ways, including in non-hierarchical or collective setups, and usually operate on 
a non-commercial basis, insulated from market and state forces (2004: 3), posing a challenge to 
professional and institutionalized norms seen in the mainstream media (Ibid., 26).  
 Bailey et al. offer their own detailed definition and conceptualization of alternative 
media, arguing that its definition should include a wider spectrum of media that are working to 
democratize information and communication (2008: 5). The authors present four theoretical 
                                               
5 This terminology includes “alternative media,” “radical media,” “citizens' media,” “activist media,” “community 
media,” “third-sector media,” “social movement media,” “oppositional media” (or “media in opposition [to]”), “non-
commercial” or “non-profit” media, “advocacy media,” ”minority media,” “grassroots media,” “independent 
media,” “non-mainstream media,” “non-professional media,” “participatory media,” “amateur media,” “alterative 
media,” “media from below,” “volunteer media,” “volunteer journalism,” among many others. Often, composite or 
derivative terms, such as “radical alternative media,” are used. 
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approaches which attempt to locate alternative media’s place in society, whether in terms of their 
target audience or what they are alternative to, as well as the linkages of such media to civil 
society, which is of direct relevance to this research project. In the authors’ first approach, 
alternative media are seen as serving a community, whether it is a geographical/spatial 
community, or an interpretative community or community of meaning (Carpentier et al., 2003: 
54). The second approach views alternative media as an alternative to mainstream media, in that 
they are small-scale, oriented towards specific communities and potentially marginalized societal 
groups; operate independently from the state and the market; are horizontally structured and 
facilitate audience participation and access; and transmit non-dominant and possibly counter-
hegemonic discourses and representations (Ibid., 56). The third approach links alternative media 
to civil society through organizations which, due to their democratized nature, permit citizens to 
be active through micro-participation while acting as the "third voice" between state and 
commercial media, thus serving a crucial role for the overall viability of democracy (Bailey et 
al., 2008: 23). This approach resembles the conceptualization of civil society as the “third sector” 
between the state and the private sphere. The authors caution, however, introduce a caveat: in a 
top-down conceptualization of civil society, dominant forces have the ability to co-opt elements 
of popular movements (Ibid., 22). Bearing similarities to Castells’ concept of a “rhizomatic 
revolution,” the authors’ fourth approach views alternative media as a “rhizome,” a non-linear, 
anarchic, and nomadic entity, in which any point within the network can be connected to any 
other point, while the rhizome itself is constantly in flux. Such outlets are viewed as operating 
with a high degree of contingency (where what may be considered “alternative” at one point in 
time can become “mainstream” at another point in time) and building linkages between civil 
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society and other alternative media organizations (Ibid.: 25-29). Carpentier et al. argue that there 
is no one correct way of defining alternative media, but that the combination of these four 
approaches paints a “panoptic picture” that takes account of the multiplicity, diversity, and 
fluidity of alternative media (Ibid., 150). Together, these four approaches provide a basis for 
better understanding what alternative media are alternative in comparison to, what other societal 
entitles they may be linked to, as well as their ability to metamorphosize, to “become 
mainstream” or to adopt dominant discourses, or to exist only ephemerally. 
 Other scholars have offered their own interpretations of alternative media. Atkinson 
argues that media are deemed to be “alternative” if they adhere to one of three definitions that 
have been established in prior media studies literature: alternative content, interpretative 
strategies utilized by their audience to read such media, and alternative production that is 
independent of corporate media interests and which often occurs under conditions of economic 
duress (2010: 22). Couldry and Curran define alternative media as “media production that 
challenges, at least implicitly, actual concentrations of media power, whatever form those 
concentrations may take in different locations” (2003: 7). Forde argues that “alternative” is the 
only term which encompasses all other kinds of terminology that is frequently used to describe 
such media, including radical, grassroots, citizens’, and independent media, while characterizing 
alternative journalists as “amateur media producers,” typically lacking in professional training or 
qualifications (2011: 6). Harcup adds that the production of alternative and participatory forms of 
media can be seen as an example of active citizenship (2011: 26-27), while Haas, noting that an 
all-encompassing definition of alternative media is impossible, states that they could be seen as 
media “devoted to providing representations of issues and events which oppose those offered in 
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the mainstream media,” which advocate for political and social reform, and which constitute 
either an alternative public sphere, or a sphere of multiple alternative publics (2004: 115). These 
definitions of alternative media add greater depth to the many dimensions of “alternativeness” 
which can potentially be found in such mediums, including the relationship of alternative media 
to the idea of citizenship—itself a vital component of the public sphere and civil society. 
Despite the common usage of the term alternative media, it has also been problematized 
by several scholars. Downing et al. (2001) wrote that the term is “almost oxymoronic,” because 
“everything, at some point, is alternative to something else” (2001: ix). Interestingly, in one 
paper, Atton (2002b), who has otherwise favored the usage of the term alternative media, 
employs the term “radical media” in its stead. The usage of the term “radical media” is most 
often associated with Downing, who argues that such media are the media of social movements, 
and which express an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, priorities, and perspectives 
(Downing et al., 2001: v-xi). They are generally small-scale in nature, typically underfunded, 
sometimes unnoticed or short-lived, express opposition from a subordinate position targeted 
directly at the power structure, and build support, solidarity, and networking against the policies 
of or even the very survival of the power structure. They also tend to be at least somewhat more 
democratic in terms of their internal structure than mainstream media, and may include a wide 
variety of formats and styles (Ibid., xi). Downing also proffers some caveats, including the 
existence of “radical” media which could represent regressive or far-right political and societal 
forces, and challenges that radical media broadly face, such as the “price of participation” 
(including printing costs) which may limit the ability of such outlets to survive (Ibid., 50-51, 88-
91). Case studies presented by Downing of alternative media outlets in Italy (such as Radiopop) 
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and Portugal—two countries which also comprise Hallin and Mancini’s “Polarized Pluralist” or 
“Mediterranean” model, as is Greece, examined the ephemerality of some such outlets as their 
participants shifted to other forms of activism or were co-opted by political or other forces, while 
professional journalists stifled by editorial controls at the outlets where they were employed 
developed a peculiar symbiosis with such radical mediums, feeding them news stories that would 
not otherwise be published. Even if they are short-lived though, Downing highlights how the 
experience of participating in such ventures can help foster a “generational resurgence” in the 
future (Downing, 1984: 273-282, 354; Downing et al., 2001: 16, 186, 280-281, 288). 
Notably, however, in one journal article, Downing (2003) employs the term “alternative 
media” instead of “radical media.” Radical media as a concept has also been problematized, as 
Atton has argued that Downing’s model remains limited by its emphasis on social movements 
and does not consider other potential purposes of alternative media which may ignore “weaker” 
communicative mediums ranging from personal websites to zines (2002: 20-21). Nevertheless, 
this emphasis on the media of social movements is relevant to the case of Greece, and the usage 
of various media forms (including social media) by various protest movements, and activist and 
social groups. However, it can be argued that a medium can be “alternative” without representing 
a social movement or activist effort. 
 Rodríguez also problematizes this notion, writing that it entraps us in a binary notion of 
power and misses the myriad of power equations which exist in the community, which are not 
static but constantly shifting and changing (2001: 16-17). She proposes the abandonment of the 
terms alternative media and radical media and, instead, the adoption of the term “citizens’ 
media.” She argues that the term citizens’ media implies that a collectivity is enacting its 
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citizenship through its active intervention and transformation of the existing mediascape; that 
such media contest social codes, legitimized identities, and institutionalized social relations; and 
that these media practices empower the community involved, to the point where transformations 
and changes are possible beyond the realm of the media (Ibid., 20). They may have short life-
cycles and are often fragmented and improvised in nature (Ibid., 22), and they are at risk of being 
corrupted and co-opted by their funding sources or by dependencies on central authorities, while 
communication technology itself is always at risk of being overtaken by commercial interests. 
The author highlighted the example of underpaid citizens’ media practitioners in Colombia and 
the propensity for them to be co-opted by financial interests (Ibid., 55, 183). Citizens’ media can 
exist in both indigenous and non-indigenous societies (Ibid., 27-47). The notion of citizens’ 
media has nevertheless also been viewed as problematic, seen as a term that cannot avoid the 
connotation of inclusion or exclusion based on one’s citizenship status, while it has been pointed 
out that the term “citizen” or “citizenship” may have different meanings, or multiple meanings, 
in non-western and/or authoritarian societies (Al-Ghazzi, 2014: 443-449). It can be argued that 
while citizens’ media can and is likely to be “alternative” to hegemonic media outlets, alternative 
media does not necessarily have to operate as citizens’ media. 
 Several scholars choose instead to use the term “community media.” Rennie describes 
community media as media that allow for access and participation, usually run on a not-for-profit 
basis, providing community members with an opportunity to participate in the production 
process, while varying greatly in their structures, financial health, and target audiences (2006: 3, 
22). Howley presents community media as “popular and strategic interventions into 
contemporary media culture committed to the democratization of media structures, forms, and 
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practices,” assuming different forms and meanings depending on the needs of the community 
and the resources available at a particular time and place, while typically relying on 
noncommercial forms of support, with a less hierarchical structure than corporate and public 
service media, and often entering into an alignment with counter-hegemonic struggles (2005: 2-
3; 2010: 2-4). Jankowski refers to community media as encompassing a diverse range of 
mediated forms of communication, providing news and information relevant to the needs of 
community members, engaging these members in public communication via the community 
medium, empowering those who are disenfranchised politically, producing locally-oriented and 
locally-made content, essentially non-commercial in nature, with ownership and control often 
shared by community residents, local governmental institutions, and community-based 
organizations (2002: 6-8). Lowrey, Brozana and Mackay refer to “community news media” as 
media that reveal or make individuals aware of resources, institutions, events or ideas that may 
be shared, and which encourage such sharing, and which also facilitate the process of negotiating 
and creating the meaning of “community” (Lowrey et al., 2008: 288), while Meadows describes 
community media as media produced in an environment where strong connections to either a 
local community or a community of interest exist, and where the relationship between audiences 
and producers plays a crucial role, arguing that the term “community” can encompass terms such 
as “radical,” “alternative,” “participatory,” “citizen” and “grassroots” (2013: 44-45). These 
conceptualizations of community media are based on definitions of the term “community” which 
may refer to geography (place) and/or ethnicity as its structuring notion, or which may refer to 
such non-geographical definitions as “communities of interest,” “communities of practice,” 
“virtual communities,” “interpretative communities,” “imagined communities,” or “communities 
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of meaning” (Bailey et al.., 2008: 8-10). Similarly to “citizens’ media” though, this term also can 
be said to possess shortcomings. While “community media” may potentially act as alternatives to 
dominant mediums within a society, via their targeting of specific communities, it can be argued 
that “alternative” media does not necessarily have to target particular communities or groups. 
Indeed, these conceptualizations have not escaped critique either. Downing views the term 
“community” as a catch-all with a localist sense, a professional sense, a sense of community 
standards of decency, and/or a nostalgic sense: “politically fuzzy” words that “urgently need 
anchoring” (Downing et al., 2001: 38). It has also been argued that the term community takes on 
many different meanings depending on place and culture (Meadows et al., 2010: 163-164). 
 Also significant is Lievrouw’s extensive analysis of how alternative and activist media, as 
she describes such outlets, can experience cycles of “capture and co-optation” as well as 
subversion, or a “war” between “uploading and downloading,” while introducing the competing 
“pipeline” (“center”) and “frontier” (“edge”) visions of the internet, which could broadly be 
summarized as top-down and bottom-up notions of media and cultural production in the online 
sphere (2011: 2-3). Lievrouw notes that this continual process of co-optation may leave no 
authentic or independent space for genuine cultural expression separate from the market, with 
members of subcultural groups often acting as willing participants in this process (Ibid, 82-83). 
 Academic literature on alternative, radical, or community media in Greece is particularly 
limited. As is the case with much of the global literature on alternative media, one of the pre-
eminent scholarly articles on this topic with relation to the Greek context has to do with the 
activities of the Independent Media Center, or Indymedia, which maintains a presence in Greece. 
Milioni uses Indymedia Athens as a case study to examine the capability of such an online, 
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alternative media outlet to contribute to the online counter-public sphere, including the network 
structure of Indymedia and its ability to act as a global network for collective action. Very little is 
discussed regarding its place within the Greek (alternative) media landscape (Milioni, 2009). 
Gazi and Boubouka authored one of the few scholarly articles which exclusively examines an 
“alternative” media outlet, highlighting the case of online radio station Radiobubble and the 
station’s official Twitter hashtag, #rbnews. The authors analyzed how Radiobubble managed its 
participatory visibility through content production in Twitter and through the use of its hashtag, 
while analyzing the content of its tweets. However, the content of Radiobubble’s radio 
programming was not analyzed or discussed in detail (Gazi & Boubouka: 2015). Radiobubble is 
one of the five illustrative examples examined in this research project. 
 Siapera et al., in their examination of what they term “post-crisis journalism” in Greece, 
highlight several online news media outlets as providers of alternative journalism and which 
have implemented an alternative organizational and production model that is antagonistic to the 
dominant ideology. These outlets include the daily newspaper Efimerida ton Syntakton, which is 
collectively run; the magazine Unfollow (which is also collectively run); the news website The 
Press Project; Radiobubble; and Infowar Productions, which produces crowdsourced journalism 
and documentaries. The authors highlight the investigative journalism practiced by many of these 
outlets, and the bottom-up nature of their operations (2015: 459). In a similar study, Tsene 
examines new online media outlets which are products of the ongoing economic crisis in Greece, 
referencing The Press Project and Radiobubble, in addition to news portal tvxs.gr and online 
activist and civil society initiatives such as 100myria.gr and deb8.gr (2012: 169-170, 198-204). 
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In this research project, representatives from all of the aforementioned outlets were interviewed 
on an individual basis or, in the case of Radiobubble, as one of the five illustrative examples. 
Bouka examines the activist efforts which followed the June 2013 shutdown of national 
public broadcaster ERT and the launch of the worker-run ERT Open. Specifically, this paper 
highlighted the role of ERT Open as an alternative media outlet, standing in opposition to the 
“black screens” imposed by the government, while describing the self-organized and collective 
structure of ERT Open, the experimental nature of its broadcasts, and its role in furthering the 
protests and social movement which arose calling for the re-establishment of a truly public and 
independent national broadcaster (2015: 27, 30, 33, 45, 59-62). This could be said to be an 
example of the rhizomatic model in reverse, where a previously dominant media outlet was 
transformed, literally overnight, into an “alternative” media outlet. Finally, both Smyrnaios 
(2009: 155) and Nevradakis (2014d) approach the issue from an economic and from a legal 
perspective and address the difficulties independent and alternative media outlets face regarding 
entry in the existing Greek media marketplace, from a legal and economic point of view. 
 For the purposes of this research project, the term “alternative media,” and the broad 
range of definitions and approaches utilized by the aforementioned scholars who have chosen to 
employ this terminology, will be most frequently adopted. Adopting the argument put forth by 
Forde (2011: 6), the term “alternative media” is, in my estimation, more inclusive than “radical 
media,” “community media,” or “citizens’ media.” “Alternative” media does not necessarily 
need to be socially or politically radical or to adopt “radical” positions, nor does any one specific 
“community” necessarily need to be targeted by an “alternative” media outlet. Moreover, 
“alternative” media outlets could presumably be staffed by professional paid journalists, or at the 
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very least by journalists and media practitioners who possess professional training and 
experience. Many of the media outlets which were examined as part of this project, particularly 
through individual interviews, are best classified under the “alternative media” umbrella, as 
compared to the other two terms, as it can be said that they operate as general “alternatives” to 
the country’s traditional press titles, television stations, and news-talk radio stations. 
2.6.3 – Summing up Research on the Alternatives to Mainstream Media 
 The preceding section has provided definitions of social media, blogs, and alternative 
media that will be used to guide this research project. It has also analyzed the extant literature in 
the areas of social and new media; as well as alternative, radical, citizens’ and community media; 
collectively grouped for the purposes of this literature review as alternatives to mainstream, 
traditional media forms. This literature has examined the myriad ways in which alternative media 
indeed act as “alternatives” to dominant media forms and practices, and the manner in which 
social and new media, including blogs, can themselves operate as alternative mediums and 
contribute to social, political, activist, and protest movements. 
While much literature exists which has examined how social and new media tools such as 
Facebook and Twitter were utilized during moments of protest and social upheaval in Greece 
(with a particular focus on the December 2008 protests and the protests of the “Indignants” in the 
spring and summer of 2011), very little of that research has connected this social and new media 
usage to its potential broader impacts on the Greek public sphere or Greek civil society. The 
usage of social media in certain significant moments in Greece’s recent history, such as the 
shutdown of national public broadcaster ERT in June 2013 or in the days leading up to the July 
2015 referendum, is also conspicuously lacking. The same can be said about the social media 
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activity surrounding certain specific activist causes in Greece, such as the highly unpopular and 
controversial gold mining activities taking place in the environmentally sensitive northern Greek 
region of Skouries. These will be focus areas of this research project. 
 In terms of literature pertaining to alternative, community, and radical media, there is a 
surprisingly small amount of research pertaining to the growth and development of such outlets 
during the years of the economic crisis in Greece, and the manner in which such outlets are 
indeed serving as “alternatives” to the incumbent mainstream media outlets. In the present 
research study being performed, both individual interviews and the five illustrative examples 
have focused extensively on such “alternative” media outlets, and how exactly they might serve 
as “alternatives” in Greece’s media and news landscape. 
2.7 – SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND PROTESTS 
 In this subsection, my review of literature on social movements and protests does not 
profess to be all-encompassing, as a full review would be beyond the scope of this research 
project. Initially, selected literature on global social movements will be examined, which will 
allow the protests and conflicts seen in Greece in recent years to be located within a global 
framework. Following this, relevant literature on the Greek case will be examined, with a 
primary emphasis on identifying the gaps which exist in the body of research with regard to 
Greek social and protest movements that have not been examined, and the potential impact of 
social and online media in Greek social movements, protests, and activist causes. 
2.7.1 – Protests and Social Movements in Greece 
 Several authors have highlighted the increasingly worse conditions of political, 
economic, and social inequality in the Western world in recent years as a prelude to the protest 
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movements which have taken place in the United States and many European countries, including 
Greece. As early as 1995, Dahlgren noted that citizens in the Western world were increasingly 
withdrawing from the political sphere, with democracy often viewed as a choice amongst a 
“rotation of elites”—a situation which Dahlgren argued was breeding contemporary social 
movements (1995: 2-5). This view is mirrored by Purcell, who identifies the growth of 
neoliberalism since the 1970s as a direct factor in the global economic recession which began in 
2007 via the naturalization of austerity politics and the lack of any alternatives presented 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union (2013: 4-9). This has resulted in an expression of 
“popular power from below,” via the mobilization against neoliberal policies and austerity 
measures (Ibid., 9-13, 168-169). Mann argues that these mass mobilizations reflect deeply global 
forces responding to growing inequality and the delegitimization of both political institutions and 
traditional civil society organizations such as trade unions (2012: 182-189). In his listing of four 
categories of civil society actors, Castells includes democratic social movements (which aim to 
control the process of globalization via oppositional political action), and the global movement 
of public opinion, through which spontaneous and ad hoc mobilizations via horizontal and 
autonomous networks of communication have emerged (2008: 85-87). He highlights such 
movements, including those recently seen in Tunisia, Iceland, Egypt, Spain, and in the United 
States, as a “new breed” of networked movements, and lists 10 common characteristics of such 
movements: they are networked in multiple forms, they occupy urban space, they are 
simultaneously local and global, they generate their own form of time (“timeless time”), they are 
usually triggered by a spark of indignation, they are viral, they are leaderless and deliberate in 
the space of autonomy, they create “togetherness,” they are highly self-reflective, they are non-
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violent, they are rarely programmatic, they are aimed at changing societal values, and they are 
fundamentally political (2012: 12-14, 221-228). These characteristics can also be applied to the 
Greek case, and to the protest movements borne out of Greece’s economic crisis. 
 Greece has a very long history of protest, and many of these movements have been 
connected to the media forms which were available at the time. During the students’ uprising 
against the military junta at the Athens Polytechnic University in 1973, pirate radio was 
employed to spread the message of resistance (Rigou, 2010: 44-45; Zaharopoulos & Paraschos, 
1993: 11). Leontidou points out that Greek society has been marked by its propensity for 
spontaneous social movements despite being regarded as having a “weak” civil society (2015: 
86). Major student protests during 1985-86, 1990-91, 1995, and 1998-99, protests against the 
visit of United States president Bill Clinton in 1999, widespread protests against the United 
States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, and further student protests and occupations in 2007 set the 
stage for the movements which developed during the years of crisis in Greece (Karamichas, 
2009: 291-292; Papadatos-Anagnostopoulos, 2009: 31, 54-56, 178; Psimitis, 2011a: 114-115). 
Close emphasizes the tradition of successful environmental protests and movements in Greece 
from the 1970s until the present day (2014: 56-57). Tzaliki highlights the spontaneous protests 
which arose in the summer of 2007 in response to two destructive forest fires and perceived 
government inaction after a call sent out via text message and Greek blogs, pointing out though 
that these protests did not translate into political change in the parliamentary elections which 
followed that autumn (2010: 155-157). Tsene highlights the role citizens played in leading the 
protests following the fires, which even influenced national public broadcaster ERT to organize 
volunteer efforts in the aftermath of the disaster (2012: 104, 169-170). 
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 Karamichas examined the fierce social movement which followed the shooting death of 
Grigoropoulos in December 2008, describing it as the most intense social crisis in the post-junta 
democratic history of Greece, and as the “straw that broke the camel’s back,” unleashing pent-up 
anger towards the police, the political system, worsening economic conditions, and the fires of 
2007 (2009: 289-290). Karamichas cites two main factors for the protests: structural deficiencies 
in the Greek economy and educational system, and memetics/rites of passage, as the current 
generation of youth reproduced the rebellions of its predecessor generations (Ibid., 291-292). 
Milioni further highlights this point, citing the role of the previous year’s student protests as a 
key factor in the participation of high school students in the events of December 2008, as well as 
the exclusion from the official sphere that participants in the protests on a broader level were 
experiencing (2011: 234). Papadatos-Anagnostopoulos highlights the many political scandals 
which had impacted the then-government without lasting consequence, the entry of the far-right 
into the televised public sphere, a longstanding decline in political interest and delegitimization 
of the country’s institutions as factors which fueled the uprising, as the author described the 
events (2009: 42, 45, 52-56, 59-69). Kavoulakos and Gritzas pointed out the lasting influence of 
the December 2008 protests, citing the 25 major protests which took place between February 
2010 and February 2012 in Greece and the development of new alternative social groups (2015: 
339-341). In turn, Psimitis describes the mass demonstrations which took place in the spring of 
2010 against the austerity plans of the then-government as an example of new features of 
collective action in Greece, in which neighborhood committees and citizen assemblies quickly 
organized to resist the austerity measures and to claim public areas, with the participation of 
many individuals who were not organized as part of previously entrenched civil society actors 
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such as trade unions (2011b: 195). Together, this body of research addresses key incidents in 
Greece’s recent history leading up to the country’s economic crisis, which also set the stage for 
the social movements and protest movements which developed during the crisis years. 
 Several first-hand accounts of participants in the movement of the “Indignants” highlight 
the motivations and goals of the movements, and the factors which led citizens to join and to 
protest. Giovanopoulos and Mitropoulos attributed the movement to the increasing distance of 
the political sphere and the economic elite from the increasingly marginalized populace, and 
noted that the term “indignants” was chosen accidentally by the movement instead of “outraged,” 
even though the former had been used by conservative groups in the past. They noted the lack of 
dialogue which followed the December 2008 protests and the different social climate which 
formed after the forced end of the “Indignants” movement, cautioning, however, that the 
occupation of public squares did not replace previous modes of mobilization (2011: 11-18). 
Ceamor was attracted to the protest due to the lack of partisan labels and maintained her presence 
there due to its peaceful and cultural nature, despite concerns that such promises would not be 
genuine (2011: 23-25). Stavrou drew parallels between the protests which were organized 
following the forest fires of 2007, and the celebratory street gatherings which followed Greece’s 
surprise victory in the Euro 2004 soccer championship, noting the self-organization and self-
regulation of both public gatherings, with the mass of participants “setting the norms.” He added 
that it had been a very long time since so many disparate people had congregated for a common 
cause in Greece, while arguing that the often-repeated division between the protesters who 
congregated in the “upper” and “lower” parts of Syntagma Square was a “myth,” as was the 
claim that Greek protesters only took to the streets after a banner appeared at the “Indignados” 
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protests in Spain, warning the protesters not to awaken the “slumbering” Greeks who had not yet 
arisen (2011: 31-37). Mitropoulos focused on the role of the protest’s popular assemblies, which 
congregated daily, set the tone for the movement from the beginning with calls for “direct 
democracy” (instead of the “true democracy” demands of the Spanish “Indignados”), the 
egalitarian nature of participation in the assemblies and lack of a “media representative” for the 
movement, and the rejection of attempts by student organizations and other groups to co-opt the 
assembly (2011: 61-62, 65-67). A participant identified as “Christina L.” cited the people’s lack 
of faith in the political and economic system to handle the crisis and the increased number of 
people questioning their political identities as factors which resulted in the protest, while 
highlighting the creation of alternative economic initiatives such as the “Time Bank of Athens” 
as a result of the protest movement (2011: 75-77, 82). Kosmatopoulos sought to debunk common 
myths about the “Indignants,” including that the movement was apolitical, spontaneous, and a 
large mass; that there was a divide between the “upper” and “lower” squares, that it was merely a 
copy of the Spanish “Indignados” and that the movement was favorably treated by the mass 
media (2011: 128-133). Rinaldi said that the movement brought to the forefront many people 
who were no longer being represented by the political system, also minimized the divide 
between the “upper” and “lower” squares, the unifying sentiment against the mass media which 
existed among participants, and cited the political results the movement delivered, including an 
unprecedented political crisis and the near-collapse of the then-government (2011: 191-193). 
Giovanopoulos noted that prior calls to congregate at Syntagma Square earlier in 2011, which 
had failed, pointing out that the appeal of the “Indignants” movement stemmed from the new 
communications mediums which were utilized to organize the protest. He cited the development 
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and operation of the movement’s communications team, their desire to protect the image and 
coverage of the movement on its own terms, the lack of a “public representative” for the 
movement, the challenges that were faced (including the loss of the real-democracy.gr website), 
and the need for “netroots”—or the connection of the virtual and real-life spheres (2011a: 245, 
254-259, 263-264). Voulgarelis stated that this was only the second time he had participated in a 
social movement, but like most protesters, he disapproved of the “unfair” tax system and quality 
of Greece’s institutions. Such sentiments indicated that the movement was not just political in 
nature, but social and economic as well. Voulgarelis noted that the “Indignants” movement 
directly contributed to the collapse of the Papandreou government in November 2011, and added 
that on a personal level, the movement strongly influenced his transformation into an “active 
citizen” (2012: 167, 171-173). Finally, Papahadjis stated that he felt at ease in the non-partisan 
atmosphere of the movement, noted that many participants in the popular assemblies were 
speaking in public for the first time, and highlighted the legacy of popular assemblies which 
continued after the “Indignants” movement ceased (2012: 160-161, 167). 
 In a Kapa Research survey of 1,014 individuals conducted in December 2010, it was 
found that 29 percent of adult respondents in Greece had participated in protests that year and 
two-thirds supported the protests, with participants stemming from the “heart” of Greek society, 
including the fully employed, and those who are married or not highly educated, which were 
cited as signs that the anti-austerity protests lacked the typical characteristics of “new social 
movements” as defined by the relevant literature (Rüdig and Karyotis, 2014: 499, 509). A two-
part Kapa Research survey, with an initial sample of 643 individuals participants in the 
“Indignants” movement and a second sample of 1,208 individuals nationwide (including protest 
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participants) confirmed the above findings, showing participants representing a varied cross-
section of social and demographic groups. Societal schisms were nevertheless evident, as 44.2 
percent of protest participants stated their desire for the formation of a new political party, as 
opposed to 30% of the total sample (Real.gr, 2011). Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos identified 
the petty bourgeois and the middle class as the dominant class present in the “Indignants” 
movement, its calls for direct democracy, and a “diagonal dichotomy” between the “patriotic 
bloc” of protesters in the “upper square,” and a “left-wing bloc” focused on issues of social 
justice in the “lower square” (2013: 447-450). Zargani highlighted the political targets of the 
“Indignants,” their reasons for protesting, and their protest repertoire (2012: 52-56, 67-70). 
 Contogeorgis stated that the Greek public was not consulted about the austerity measures 
before they were enacted and that they were illegitimate as a result (2013: 127). He cited the 
December 2008 protests as an uprising against the political system, particularly by youth who 
bypassed the partisan system, but one which was a trap, as it provided the impetus for the 
government to impose harsher law enforcement tactics (2012: 114-116, 121-123), while arguing 
that the “Indignants” movement was doomed to failure as a result of the repetition of old 
practices and the insistence to remain in Syntagma Square (Ibid., 150). His article which 
proposed a peaceful but prolonged blockade of the Parliament building as a strong showing of 
civil society’s determination was largely overlooked in Greece, but was said to have influenced 
the Spanish “Indignados” in the drafting of their manifesto (2013: 268). 
 In a study conducted by Loukidou (2014) where 50 NGOs in Greece’s second-largest 
city, Thessaloniki, were surveyed, 25 percent stated that they had participated in the “Indignant” 
movement, a finding mirrored by Vathakou, who identified many social movements which 
 112 
emerged out of the “Indignant” protests (2015: 167). Pantazidou highlighted the role of a 
category of these movements, open neighborhood assemblies, with over 30 such assemblies 
active in Athens alone, pressuring local authorities, solving local residents’ problems and serving 
as local-level resistance to national policies—with an overall increase in the number of citizens 
involved in “disruptive” actions throughout Greece (2013: 764-767). Together, these accounts 
and findings highlight the motivations and factors cited by individuals who chose to participate 
in the major protest movement of the “Indignants,” the potentially important role of social and 
online media in these protests, and their potential role in breeding new civil society initiatives. 
 Understanding the manner in which the mainstream media covered these protests is key 
in order to be able to analyze and understand the role played by social, new, and alternative 
media in disseminating news and information about these protests, and how their coverage may 
have differed. Several scholars examined the press and media coverage of the “Indignants.” 
Kyriakidou and Osuna, in a thematic analysis of press coverage of the movements in Greece and 
Spain in four newspapers between May and August 2011, found press coverage was generally 
favorable towards the protesters, particularly due to the mass media’s focus on the nonviolent 
and apolitical nature of the protests, the role of social media, and a human-interest focus on the 
individual stories of participants (2014: 213-216). Chrisanthakopoulou, in a content analysis of 
the protest coverage of six major Greek newspapers in 2011, found that the stance of the Greek 
press towards the protesters depended upon the ideological lean of the paper, with the center-
right and the left expressing generally positive views and the center-left generally negative views 
(a center-left government was in power at the time) with no overall tendency to marginalize the 
protesters, who were shown as being non-violent and non-confrontational, while the political 
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character of the protests was minimized (2013: 51, 67-68, 79, 84, 111-112). Filippopoulos, in his 
own content analysis of 141 newscasts and 250 news reports on four major Greek television 
stations in the week immediately following the launch of the protests, also found coverage of the 
protesters to have been mostly positive, with the exception of public broadcaster ERT, while the 
apolitical and non-partisan aspects were emphasized (2013: 31-32, 57, 65-66, 91-93, 100-103). 
 Bouka noted the extensive solidarity campaign which followed ERT’s closure, with a 
societal cross-section of participants ranging from labor unions to students, with calls for “real 
democracy” which drew upon the legacy of the “Indignants” (2015: 25-26, 30-33), while 
Frangiskou noted that the hopes that followed the ERT protests for the formation of a new type 
of participatory, inclusive media in Greece went unrealized (2015: 487-489). 
 Finally, the previously mentioned diaNEOsis/MRB survey of young adults and parents, 
conducted nationally in the autumn of 2016, provides one additional notable insight regarding 
participation in protests and social movements. In this poll, 34.5 percent of 18-35 year olds 
surveyed stated that they had participated in public protests and demonstrations sometime in the 
preceding 12 months, compared with 22 percent of parents polled (2017: 43). 
2.7.2 – Summing up Research on Social Movements and Protests 
 The review of literature in the preceding subsection located recent Greek protest and 
social movements in a global context, social conditions which existed in Greece leading up to the 
years of the economic crisis and the later development of the “Indignants” movements, which 
serves as the starting point for this research project, and highlighted the numerous gaps and 
deficiencies which can be found in the existing body of literature. 
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It is surprising to see that more research has not been published on the movement of the 
“Indignants” and its impact and legacy, as well as its usage of social and new media. Certainly 
compared to the counterpart protests of the Spanish “Indignados,” or other protest movements 
which took place around the globe during that same period, there is much less literature which 
has studied the Greek case. There is also a dearth of research on the protest movements which 
have followed since then in Greece, including the protests surrounding the closure of national 
public broadcaster ERT in June 2013, the demonstrations prior to the July 2015 austerity 
referendum, or on ongoing social and activist movements, such as the protests organized in 
opposition to gold mining activities in the Skouries region. Even much of the existing research 
on social movements and protests in Greece has not provided more than a cursory look at how 
these movements may have utilized or implemented social and new media in their operations. 
 Finally, there is also little, if any, research on how social and new media may have 
contributed to the formation of new political movements and parties in Greece, to the growth in 
popularity of existing and previously minor parties such as SYRIZA (which, since January 2015, 
has co-governed Greece), or their impact in the sharp electoral decline of previously incumbent 
political parties such as New Democracy and PASOK. This research project will take a broader 
look at the relationship between social movements in Greece and social and new media during 
the years of the economic crisis, as well as the potential impact of social and new media in 





Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 – INTRODUCTION 
 This research project employs a multimethodological approach6, combining qualitative 
and quantitative research methods. Qualitative methods are useful for discovering and 
deciphering socially constructed meanings, differing views and values, and varying perceptions 
and understandings of the same events or concepts. They provide detailed descriptions of the 
topical and cultural arenas being examined, while qualitative methods are also valued for their 
contribution to the analysis of quantitative data (Lindlof, 2011: 7; Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 34). 
 The qualitative methods employed include interviews (both individual interviews and 
interviews as part of the illustrative examples), plus historical-descriptive methods. The 
quantitative aspect of this research consists of data garnered from electronic survey 
questionnaires which were sent to three sample populations. The quantitative portion of this 
project provides the opportunity to closely examine select populations which are relevant to the 
overall study as a point of comparison to the themes and trends which may emerge out of the 
interview process. 
 This study approximates a longitudinal study in two important ways. First, several of the 
same individuals, particularly within the context of the five exemplary illustrative examples, 
have been interviewed twice, towards the beginning of the period studied and again towards the 
end of this period. Second, the overall duration of this project, spanning from November 2012 to 
August 2017 and covering the time period between the protests of the “Indignants” in the spring 
and summer of 2011 until August 2017, allows a wide range of social and political developments 
                                               
6 Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for human subjects research was initially granted by The University of 
Texas’ Office of Research Support on December 14, 2012 (study number 2012-11-0041). Continuing review on an 
annual basis, while amendments to questionnaires and other research documentation have been filed as necessary. 
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to be captured and to be reflected in the data that was collected. This enables the identification of 
particular trends or changes over the period of time covered by this research, and significantly, 
this is a time period which is marked by both a protracted economic crisis and by significant 
change in Greece’s political and electoral landscape. 
 The primary sources of data for this study are individual interviews, the five illustrative 
examples of focus organizations and interviews conducted from members of each organization, 
and surveys (conducted electronically), in addition to contextual information provided via the 
historical-descriptive analysis. 
3.2 – RESEARCH QUESTIONS, CATEGORIES AND OBJECT OF ANALYSIS 
 The objective of this research project is to examine the role of social and new media in 
the potential rejuvenation of Greece’s public sphere and civil society during the years of the 
financial crisis, and specifically between May 2011 and August 2017, with on-the-ground 
research occurring through most of this time. This period was selected as it spans begins at the 
time of the widespread protests of the “Indignants” in Athens and cities throughout Greece (in 
the spring and summer of 2011). This was a period which saw several changes in government, a 
significant alteration of the country’s electoral landscape, the rise of two new political parties to 
power, the prolonged deepening of the country’s economic crisis, and several protest and activist 
movements. The timeline below displays some of the most significant moments in Greece’s 
recent history, while the various stages of research activity and data collection that were 




Table 2: Timeline of Recent Events in Greece and Research Stages 
May-July 2011 “Indignants” protest movement throughout Greece 
June 2011 Mid-term austerity agreement passed by Greek parliament 
February-March 2012 
Second memorandum agreement and further austerity measures 
passed, major protests in Greece 
May 6, 2012 Parliamentary elections, no clear winner emerges 
June 17, 2012 
Follow-up parliamentary elections, New Democracy-PASOK-
Democratic Left coalition government formed June 20, 2012 
September- 
October 2012 
Arrival in Greece. Initial development of research questionnaires 
for individual interviews and illustrative examples 
November 2012-
November 2013 
Individual interviews and initial interviews of illustrative 
examples conducted 
June 11, 2013 




Initial development of survey questionnaire 
April-May 2014 Pilot study conducted, to test survey questionnaire 
June-November 2014 
Preparation work for survey. Revisions to questionnaire, 
identification and selection of final sample populations 
May 25, 2014 
European parliamentary elections, local and regional elections. 
SYRIZA finishes in first place in the European parliamentary race. 
December 1 2014-
March 15 2015 
Survey conducted via electronic questionnaire 
January 25, 2015 
Snap Greek parliamentary elections. SYRIZA emerges victorious, 
forms coalition government with Independent Greeks. 
March- 
November 2015 
Stage one of research of relevant literature, for comprehensive 
exams and literature review 
July 5, 2015 
Historic referendum held on whether to accept or reject austerity deal 
proposed by Greece’s lenders. Deal rejected by voters. 
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Table 2 continued 
July-August 2015 
Government passes third memorandum agreement and further 
austerity measures, contradicting referendum vote result 
September 20, 2015 
Snap parliamentary elections held, SYRIZA again finishes in first 
place and forms coalition government with the Independent Greeks 
January-October 2016 Stage two of research of relevant literature, for literature review 
November 2016- 
May 2017 
Development of dissertation proposal 
December 2016- 
August 2017 
Final round of interviews conducted, including follow-up 
interviews 
May 2017 
Fourth memorandum agreement and accompanying austerity measures 
debated in Greek Parliament, ratified 
 
The main concepts guiding this research study include the public sphere, civil society, 
and social and new media. Specifically, this study examines the role of social and new media in 
fostering the rejuvenation of the existing Greek public sphere or the formation of new public 
spheres in Greece, the role of social and new media in rejuvenating or bolstering Greek civil 
society, and the role of social and new media in fostering or promoting new social movements, 
political initiatives, and alternative media outlets.  
 Several different categories of analysis are utilized as part of this study. They include the 
diversity of opinion and diversity of sources, the inclusion and participation of oppositional 
voices in the dominant public sphere (including the mainstream media) or through  an increase in 
the quantity or visibility of alternative and new media outlets, the growth in number or visibility 
of new civil society or “third sector” organizations and entities and/or the participation level in 
such initiatives, the diversity of new political parties or new social or grassroots movements, and 
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the contributions of social and new media to all of the aforementioned categories. The object of 
analysis for this research study is how social and new media has altered public discourse and 
civil society in Greece, as measured via individual perspectives (determined through the 
individual interviews that have been conducted), organizational perspectives (as measured 
through the five illustrative examples of focus organizations that this study includes), as well as 
the perspectives of particular categories of individuals (through electronic survey research and 
the three sample populations which were surveyed). 
 The following research questions and subquestions guided this research project: 
RQ1: How have social and new media challenged clientelism and diaploki in Greece via 
contributing to the expansion or rejuvenation of the public sphere and civil society in 
Greece during the years of the economic crisis? 
 
RQ2: How do public institutions, as well as civil society, citizen, and activist 
organizations and movements employ social media to engage with the public, to spread 
their message and to organize political or social movements? 
 
SQ1: How have social and new media contributed to political change, changes in 
political behavior, or the formation of new political movements in Greece during 
the crisis? 
SQ2: How have social and new media been used towards the formation of social 
movements and protest movements in Greece during the crisis? 
RQ3: Do social and new media differentiate themselves from the mainstream media in 
Greece, and if so, how? 
 
SQ3: How have social and new media contributed to the formation and 
development of alternative or community-oriented media outlets in Greece? 
SQ4: Are social and new media in Greece considered to be more credible sources 
of news and information compared to traditional, mainstream media institutions? 
 
These research questions and subquestions are closely interrelated, and together, they cover all of 
the categories of analysis that this research project focuses on. Furthermore, the research 
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questions seek to address the many gaps which were identified in the existing research and 
literature, and which were discussed in the literature review in the preceding section, which 
pertain to the Greek public sphere, Greek civil society, the Greek media landscape, alternative 
media in Greece, social and new media in Greece, and social movements and protests in Greece. 
These gaps include a notable lack of research on the specific impact of social and new media on 
the Greek public sphere and on civil society in Greece, the potential impact of social and new 
media on the formation of new political parties and movements in Greece, the usage of social 
and new media by these new political parties and movements, how mainstream media have 
reacted to “competition” from social and new media outlets, and how social and new media may 
have helped foster new alternative, community, or radical media initiatives in Greece. The 
following subsections will present the methodological tools utilized in this project. 
3.3 – INTERVIEWS 
 Qualitative interviewing is a research method that is particularly well suited for 
developing detailed descriptions of specific phenomena or ideas, describing processes, 
developing holistic description, learning how events are interpreted and understood, and bridging 
intersubjectivities (Weiss, 1994: 8-9). They allow researchers to understand the experiences, 
knowledge, and/or worldviews of the interviewees, often providing a window into the 
experiences of an individual who has “been there” or “is there” (Lindlof & Taylor, 1995: 173-
174; Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 3; Seidman, 1998: 3). It is for these reasons that quantitative 
interviews were selected as an integral component of this research project. 
 The interview method employed was that of semi-structured interviews. Also called 
focused interviews, semi-structured interviews allow for each interview to be tailored to the 
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specific expertise of the individual being interviewed, while also providing a set of standard 
questions which are directly relevant to the research questions and the overall project, which are 
asked of each participant. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews do not impose a set of 
response categories upon respondents (Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 5-6). 
 For each interview, a rapport process with the participant is first employed (Spradley, 
1979: 78) and interview guides were employed during the interview process, providing a list of 
standard questions addressed in each interview, as well as specific notes on each participant 
(Weiss, 1994: 46-49). Question types which were employed in the interviewing process include 
example and experience questions (Spradley, 1979: 88-89), contrast questions (Ibid., 157; Baxter 
and Babbie, 2004: 334-335), “grand tour” and “mini-tour,” or “main” questions (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2011: 203; Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 145-147; Spradley, 1979: 86-88), and follow-up 
questions (Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 154). IRB approval for human subjects research was obtained 
from all participants via signed and dated paper consent forms, while all participants 
affirmatively provided their approval for the audio of the interview to be recorded. Two pilot 
interviews were conducted in a prior visit to Greece in 2011, to refine the final questionnaire. 
 The sample of interview participants was primarily selected via purposeful (or non-
probability) sampling, based on informed judgments on which participants would be useful to 
recruit (Baxter & Babbie, 2004: 110; Lindlof & Taylor, 2011: 110). Within this framework, the 
selection of the interview sample was guided by such principles as criterion sampling (candidates 
who possessed specific criteria which made them a worthy case to be interviewed), maximum 
variation sampling (in order to ensure that as many different variations of a case were explored), 
recruitment of typical and atypical cases, quota sampling (such as ensuring that at least one 
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interview with an individual from each political party represented in the Greek or European 
Parliaments was conducted), and snowball sampling (where certain interviewees also served as 
informants, suggesting other possible candidates to be interviewed) (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011: 
111-116). For example, in the case of politicians and members of Parliament who were 
interviewed, effort was made to interview at least one representative from each political party 
represented in the Greek Parliament during the period being studied, plus individuals from a 
diverse range of smaller political parties lacking parliamentary representation. In the case of 
snowball sampling, journalists who participated were particularly willing to share their network 
of contacts, and this was the primary means through which politicians and political personnel 
were recruited, who were otherwise difficult to successfully reach and recruit. 
 In total, the interview sample consists of a total of 92 individual interviews with 94 
individuals, with a response rate of 74.80 percent (123 invitations were extended in total). 
Interviewees included journalists, bloggers, social media professionals, mass media 
professionals, academics, activists, civil society representatives, opinion leaders, politicians, 
political party personnel, employees of government ministries, and candidates for public office. 
While there was no pre-determined number of interviews established, interviewing continued 
until it was deemed that a saturation point had been reached (Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 72-73). One 
guiding principle, however, was to interview at least a few individuals who together were likely 
to constitute comparison cases (Weiss, 1994: 29). Interviews were all conducted face-to-face and 
were audio recorded, with affirmative permission provided by each subject for the recording to 
take place. No interviewees dropped out of the study at any time. 
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Regarding the 31 individuals who were invited to participate but who ultimately did not, 
the majority of invitees were politicians and public officials (particularly from major political 
parties). For these invitees, it is possible that e-mail and phone communications were filtered by 
staffers and the invitations never reached the officials themselves, while for others, a heavy 
workload may have been a contributing factor in their inability to participate. 
 The interviewees chosen to participate in this research study were selected because their 
knowledge areas or areas of experience and expertise were deemed to be directly relevant to the 
conceptual areas being studied, including the public sphere, civil society, and social and new 
media. Most of the interviewees, though not all, also maintained an active presence on one or 
more social media tools, such as Facebook or Twitter. Interviews also included atypical cases, 
such as a “man on the street” (a retired banker) with no relation at all to the media, political 
parties, civil society organizations, or activist movements or groups; an unemployed journalist, a 
small-island blogger, and journalists and other individuals who were not social media users. 
Initial outreach for the first individual interviews which were conducted followed two 
strategies: sending out invitations to prominent personalities that I was aware of and who 
maintained a very active social media presence, and outreach to existing networks of contacts, 
both for interviews and for suggestions and recommendations of others that I could come in 
contact with. Following this latter model, a form of snowball sampling was practiced, where 
participants were invited to recommend other individuals for potential participation in the study, 
particularly to fill in existing gaps in the body of interview subjects. However, “cold” invitations 
were also sent out, for instance to political parties where I could not find any means to contact a 
specific individual. In such communications, invitations were extended either to specific 
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individuals whom I wished to interview, or a request was made for a representative of that 
organization or entity who would be available for an interview. 
On all levels, numerous efforts were undertaken to develop a diverse and broad sample. 
Politically, participants were chosen across all of the political parties represented in parliament 
during the time period of this study, as well as from many smaller political parties and 
movements not represented in parliament, providing a wide diversity of political opinions and 
viewpoints. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with representatives of local and regional 
government, in addition to representatives from the national government and political parties. 
Journalists were interviewed from media outlets which ranged from major privately-owned 
television stations, to upstart online publications, to mainstream newspapers, to alternative online 
radio stations, running the gamut from publicly- and privately-owned mediums and including 
representatives of print, broadcast, and online-only outlets. Furthermore, well-known bloggers 
were interviewed as well. Representatives from a variety of civil society initiatives were 
interviewed, ranging from professionalized NGOs to grassroots and activist organizations and 
movements. While from a geographical standpoint most interviewees were located in Athens, 
several interviews were also conducted in Thessaloniki, Greece’s second largest city, the 
Skouries region (site of controversial gold mining activity that has been a hotbed of activism in 
recent years), and the island of Symi. Even in the microcosm of Thessaloniki, interviews were 
conducted with a cross-section of individuals, including political personnel, journalists, bloggers, 
academics, and activists. In short, the “three pillars” of this research project: the public sphere, 
civil society, as well as social and new media, are well-represented through the individual 
interviews that have been conducted. 
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Nevertheless, biases are likely to exist within the sample of interviewees. Most interview 
subjects maintained some sort of online presence or other type of public presence, such as an 
active social media account, or were otherwise easily accessible via online means (such as 
personal websites or blogs, directly via social media accounts, or via publicly available telephone 
numbers). Several participants were recommended by other participants as part of the process of 
snowball sampling, and there may be inherent biases in terms of the socio-demographic circles 
which these particular individuals occupy. The sample is also largely centered around Athens and 
Thessaloniki, Greece’s two largest cities by far, and it is possible that respondents from less 
urban parts of Greece would view social and new media and their impact differently. From a 
secondary standpoint though, several elected officials were interviewed whose electoral districts 
were outside of Greece’s two main urban centers, and it is possible that their insights could, in 
part, help address this potential bias. Ideologically though, great efforts were taken to ensure that 
a very full spectrum of political parties and voices were included in the interview sample. 
 All of the interviews were transcribed, while quotations have occasionally been edited to 
eliminate conversational spacers, false starts, and other irrelevant material, and to reorganize for 
coherence (Ibid., 197-198). A coding process was then employed, via the use of a codebook, pilot 
coding, and a combination of the following methods: attribute coding, magnitude coding, 
simultaneous coding, descriptive/topic coding, evaluation coding, holistic coding, subcoding, 
second-cycle coding, and metasummary (Saldaña, 2013). 
Specifically, this set of coding tools was utilized to best organize a vast amount of 
interview data that was collected. Initially, the transcribed data from these interviews was entered 
into an Excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet contained columns for information about each 
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interview (such as the name of the interviewee, a classification which best described their 
profession or position (for instance, “academic” or “journalist”), the date the interview was 
conducted, the location where the interview was conducted, the specimen/excerpt of the 
interview being transcribed and the time block it corresponds to in each respective audio 
recording of the interview), a metasummary of the interview, four main columns for coding and 
subcoding each excerpt, and more. The transcribed interviews themselves were spread across six 
tabs within the spreadsheet: one tab for the individual interviews, and five tabs corresponding to 
the interviews for each of the five illustrative examples. An additional tab was created to keep 
track of metadata regarding the interviews, including demographic details of the interviewees. 
The Excel spreadsheet was continuously tweaked throughout the process of transcription, 
to best accommodate coding needs which arose as the transcription process was navigated. These 
revisions included the insertion of additional columns for subcoding, as well as a column for the 
metasummary of each excerpt, when necessary. Minor as it may appear, this latter step was of 
tremendous importance to the overall process of coding. During this process, connections and 
insights began to be made with material that had previously been researched, which had 
addressed in the literature review, which directly addressed the project’s research questions or 
subquestions, or with other relevant concepts, thoughts, ideas, or arguments intended to be 
addressed in the final dissertation. Adding these metasummaries during the coding process 
resulted in the development of a running record of these important insights. 
Throughout the transcription process, the manner in which excerpts were coded and 
subcoded was further refined. It did not take very long to determine that four categories of codes 
and subcodes would be most appropriate for this process, with the primary coding category 
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focusing on “big picture” topics relevant to my research, such as “public sphere” or “civil 
society,” the secondary category focusing on descriptive terms that are relevant to that particular 
excerpt or artifact (such as “transformation” or “definition,”) a third category focusing as a 
descriptor of the particular entity or concept that was being discussed (such as “mass medium,” 
or “clientelism and diaploki”), and finally, for the fourth category, a specific term or phrase is 
used to most closely describe the concept or entity being discussed (including, for instance, 
“Mega Channel,” “Radiobubble,” “December 2008 protests,” or “SYRIZA”). In turn, these 
codes and subcodes were easily searchable within the spreadsheet on a column-by-column basis, 
allowing for the easy location of all relevant excerpts to which a specific code had been assigned. 
Methodologically, the coding method which was primarily employed was “descriptive 
coding.” This method assigns basic labels to data to maintain an inventory of topics. The 
technique of “simultaneous coding,” where two or more codes are assigned to the same attribute, 
was also frequently employed, in two specific ways: first, via the four columns of codes and 
subcodes which ranged from lesser to greater specificity, and also within each coding category. 
For instance, a specific excerpt could be coded both as “public sphere” and “mass media” in the 
primary coding column, if both of those codes were deemed relevant to that particular excerpt. 
Subcoding is, of course, a coding technique in itself, while this combination of coding 
techniques is itself known methodologically as “eclectic coding.” Additionally, a form of 
“structural coding,” a technique where excerpts or artifacts from the data are coded in reference 
to the specific research question(s) (or subquestion(s)) that they address, was also developed to 
help organize the vast amount of transcribed data. This technique was tweaked in the following 
way: aside from the specific research question(s) and/or subquestion(s) that each excerpt was 
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relevant to, the relevant dissertation chapter that the material was applicable to was also notated, 
to better organize the transcribed data. Finally, a form of “attribute coding” was also performed, 
as relevant demographic attributes about each participant (particularly their name and their 
position or job title) is being recorded in a separate, dedicated column in the coding spreadsheet. 
To keep track of these codes, a separate coding sheet was developed. An initial list of 
codes and subcodes was developed, in accordance with standard methodological practice, and 
this sheet continuously revised and updated with new codes and subcodes throughout the coding 
process. Newly-added codes and subcodes were then retroactively added back to previously 
coded excerpts whenever deemed relevant and necessary. This coding sheet served as a constant 
reference for the codes which were utilized, ensuring that duplicate or redundant codes were not 
created and that existing codes were not overlooked, while the usage of a standardized set of 
codes that would be easily searchable within the spreadsheet whenever necessary was ensured. 
3.4 – SURVEY RESEARCH 
 The method of survey research, by means of the creation of an electronic survey 
questionnaire, was selected to provide a quantitative aspect to the research project, and to probe 
and explore three specific sample populations which are directly relevant to the research being 
performed with further depth. This method also provides the opportunity to potentially draw 
conclusions from the findings of the survey, which could, in turn, be compared with trends 
observed in the qualitative interviewing process. 
 The three sample populations which were selected are: Greece’s members of the 
European Parliament (as elected in the May 2014 elections), the chief editors of Greece’s 14 
largest daily and Sunday newspapers, as determined by official circulation figures from 
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September 2014 (prior to the launch of the survey)7, and finally, representatives from civil 
society and citizens’ organizations in two randomly selected Greek prefectures outside of Athens. 
These two regions were the prefectures of Korinthia and Evia. These three populations closely 
pertain to the study’s core conceptual areas of focus (the public sphere, civil society, social and 
new media), and were also selected due to manageability. Greece’s representatives in the 
European Parliament were selected due to the ability to easily send questionnaires to the entire 
population. This was likewise the case for the sample of chief editors of Greece’s major 
newspapers, and the representatives of two smaller regions outside of Athens (adding a non-
Athens-centric perspective to the study as well). For the latter, the selection of organizations 
comprising the sample consisted of all relevant organizations which could be located via the 
enallaktikos.gr website, which was found to offer the most complete and detailed listing of civil 
society, grassroots, and citizens’ groups in each prefecture of Greece. 
 Once these sample populations were determined, paper-based pilot surveys were initially 
conducted in person amongst populations that were similar to the final survey, but which would 
not actually be included in the final research project (Fowler, 1993: 12). These populations 
included three representatives of non-parliamentary political parties, three journalists at 
independent and alternative media outlets, and three representatives of civil society organizations 
located in Athens. Each participant was asked to provide feedback about the survey, including 
                                               
7 Official circulation figures from the week of September 1-7, 2014 were used, including the six highest-circulating 
daily afternoon newspapers, the highest-circulating daily morning newspaper, the four highest-circulating Sunday-
only newspapers, and the highest-circulating weekly newspaper. In addition, daily broadsheet Kathimerini was also 
included in the sample, even though its circulation figures (which are comparable to the country’s most popular 
newspapers) were, until May 2017, were not included in the figures provided by the official “Europe” Greek press 
distribution agency, but only published in Sunday editions of Kathimerini. Tabloid newspaper Espresso, despite 
relatively high circulation figures, was not included, due to its focus on celebrity and lifestyle news. Circulation data 
can be found at http://content-mcdn.feed.gr/pegasus/Multimedia/pdf/PDP_20140901.pdf and http://content-
mcdn.feed.gr/pegasus/Multimedia/pdf/PWP_201436.pdf. 
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questions or answer choices they found to be confusing, and suggestions for other questions or 
topics to address. The feedback received from the pilot survey was used to make many 
improvements and clarifications to the questionnaire prior to the start of the actual survey period. 
The types of questions included in both the pilot study and the final questionnaire 
included open-ended and closed-ended questions, composite measures, and contingency 
measures (Baxter & Babbie, 2004: 170-185). While most of the questionnaire was uniform 
across the three sample populations, the final section of the questionnaire was customized for 
each respective population. An online survey platform, Limesurvey, was chosen to host the 
electronic questionnaire. Limesurvey was selected due to its dynamic platform and features, 
which allowed multiple question types, the display of questions that would be contingent on 
previous replies (this feature was used in order to display the correct final questionnaire section 
for each participant), its support of multiple languages, its data collection and export features, 
and the ease of sending invitations and follow-up messages to those invited to participate in the 
survey. Through this platform, e-mails were sent to each of the individuals who were invited to 
participate. Follow-up invitations were sent by e-mail at regular weekly intervals, until the 
survey period (three months) concluded (Ibid., 189). A generous amount of time—over three 
months—was afforded to invitees to participate, with the understanding that due to time 
constraints, lost or unseen e-mails, the intervening holiday season during the survey period, or 
other factors, many potential participants would not be likely to immediately respond. 
Specifically, the survey was open from December 1, 2014 until March 15, 2015. Introductory 
messages and follow-up e-mails were sent in both Greek and English, and the entire survey 
platform (including the survey introduction, consent form, and questionnaire) was also available 
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in both languages. IRB consent for human subjects research was obtained from all participants 
via the online survey system (online agreement and electronic signature). Survey participants 
were informed about their rights, in both Greek and English, including the anonymity of the 
survey and the protection of their identities and responses, their right to withdraw consent and 
participation at any time during the survey, and their right to refuse to answer any question in the 
survey, other than one question asked for purposes of classification (and selection of the 
appropriate questionnaire by the online survey platform) in one of the three sample populations 
of the survey. These rights were clarified in both the initial e-mail invitation to the survey, and 
during the initial process of launching the survey via the online Limesurvey platform. 
As shown in Table 3, the response rate was robust for newspaper editors, moderate for 
representatives of the European Parliament, and low for civil society and citizens’ organizations.  
This can potentially be explained by a number of different factors. Newspaper editors, already 
accustomed to an active role in the public sphere due to their profession, likely took a strong 
interest in the research being conducted. Conversely, the moderate response rate of Greece’s 
European parliamentary representatives can likely be attributed to their heavy workload and 
frequent travels between Greece, Brussels, and Strasbourg, as well as the possibility that e-mail 
invitations and messages left in follow-up telephone calls to their offices may have been filtered 
by their staffers and never reached the representatives themselves. The low response rate from 
civil society and citizens’ organizations can likely be attributed to suspicion of outsiders (which 
is a common trait in Greece, especially amongst organizations that might not be favorable to the 
government or existing political system), sensitivity towards answering questions of a political 
nature, the potential inactivity of some groups, the lack of a representative from these 
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organizations that would be willing to take the time to respond to a questionnaire on behalf of the 
group, or not regularly checking their e-mail. The long questionnaire may have also dissuaded 
some from participation. It should also be noted that in the sample of Greek representatives in 
the European parliament, the seven responses that were received came from representatives of 
the top four political parties in the 2014 election8, with two responses from each of the top three 
parties (SYRIZA, New Democracy, Golden Dawn), and one response from PASOK. 








Members of the 
European 
Parliament 
7 21 33.33% 
Chief editors of 
major 
newspapers 
10 14 71.43% 
Representatives 
of civil society 
organizations 
6 51 11.76% 
TOTALS 23 86 26.74% 
 
 Due to the low overall number of completed surveys, the data garnered from the survey 
questionnaires is  not sufficient to draw statistical conclusions from, and as such, raw data from 
the survey results will not be presented in this dissertation, save for the appendix. Indeed, a more 
complex analysis of the data (using, for instance, software such as SPSS) was deemed 
unnecessary for the purposes of this study. Instead, the main objective of utilizing this data 
                                               
8 Official results of the 2014 European parliamentary election in Greece are available at http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/may2014/e/public/index.html. 
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would be to draw conclusions and detect potential trends or patterns of a more descriptive, rather 
than complex, nature, across the three survey populations and in comparison with the findings of 
the individual interviews and illustrative examples (see Lindlof & Taylor, 2011: 7). In this sense, 
the results of the survey could be viewed as data derived from in-depth, structured qualitative 
interviews, separate from the individual interviews and illustrative examples. 
3.5 – ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
 To help answer the three primary research questions, five illustrative examples of focus 
organizations and entities were selected. The objective of studying these illustrative examples 
was to examine five specific organizations spanning different parts of the public sphere and civil 
society, including three media organizations, a political party, and NGOs, how they have utilized 
social and new media in their operations, and how social and new media tools have helped these 
organizations bolster or enhance their contribution to the public sphere and civil society. 
 These five organizations were selected based on a number of factors, including their 
relations to the conceptual areas of focus of this research project (civil society, the public sphere, 
as well as social and new media), and their prominent position in the Greek social and new 
media sphere. Three main pillars of the public sphere are encompassed in these five examples, 
including the media (in several forms), a political party, and a non-governmental organization. 
Furthermore, by comparing a mainstream with an alternative media outlet (Skai and 
Radiobubble), and with a “hybrid” mainstream and alternative outlet (enikos.gr), potentially 
useful comparisons could be made across these three organizations.  
 Within each case, multiple interviews were conducted with individuals representing a 
broad cross-section of organizational roles and responsibilities, including social and new media 
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managers, editors, journalists, radio producers, communication strategists, political party leaders 
and candidates for public office, volunteers, and activists. This was done in order to attain 
multiple perspectives from within each organization from individuals employed in a variety of 
capacities and who may each have had different relationships with the usage of social and new 
media within that organization. 
What follows is a listing of the five organizations which were selected as the illustrative 
examples for this study, including a description of each organization, the reasons why that 
particular entity was selected, the research questions that particular illustrative example is geared 
towards answering, and the number of interviews (including follow-up interviews) that were 
conducted for each organization: 
 Skai Media Group: a mainstream media group consisting of Skai TV, a television station 
with nationwide coverage; Skai Radio, a news-talk radio station in Athens; the web portal 
skai.gr; and the Kathimerini and eKathimerini newspapers and online portals. Skai was 
chosen to provide a mainstream media counterweight to the other four illustrative 
examples, and due to its strong position in the Greek media landscape. It is an outlet that 
is active in television, radio, the press, and online, and is one of the most prominent 
sources of news in Greece, with Kathimerini often considered the Greek “newspaper of 
record.” Skai’s online news portal is one of the most popular in Greece, having been 
ranked as the country’s most popular traditional news source in the Reuters Institute’s 
2016 study on digital news consumption in Greece (Kalogeropoulos et al., 2016: 42). 
Skai’s online news portal is also arguably the most comprehensive of those of any of 
Greece’s major television or radio stations. The Skai Media Group has been perhaps the 
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most active of Greece’s mainstream media groups in terms of its usage of online and 
social media tools. This illustrative example targets RQ3 in particular. A total of six 
interviews with six individuals were conducted as part of this case study, including two 
interviews with Skai’s respective social media managers in 2013 and 2017. 
 enikos.gr: an online news portal founded in 2011, in the midst of the economic crisis, by 
the prominent journalist, television anchor, and radio personality Nikos Chatzinikolaou. 
enikos.gr is directly connected to Chatzinikolaou’s live television panel discussion 
program Ston Eniko, while the design of the web portal bears a very close resemblance to 
a blog. This outlet was selected because it straddles the line between “mainstream” and 
“alternative” and because it is a “product” of the economic crisis, having been founded in 
2011. It is operated, and indeed named after, one of Greece’s most prominent journalists, 
with a long career in broadcasting and publishing. He is the part-owner of radio news 
stations Real FM in Athens and Thessaloniki (which were, and continue to be, the top-
rated radio stations in their respective cities)9, owner of one of the highest-circulation 
Sunday newspapers (Real News), and as of this writing, is the main presenter of the main 
evening newscast of one of Greece’s largest privately-owned television stations, Antenna 
TV. At the same time, enikos.gr is designed with a blog format and operates very 
similarly to a blog, with many brief news updates throughout the day, a very active 
comments section, and some opinionated postings interspersed with news reporting. The 
blog is also tied in to Chatzinikolaou’s television program, “Ston Eniko,” and for a time 
this program was broadcast exclusively via enikos.gr, when it was left without a home on 
                                               
9 Official radio audience data for Athens and Thessaloniki is available at https://www.focusbari.gr/media-
research/radio/research-radio-attica.html. 
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mainstream television. Furthermore, enikos.gr is considered one of Greece’s most 
popular online news sources. In the 2016 study of digital news consumption conducted 
by the Reuters Institute, enikos.gr was ranked as the fourth most-visited news website on 
a weekly basis, and the third most popular source of news that is located exclusively 
online (Ibid., 43-44). enikos.gr was chosen as one of the five illustrative examples 
precisely because it straddles the boundary between “mainstream” and “alternative” 
media, while maintaining a very active online presence. The specific research question 
this case study aims to contribute to is RQ1. A total of four interviews with three 
individuals were conducted as part of this illustrative example. 
 Radiobubble: an online radio station and web community which features programming 
of an activist and community orientation, as well as the popular Twitter hashtag #rbnews, 
which has been used as a point of reference during newsworthy events in Greece, 
particularly during protests and other social movements. Radiobubble features a variety 
of news and talk programs, often of an opinionated or non-mainstream nature, while a 
number of civil society initiatives, such as Tutorpool, providing tutoring to children in 
low-income households, were also developed out of the community which Radiobubble 
has helped foster. Though this is no longer the case, Radiobubble was, for several years 
(including much of the period covered by this study) based out of a physical social space, 
the Radiobubble Café, which served as a space of organizing and producing radio 
broadcasts, as a meeting space for various activist and grassroots groups, and as a space 
of socialization and communication. It is due to all of the aforementioned reasons that 
Radiobubble was selected. It is one of the most visible “alternative” media outlets in 
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Greece, has served as an incubator for a number of other initiatives which could be seen 
as contributors to Greek civil society, and built a reputation in Greece and abroad for its 
coverage of protests and social movements within the country. Among the five illustrative 
examples that have been selected, Radiobubble represents alternative media, but its 
activities also closely pertain to civil society. RQ1 and RQ3 are targeted by this 
illustrative example, while a total of eight interviews with eight different individuals were 
conducted as part of this specific illustrative example, in 2012-2013, 2015, and 2017. 
 Independent Greeks – Anexartitoi Ellines: a political party which was founded in early 
2012, in the midst of the Greek economic crisis. The launch of the party was announced 
on Facebook, and especially in the first months of its existence, the party was extremely 
active on Facebook, inviting the public to help draft the party’s manifesto and policy 
platform, via online polls. Within months of its foundation, in the snap parliamentary 
elections of May 2012 and the follow-up parliamentary elections of June 2012, the 
Independent Greeks were able to enter Parliament, with a 10 percent and 8 percent 
showing, respectively. In January 2015, following that month’s snap parliamentary 
elections, the Independent Greeks joined the SYRIZA-led government as minority 
coalition partner (albeit with a reduced electoral share, closer to 4 percent), and this was 
the case following new parliamentary elections which were held in September 2015. 
Party leader Panos Kammenos, currently Greece’s Minister of Defense, is very act ive and 
often outspoken on social media. The Independent Greeks are perhaps the first party in 
Greece which truly harnessed the potential power and reach of social media to establish 
their electoral base. Within the five illustrative examples which have been selected, the 
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Independent Greeks political party represents the “official public sphere,” or political 
sphere, and were selected due to their reputation in Greece as being “the party of 
Facebook” due to the manner in which the party utilized this social medium during its 
launch and in the first months of its existence. RQ2 is primarily targeted by this 
illustrative example, for which a total of nine interviews with nine individuals were 
conducted, in 2012-2013 and in 2017. 
 Boroume: a non-governmental organization based in Athens. Boroume was founded in 
2011, in the midst of the economic crisis, and its mission is to limit food waste by helping 
to link organizations which possess unsold or excess food, with organizations which 
require such food to assist those in need. Boroume was known from the start as having 
been founded, in part, “on” social media, being particularly engaged with social media 
tools. Boroume serves as the “civil society representative” amongst the five illustrative 
examples which have been selected. RQ1 is addressed by this particular case study, for 
which five interviews with four individuals were conducted, in 2012-2013 and in 2017. 
 For each of the illustrative examples, the primary objective is to explore how these 
organizations have utilized social and new media in their efforts, the extent to which social and 
new media have provided avenues to spread their message and participate in the public sphere 
that were previously unavailable to them, the number and variety of social and new media outlets 
used and their overall reach, and their perspectives as to how social and new media have 
impacted the broader public sphere and/or civil society and their specific sector (media, politics, 
non-governmental organizations). Interviews were conducted with multiple individuals 
associated with the organization in question, across multiple roles and positions, including 
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individuals responsible for the organization’s social and new media presence, administrative 
personnel, members of Parliament, volunteers, journalists, and others). The interview methods 
employed were identical to the individual interviews conducted as part of this study, through the 
utilization of semi-structured interviews, with additional questions formulated that were asked of 
all participants within each specific illustrative example. Follow-up interviews have been 
conducted as deemed necessary. As with the individual interviews, IRB approval for human 
subjects research was obtained from all participants via signed and dated paper consent forms, 
and all participants provided their approval for the audio of the interview to be recorded. 
3.6 – HISTORICAL-DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 This research method pertains to the analysis of the Greek media landscape and the Greek 
blogosphere—particularly the phenomenon of “news blogs” becoming popular “alternative” 
sources of news—which will foreground the overall media environment and the context in which 
social and new media outlets are operating today and what, in particular, they might be different 
to. This approach is utilized to identify the main characteristics and trends in the present-day 
Greek media environment, including the regulatory environment in which they operate and the 
restrictions that it may present in the operation of these outlets; plus relevant historical factors. 
3.7 – INDICATORS 
 This research project is one which is largely based on opinions. There has long been a 
perception which evident in the existing body of literature and research, that Greece is a country 
with a limited or atrophic public sphere and civil society, with a high degree of clientelism, 
corruption, and patronage; and a low degree of institutional credibility and trustworthiness. In 
this project, the object of analysis is how social and new media has potentially altered public 
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discourse and civil society in Greece, as measured via the perspectives of individuals (via the 
individual interviews that have been conducted), the perspectives of organizations (as 
determined through the five illustrative examples), and the perspectives of specific categories of 
individuals (as determined through the surveys which were conducted across three sample 
populations). Even though the survey research was intended to provide quantitative data, many 
of the questions included in the survey relied upon the participants’ perceptions of issues which 
relate to the public sphere, civil society, and social and new media.  
 Ultimately, this study seeks to determine impact of social and new media on the Greek 
public sphere, Greek civil society, and Greek public discourse. How can these potential changes 
be determined or measured? Utilizing the definitions of the public sphere and civil society which 
were presented earlier, and the distinction that has been made between these two contexts, 
several indicators which could capture whether or not the public sphere or civil society has been 
rejuvenated are utilized in this study. These indicators are listed in the table below: 
Table 4: Indicators 
Public Sphere Civil Society 
 Formation of new political parties 
 Creation of new media outlets, including 
alternative media outlets 
 Broadening of public discourse 
 Influencing and fostering protests and 
social movements 
 Changes in the political landscape (such as 
voter behavior or participation) 
 Reduction in clientelism, patronage, and 
“diaploki” 
 Increased usage of social and new media 
for matters of public interest and concern 
 An increase in the number of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) 
 An increase in the number of citizens’ 
movements and activist movements 
 An increase in volunteerism  
 Increased citizen involvement in public 
affairs 
 Increased awareness of civil society 
organizations and initiatives 
 Increased usage of social and new media 
for civil society efforts and initiatives 
 Development of media outlets by civil 
society groups 
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 Moreover, via the illustrative examples, the specific means through which social and new 
media have been used by various actors was ascertained. This includes a determination of which 
social or new media channels have been used most frequently and how they have been used; the 
types of actors or organizations that have used them; and their contribution to the efforts of 
alternative media outlets, political or social movements, and civil society initiatives. The survey 
research, in turn, allowed perceptions of social and new media’s impact on civil society and the 
public sphere to be measured and to be compared across the three sample populations.  
 Finally, by describing the existing media landscape and context in which social and new 
media have arisen in Greece, there will be a point of comparison made which will permit a 
determination as to how social and new media are different, and what they are different to. 
3.8 – ENSURING VALIDITY 
 Internal validity was ensured via a variety of methods. For instance, the process of 
subject selection and determination that interviewees were valid members of the groups they 
were thought to be a part of was confirmed via the opening question in each interview, which 
asked the subjects to describe their specific role and involvement within that respective 
organization. The Hawthorne Effect and Unintentional Expectancy were alleviated through the 
development of a rapport process with each interviewee, and further confirmed via the overall 
consistency of the respondents’ replies. Regarding procedure validity, the same basic interview 
guide and questionnaires were employed across all interviews that were conducted, all interviews 
were performed face-to-face, and all followed the same procedure of explaining the rights of the 
participant, obtaining consent for participation and for audio recording the interview, and 
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performing the interview itself. Moreover, for the survey questionnaires, the same questionnaires 
on the same online platform were used for all participants and sample populations. 
 For a nationally-focused case study, as is the case with this research project, it is difficult 
to ensure that results here will necessarily be applicable to other national contexts and 
environments in other countries. However, to the extent that determining factors are identified, 
the broader relationships between social media, political democracy, and conventional media can 















Chapter 4: Context: Recent Greek History and the Greek Media Landscape 
4.1 – INTRODUCTION 
 A necessary prerequisite for understanding the potential impact of social media on the 
Greek public sphere and on civil society in Greece during the years of the economic crisis is the 
examination of the broader sociopolitical context in Greece in the years immediately preceding 
the economic downturn. Understanding the context within which social and new media came 
into the picture and within which new media outlets, citizens’ initiatives, social movements, and 
civil society organizations developed, is vital in order to understand what these new initiatives 
were responding to. For instance, if social media provided an alternative source of news and 
information, what incumbent media landscape were they alternative to? What gaps existed in the 
existing public sphere and realm of public discourse which could be addressed by social media 
and by new media outlets? What societal forces were at play in Greece in the years leading up to 
the onset of the economic crisis which may have sparked the social and political upheaval which 
followed? What social and political needs and what gaps in the existing civil society sphere were 
new civil society organizations, and citizens’ and grassroots initiatives, responding to? 
 In this chapter, the sociopolitical and media landscape in Greece in the years prior to the 
onset of the economic crisis will be examined. The chapter is divided into three main sections. 
The first section will provide an overview of the incumbent mainstream media landscape which 
was extant in Greece, with a particular focus on the broadcasting landscape and its many 
peculiarities. This will be followed by a section examining the rise of the blogosphere in Greece 
beginning in the first decade of the 2000s, with particular attention paid to the development and 
growth of so-called “news blogs,” the potential factors which accounted for their rapid rise in 
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popularity, the content they provided and the extent to which it was distinct from the news and 
information available via mainstream media outlets, their influence upon public discourse and on 
social movements and political developments in Greece, and potential factors accounting for 
their subsequent decline in popularity. The final section of this chapter will look at the protest 
movements which sprang up in Greece in the latter part of the previous decade, including the 
massive December 2008 riots, the extent to which social and new media tools helped fuel these 
movements, and their potential impact on ensuing political and social developments in Greece 
during the years of the economic crisis. 
4.2 – GREEK MAINSTREAM MEDIA LANDSCAPE 
 In Greece, broadcasting is governed by Article 15 of the Greek constitution, which was 
ratified in 1975 and under which broadcasting was placed under the “immediate control” of the 
state (Zaharopoulos & Paraschos, 1993: 45). Initially, this article was construed as granting the 
state a full monopoly over broadcasting, but a 1987 decision by the Council of State, Greece’s 
highest administrative court, overturned this interpretation. Under the 1987 ruling, private 
broadcasting could be permitted under “state supervision.” The National Council for Radio-
Television (ESR) was established in 1989 but remained largely ineffective and invisible until 
2001, when following a constitutional revision, purview over broadcast licensing was officially 
extended to the ESR. As part of this same constitutional revision, Article 15 was clarified to 
recognize state-issued broadcast licenses, as part of the interpretation permitting the operation of 
privately-owned broadcasters under “state supervision” (Kalogirou & Sourpi, 2006: 102).  
 As described in chapter 2, the liberalization of the broadcasting landscape in Greece is 
considered by scholars such as Hallin and Mancini (2004) as an example of “savage 
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deregulation,” referring to a situation where commercial broadcasting was introduced in an 
uncontrolled fashion, with loose legal requirements and lax or selective enforcement of existing 
laws. As stated in chapter 2, Greece does fit this model in the sense that private broadcasters 
indeed proliferated following deregulation, while this liberalization of the airwaves occurred in a 
seemingly haphazard manner, without the strict enforcement of licensing laws or technical 
standards. However, Kogen (2010: 340-342) argued that Greece does not represent an example 
of “savage deregulation,” as deregulation was spurred on by the actions of opposition political 
forces who were, to a significant extent, shut out of the public sphere and particularly the state-
controlled broadcast media up until that point. According to Kogen’s perspective, these 
oppositional voices took to the airwaves and forced the legal system to follow, preparing 
legislation opening up the airwaves after the fact. 
 While this view is largely accurate, Vovou (2009: 117-119) provides some clarity which 
likely leads us to the most accurate description of deregulation as it occurred in the case of 
Greece. According to Vovou, it was not at all anarchic, and instead was the product of political 
machinations and battles between the government and opposition at a time when the governing 
regime was unstable and weak after almost a decade in power. The developments of the late 
1980s and early 1990s give credence to this perspective. In 1987, law 1730/1987 was passed, 
soon followed by Presidential Decree 25/1988, which together established the right for private 
stations to obtain licenses (Kalogirou & Sourpi, 2006: 83). When the state broadcasting 
monopoly was broken in earnest in 1987, it occurred via the launch of municipally-owned radio 
stations. The first such station was in the provincial city of Halkida (Radio Halkida), and this was 
followed by municipal stations in Greece’s three largest cities: Athens (Athena 9,84 FM), 
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Thessaloniki (FM 100), Piraeus (Kanali 1), as well as in other cities and towns throughout the 
country. These municipalities had all been won by candidates who had been elected with the 
support of the opposition New Democracy political party that year, and were intended to serve as 
a broadcast counterweight to the state-controlled ERT. Furthermore, some of the most prominent 
pirate radio stations of that era, many of which remained on the airwaves in the early years of 
deregulation, were also of a highly political nature and frequently represented specific political 
interests, including live interviews with politicians and elected officials (Nevradakis, 2014a). 
The municipal stations were soon followed onto the airwaves by major publishers and 
business and shipping magnates. As described in chapter 2, newspapers in Greece were 
traditionally highly politicized and typically aligned with partisan interests or even specific 
politicians or factions within parties. That model was, for all intents and purposes, replicated by 
the upstart privately-owned television and radio broadcasters. Despite the aforementioned law 
and decree regulating private radio broadcasting, it quickly became evident that these laws were 
not enforceable. As a result, many stations began to operate without any license whatsoever 
(Sims, 2007: 244). The television landscape was similarly divided up along political lines. 
In 1989, after the collapse of the PASOK government and the formation of an unusual 
and highly unstable coalition between the right-wing New Democracy party and the left-wing 
Synaspismos political party (predecessor to SYRIZA), law 1866/89 was passed, formally 
deregulating the television industry. The criteria set forth by this law in order to be licensed 
included the applicant’s prior experience and involvement in the mass media, or the applicant’s 
status as a local municipal authority. Being that the only actors who had, up until the late 1980s, 
any “prior experience” in mass media were publishers, this law could be viewed as an example 
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of tailored legislation which was designed to turn the television landscape over to vested 
publishing interests and local government authorities. Two nationwide licenses were initially 
issued, one to a consortium of publishers and business figures broadly representing the “center-
left” and representing PASOK, and one to another group of publishers and business moguls 
representing the “center-right” and favoring New Democracy. The first consortium launched 
Mega Channel, which for much of the 1990s and 2000s was Greece’s biggest and most-watched 
television station, while the second consortium, despite plans to launch “Nea Tileorasi,” 
ultimately failed to put the station on the air (Ibid.). This void was, however, quickly filled by 
Antenna TV, owned by the aforementioned ship owner Minos Kyriakou, who was favorable to 
the New Democracy party and who launched the station without a license. What could be 
described as a free-for-all followed, with one publisher and business magnate after another 
taking to the airwaves without any licensing formalities. For instance, Kanali 29 was launched in 
1990 by the Kouris family, publishers of the vehemently pro-PASOK Avriani tabloid; the same 
family had also established Radio Athina (Nevradakis, 2014b). That same year, a prominent 
right-wing politician who was with the New Democracy party at the time, Giorgos Karatzaferis, 
launched Tele City and Radio City. Karatzaferis built upon his prior audiovisual experience, 
which he had utilized in the 1980s in a creative way to circumvent ERT’s broadcasting 
monopoly: he had launched a subscription video service, tape recording his talk show and 
mailing the video cassettes to his subscribers on a regular basis (Ibid.; Nevradakis, 2014a). 
What should therefore be clear is that privately-owned broadcasting was introduced in 
Greece not under conditions of uncontrolled anarchy but, rather, controlled anarchy. The legal 
vacuum which existed both prior to regulation and immediately after the first municipally- and 
 148 
privately-owned radio stations began operating, as well as instances of tailored legislation and 
weak enforcement of what laws did exist, seem to have been intended to create conditions in 
which powerful and vested interests could take advantage of the apparent confusion. Such a 
“chaotic” environment at face value would allow powerful and well-connected actors to come on 
the air either without a license initially, or as the result of tailored legislation and a situation 
where such actors would not have to face competition from potentially more qualified applicants, 
who would otherwise be discouraged from applying for a license due to the legal uncertainty. As 
stated by Ioannis Adamidis, an editor at national broadcaster Skai TV: 
The mass media in Greece developed in a paradoxical and illogical manner…the process 
was a bit backward. It began initially with radio. First the radio stations opened and then 
the law followed, and even then it was not fully enforced. This then happened with 
television as well. (Personal communication, April 10, 2013) 
 
Journalist Nikos Andritsos of Skai Radio 100.3 FM in Athens added: 
As with many things in Greece, [the broadcast landscape] developed without a specific 
context. It developed upon the basis that, for many years, you were obliged to choose 
between two channels which were both state-run. It developed upon a basis which was 
not defined by any specific framework, in order for specific standards to be set. This 
resulted in side effects which impacted the standards of public discourse. (Personal 
communication, April 12, 2013) 
 
The press was highly partizanized; a system which was transplanted to broadcasting. As 
stated by Giannis Skarpelos, assistant professor at the Department of Communication, Media and 
Culture at the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens: 
The public sphere developed following the “metapolitefsi” [fall of the military 
government], and many newspapers which were especially popular with the public were 
directly connected with actors within the public sphere and public discourse, with 
political parties. I remind you of Eleftherotypia for instance, representing the left wing of 
PASOK, Avriani representing the populist wing of PASOK, newspapers such as 
Eleftheros Typos which attempted to authentically represent New Democracy, the 
traditional newspapers of the left, and in between, when the publishers’ interests changed, 
so did their relationship with actors within the public sphere, and this had consequences 
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for public discourse… Newspapers were not neutral communications vehicles but in fact 
set partisan rhetoric as public rhetoric. (Personal communication, May 29, 2013) 
 
Skarpelos added that the newspapers’ agenda-setting role in this regard was largely taken over by 
privately-owned television after 1989. 
The replication of the partisan press system in the radio and television landscape did not 
detract in the slightest from the popularity of these mediums and the new privately-owned 
broadcasters. As detailed in chapter 2, state broadcaster ERT was particularly battered by the 
introduction of private broadcasting, with its audience figures declining sharply to the lowest 
percentage of any state or public broadcaster in Europe. In part, this could be explained by the 
association many Greeks had between ERT and state propaganda from each successive 
government. Up until 1982 for instance, one of the two state-owned television channels, 
YENED, was operated directly by the Greek military (Nevradakis, 2014a). 
Various efforts to enact comprehensive broadcasting legislation in the 1990s and 2000s 
largely failed or were never fully implemented. Law 2328/1995, passed by the PASOK 
government in 1995, set a comprehensive framework for the licensing of television and radio 
stations. Several licensing tenders were launched for both radio and television but only one was 
ever fully completed: the controversial licensing of 20 radio stations in the Athens region in 2001 
(out of 86 applicants and over 100 radio stations which were operating). The rationale given for 
the low number of licenses was the grand opening of the new Eleftherios Venizelos International 
Airport in Athens in March 2001 and claims on the part of the government that the operation of 
more than 20 privately-owned radio stations would create harmful interference to the aviation 
frequencies to be used by the new airport. In practice, this argument collapsed quickly: on the 
eve of the opening of the new airport, the ESR issued eight additional “temporary” licenses using 
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different (and unclear) criteria from those with which the original 20 stations were licensed. The 
remaining 60-plus radio stations were violently shut down in one night with the assistance of riot 
police. Following an outcry, a new licensing tender was hastily launched in 2002 for 15 
additional stations, replacing the previous year’s temporary licenses. Even with a total of 35 
licensed stations, approximately two-thirds of the stations that had previously been in the air 
were shut down, while those that remained overwhelmingly were owned by major publishing 
and business interests, local municipalities, or the church (Nevradakis, 2014c). 
A hodgepodge of legislation followed law 2328/1995, none of which has succeeded in 
achieving the full licensing of radio or television stations. Law 2778/1999 aimed to “freeze” the 
proliferation of radio stations by conferring a temporary legal status only to those stations which 
were operating on November 1, 1999 and which had previously applied for a license. These 
stations would receive a “certificate of legality” that would remain in effect until licenses were 
formally issued (Kalogirou & Sourpi, 2006: 105). As of 2018, this law remains valid, providing 
the legal status under which radio stations throughout Greece, except for Athens, continue to 
operate. Indeed, as no application deadline was ever specified by the law, stations have continued 
to apply for certificates of legality up until the present time (Nevradakis, 2012: 132). 
The supplemental licensing of 15 additional radio stations in Athens in 2002 was 
invalidated by the Council of State in 2004, while the original licenses issued in 2001 expired in 
2005, as they were valid for a four year term. Unable or unwilling to move forward with a new 
licensing process despite a court order, the then-government inserted a rider into an otherwise 
unrelated law, 3310/2005, which legalized all radio stations which were broadcasting in Athens 
on December 31, 2004, as long as they were operating under the same name and same ownership 
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as they were prior to being shut down in 2001 and with the precondition that the station had 
applied for a license in all previous licensing bids (Nevradakis, 2012: 137). While this law was 
purportedly meant to provide legal coverage for the 35 stations licensed in 2001 and 2002, its 
provisions were written in such a way that several stations which had been shut down in 2001 
but which had later reopened illegally could attain legal status with an application to the ESR. In 
reality, this process has also seemingly been tainted by political and economic interest. One 
example is the case of Radio Veronica, a station which had been shut down in 2001 but which 
resumed broadcasting in 2004 without a license. On at least two occasions, Radio Veronica 
applied for a certificate of legality under law 3310/2005, only to be denied by the ESR. In 2007, 
however, when rumors were circulating that the station was about to be purchased by the Kouris 
family in a joint venture with prominent journalist and newscaster Nikos Chatzinikolaou, the 
ESR granted Radio Veronica a certificate of legality. Within months, the station was renamed 
Real FM and became the influential and highly popular radio counterpart to the popular Sunday 
newspaper Real News, featuring a news-talk format. Within a few years, Real FM reached first 
place in the Athenian audience ratings. Meanwhile, the expired licenses of the 35 stations 
legalized in 2001 and 2002 have been renewed on a rolling basis, usually every six months, via 
riders inserted into unrelated legislation passed in parliament. The Council of State invalidated 
this practice, but it has continued with impunity (Nevradakis, 2014b). 
In 2007, the New Democracy-led government passed what was touted as the most 
comprehensive media and broadcasting law to date, law 3592/2007, which once again set forth 
provisions for the licensing of television and radio stations. In reality though, few aspects of this 
law have ever been enforced. One aspect of the law that has been implemented, however, is the 
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clause permitting the ownership of multiple stations, which had previously been forbidden. This 
resulted in a wave of concentration in the broadcast industry, not unlike the concentration which 
followed the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the United States (Nevradakis, 
2014e). In practice, this allowed a small number of media moguls to purchase multiple stations 
and to hold influence over a larger share of the audience, further consolidating their power. 
It bears noting that this same government was elected in March 2004, amidst the euphoria 
of the upcoming Olympic Games in Athens, in part based on pledges to do away with “diaploki” 
and to rein in Greece’s media barons. Within a few months after attaining power, in late 2004, 
the new government introduced draft legislation which would have imposed far more stringent 
transparency standards upon the owners of television and radio stations, including prohibiting 
offshore corporations from owning shares in such stations. The introduction of this draft 
legislation led to an extended period of crisis for the government, which came under continuous 
attack from Greece’s major media outlets, which revealed scandal after scandal against members 
of the government. Ultimately, this controversial law was withdrawn (Zervas, 2009). 
Another clause of law 3592/2007 which was enforced and which also reflects the highly 
politicized nature of broadcasting and media regulation in Greece is a provision – perhaps 
uniquely Greek – permitting radio and television stations owned by political parties represented 
in parliament to be legalized without going through a licensing process. Two stations have been 
legalized under this provision of the law: Sto Kokkino 105.5 FM in Athens, owned by the 
SYRIZA political party, and Radio Asty (formerly Radio City and now known as ART FM) of 
the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) political party, led by aforementioned politician Giorgos 
Karatzaferis, formerly of New Democracy. LAOS is no longer is represented either in the Greek 
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or European parliament, but ART FM nevertheless remains on the air to this day (Nevradakis, 
2014d). In all, in the Athens region, radio stations were operating under nine different legal 
statuses as of 2010 (Nevradakis, 2012: 151-152), a situation which remains similar to this day. 
Another aspect of legal chaos with regard to broadcasting regulation in Greece is the 
preferential treatment afforded by the law to radio and television stations which have been 
classified as “news stations,” as opposed to “entertainment stations.” Up unt il 2010, radio 
stations classified as airing news content were the only ones legally permitted to retransmit their 
signal from a secondary transmitter site, a technical necessity in the hilly Athens region 
(Nevradakis, 2012: 139). In a more recent development, a rider slipped into a law passed by the 
New Democracy-PASOK coalition government in 2014 permitted “news stations” from 
changing their classification to “entertainment” with a simple application submitted to the ESR. 
However, “entertainment” stations were not permitted, under this same law, to change their 
programming classification to “news” (Nevradakis, 2014d). In effect, this has created a closed 
marketplace for broadcast news stations. “Entertainment” stations are not permitted to air any 
news programming other than short newscasts, and have been fined for violating this clause 
(Ibid.). Between this law and the fact that there have been no licensing tenders completed for 
radio and television in many years, the only way a potential broadcaster who wishes to air news 
programming can gain access to the airwaves is by purchasing an existing station and taking a 
risk that this station will be licensed if and when a bid is announced. Furthermore, being that 
there are only a limited number of “news stations,” the purchase price of such stations is likely to 
be inflated, while the legal requirements for “news stations” under law 3592/2007 include a 
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provision with a much higher minimum number of employees than “entertainment” stations, 
resulting in higher operating expenses that only deeper pockets will be able to meet. 
What all of the above is meant to demonstrate is that even following the end of the state 
monopoly on broadcasting in 1987, television and radio in no way detached themselves from the 
political system, partisan politics, and the governments of the day, while in turn, both legislation 
and regulatory agencies were crafted with a view towards preserving the status quo. This has 
resulted in a situation where television and radio stations are, on the one hand, unlicensed or 
operating under a state of temporary legality, but on the other hand, hold tremendous power over 
the government of the day. Addressing the politicized nature with which broadcasting was 
deregulated and the issue of licensing treated by successive governments, Ferry Batzoglou, a 
journalist and correspondent for German mass media outlets, states: 
There was a time where PASOK dominated the central political scene, and it is not by 
accident that the first opening, the first pluralism…was from New Democracy…But 
[deregulation] had to start somewhere and so it did, and following this, a chaotic 
landscape developed beginning in the 1980s. This posed legal issues…as public 
frequencies have been licensed on a temporary basis and are perpetually renewed. 
Naturally, the authorities intentionally do not do anything to change this situation. It does 
not change in order to keep these means of communication under control, and what we 
see is when, from time to time, shortly before an electoral contest, there is some talk 
about licensing, this discussion disappears, nothing happens and the status quo remains. 
(Personal communication, May 24, 2013) 
 
Rena Dourou, at the time a member of parliament with SYRIZA, added: 
[I]n Greece, over 20 years after the advent of private television there are no legally 
licensed frequencies…[it’s unbelievable] that in a European country for many decades, in 
a country that wishes to belong in the first world and not the third world, successive 
governments…from two specific parties, PASOK and New Democracy, allowed 
television and radio stations to operate without a regulatory framework. It therefore 
follows that the introduction [of private broadcasting] was poorly done. (Personal 
communication, July 3, 2013) 
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The deregulation which occurred in the late 1980s in Greece could be said to have 
fostered the conditions for the reproduction of the existing and highly partisan press landscape in 
the electronic mass media. Indeed, the theme of reproduction or replication is one which we will 
come across often in this study. This strongly partisan broadcasting environment closely matches 
Hallin and Mancini’s definition of the “Polarized Pluralist” or “Mediterranean” model of 
broadcasting, where private broadcasters maintain a dominant foothold in the industry while 
cultivating close ties with the government, political elite, political parties, and business interests. 
It could also be argued to be reflective of “capture theory,” wherein regulators are influenced (or 
controlled) by the industries they are meant to regulate. This intertwined relationship between the 
state, political parties, and business and media interests is described in Greece as “diaploki,” a 
concept which will be examined further in chapter 7 in relation to the extent to which the 
mainstream, hegemonic mass media outlets in Greece today are suffering from a crisis of 
credibility. As described by Baltzis: 
I think that there are two main characteristics of media in Greece. One characteristic is 
the instability of the legal framework and regulation. The other is the close relation of the 
most mainstream media with the construction, banking, and shipping sector and with the 
political parties. This is what we call in Greece “diaploki.” I think that these are the two 
main characteristics that define the media landscape in Greece, all media, radio, 
television and of course the press. (Personal communication, February 23, 2013) 
 
Within this context, a media landscape characterized by “diaploki,” a very high degree of 
politicization, and a weak and haphazard legal framework which ultimately benefited the most 
powerful media moguls, a credibility crisis began to develop on the part of the Greek public at 
large, towards the mainstream mass media outlets. While the credibility crisis of the Greek 
mainstream media will be examined more closely in chapter 7, it bears noting that as the internet 
began to become popular and widely used in Greece towards the end of the first decade of the 
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2000s, it could be said that this crisis of credibility spurred increasing numbers of Greeks at the 
time to look for online alternatives to the hegemonic media landscape. It is here where the 
blogosphere comes in, particularly via the rapid growth in popularity of so-called “news blogs.” 
4.3 – THE RISE (AND FALL) OF THE BLOGOSPHERE 
4.3.1 – Introduction 
 
 As seen in the preceding section, the mainstream press and mass media in Greece have 
long been characterized by their partisanship and their interplay with the government of the day. 
Most mainstream media outlets are concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of 
powerful publishers, industrialists and businesspeople, who maintain close ties with the 
government and political establishment and who have not hesitated to use their media outlets to 
wield political influence and to lobby for their own interests. In this sense, the “fourth estate” in 
Greece has often been viewed as safeguarding the interests of its well-connected guardians, 
rather than the interests of the populace at large. Within such a media landscape, it was 
traditionally difficult for alternative and citizen-based media initiatives to successfully emerge 
and survive. Competition in the Greek media market is fierce due to the great plethora of 
mainstream media outlets, while successive governments have, at times, responded in a hostile 
fashion to the efforts of alternative media outlets.  
 It is within this environment that a new online media phenomenon appeared. Starting in 
2006, a new category of blogs emerged which featured continuous news updates, commentary, 
and criticism. Many of the news items were revealing in nature, exposing alleged instances of 
corruption and wrongdoing within government and the business and media spheres, as well as on 
the part of individual politicians, businesspeople and major journalists and media personalities. 
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These blogs made an immediate impact, rapidly growing in popularity and garnering a great deal 
of attention—both positive and negative. 
 What is particularly noteworthy about these so-called “news blogs,” as they were known 
in Greece, is that they attained popularity at a time when internet penetration in Greece was still 
at relatively low levels. According to statistics from the International Telecommunications Union 
(2018), 42.4 percent of the Greek population used the internet in 2009; the figure in 2006 was 
32.25 percent. Nevertheless, as will be seen below, they quickly attained a tremendous degree of 
popularity and influence in Greece in the years immediately prior to the country’s economic 
crash and the onset of the crisis which followed. 
 In the subsections which follow, the “news blog phenomenon” in Greece will be 
examined from several perspectives: who were the bloggers and the audience for these blogs, 
what factors accounted for their early popularity and how they were distinct from or similar to 
mainstream news sources, the legal challenges these blogs faced and the debate over anonymity 
on the internet, the overall impact these blogs had on the broader public sphere and public 
discourse in Greece, and potential reasons for their subsequent decline in popularity. In addition, 
specific blogs and bloggers will be examined, including the example of a blog which 
differentiated itself from the popular news blogs of the day and which instead served as the 
catalyst for a specific cause in the years leading up to the onset of the Greek economic crisis. 
4.3.2 – Early Adapters and the Increase in Popularity of News Blogs 
 Many early bloggers in Greece were themselves early adapters of new technologies in a 
broader sense.  Angeliki Gazi, assistant professor of journalism at the Technical University of 
Cyprus, attributes this to a cultural mentality inherent within the Greek people, one in which the 
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Greek people have a strong need to be heard, and which was similar to the manner in which they 
had previously adopted other new communications technologies: 
We have seen…the way in which Greeks embrace new things which are introduced in 
society in some manner. This is how they embraced the…deregulation of media. 
Suddenly in 1987 every random person, everyone who knew a couple of things about 
electronics and technology built a radio station to broadcast and to be heard in his 
neighborhood…The same thing happened, if you will, with cellular phones. Suddenly, 
surveys at the time showed that there is no Greek, no Greek household which did not 
have one and two and three cellular phones. The same thing occurred with the internet… 
I believe it was used, in my opinion, from this basic need of Greeks. I won’t say if it is 
good, positive, or negative. For me it is noteworthy, this enthusiasm is characteristic…of 
the identity of the Greek. (Personal communication, January 11, 2013) 
 
Blogger, publisher and documentary filmmaker Manolis Andriotakis, formerly a professional 
journalist, described his early experiences with blogging as such: 
My blog began by featuring articles which I was not getting published in the newspaper, 
this was in the beginnings, 10 years ago [in 2003], and in the years which followed, I 
focused on topics such as the media, journalism, on blogging itself, new media, social 
media, on my activism. It was broad-based, my blog was not monothematic, it has even 
featured my creative works, fiction pieces, artwork. In other words, my blog contains 
anything that concerns me. (Personal communication, May 27, 2013) 
 
Journalist Giorgos Epiteidios, a web analyst with the Lambrakis Press Group (DOL) and blogger 
with DOL’s in.gr online portal, described the transformation of his blog from a personal blog to 
one that was more closely related to developments in Greece: 
I started my blog writing about technology news, but after the crisis I used the blog as a 
site of therapy, instead of talking about my problems and my worries to a specialist, I 
write about them and people reply, so I have a number of interactions with my users and 
my viewers also talk to each other. (Personal communication, July 17, 2013) 
 
Craig Wherlock, an educator residing in Greece since 1989 and known online as “Teacherdude,” 
describes the similar transformation his blog underwent as a result of the worsening economic 
crisis, from the perspective of a citizen journalist who was not employed by any media outlet: 
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This was very much a gradual process. If you look at my blog…it’s a mix of teaching 
ideas, thoughts on teaching practice, photographs, video, maybe the occasional reference 
to what's happening, then that balance changed. The two most significant events for me 
were September 2007, when I was beaten the riot police, I was taking photograph at a 
demo, I got attacked by the riot police…And the other moment, I think, especially for 
Twitter, would be the Greek riots of 2008. (Personal communication, April 3, 2013) 
 
The above bloggers, it must be noted, spoke from personal experience and on behalf of their own 
personal blogs. Andreas Kapsambelis, a journalist with the Dimokratia newspaper and publisher 
of the Press-GR blog, draws a distinction between personal blogs and news blogs, such as Press-
GR (Personal communication, October 18, 2013). The early and rapid popularity of so-called 
“news blogs,” however, provides us with insights into the reasons why ordinary Greeks began to 
turn to the internet in search of news and information, at a time when the medium was still 
relatively new in Greece and not universally available. 
In May 2010, the Brussels-based weekly newspaper “New Europe” featured an extensive 
article on Greek blogosphere, featuring blogs such as Troktiko and contrasting what it interpreted 
as the failures of the “fourth estate” with the rise of the “fifth estate,” exemplified by news blogs: 
Mass media, typically regarded as the fourth estate, are in their majority not serving as 
watchdogs of the political bodies, but disappointingly all too often find themselves 
accomplices by non-coverage or over-coverage of specific issues…[w]ith fewer 
gatekeepers, and in some cases, a near dictatorial approach to deciding what receives 
extensive coverage and what gets buried, Media have allowed for a new estate: The fifth 
estate” (New Europe Brussels Team, 2010). 
 
According to New Europe, the fifth estate has emerged most strongly in Greece, with news blogs 
such as Troktiko leading this new journalistic movement.  
 Dimitris Yalourakis, director of communications with the Independent Greeks political 
party, attributes the early rise in popularity of news blogs to a realization on the part of the public 
 160 
that the mainstream mass media were not credible, whilst reflecting Gazi’s view that Greeks 
have a strong cultural need to be heard: 
When blogs became fashionable everyone abandoned the portals which existed up until 
then, and turned to blogs believing that they were more independent voices. This 
happened because the media moguls who owned a television station turned to the internet 
and developed a site or a large portal, with the result being that they controlled online 
news. Fortunately the public quickly realized this. The Greek has a need to be heard, and 
so a multitude of blogs were developed…[Greeks] believed they found a source of 
independent news and that they would learn the truth, because no one up until them was 
telling them the truth. (Personal communication, December 15, 2012) 
 
This search for the “truth” was also specifically addressed by Giorgos Baganis, a journalist with 
the enikos.gr online portal-blog, stating: “…the public believed that the news [provided by news 
blogs] was the real news, without dependencies, without hidden interests…here was the 
anonymous blogger who was telling the truth” (Personal communication, December 19, 2012). 
This view is compatible with the oppositional role which some ascribed to the Greek 
blogosphere of that era. Mathaios Tsimitakis, a journalist with the Efimerida ton Syntakton 
newspaper, characterizes the 2006-2008 period as the “golden age” of the online public sphere 
and describes the early blogosphere in the following terms: 
I think that from the start, as early as 2004-2005 and the appearance of blogs in public 
dialogue in Greece, the role the blogs and later the social media took, was to oppose the 
media discourse. And I think that they define themselves a lot through this opposition to 
the media, through this controversy and this antagonism with the mainstream media. 
(Personal communication, February 13, 2013) 
 
This oppositional role was further elaborated upon by Kyra Kapi, a journalist at Easy 97.2 FM in 
Athens, which is part of the Antenna Group of media companies. According to Kapi: 
Blogs such as Troktiko and other similar ones were in fashion, because everyone had a 
little power to write something which would not have had the opportunity to be published 
otherwise. I believe there was an effort to perform independent journalism and provide 
independent voices. The public was hearing the truth that could not be heard from the 
traditional mass media, which have a specific newscast with a specific format they do not 
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deviate from. The public could find alternative content or [citizen] complaints and things 
that would not see the light of day otherwise. (Personal communication, June 3, 2013) 
 
Another factor attributed to the popularity of news blogs was the publication of investigative 
journalism, or at least the perception that these blogs provided such content. This is closely 
related to the belief that the mainstream media were not providing such content: “Certainly one 
factor in the then-popularity of this phenomenon was that they introduced the model of 
revelatory journalism, [exposing] the dirty laundry of the system,” said Aggeliki Boubouka, a 
journalist at the Eleftherotypia newspaper, adding “[o]f course this was a la carte. They 
published certain things and concealed others,” hinting at the darker role some of these blogs 
were said to have played in threatening politicians and public figures with exposure of 
inexpedient, scandalous, or salacious information (personal communication, May 31, 2013).  
 For others, it was the scandalous content often presented by these blogs that itself was 
their main attraction. According to Failos Kranidiotis, attorney, journalist with the Dimokratia 
newspaper and antinews.gr, and adviser to then-Prime Minister Antonis Samaras: 
[News blogs] had the same draw as tabloid newspapers, which utilize sensational 
headlines and profanity. People often have what we call a voyeuristic syndrome…That’s 
what these blogs do. One can be home and visit a blog and news which could be quite 
fantastic…This was the reason for their popularity and amongst a specific segment of the 
audience. People of good judgment…never trusted these blogs for their information. 
(Personal communication, December 6, 2013) 
 
Maria Psara, a journalist with the Ethnos newspaper, tied this desire for voyeuristic information 
with the growing anger and disenchantment in Greek society: 
Here we have to do with the issue of the public’s trust in the traditional media. The public 
was thirsty for alternative news and information and because these blogs published 
everything…they drew a great deal of interest from the public. At that time, the public 
first read Troktiko and Fimotro before logging in to social media…[The news blogs] were 
very aggressive and named names and the public had begun to get angry, and this content 
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identified with the public and their anger. Therefore it made sense that they gained 
support and popularity. (Personal communication, November 11, 2013) 
 
This openness, or perhaps distinction from the traditional mainstream media, was a selling point 
for these news blogs according to journalist Pashos Mandravelis of the Kathimerini newspaper, 
who also referenced the legal restrictions which professional journalists face in Greece: 
They were new and…you could find things that you could not find in the traditional 
media. One of the challenges Greek media face is that the law is so stifling that if it were 
to be enforced to the letter, nothing could be published…As with everything, [journalists] 
write because the laws are not enforced. But because you do not know where the 
boundary lies, there are things that are not written. Anonymous blogs, vulgar as they are, 
deliver some news that you cannot find in the traditional media and became popular as a 
result. (Personal communication, June 11, 2013). 
 
Relating to the earlier contention that Greeks are inherently and culturally interested in new 
technologies and readily become early adapters, Panagiotis Vlachos, the president of the 
“Mbrosta” (“Forward Greece”) political action group, attributed the popularity of news blogs as 
a step in the process of shifting media behaviors and habits, stating: 
If you saw what the public read prior to the crisis and in the end of the 00’s, the Greek 
middle class had as cultural models tabloid and lifestyle magazines. This shifted from 
magazines and newspapers to blogs. (Personal communication, November 26, 2013) 
 
For others, blogs became popular because they were seen as providing a venue for popular 
expression that had previously been unavailable to most of the populace. Boubouka described 
early blogs as “the first major means of organized public expression on the internet” (personal 
communication, May 31, 2013), while Kapsambelis argued that news blogs “became popular 
because they offered a space, an opportunity for people, especially younger people, to express 
themselves and their frustration,” adding that “when controlled information becomes 
overcontrolled information, the alternative [blogs] is preferable, even if more chaotic” (personal 
communication, October 18, 2013). Christina Fotinaki, a journalist with the Thessaloniki-based 
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seleo.gr local news portal, credited blogging with the advent of citizen journalism in Greece, 
stating: “I believe that the beginnings of citizen journalism, in Greece at least…came with the 
development of the [news] blogs” (personal communication, July 5, 2013). 
 Nevertheless, there are those who dispute the popularity attained by the various news 
blogs, such as the aforementioned Troktiko, Press-GR, and Fimotro. According to Epiteidios, it is 
difficult to objectively ascertain the popularity of these blogs as they do not utilize a standard and 
commonly accepted set of metrics to measure their audience: 
…[W]e are not sure how really popular are all these blogs…There is sadly a vast number 
of sites that create traffic with mechanical ways, so we cannot be sure…I tend to be 
somewhat suspicious about their real popularity…[B]log news sites are popular in Greece 
but perhaps not as popular as they claim. (Personal communication, July 17, 2013) 
 
Having examined some potential factors accounting for the rapid increase in popularity of Greek 
news blogs, the next subsection will examine the content and controversy surrounding Troktiko, 
perhaps the most emblematic and popular news blog during the peak of such blogs’ popularity. 
4.3.3 – The Rise and Fall of Troktiko 
 
Perhaps the most emblematic blog of the news blog movement was Troktiko (“The 
Rodent”), which was founded in December 2007. Hosted on blogspot.com, with a simple layout 
and a continuous stream of postings throughout the day, Troktiko began to attract unprecedented 
amounts of visitors—and unprecedented levels of attention for an online medium in Greece. 
One of the notable characteristics of Troktiko, which was also shared by many of the 
other news blogs which emerged, was its anonymity. The identities of the individuals behind the 
operation of Troktiko were not made public, which further fueled controversy and criticism of the 
blog, including accusations that the blog’s editors were using their anonymity to make scathing 
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and possibly libelous attacks on public figures, political parties and the government. Despite this, 
Troktiko enjoyed extensive popularity.  
By 2010, Troktiko claimed that it had become the most popular blog in Greece and the 
most-visited blog hosted on blogspot.com in the world (“Biografia,” 2010), an almost 
unbelievable achievement for a blog based in a country with a population of just over 11 million 
people. Its success, however, abruptly ended on the early morning of July 19 of that year, when 
journalist Sokratis Giolias was murdered in an assassination-style attack outside of his home. It 
was the first time in 25 years that a journalist had been killed in Greece, and responsibility for 
the attack was claimed by a domestic terrorist group known as the “Revolutionary Sect,” in a 
scathing letter which appeared in the Athens-based daily newspaper Ta Nea several days later 
(Iriotou, 2010). Almost immediately after the attack, it was revealed that Giolias had been the 
founder of Troktiko, and within days, following a series of final postings by each of the bloggers 
involved with Troktiko, the blog ceased operating. 
Though his involvement with Troktiko was a secret, Giolias was a well-known journalist 
in Greece, and at the time of his murder he was the general manager of the Thema 98.9 radio 
station in Athens. Previously, Giolias had worked as the head editor of two investigative 
television programs, “Kitrinos Typos” (“Yellow Press”) and “Zougla” (“Jungle”), both of which 
were hosted by Makis Triantafillopoulos, one of Greece’s most well-known journalists. The 
relationship between Triantafillopoulos and Giolias soured, and Triantafillopoulos was the target 
of many of Troktiko’s attacks (“Biografia,” 2010). 
 In a content analysis performed for an unpublished study (Nevradakis: 2010), a day’s 
worth of postings from the blog were analyzed. On the randomly-selected date of Sunday, July 
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11, 2010, 454 postings appeared on Troktiko. This amounts to an average of almost 19 postings 
per hour, and indeed, updates were made all throughout the 24-hour period of this day, with the 
interval between new postings occasionally being as brief as one minute. The content which 
appeared was also diverse in terms of subject matter. The day’s postings included political and 
financial news, letters and commentaries submitted by readers, sports news, celebrity gossip, 
feature articles, international news, offbeat news, as well as commentary on a number of 
political, economic and social issues of the day. User-submitted breaking news reports from 
Greece also appeared, as well as satire, jokes, and mundane content such as weather reports. 
Much of the day’s news which was reported on Troktiko was, at its face, reported objectively, 
similarly to any mainstream news outlet, while a notable aspect of the blog’s content was the 
large number of commentaries posted, some of which were written by Troktiko’s bloggers, while 
others were submitted by the blog’s readers. Some of the user-submitted content focused on 
mundane quality-of-life complaints, while some reader submissions were in response to postings 
submitted by other readers, thus leading to a dialogue taking place through the blog. Finally, 
there were also numerous postings of a satirical or humorous nature. 
A substantial portion of Troktiko’s content was reproduced (with attribution) from other 
blogs, providing horizontal linkages to other locations on the Greek blogosphere. Notably, that 
some news was also reproduced from mainstream media outlets, including postings featuring the 
day’s newspaper headlines, and short video excerpts from televised news and talk shows. 
 Though there were no such postings on the particular date studied, Troktiko frequently 
featured postings announcing the launch of new blogs, thus lending further support to other parts 
of the Greek blogosphere. On many occasions, Troktiko’s posted teasers for forthcoming 
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“bombshells” which were to be posted on the blog later that day. These “bombshells” typically 
featured allegations of scandals or corruption within the Greek government or the country’s 
business and media elite, and could be said to represent the veiled threats and blackmail that 
news blogs such as Troktiko were frequently accused of. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of Troktiko 
was its tendency to expose many often embarrassing scandals involving prominent politicians, 
businesspeople, major journalists and other prominent public figures. For instance, in May 2010, 
Troktiko revealed that the husband of Angela Gerekou, a minister in the PASOK government, 
owed over 5.5 million euros in taxes, leading to Gerekou’s resignation (“The fifth estate,” 2010). 
Troktiko also made waves not just by exposing scandals, but by often being the first to report on 
major emerging stories, as was the case in April 2010, when Troktiko was the first outlet to report 
that the Greek government would request an emergency loan from the IMF (“To Troktiko sas 
enimerose,” 2010), signaling the official start of Greece’s period of economic oversight. 
 As with other similar news blogs, perhaps the most controversial aspect of Troktiko was 
its anonymity. The identities of the blog’s writers were not publicly known, and the blog faced 
sharp criticism from the mainstream media and from the political establishment. Several 
commentaries appeared in major mainstream newspapers, accusing Troktiko of being a purveyor 
of “yellow journalism,” of spreading unsubstantiated gossip and innuendo, and decrying its 
anonymity, claiming that Troktiko’s bloggers were able to get away with libelous postings by 
virtue of hiding their identities and that anonymous reporting could not be equated with 
responsible journalism (Bartzinopoulos, 2010; Giannarou, 2010b). Some journalists even went as 
far as to make the argument that Giolias essentially brought his murder upon himself because he 
chose to maintain his anonymity (Giannarou, 2010a). 
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 According to Gazi, its sensational nature and reputation for revealing hidden information 
were the primary factors behind its success, in conjunction with Greek cultural traits: 
Troktiko…was theoretically a blog which published news content which was not 
published by other outlets which were considered to be more mainstream. This is what 
led to its success, that Troktiko would reveal a specific story that would not easily be 
found elsewhere. Greeks, in large part, as a people and society and culture and 
politically…seek out scandal…[W]e seek out what’s hidden under the rug…as we always 
believe that there is a portion of the truth that we don’t know and that we must find out. 
Troktiko was successful on this basis. It’s where its success lay. I don’t know if Troktiko 
would have been as successful in the United States if it existed there. Probably not. 
(Personal communication, January 11, 2013) 
 
Similarly, according to Konstantinos Papatheodosiou, the general manager of the Star Radio 
Network, the murder of Giolias and the demise of Troktiko demonstrates that:  
…[A] blog that anybody can create, if it truly operates properly…having secured its 
popularity from the accurate information it provides, can clash with an entrenched system 
which may exist on the other side. (Personal communication, October 10, 2013) 
 
Activist and blogger Asteris Masouras, an editor with Global Voices, highlighted this apparent 
clash between Troktiko and entrenched power structures, but questioned the ethics of such blogs: 
Troktiko was very controversial and is part of a movement of yellow journalism online, 
based technically on blogs which aren’t exactly blogs, because they [operate] completely 
anonymously, operated by journalists that supposedly do investigative journalism. Others 
have charged that these blogs are engaging in blackmail. But the fact remains that a 
journalist was gunned down with 17 bullets in front of his home. That’s part of the scene 
that many journalists deny. (Personal communication, February 23, 2013) 
 
Similarly, attorney and digital rights activist Anthony Broumas pointed out the sensational nature 
of Troktiko and the likelihood that it engaged in some form of blackmail, adding that the blog’s 
low-brow content was reflective of its audience, replicated offline mentalities and the practices 
of tabloids, adding that the emergence of news blogs led to the decline of personal blogging: 
You had the kind of mentality in blogs that would encounter in tabloids, because many 
journalists started to have a blog and they started to use this blog for their own career, and 
there were many tabloid journalists. These people started to dominate the blogosphere, 
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which ended up losing its community aspect, because these people were doing this for 
other reasons…So you had Troktiko, which is this specific kind of tabloid journalism… 
and there is proof of this, by blackmailing. Very low quality stuff. It became very 
popular. This happened because society does not change when it encounters the internet... 
You have the same ideas and usual mentalities. (Personal communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
Christina Lardikou, a volunteer with Radiobubble and the Tutorpool initiative, adopted a 
different view of Troktiko’s content, however, and the extent to which it was distinct from 
mainstream news stories. According to Lardikou, “Troktiko was very mainstream,” adding “I 
remember having news from Troktiko in Star,” referring to the national privately-owned 
television broadcaster Star Channel (personal communication, February 20, 2013). 
4.3.4 – Greek Law and Legal Threats to Online Communication 
 
 Troktiko was far from the only news blog to generate controversy. In 2006, the owner of 
the blog aggregation site “blogme.gr,” Antonis Tsipropoulos, was arrested because of links which 
appeared on blogme.gr directing visitors to a different blog, “funEL.blogspot.com,” where some 
postings had satirized the controversial Greek televangelist Dimosthenis Liakopoulos (McCarthy, 
2006; “O Dimosthenis Liakopoulos,” 2009). Because “funEL” was hosted on blogspot.com on 
servers based in the United States, Liakopoulos was unable to obtain the identity of the owners 
of that blog without proof of criminal charges being filed, and so he instead filed suit against 
blogme.gr for merely providing a link to the content which appeared on funEL (“O Dimosthenis 
Liakopoulos,” 2009). Tsipropoulos was eventually acquitted (“Athoos krithike,” 2013). 
According to Masouras (personal communication, February 23, 2013), the initial arrest of 
Tsipropoulos resulted in a spontaneous online campaign organized by Greek bloggers calling for 
his release, with 300 blogs republishing a message of support. 
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A higher profile case involved the aforementioned Press-GR blog. In 2008, acting upon 
criminal charges of blackmail which had been filed against the then-anonymous bloggers who 
operated Press-GR by several prominent media personalities and politicians, police raided the 
offices of a newspaper where the blog’s founder, Andreas Kapsambelis, was employed as an 
editor, confiscating computer equipment and files. Kapsambelis’ home was also searched by the 
police, although no items were confiscated (“Eisaggeleas kanei efodo,” 2008; “Sinelifthisan gia 
ekviasmo,” 2008). Though the anonymity of online communications is protected by law in 
Greece, prosecutors were able to overcome these protections as a result of the criminal charges 
which were filed against the blog, which enabled them to execute a search warrant. 
According to Kapsambelis, Press-GR was the first news blog, the one which opened the 
door for others which later followed, and was targeted as a result: 
[Press-GR] made the internet popular as a source of news. [The raid] occurred because 
Press-GR was targeted. In my estimation…it was the first sign of the unease which the 
public system was feeling, as things were being written which, even with alterations and 
mistakes…as one can determine after the fact, broke the barriers of news delivery. 
(Personal communication, October 18, 2013) 
 
In Kapsambelis’ view, the legal troubles blogs like Press-GR faced were the result of “the 
paralysis and turbulence which was fostered, as the public learned about blogs…hundreds or 
thousands more opened,” adding that these efforts were counterproductive: “the public turned to 
them because it had no other choice” (personal communication, October 18, 2013). This support 
was referenced by Tsimitakis, who described the support that Kapsambelis received from 
members of the Greek blogging community following his arrest, even if many disapproved of 
Kapsambelis’ practices in operating Press-GR: 
I don’t think the police had the right to break in…[s]o we stood by [Kapsambelis’] side, 
although we hated his content, but we thought we shouldn’t have double standards and if 
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we were to defend free speech online, then we should do it for anyone” (Personal 
communication, February 13, 2013). 
 
According to Masouras, the intent on the part of the authorities was not so much to arrest or 
prosecute Kapsembelis, but to reveal him as the owner of Press-GR: 
The anonymity of the editor of the Press-GR blog was dropped by pretending it was a 
blackmail case. Then the blackmail charge was dropped itself, but of course the editor 
had already been revealed to the public, and this tactic has been repeatedly used and has 
been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights, not for Greece specifically but 
in general. (Personal communication, February 23, 2013) 
 
As further clarified by Andriotakis, online anonymity cannot be lifted for libel cases, but can be 
lifted for charges of blackmail. This has resulted in individuals seeking to file charges over 
material published on the internet to attempt to prove blackmail, in order to reveal the identity of 
the individual(s) responsible for the posted content (personal communication, May 27, 2013). 
At the peak of the popularity of news blogs, there were several legislative and judicial 
initiatives which sought to outlaw or to limit online anonymity. In 2008, it was reported that the 
center-right New Democracy government was drafting legislation which would have placed 
substantial restrictions on bloggers (Asteris Masouras, personal communication, February 23, 
2013). The following year, Giorgos Sanidas, the prosecutor of the Greek Supreme Court, the 
Areios Pagos, published a legal opinion just prior to his retirement which argued that online 
communications should not be legally protected by the principle of the secrecy of 
communications (Kalavros-Gousiou, 2009). Notably, Troktiko responded by revealing that 
Sanidas had issued a decision legalizing his allegedly illegally constructed vacation home 
(“Troktiko enantion Sanida,” 2009). Also that year, the then-Minister of Civil Protection Mihalis 
Hrisohoidis publicly stated his opinion that the anonymity of bloggers should be stripped and 
that every blog should have a legal representative, arguing that anonymous blogging had led to 
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several instances of defamation (“Vazei thema,” 2009). In 2010, several members of PASOK 
began to call for the passage of such a law after Troktiko falsely reported the impending 
resignation of the Minister of Education, Anna Diamantopoulou. The government cited the legal 
opinion issued by Sanidas, as well as a similar proposal then under consideration by the Italian 
government which would have required bloggers to register ownership of their blogs with the 
government’s Communications Authority (“Nomos gia ta blog,” 2010). The Sanidas opinion and 
proposed legislation in Italy was also cited by Lefteris Avgenakis, a then a member of parliament 
with New Democracy, who called on the government to pass legislation which would strip the 
anonymity of bloggers and “restore order” to the blogosphere (“O megas karagiozis,” 2010). 
 As is plainly evident, anonymity was an issue which generated political controversy. This 
controversy is reflected in the diverging opinions received from individuals interviewed for this 
study. Several reasons were put forth for defending anonymity, albeit frequently with qualifiers 
attached. For Fotinaki, anonymity can be abused but it can also provide a voice to the voiceless: 
Certainly anonymity can liberate someone in order to express themselves, and it is a 
characteristic of the internet…if this freedom is used correctly, I don’t consider it a bad 
thing. But unfortunately it is often abused…I don’t believe anonymity is a bad thing, it is 
a personal choice. If someone wishes to speak eponymously they can do so. Also, 
anonymity can help those people…who are otherwise afraid to express themselves. 
(Personal communication, July 5, 2013) 
 
Dimitris Trimis, the president of the Journalists’ Union of Athens (ESIEA) sees the journalistic 
and democratic value in anonymity, even if he believes journalists should operate eponymously: 
I believe that the right to anonymity online must be maintained, even if in many 
instances, it creates the conditions for slander, for twisting the truth, for spreading fake 
news. For journalists and journalistic websites and journalistic blogs, I would prefer they 
had an identity, to take responsibility for what is written and publicized. But for centuries 
there has been a journalistic tradition of anonymity which has been useful. Therefore I 
would support this freedom up to a certain point where it becomes criminal, for 
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anonymity to remain even if I personally have been harmed by it…but that is the cost of 
democracy. (Personal communication, May 29, 2013) 
 
Dourou highlighted incidents such as the murder of Giolias, but warned against allowing such 
incidents to create laws limiting freedom of expression online, instead proposing a balancing act: 
We must be extremely careful because in the name of individuals who might be operating 
in an undemocratic way…we can’t move forward and pass laws which will create an 
online “Big Brother,” to do away with anonymity for ordinary users in the name of online 
blackmailers…we must strike a democratic balance between what is public and what is 
private in new and social media. (Personal communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
Blogger Paschalis Aganidis also highlights the need to strike a balance between criminal use 
under the cloak of anonymity, and its democratic potential: 
I believe that anonymity is not harmful. I am against a general prohibition which would 
dictate that participation in public dialogue must always be eponymous. There must be a 
stable and strict framework for those who violate certain ethical standards or criminal 
laws in the case of blackmail, but the opportunity to participate in the public sphere 
without sharing your identity is, for me, revolutionary and we must not retreat from this. 
In regimes which are undemocratic…it is a tool of mobilization and democratization. 
(Personal communication, December 16, 2012) 
 
Similarly, Costas Efimeros sees the journalistic value in anonymity, highlighting the examples of 
Wikileaks and whistleblower Edward Snowden. He proposed, however, a certification process 
for online mediums under the umbrella of ESIEA: 
I am in favor of anonymity openly. Our proposal towards ESIEA…is for ESIEA to adopt 
a model of certifying online media…I believe that anonymity is extremely useful and this 
is proven by the Wikileaks case and Edward Snowden…An anonymous party can say 
things that could not be told on the record, and it must exist and must be…It must be a 
choice. (Personal communication, July 18, 2013) 
 
On the part of ESIEA, however, the union’s general secretary Maria Antoniadou draws a 
distinction between whistleblowing sites such as Wikileaks, and malicious anonymity: 
On the internet reputations have been ruined and people could not respond because there 
existed anonymity. We’re not talking about Wikileaks and publicizing content from there 
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as a form of investigative journalism that is overseen…Here we have anyone who wants 
to provoke, to destroy, able to write anything… (Personal communication, May 29, 2013) 
 
Along a similar vein, Psara says that in her professional work as a journalist, anonymous 
information is met with greater skepticism, even if she supports the right of anonymity, stating: 
“[f]or better or for worse anonymity is a part of the internet and I accept it, with the condition 
that I cross-check five times more the words of an anonymous user versus one who is 
eponymous” (personal communication, November 11, 2013). In turn, Andriotakis accepts 
anonymity but points out that it is inherently limited: 
I came under attack…after publicizing my book, because I took a public stance not 
against anonymity, but by saying that I do not consider it wise to encourage it. 
Anonymity is constitutionally protected, but there is no such thing as total anonymity… 
There are ways to find you even if you consider yourself anonymous…I don’t believe 
anonymity is of help to any public issue. (Personal communication, May 27, 2013) 
 
Many others vociferously opposed online anonymity. Aphrodite Al-Saleh, a former social media 
volunteer with PASOK, described anonymity as “a force of darkness…[a]nomymity provides the 
opportunity to do whatever cannot be done in public” (Personal communication, January 11, 
2014). Another political figure, Giorgos Katrougalos, at the time an attorney and law professor at 
Democritus University (and presently a minister with the SYRIZA political party) argued that 
online anonymity leads to a replication of darker practices of print journalism in Greece: 
I don't support anonymity. I think that it can be a factor of slander, of malign use of 
information. Unfortunately we have a tradition like that in Greece, not specific to social 
media, quite the opposite. Some newspapers...had a specialty to blackmail people, saying 
that if you do not pay us that amount of money we're going to publish something bad 
about you. So I have a fear that this bad tradition with the bad journalists...can [translate] 
to [online] media. So I strongly support the non-anonymous appearance of information. 
(Personal communication, July 2, 2013) 
 
Journalist Paris Karvounopoulos, a reporter with Antenna TV and the Real News newspaper, and 
editor of onalert.gr, believed that journalists and websites should always be on the record: 
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I may be a traditionalist, but I think that every site and blog has to be identifiable. We 
[onalert.gr] have an identity, everyone knows that newsit.gr belongs to [journalist] Nikos 
Evaggelatos and that onalert.gr belongs to the Evaggelatos Group. I sign off on all my 
articles every day, I believe that I should be identifiable, and that if someone feels 
slighted or slandered or was harmed by something that was published, that they can know 
who to respond to. (Personal communication, June 28, 2013) 
 
Thanasis Heimonas, the head of PASOK’s cultural department and a columnist with the Athens 
Voice weekly newspaper, identifies a legal discrepancy, stating “anyone can slander 
anonymously…and there is no problem, there is a gap in the law” (personal communication, 
February 15, 2013). Kranidiotis points out that there is a legal disconnect, wherein professional 
journalists can be held legally liable for something they publish in print or broadcast on 
television or radio, but the same material is not punishable if published online: 
These blogs weren’t just anonymous, they blackmailed and this continues to 
happen…There is a great anomaly here…If I say something to you in person or publish it 
in a newspaper or say it on radio or television, I can be criminally tried…If I do the same 
thing from a Blogspot site and be protected under the veil of anonymity. This has to stop, 
everything should be eponymous. (Personal communication, December 6, 2013) 
 
Papatheodosiou points out that anonymity is an issue not just for what a journalist or blogger 
might write, but what any online user might publish as a comment: 
Anyone can start a website or blog with a throwaway e-mail address and a fake name, 
even if all of this can be traced, but there are ways around this too…You can come in 
anonymously and criticize a point of view, I can come in a second and third time with 
different accounts and leave more comments…and make it seem like they are from 
different users. (Personal communication, October 10, 2013) 
 
A potential compromise – the use of a pseudonym – was also put forth. Augustine Zenakos, the 
editor of Unfollow magazine, presents the issue in this way: 
You encounter a writer in a newspaper. His name is, I don’t know, Augustine Zenakos. It 
doesn’t really matter…if it wasn’t that, it’s something else. Isn’t the important thing that 
through his writing, week after week, that builds a consistent…identity, that you can 
follow, and through that a kind of presence, a political presence. Strictly speaking, the 
name is just a legal issue, if they did something and you needed to identify the particular 
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physical person and take them to court. As far as public discourse is concerned, you need 
an identity, not the identity that identifies you as a physical person…a blogger that is 
stable, identifiable, like Pitsirikos [a prominent Greek blogger], it doesn’t matter if his 
name is Andreas or Giorgos or whatever. His name is Pitsirikos… that’s something that 
you can focus on…it’s something that is accountable in terms of public discussion. 
Troktiko isn’t. That’s one of the problems. (Personal communication, July 19, 2013) 
 
Petros Papathanasiou, a producer with Radiobubble, discusses how pseudonyms are used at his 
station and how identifiable online names are not as important as some may believe: 
The philosophy of Radiobubble…is to respect pseudonyms. A pseudonym represents an 
online persona. Many times this may not be our true professional self, but a persona 
which in many cases is what we prefer to be…many of our producers have created a 
persona…and tailor this personality to their radio show...Online communication allows 
people to operate with the idea of an avatar…Of course anyone could be hiding behind a 
pseudonym and some unscrupulous people may take advantage of this, but using your 
real identity on the internet is nevertheless meaningless…To give an example from 
Twitter…many “eponymous” accounts are used by multiple users…the individual 
photographed is not always the one that is writing, it is often people working for that 
individual… (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Batzoglou, however, dismisses this view, rejecting even the use of a pseudonym or handle: “the 
journalistic product must always be eponymous, to be signed off [by its author] and not with the 
use of a pseudonym, except if your life is in danger” (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
 The controversy over anonymity and the attempts, a decade ago, to outlaw or restrict it, 
reflect a broader trend in which electronic communications in Greece have been targeted. In 
2002, a law was unanimously passed by the Greek Parliament which was purportedly aimed at 
outlawing the use of video gambling machines in public places other than casinos, but the law 
was so overbroad that it effectively banned all electronic games and put arcades and internet 
cafés at risk of being shut down (“Omofona yperpsifistike,” 2002; “Antidroun,” 2002). This law 
was soon overturned by the European Union, which later levied a fine against Greece for not 
implementing this directive in a timely manner (Stampoglis, 2009). In 2009, soon after the 
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widespread December 2008 riots which will be examined in the next section, a law was passed 
which eliminated the anonymity of pre-paid and “pay-as-you-go” cellular phones, requiring 
owners of these phones to officially register them. 
 In Mandravelis’ view, these legislative attempts reflect the fear of the political system 
towards new forms of communication: “The first thing on the mind of each government is to find 
a way to limit social media. They do not understand its nature and can’t manage it, so they fear 
it” (personal communication, June 11, 2013). Andreas Roumeliotis, a former journalist with the 
Eleftherotypia newspaper who is the founder of the enallaktikos.gr civil society web portal, adds:  
If [the politicians] could, they’d do whatever [Turkish president] Erdogan does in Turkey. 
If it was in their hands, they’d censor the internet. I deeply believe this. Now they simply 
can’t control it. I am certain they don’t like it and don’t want it. They have a thousand 
ways to target someone and to destroy them. (Personal communication, April 3, 2014) 
 
Broumas points out that where the state has been most effective in stymieing online speech is not 
through direct legislation but through indirect actions which create a chilling effect: 
The state has not made an impressive move to cease freedom of expression on the 
internet. Of course we know that there is a law regulating freedom of expression on the 
internet, there is a bill that somewhere in the shelves of the Ministry of Justice, but it 
hasn't surfaced yet. This would be, of course, a censorship law, to suppress freedom, not 
to give more freedom. But, this has happened in an indirect way. The Greek judicial 
system and the Greek laws are very conservative in terms of freedom of expression. They 
have the laws there to use when it is convenient for them. These [wealthy] people have 
the money to prosecute you. So if you end up going to court, most people that have been 
imposed in such a situation have closed down their websites. This happened a lot of 
times. (Personal communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
One potential example of this comes from the arrest of Facebook commentator “Geron 
Pastitsios,” whose name was a play on the name of a famous Greek monk, Geron Paisios, 
revered by some for his prophecies, and “pastitsio,” a famous Greek dish. “Geron Pastitsios” 
(real name Filippos Loizos) was arrested in 2012 and charged with “malicious blasphemy,” 
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resulting in an initial 10-month suspended jail sentence and an outcry in the Greek social media 
sphere. Though he was eventually acquitted (“Athoothike,” 2017), Masouras points out: “[I]n the 
same fortnight we had blasphemy cases in Greece, Saudi Arabia, in Iran I think, and in Egypt. 
That tells you something about the legal status of how law sees the internet in Greece.” 
Notably, even though the issue of online anonymity and regulating online speech is today 
well past its peak, in terms of the controversy that it generates in Greece, a series of recent 
decisions has addressed several concerns connected to such speech. In an April 2017 ruling by 
the Areios Pagos, charges of online defamation are written off after five years, as opposed to 
three years for print defamation (“Sta 5 xronia,” 2017). In another recent ruling, the Areios Pagos 
decided that administrators of websites cannot be held legally liable for the content of comments 
posted on their sites (“Areios Pagos,” 2018). Finally, in 2017, the Greek Ministry of Digital 
Policy, Telecommunications and Media inaugurated a new service that will detect and report 
instances of online plagiarism and copyright infringement, in response to rampant complaints 
about “copy-and-pasting” on news websites (“Digital Policy,” 2017). 
4.3.5 – Single Issue Advocacy Blogs: The Case of G700 
 
While much attention was directed towards the “news blog phenomenon” in Greece in 
the years leading up to the economic crisis, and despite the general distinction between news 
blogs and personal blogs, a third type of blog with an acute impact on the public sphere can be 
identified: single-issue advocacy blogs. 
An example of such a blog was the G700 blog. Blogger Paschalis Aganidis was one of 
the founders of this blog. According to Aganidis, the blog was established in 2007, and he 
described the blog as “the first-ever collectively run political blog in Greece, with a narrow focus 
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and very specific political content” (personal communication, December 16, 2012). Aganidis 
describes the impetus for creating the G700 blog as being the low wages which young people 
faced in the job market. It is out of this issue that the blog’s name was symbolically derived, as 
G700 represents the “700 euro generation,” alluding to the 700 euro monthly wages which many 
employed young people received at that time. Indeed, according to Aganidis, the blog was 
founded by individuals representing this generation: 
It was founded by young people who, in their daily lives, experienced the problems of the 
job market…the minimum wage at the time was 700 euros. The blog placed at the 
epicenter of public discourse, within which we introduced the issue of intergenerational 
justice. Our primary objective was to impact the public dialogue, to take advantage of the 
net route of the blogosphere... (Personal communication, December 16, 2012) 
 
As stated by Aganidis, the original team of bloggers consisted of 15-20 individuals who wrote 
articles on the blog, an activity which Aganidis described as the “net route.” Notably, most pieces 
were nominally anonymous and were signed off by “the 700 euro generation.” Aganidis stated 
that on occasion, eponymous articles were publicized if the writer of the piece wished to be 
identified, but Aganidis noted that the team of bloggers was nevertheless not operating in secret, 
as numerous writers of the blog publicly appeared in the media and spoke at conferences 
pertaining to new and social media. However, the idea behind the blog was that most articles 
would be identified as representing the “700 euro generation” rather than any specific individual.  
 Aganidis noted the rapid popularity the blog enjoyed, which peaked in the 2008-2009 
period. During this time, postings on the G700 blog would receive anywhere between 2,000 and 
3,000 comments and thousands of visits and page views per day. Indeed, Aganadis stated that 
commenting was the primary way in which the public interacted with the blog, via young people 
who visited the blog to share their own experiences from the job market. Aganidis added a 
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second means of public participation, a group which was formed by G700 called “the worker’s 
advocate,” which consisted of five young attorneys who specialized in labor law and who were 
acting on a volunteer basis to handle labor and workplace issues submitted by young persons. 
 Through the blog, Aganidis noted that a significant degree of networking took place with 
other similar movements throughout Europe, such as the “G1000 generation” of Italy and Spain. 
However, one of the most direct contributions of the blog to the Greek public sphere and public 
discourse in Greece came from the many media appearances and references to the blog in the 
press10, which came as a result of the blog’s popularity and visibility at the time. Aganidis noted 
that writers of the G700 blog were often invited to appear on the mass media, but that the media 
often attempted to transform G700 into a personal human interest story: 
The [media] took an interest, but it was a little superficial. For example, I was invited to a 
televised morning show…the journalists were primarily interested in everyone’s personal 
story…how do you get by? How do you manage to survive?...For the most part they were 
not interested in…the issue of intergenerational justice…I would talk about the closed 
economy, the need for reforms, the restricted job market, the lack of connection with 
universities. This was not of interest…They did not see that behind the G700 name was a 
political initiative and perspective. (Personal communication, December 16, 2012) 
 
Nevertheless, the influence of the G700 blog was such that some of its bloggers had the 
opportunity to meet with the then-President of the Hellenic Republic Karolos Papoulias to raise 
the concerns of the G700 generation. According to Aganidis, as a result of this meeting, “[f]or 
the first time the President of the Republic made a public statement saying that aside from social 
justice there is an issue of generational justice” (personal communication, December 16, 2012). 
In addition, G700 bloggers addressed the Greek Parliament and the European Parliament. 
                                               
10 See for instance http://www.kathimerini.gr/304961/article/epikairothta/ellada/emeis-h-genia-twn-700-eyrw-
zhtame, published in the Kathimerini newspaper (November 18, 2007) and written by a G700 blogger. 
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 In addition to the “net route” of blogging described by Aganidis, the G700 team also 
engaged in offline, “crash route” options. One example provided by Aganidis was a successful 
protest organized via the G700 blog which took place in the Syntagma Square metro station in 
central Athens, calling for an expansion of the metro’s hours of operation to 2 am on Fridays and 
Saturdays, in order to accommodate the needs of the youth. According to Aganidis: 
This was the first time that there was a protest with a specific demand and a creative 
manner in which it was approached. Until that time, and still to this day, protests in 
Greece consist of a wholesale rejection and complaint…general demands of outrage and 
remonstrance. Ours was the first time a movement came along and put forth something 
very specific and very creative. (Personal communication, December 16, 2012) 
 
Another example provided by Aganidis concerns the G700’s participation in protests regarding 
proposed reforms to the social insurance system. Aganidis noted that G700 was not alone in 
participating but that its participation was quite distinct, reflecting a social democratic 
ideological perspective. As stated by Aganidis, “while the others were waging a regressive battle 
and maintaining a defensive stance, demanding no change, we protested and said the reforms are 
insufficient, we want more reforms. We were successful in infiltrating the public discourse” 
(personal communication, December 16, 2012). 
 Despite introducing Twitter and Facebook along the way as complementary tools and as a 
means for disseminating the blog’s material, the blog remained the G700’s main vehicle of 
expression up until the time that it ceased operations, according to Aganidis. This occurred in 
2012 and, as stated by Aganidis, was the result of the founders’ own generational shift, as many 
were by that point over 30 years of age, while some had emigrated. Moreover, political blogging 
was in decline by then, while due to the harsh economic effects of the crisis and the austerity 
measures that were implemented, “G700” was no longer symbolic, as the “G700” had, in effect, 
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become a “G300” due to widespread wage cuts. Nevertheless, it could be said that the G700 blog 
had a palpable impact on public discourse, particularly in terms of raising awareness of the 
travails of young workers, and it could be said to have helped inspire later initiatives, such as the 
development of the #aggeliesergasias (“job listings”) hashtag on Twitter in 2013, the creation of 
Twitter user @dimitrischid. The hashtag remains actively used as of 2018 (“Get a job,” 2013). 
4.3.6 – Survey Results: Views on Blogging 
 
 The results of the survey questionnaire revealed findings which largely reflect the general 
sentiments expressed by many of this project’s interviewees with regard to blogging and its 
impact on the public sphere and public discourse in Greece, including low levels of credibility 
and a sentiment that news blogs were not independent sources of news, suspicion towards online 
anonymity but a reluctance to criminalize it, and some impact towards the mass media. 
 In general, survey respondents believed that the Greek government maintained a negative 
view of bloggers. This view was held most strongly by newspaper editors and civil society 
representatives, while members of the European Parliament, on average, claimed that they 
viewed bloggers highly positively, and highlights a potential disconnect between politicians and 
society at large. In examining blogs further, news blogs were not widely viewed as a credible 
source of news and information, particularly (and not surprisingly) among newspaper editors, 
though credibility scores were low across the three samples. Nevertheless, there was a strong 
sentiment that such blogs likely contributed to a decline in the popularity of the mainstream 
media, albeit with a slightly negative impact upon the quality of the news and information 
received by the Greek populace. Here, the most positive view was held by civil society 
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representatives, who could be said to be the closest approximation of “ordinary citizens” out of 
the three sample populations surveyed. 
 There was very slight support towards the maintenance of the right to anonymity on the 
internet, which in reality could be said to reflect the divided and polarized opinions which exist 
on this controversial matter. Notably, newspaper editors were, on average, neutral towards the 
issue of anonymity, politicians were slightly negative, while civil society representatives were 
those who favored the maintenance of online anonymity the most. Even opposition to online 
anonymity was often qualified, however, as a majority of respondents—including newspaper 
editors—did not support a blanket prohibition of anonymous blogs or news articles. This 
sentiment existed despite a slight tendency for respondents to believe that anonymity diminishes 
the trustworthiness of a news story. Here, members of the European Parliament displayed the 
highest degree of mistrust, while newspaper editors and representatives of civil society were 
slightly positive towards anonymous news content. 
 Suspicion towards news blogs was also reflected with regards to how their independence 
from existing power structures was viewed, with a significant majority of respondents, and 
particularly elected officials and newspaper editors, stating that they did not believe blogs 
operated truly independently. Perhaps relating to this, and to a likely perception that professional 
journalists tended to operate news blogs, a slight majority of respondents believed that news 
blogs were not or probably were not representative examples of citizen journalism, with this 
sentiment particularly prevalent among newspaper editors. Respondents were, on the whole, 
neutral regarding their views towards the impact of news blogs on citizen journalism, with 
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representatives of civil society organizations holding the most positive view, followed by 
members of the European Parliament and newspaper editors . 
 In terms of consumption and recognition of news blogs, a large discrepancy was noted 
between, for instance, elected officials, who stated that they regularly read a very low number of 
blogs, and civil society representatives, who claimed to regularly read a much larger number of 
such blogs. The diversity of blogs in existence was reflected in the responses provided to a 
question asking participants to state up to three blogs which they regularly read, with only three 
blogs mentioned more than once. This likely reflects the vast diversity and large number of 
Greek blogs in operation and the lack of any predominant blogs in the post-Troktiko era. 
4.3.7 – The Decline of News Blogs 
 
 There is a general consensus that the popularity of the blogosphere—and news blogs in 
particular—has waned in Greece in recent years. This decline in popularity is attributed to a 
number of different factors, including the increased prevalence of social media (such as 
Facebook and Twitter), the growth of online news portals, difficulty in standing out or attracting 
an audience due to the plethora of blogs that are operating, an increased sophistication on the 
part of the audience, and the “mainstreaming” of popular individual bloggers. 
 For Aganidis, there are three main reasons for the decline: social media, the complete 
discrediting of the political sphere in Greece post-2009 (in parallel with the start of the economic 
crisis), and the increased prevalence of “yellow blogs” which engaged in blackmail (personal 
communication, December 16, 2012). Other respondents, however, focused on social media 
more exclusively as the main factor in the Greek blogosphere’s decline. According to 
Andriotakis: 
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Very quickly once Facebook and especially Twitter began to grow, the decline of blogs 
began. Some might say it is because they prefer Facebook or Twitter as they do not have 
to write as much…a few quality bloggers are left, the ones who are the most persistent 
and focused. (Personal communication, May 27, 2013) 
 
Similarly, blogger and journalist Andreas Panagopoulos attributes the blogosphere’s decline to 
the growth of social media, while hinting at the potential growth of a new literary public sphere: 
The decline of the Greek blogosphere is due in large part to social media, and this is 
because it’s surely easier to write 140 characters than a blog post. Nevertheless, the 
blogosphere has shifted from a mass phenomenon to one where a few, who either merge 
social media with their blogging…or who have moved on to a more literary, analytical, or 
specialized form of writing. The blogosphere scaled down…but generally blogs are not 
the point of reference they once were. (Personal communication, May 31, 2013) 
 
For Masouras, the decline of the Greek blogosphere was a two-step process, one in which 
personal bloggers stepped out of the picture, leaving behind news blogs to discredit the medium: 
The majority of social media netizens transcended from bloggers to Twitter and 
Facebook, so the blogosphere was no more. There is no more blogosphere. I stopped 
blogging...in 2009 because I was very active in Twitter…I think over time, maybe blogs 
dropped out of the picture because they felt irrelevant, and also of course because new 
forms of public communication surfaced, like Twitter and Facebook…The reason why 
the blogosphere degraded is aggregate. We focused our attentions elsewhere, and the 
professionals, so to speak, stepped into the picture and in my mind they corrupted the 
essence of the blog. (Personal communication, February 23, 2013) 
 
Adamidis also sees the decline of blogs as being attributable to a two-step process, but one where 
online news portals inherited the audience and popularity of news blogs: 
Initially blogs gave Greeks the impression that they were a means to be informed without 
hidden interests behind the scenes…Eventually, the most well-informed readers realized 
that other types of interests were hidden behind these blogs…I believe this slowly led to 
their decline. Subsequently, the need for better information led to the creation of a new 
series of websites that are more professionalized, have a more serious appearance, and 
which have an identifiable owner…sites which have the aesthetic of a traditional news 
portal but also have incorporated a bit of the blog aesthetic, with many anonymous 
articles or articles based on information garnered from blogs. They were the next step 
following the decline of blogs… (Personal communication, April 10, 2013) 
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Social media consultant Panagiotis Papachatzis, a former member of the communications team 
of PASOK and the interim government of technocrat Loucas Papademos, believes such news 
portals are directly derived from news blogs: 
Much more professional infotainment websites launched. A crucial moment was when 
newsbeast.gr began…it gave the impression of being credible, without raising the bar too 
much journalistically. From that point forward several initiatives began which satisfied a 
portion of the public which sought out this type of news. [Blogs like] Fimotro were 
replaced by portals such as newsbeast.gr, newsbomb.gr, and newsit.gr. In other words, 
well-known populist journalists entered the picture, and they had no problem operating 
eponymously…blogs did not decline, they transitioned into such portals. (Personal 
communication, October 12, 2013) 
 
In turn, Manos Niflis, the editor of enikos.gr, believes that while online news portals inherited 
the audience of the news blogs, these portals are not directly derived from such blogs, stating that 
the former reader of news blogs “stayed online but now divides his visits amongst more portals 
or eponymous blogs…he will seek out a news item from more than one site and that is 
significant” (personal communication, December 18, 2012). In a follow-up interview, Niflis 
added his belief that “[p]ortals are not the continuation of blogs. Portals developed from the need 
for quick and accurate information while allowing the public to judge and to be heard” (personal 
communication, March 15, 2017). 
 Skarpelos, while addressing the development of news portals, points out another potential 
factor in the decline of the blogosphere: the mainstreaming of prominent individual bloggers 
once they were absorbed by major traditional news outlets, thus losing their original aura: 
Bloggers initially had some credibility, but as they multiplied…the traditional media 
began to consider the internet an outlet for their material and developed joint newsrooms. 
It was upon this that individual bloggers such as Pitsirikos and Amalia [Kalyvinou] began 
to stand out…At some point, traditional media attempted to incorporate visible bloggers 
such as the example of Pitsirikos joining Skai. I believe this harmed them, because as 
they were forced to say a lot and attaching a voice to their written word, they lost their 
autonomy. (Personal communication, May 29, 2013) 
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Giorgos Apostolopoulos, a former master tutor in journalism at the Donau Universitat of Krems 
(Austria) and the Athina Research Centre, adopts a similar view, stating: “one who starts out as a 
truly authentic blogger and expresses truly unique positions but who begins to become more 
popular, eventually begins to replicate the mass media, by suppressing certain unpopular 
perspectives in order to gain more followers…” (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
 As blogs began to become increasingly popular and their numbers grew, this proliferation 
may have ended up working against the blogosphere as a whole. According to Kapsambelis, “the 
biggest enemy of the blogs are themselves…as there are very many” (personal communication, 
October 18, 2013). Aris Chatzistefanou, a documentary filmmaker, editor of info-war.gr, and 
journalist with the Efimerida ton Syntakton newspaper and Unfollow magazine, cited the need to 
be heard as a factor, stating: “Citizens want to have their own blog and gather information and 
write, which…is very positive, on the other hand, with all this noise of information, it becomes 
more difficult to find what you are really looking for” (personal communication, June 26, 2013). 
Lefteris Arvanitis, co-founder of the Thessaloniki-based alterthess.gr local news portal and 
journalist with the Dromos tis Aristeras newspaper, cites the failure of news blogs to specialize, 
saying: “they did not differentiate themselves, other more professional efforts have appeared and 
overtook them, and the landscape is now different” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 For others, the decline in the blogosphere’s popularity is part of a maturation process on 
the part of the audience. According to Mandravelis, “the role [of news blogs] was revealed” 
(personal communication, June 11, 2013), while Kostas Vaxevanis, editor of Hot Doc magazine 
and the koutipandoras.gr news portal, stated that while “the frustration of the public and their 
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need to find real news turned them towards blogs, the public has learned now, has matured…and 
now understands which blog is playing games” (personal communication, March 6, 2013). 
4.3.8 – The Impact of News Blogs 
 
 Despite their decline, it is unquestionable that the Greek blogosphere, and news blogs in 
particular, significantly impacted the Greek public sphere, public discourse, and the mass media 
to some extent. Their impact is evident in a variety of ways. According to Baltzis, “there have 
been some occasions where some scandals have been revealed starting from blogs, and then 
shown on TV…and in the press and then by [the viewers]. So there has been some influence” 
(personal communication, February 23, 2013). Baltzis may have possibly been referring to a 
string of scandals which rocked the then-government of New Democracy in 2008, including a 
sex scandal and attempted suicide involving a highly placed public official, Christos Zahopoulos, 
which were revealed or at the very least heavily publicized by news blogs such as Troktiko. 
 Another sign of the impact and influence of the blogosphere was the decision of the 
Eleftherotypia newspaper, shortly after its recirculation in early 2013, to hire four of the most 
popular and recognizable bloggers as regular columnists for its Saturday edition (Aggeliki 
Boubouka, personal communication, May 31, 2013). Longtime journalist Terrence Quick, a 
member of parliament with the Independent Greeks political party and the party’s press 
representative, stated that he used blogs extensively as a news source while hosting a nightly talk 
program on Athens-based television station Kontra Channel in 2010 and 2011, particularly 
during large-scale protests such as the Indignants’ movement of 2011 (personal communication, 
November 14, 2013). However, Liana Kanelli, a former journalist and member of parliament 
affiliated with the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) argues that “blogs…destroyed 
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journalism…You have the distortion of journalism…they turned into conspiracy seekers of the 
hidden truth” (personal communication, June 11, 2013). 
 Perhaps the most significant impact of the blogosphere—and the defining moment where 
the blogosphere in Greece gave way to the burgeoning social media sphere—were the December 
2008 riots, which will be covered in the upcoming section. 
4.4 – THE IMPACT OF BLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA ON PRE-CRISIS PROTEST MOVEMENTS 
4.4.1 – Introduction 
 
 The latter part of the first decade of the 2000s was an increasingly turbulent time in 
Greece. Just a few years removed from ascension to the Eurozone in 2002 and the hosting of the 
Olympics in Athens in the summer of 2004, the economic downturn of the latter part of the 
decade and a series of widely-publicized political scandals began to destabilize in the years 
leading up to the onset of the country’s full-fledged economic crisis. While protests were 
historically commonplace in Greece, they were typically the result of industrial actions and 
strikes called by trade unions or grievances of specific social groups, such as farmers. Moreover, 
in the period following the collapse of Greece’s military dictatorship, riots rarely erupted, and 
were generally limited to minor clashes between students or anarchists with police officers. This 
began to change in 2007, and blogs and social media played a significant role in this change. 
4.4.2 – The Protests of 2007 
 
In the summer of 2007, Greece was ravaged by two sets of major forest fires, one in the 
Western Peloponnese region and another in the Parnitha mountain range, just north of Athens. 
Though Greece is no stranger to summer wildfires, the scale and destruction of these two blazes 
was largely unprecedented, and protests followed. 
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 According to Broumas, the first instance where change was evident in Greece’s modern-
day public sphere were the protests which followed the fires of 2007. Bloggers and social media 
played a preeminent role in the development and organization of these protests: 
I was the person who initiated the message for the 2007 demonstrations of the mega 
fires…It didn’t start from one person…I think the first instance that showed this change 
[in the Greek public sphere] were the 2007 massive demonstrations…We had for the first 
time a mobilization through the internet without any central political entity behind 
it…This was made possible through the internet. People…fixed an appointment in the 
central square of Athens, in Syntagma, at a specific afternoon, and they said that we 
should all come dressed in black clothes. This was a massive demonstration of 20,000 or 
30,000 people. In the second mega fire, which was much bigger, [protests] took place all 
around Greece…again organized via the internet…Everybody came in black, but 
everybody came without saying that we are [from a party]... an extraparliamentary party 
of the left came, but came as in an ordinary demonstration with…their chants [and] 
banners. They were booed by the people. (Personal communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
Dimitra Dimitrakopoulou, a lecturer in the Department of Journalism at the Aristotle University 
of Thessaloniki, noted the role blogs played in encouraging volunteerism directly related to the 
fires, stating “[t]here was a very big movement organized by volunteers who were formed into a 
group in order to help the fires get extinguished in Athens…information was communicated 
through blogs, social media were very active…” (Personal communication, July 5, 2013) 
 Though the biggest protests of 2007 were those which were organized following the 
destructive fires of that summer, other protests took place that year which could be said to have 
played a significant role in the developments which were to follow in Greece in the coming 
years. Student protests were organized over a change in Article 16 of the higher education law 
(Zaira Konstantopoulou, personal communication, February 15, 2013), while major protests took 
place outside the annual speech of the prime minister at the Thessaloniki Trade Fair—a speech 
similar to the State of the Union address in the United States—in September. Wherlock cites this 
protest as one of the two transformative events—the other being the December 2008 riots—
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which led him to transform the nature of his blogging activity to political activism (personal 
communication, April 3, 2013). At the Trade Fair protests, Wherlock was beaten and detained by 
riot police, an incident which was partially captured on video and which was publicized by The 
Guardian, which learned of the story via his blog and Flickr account (Greenslade, 2007).11 
 One final notable protest involved prominent blogger Amalia Kalyvinou. A cancer 
patient, Amalia became popular in the Greek blogosphere for chronicling instances of corruption 
and malpractice in the Greek public health system. After her death in 2007, bloggers organized 
and demanded reforms to the national health system. In Masouras’ view, this was the first case of 
an “apolitical political” protest in Greece (personal communication, February 23, 2013). 
4.4.3 – The December 2008 Riots 
 
 The riots of December 2008 in Greece which followed the killing of unarmed 15-year old 
Alexis Grigoropoulos by a police officer at a student demonstration in central Athens on 
December 8 of that year were unprecedented in both their scope and scale. They occurred not 
just in Athens but in Thessaloniki and other cities in Greece, and lasted until December 31.  
 Aside from their severity, what was also notable about the December 2008 riots from a 
Greek perspective was the role played by social and new media tools, which were used to 
various extents for the purposes of publicizing news, photos and information about the riots, and 
for coordinating meeting points and other aspects of the protests themselves. Furthermore, they 
served as an impetus to bring many individuals who were up until that point not social media 
users, into this online realm, and in particular the Twittersphere. Despite the fact that Twitter was 
                                               
11 See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MThrBIWsTHc, http://teacherdudebbq.blogspot.gr/2007/09/beaten-
for-taking-this-picture.html, https://www.flickr.com/photos/59089088@N00/1392519221/in/pool-73488111@N00. 
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not widely used in Greece at the time, the events of December 2008 introduced it to a broader 
audience, while the #grriots hashtag became associated with the protests (“Poioi Einai,” 2012). 
According to Tsimitakis, while social media are often used by organized activist groups, a 
second modern characteristic of their use in relation to social movements is: 
…[A] kind of open activism which organically appears and evolves, without coordination 
or any kind of pre-condition. That's the example of December 2008…that night people 
started reporting online what they witnessed…and then they started combining 
information, discussing it, like a huge open visual news desk. I think that it played a very 
crucial role in what followed after that. And that happened in the open. It happened a lot 
faster than any media could actually do it. It was complete, in the sense that it got 
information from so many sources that couldn't escape anything. In my opinion, it led 
both to a struggle against the media narrative that was coming from formal institutions, 
and also it played a huge role in what followed that troubled night, with riots in the 
streets. There was this sense…that blogs and social media operated from the bottom up 
and on behalf of the people who were on the ground, while the mainstream media 
operated from the top down… (Personal communication, February 13, 2013) 
 
Vaxevanis credits social media with revealing to the public the truth about what was transpiring: 
If social media did not exist at that time, to reproduce photographs of the deceased, the 
witnesses of people who were there and who were indicating that something pre-planned 
had occurred at that moment, no one would have learned anything, nor would the [police 
officer] have been imprisoned. (Personal communication, March 6, 2013) 
 
Wherlock, who covered the protests in Thessaloniki for almost a full month, cautions us, 
however, about giving Twitter more credit than it is due for helping to spark the protests: 
I covered [the protests] for a month. I was down in the streets for a month. Twitter…it's a 
bit like, you know, what happened in Egypt. Everyone says “ahhh, Twitter revolution!” 
Twitter is still very much a minority sport…To think that the whole of Greece went up in 
flames, that you had thousands of people in hundreds of different locations, all because of 
Twitter is a bit erroneous…people still communicated in traditional ways, they found out 
about a demo, phoned me, said look, demonstration, will you be there?...A little bit 
Indymedia, a little bit of blogs. Twitter was more about telling people what was 
happening, what was already happening. I don't think Twitter was used as much as an 
organizing tool. I think that more traditional ways of organizing, whether it be a demo or 
a march… (Personal communication, April 3, 2013) 
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As noted by Wherlock, Twitter was far from the only online communications medium which was 
utilized during this period. Masouras emphasizes the role of Facebook while downplaying the 
importance of Twitter, especially for the youth who participated in the protests: 
Nobody expected the youths to take to the streets in such numbers in 2008, and that was 
largely due to Facebook. The youth didn't use Twitter. That's very interesting as well. The 
schoolchildren who went out into the street communicated through Facebook and derided 
Twitter as a tool used by old people. (Personal communication, February 23, 2013) 
 
Nikos Bakounakis, a journalist with the Sunday edition of the To Vima newspaper and a 
professor of journalism at the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens, 
highlighted the role of YouTube during the clashes, stating “YouTube was heavily used. The 
amateur videos which were immediately being uploaded to YouTube showed us what was 
happening, including images from the riots, but from the point of view of disseminating 
information, not from organizing a coherent movement” (personal communication, March 8, 
2013). Baltzis highlighted the role that mobile phones and SMS text messaging for the purpose 
of organizing specific actions related to the protests (personal communication, February 20, 
2013), as did Kranidiotis, who also highlights the role played by Athens Indymedia: 
The clashes which followed were coordinated from day one by cellular phones, via mass 
text messages and also within social networking spaces such as the notorious Indymedia. 
You had the coordination of illegal acts…which led to pillaging and destruction… 
coordinated via social networks… (Personal communication, December 6, 2013) 
 
Turning our attention back to Twitter, Wherlock describes how, in his view, Twitter impacted the 
mainstream media’s coverage of the events which were unfolding: 
What Twitter did was allow a national and international audience to follow very quickly, 
accurately as well, what was happening. This is something the traditional Greek media 
just couldn't handle at all. I think this is one of the things where Twitter and new media is 
much, much better than traditional media. (Personal communication, April 3, 2013) 
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On the topic of mainstream media coverage of the December 2008 protests, Konstantina Zoehrer, 
a political scientist and social entrepreneur with the “180 Moires” (“180 Degrees”) initiative, 
said: “[t]he riots in 2008, most of the stuff happening in the street was not covered. It was 
covered afterwards within a very, very strict framework” (personal communication, June 4, 
2013). Chatzistefanou argues that the events of 2008 were a turning point for the mass media: 
Before 2008, I would say that Greek media had two different faces. They were at the 
same time private enterprises that they were interested in some profit, although as I 
mentioned they were expecting more money from their connection with the state, but 
they were expecting some money, some direct profits, and that opened some windows of 
opportunities for alternative voices to be heard. We used to call them sometimes "left-
wing alibis." So the media owners were saying that look, we also have this alternative 
voice, so you cannot [accuse us of] being one-sided. After 2008, I believe that they totally 
forgot these characteristics of being a private enterprise and they were working more as a 
propaganda tool. (Personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
 
Zoehrer says that the protests led her to join Twitter, significantly impacting her career as well: 
Essentially it has started my career. I had just started writing, and when we had the riots 
in December 2008 with the death of the teenager, I was on the streets reporting every day 
basically, via Twitter. Not blogging but tweeting a lot, shooting photos a lot, providing 
them to channels like CNN and BBC… (Personal communication, June 4, 2013) 
 
Perhaps most significant of all though was the impact of the December 2008 riots and protests. 
For Broumas, following the protests organized after the 2007 summer fires, the second major 
change in the Greek public sphere occurred during the December 2008 protests, leaving behind 
an indelible impact upon an entire generation of Greek youth in the process: 
The second change in the public sphere was December 2008. This was a change because, 
first of all, it was triggered, it was ignited through the new media. The old media, the 
beginning even said that there was no death of teenager Alexandros Grigoropoulos, but 
the news spread quickly through the alternative media, the new media, and it spread 
rapidly throughout Greece. This led to the December 2008 revolt in Greece. The revolt 
changed the public sphere in the way that new kinds of messages reached a…much 
bigger audience…as a counterpower against the mainstream media. These were very 
important messages, because they delegitimized the establishment completely. This was 
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the time that the establishment lost a whole generation, the young generation. It lost them 
forever maybe… (Personal communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
4.4.4 – Discussion 
 
 The aim of this chapter was to provide a clearer understanding of the context within 
which social and new media entered the picture in Greece. The preceding examination of the 
mainstream media landscape from a legal and regulatory perspective demonstrated that Greece’s 
media landscape, and particularly the broadcasting sector, were highly controlled and largely 
inaccessible to ordinary citizens, with a significant impact on the functioning of the public sphere 
and public discourse in Greece. This directly addresses RQ1 of this study. 
 Furthermore, the preceding analysis of Greece’s uneven legal framework and legal 
enforcement as it pertains to broadcasting, and the role of this state of legal uncertainty in 
helping to foster a crisis of credibility on the part of the Greek populace towards the country’s 
mainstream media outlets, directly addresses RQ3 and subquestion 4. 
 Examination of the “news blog phenomenon,” the content of these blogs, the controversy 
the generated and the popularity that they achieved allows us to understand what these blogs may 
have been alternative to, and addresses RQ3, subquestions 3 and 4.  
In turn, the manner in which these news blogs were supplanted in popularity by social 
media, and influence of both blogs and social media in fueling major protest movements in 
Greece in the years immediately preceding the country’s protracted economic crisis, was also 
examined. This relates to RQ2 of this study, and in particular subquestion 2. 
Finally, all of the preceding sections, as a whole, provide us with a clearer picture of the 
political and social climate in Greece leading up to the period being studied, 2011-2017, and an 
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understanding of the context within which social and new media operated and what they may 
have been differentiating themselves from, during this time period. 
Building upon this contextual background, chapter 5 will examine the Greek public 
sphere and Greek civil society, the potential contributions of social and new media to the 
rejuvenation of the public sphere and civil society or the potential development of new alternate 
public spheres during the crisis, the impact of new media and social media in the development of 
new spaces of public deliberation, and the contribution and role of social and new media in 

























Chapter 5: Social and New Media, the Greek Public Sphere, and Greek Civil 
Society 
 
5.1 – INTRODUCTION 
This section will examine the potential impact of social and new media on the Greek 
public sphere(s) and Greek civil society. The contribution of social and new media to the 
rejuvenation of the public sphere and civil society and the formation of a new public sphere (or 
spheres) and new civil society initiatives will be analyzed, as well as the impact of social and 
new media on public discourse. In addition, the impact of social and new media on existing 
entities active within civil society and the extent to which these tools are utilized by such 
organizations will be examined. This section will also seek to determine what is new, if anything, 
about the post-2011 public sphere and civil society in Greece and how new initiatives and civil 
society groups may be different from what existed previously and traditionally in Greece. 
In the subsection which follows, perspectives will be presented, based on the interviews 
conducted as part of this study, on how the public sphere operated historically in Greece and 
what has changed, if anything, during the 2011-2017 time period being studied, directly 
answering RQ1 of this research project. This will include a focus on such factors as clientelism, 
the 1947-1949 civil war and societal schisms which might still remain in the present day, cultural 
traits and the existence of a “polis” or “demos” in modern day Greece, the adoption of social and 
new media tools and ways in which they have been utilized in order to intervene within the 
public sphere, and the development of new initiatives during the economic crisis within the 
public sphere. In addition, results from the electronic survey questionnaires which pertain to the 
public sphere will be presented and analyzed. 
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This will be followed by a separate subsection dedicated specifically to civil society in 
Greece. This section will begin by examining perspectives on how Greek civil society functioned 
historically, and will then present initiatives which have developed or been established during the 
2011-2017 period being studied and the role of social and new media in the development of these 
organizations and groups. Two illustrative examples will be presented, the case of the Boroume 
non-governmental organization and the case of the Radiobubble online radio station, which in 
this chapter will be examined from the perspective of civil society initiatives which were borne 
out of this station’s programming and activity. Finally, results from the electronic survey 
questionnaires which have to do with civil society will be presented and analyzed. 
Following this, the overall impact of social and new media on the Greek public sphere, 
Greek civil society, and public discourse in Greece during the period of the economic crisis, 
particularly during the 2011-2017 period being studied, will be analyzed in relation to RQ1. 
5.2 – THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GREEK PUBLIC SPHERE 
5.2.1 – Historical Development of the Greek Public Sphere 
 
 As seen in chapter 2, the general consensus which exists within the relevant academic 
literature views the public sphere in Greece as traditionally having been underdeveloped, when 
compared to the public sphere in Western Europe and North America. This general consensus 
was shared—though not unanimously—by the interviewees who participated in this study. 
Broadly speaking, the commonly held view they expressed regarding the historical existence and 
development of the public sphere reflected a sphere that was limited and dominated by 
hegemonic societal actors, such as political parties and the mass media, and often heavily 
impacted by “diaploki.” Others emphasized the unresolved societal differences stemming from 
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Greece’s civil war of 1947-1949. A significant minority, however, expressed the view that there 
existed two main competing spheres, or that historically a robust public sphere did exist, even if 
it was different from western notions of this concept. 
 According to Boubouka, “The space of public discourse was very strictly constructed 
traditionally. It was controlled by the hegemonic powers in society, meaning political, economic, 
and business interests…much more so than in most other European countries” (personal 
communication, May 31, 2013). A similar view was expressed by Tasos Oikonomou, a journalist 
with the Kathimerini newspaper: 
Before 2008 things were rather entrenched. The public sphere consisted of citizens acting 
within political parties, identifying with political parties…reflecting the positions of 
political parties in the public dialogue or being represented in the public dialogue via the 
positions of the political parties, in the press, the television stations, the radio stations. 
Pre-2008 where did the public sphere exist? Nowhere outside of the mass media. 
(Personal communication, April 10, 2013) 
 
Kapsambelis also describes a hegemonic, top-down public sphere in which marginalized groups 
sought any limited opportunity which they could find, in order to be heard: 
For many decades in Greece, the public sphere was confined and dependent, because 
there were only the state-run mediums and some newspapers. When private broadcasting 
was permitted, radio and television, the way in which deregulation occurred resulted in 
media power resting in the hands of an oligopoly. This created many filters in the public 
discourse and created much pressure on the public at large to a suffocating extent, as it 
could not be heard. For that reason, collectives, small political parties, ordinary citizens, 
and young people sought any crack they could find in the system in order to express 
themselves, and therefore there was a tremendous amount of skepticism towards the 
official sphere and the information provided by the hegemonic media. (Personal 
communication, October 18, 2013) 
 
Boubouka describes a public sphere which reflected the clientelist orientation of Greek politics: 
Politics was determined based on petty political interests, partisan norms and party lines. 
They had nothing to discuss with the public. They simply sold whatever they had to sell, 
made deals and patronage appointments. Their relationship with the citizens was one of a 
patron-client. This is changing rapidly. (Personal communication, May 31, 2013) 
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Tsimitakis argues that these conditions resulted in a societal tolerance for corruption, stating 
“…in the Greek case, it’s pretty obvious that whoever had the power...more or less controlled the 
public dialogue, therefore the public sphere and Greek society operated in a kind of tolerance 
towards phenomena like corruption” (personal communication, February 13, 2013). Bakounakis 
describes the public sphere in Greece as historically having been dominated by the state, but with 
the existence of a robust press: 
The public sphere historically consisted of a controlled public dialogue via state-run 
broadcasting, controlled by successive governments and the Ministry of Press. Greece 
was one of very few countries with such a ministry, only in dictatorial regimes and the 
Soviet Union prior to its collapse was there such a thing…Public dialogue took place 
largely through the press, where there was truly a large and free dialogue, despite the fact 
that most or all newspapers depended on revenues from state advertising…This changed 
after 1989, when a portion of the public discourse moved to privately-owned television 
stations and became a spectacle, with assigned roles for the good guy, the bad guy, the 
leftist, the right winger, the liberal, the moderate, the extremist, the profane. However, in 
the newspapers and through their columnists a dialogue continued to take place, one that 
has now broadened with the advent of new media. A large portion of the public discourse 
has now moved to the new media. (Personal communication, March 8, 2013) 
 
Odysseas Konstantinopoulos, at that time Greece’s deputy minister of development and 
competitiveness and a member of parliament with the PASOK ticket, describes a public sphere 
where, historically, citizens were able to be heard via political parties: 
The public sphere worked passively for the citizen as public discourse occurred through 
the mass media, with which the citizen did not have direct contact and communication. 
To be honest…in the past there was a better effort and better functioning of the political 
parties…you could be heard. This has waned today for many reasons, and the dialogue 
has begun to take place via social media. (Personal communication, September 3, 2014) 
 
Vasilis Karakostas, a member of the parliamentary press office of Golden Dawn, described the 
hegemony of the political parties and mass media in public discourse in blunt terms: “There 
never existed a public sphere [in Greece]” (personal communication, June 12, 2014).  
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 Apostolopoulos highlights the role of television, both state-run and private, in shaping the 
public sphere for much of Greece’s recent history, with some exceptions: 
The first major change [in the public sphere] came in 1975…there was a two to three year 
period which approached true pluralism…as political party commentary was prohibited. 
With PASOK [being elected in 1981] there was a gradual decline, reaching its low point 
just before the introduction of privately-owned television stations…when private 
television appeared, there was a surface pluralism but in practice public discourse 
consisted of the presentation of various factions and was slanted towards hegemonic 
political tendencies. (Personal communication, May 24, 2013) 
 
Vasilis Hrisos, a volunteer with the mindthecam media initiative, described the role of privately-
owned television stations in shaping the public sphere in succinct terms: “A few years back, the 
public sphere was strictly defined by the agenda that corporate media were pushing, and that was 
it. You could hear people talking in the bus, they would just talk about the subjects of the news” 
(personal communication, July 2, 2013). Dourou added that “for my generation, public dialogue 
occurred via privately-owned television stations” (personal communication, July 3, 2013). 
 For some, the development of the public sphere in Greece was directly impacted by the 
social schisms which developed as a result of the civil war of 1947-1949. As stated by Broumas: 
Public dialogue in Greece was never democratic. It was very much polarized dialogue, 
because of the civil war…So we always had problems of democracy…in the public 
dialogue. When you speak about the public sphere in Greece, you have to think of it 
mainly as monologues taking place simultaneously. This is the kind of dialogue we are 
used to in Greece. Until recently, before the advent of the internet and the information 
society, public dialogue was confined in the central political scene, in the parliament and 
in the main political parties. We didn't have strong media and independent media…[we] 
had dependent media, media that depended on the state and the parties or depended on 
specific private interests. So these media couldn't give people the venue to speak for 
themselves. (Personal communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
Katrougalos contends that the civil war’s influence led to the formation of a dual public sphere: 
 
I think the basic characteristic of the public sphere in Greece is that it followed the 
division of society, especially after the post-civil [war] era. We had a strange 
phenomenon, not the same as in Western Europe. We had a deeply divided society, an 
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almost authoritarian state that did not suffocate completely civil society, but it had 
resulted to a division of it. We had actually two public spheres: one official, and one, let's 
say, resistant of the official situation. This did not survive after the fall of the dictatorship, 
but we can also see in the after the dictatorship era a kind of duality in the social sphere: 
an official one and a more, let's say, militant one. (Personal communication, July 2, 2013) 
 
Thanos Andritsos, a member of the governing committee of the ANTARSYA (Front of the Greek 
Anticapitalist Left) political party, describes this “militant” alternative sphere, which existed in 
opposition to the hegemonic public sphere of the political system and the mainstream media: 
“[t]here existed a second public sphere, one from below, one mostly from the left, which was 
mostly that of the social movements, which was clearly much more limited, which addressed far 
fewer people, but perhaps consisted of stronger ties” (Personal communication, July 23, 2013). 
 Blogger “Ypopto Mousi” also described a dual public sphere, but one which was divided 
between the official sphere and the “kafeneio” or café sphere: “In Greece we had the public 
dialogue that was going on in neighborhoods or coffee shops…and we had another thing, the 
mainstream dialogue, which were the media: newspapers, TV, radio, and so on. And these two 
things were not communicating” (personal communication, June 27, 2013). Perhaps highlighting 
this divide, Zenakos describes his prior experience working at a major newspaper, where 
interaction with readers was limited: “There was no contact…except the occasional really 
devoted reader of the newspaper that would send a letter, but that was very, very rare, at least 
compared to the readership” (personal communication, July 19, 2013). Thanasis Gounaris, co-
founder and member of the board of the Pirate Party of Greece, also describes a similar divide: 
Society was divided into two spheres. There was that which we all watched, the 
traditional media…which often portrayed things as they wanted, often detached from 
reality, and there was the reality of the sphere where people spoke to each other in 
“kafeneions,” to their friends, families. This was completely different. (Personal 
communication, October 8, 2013) 
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Conversely, Gazi argues that the Greek public sphere was not underdeveloped, existing instead 
as a reflection of Greek society, while describing alternate spheres as having been ephemeral in 
nature, with ephemerality being another theme which will reappear often as part of this study: 
For the most part, I believe that the public sphere in Greece is developed, perhaps 
overdeveloped…Greeks speak publicly, express their feelings, and considers the public 
sphere his space to conquer in a way. It’s part of the culture of the Greek. This doesn’t 
exist as much in Germany, for instance. The public sphere for Greeks exists in order to be 
heard. It’s part of the identity and culture…[Conversely], alternativeness is not something 
I would consider to be a characteristic of the Greeks…There were times when the public 
sphere was restricted, during the civil war or the dictatorship, during which alternate 
spheres existed… (Personal communication, January 11, 2013) 
 
From a different perspective, Aris Tolios, a member of the political council of the Popular Unity 
(LAE) political party also arrives at the conclusion that a public sphere historically did function 
in Greece, reflecting the country’s development vis-à-vis the west: 
The truth is that Greek society has transformed itself very rapidly in the 19th century, 20th 
century from an agrarian society to something that should resemble but never quite 
resembled modern European societies. In that sense, I think that the public sphere, when 
you compare it to Western Europe or even the United States or Canada, it's an unfair 
judgment…[T]his does not necessarily mean that it's less political or less politically 
radical, not just socially radical. (Personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
Georges Contogeorgis, a professor of political science at the Panteion University of Social and 
Political Sciences in Athens, examines the historic roots of public discourse and deliberation 
within Greek culture. He argues that there are two ways to enforce checks and balances upon 
government in Greece. The first is direct democracy, which Contogeorgis argues existed within 
Greek culture until the time of Greece’s independence (in 1827) and which operated as a “church 
of the demos.” This was an individualized democratic system where local communities enjoyed a 
great degree of decision-making ability. When the modern Greek nation state was born, however, 
this system was purposely supplanted by a clientelist system, converting an individualized nation 
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into a mass of voters, something it never was before in its history. Contogeorgis adds that the 
force which could have served as a second check upon government in Greece, the widespread 
Greek diaspora which largely consisted of a sophisticated urban class outside of modern Greece’s 
borders, was also purposely excluded. According to Contogeorgis, “the nation was not third 
world, but the state was” (personal communication, December 19, 2016). 
5.2.2 – Remnants of the Greek Civil War in the Public Sphere of Greece 
 
 Earlier, Broumas and Katrougalos described the impact of the Greek civil war in shaping 
public discourse in the decades which followed, and in potentially fostering the existence of a 
parallel alternate public sphere, far detached from the hegemonic public sphere. According to 
several interviewees, the remnants of the societal schisms which were borne out of the 1947-
1949 conflict have remained ingrained in Greek society up until the present time and have 
contributed to the intense politicization and partisanship apparent in public discourse. 
 Oikonomou locates the roots of the often polemical nature of Greek public rhetoric to the 
Greek civil war, but also to country’s military dictatorship and the post-junta period: 
A major role [in shaping the public sphere] was the post-dictatorship climate…which was 
a triumph of liberals, left-leaning movements, the pro-democracy movement…The post-
civil war syndrome was never surpassed by Greek society, it simply was transformed. 
Even today, you will see in reader comments on Kathimerini arguments which are 
derived from civil war rhetoric. The civil war is still a point of reference for today’s 
developments…The right-wing perspective, right-wing ideology, conservative ideology 
in Greece is incriminated. (Personal communication, April 10, 2013) 
 
Mandravelis argues that this aspect of modern-day Greek society is based on myths, with direct 
consequences for political speech and political behavior: 
Greek culture, for better or for worse, is filled with myths regarding “resistance.” If you 
read Greek history, there are never any compromises. Everyone resists everything. This 
mentality asserted itself in the post-civil war era, when the victors unfortunately isolated 
a large part of Greek society, the left, from sociopolitical life…The result was that this 
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created a culture of resistance and non-compromise. Compromise in Greece is considered 
a terrible thing. Even a dialogue with the “enemy” is considered a terrible thing. This 
fostered within society a polemical culture, to wage war instead of to discuss. The 
aftermath of this is evident on social media. (Personal communication, June 11, 2013) 
 
Finally, Panos Kounenakis, a volunteer with Radiobubble, argues that the economic crisis of the 
past decade has brought all of these old divides back to the forefront: 
Greece is a society [that is] over-politicized. And that defines all the rest…[I]n the 1990s 
they were saying that there was no division any more. This comes back in our faces and 
says, there is always going to be a division, how you see the social problems being 
solved, there is a more left point of view and a more right point of view, which is never 
going to be extinguished. In Greece, this was more intense than necessary. It was always, 
there was more division, due to historical facts, as you know, there was a civil war, there 
was a resistance against the Nazis which was conducted by the communists mostly, a 
civil war, a dictatorship, and 3-4 decades of anti-communistic hysteria. And of course, 
what followed [in the] '80s, social-orientated government, which tried to [reinstate] the 
other half again…The crisis in Greece, the last 8-9 years, has put everything back on the 
table. (Personal communication, June 13, 2017) 
 
These divides could be said to be reflective of a Greek cultural mentality to passionately discuss 
politics, and at times to divide up public spaces along partisan lines, as in the case of “kafeneia.” 
5.2.3 – The Greek Public Sphere and Café Culture 
 
 In a 2011 paper, Greek “café culture” was introduced as a defining characteristic of 
modern Greek culture, both within the country’s borders and in diasporic communities around 
the world, which were direct imitations of cafés one would find in Greece (Nevradakis, 2011: 
169-170; Vouyouka-Sereti, 2002: 244, 254-255). The modern-day Greek café could be said to be 
a direct derivation of the traditional Greek “kafeneio,” or coffee shop, a traditionally gendered 
and male-dominated space which at one time existed in practically every community in Greece, 
where politics and current events were discussed. 
 For Gazi, this form of public space is a defining characteristic of modern Greek culture: 
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In the eyes of any observer, on a visit to any city or town in Greece, one will understand 
the primacy of public space. You see this at the cafes, in the squares, on the streets, 
everywhere. This culture has made its way onto social media now. This space where we 
are sitting presently [the Filion Café, a historic establishment in central Athens], is a 
space with a historic tradition where ideas, cultural works, music, cinema, books, 
theatrical works were born, and we are sitting here at this same table so many years later. 
(Personal communication, January 11, 2013) 
 
Ioanna Iliadi, a journalist and press adviser to the Ministry of National Defense, describes the 
“kafeneio” as the traditional expression of a localized public sphere: 
The public sphere in Greece…traditionally was the kafeneio. There every region truly 
had its own public sphere. In each kafeneio a television set was later installed. What was 
seen on television was then discussed in the kafeneio. And often the kafeneio was the 
delivery point for newspapers. (Personal communication, May 26, 2013) 
 
The political role of the “kafeneio” in Greek society was further elaborated upon by Alexandros 
Theodoridis, co-founder of the Boroume non-governmental organization: 
In the years before the internet was very popular in Greece, you would say that things 
were discussed in a very local basis. I mean, the typical kafeneio in villages come to my 
mind, where the member of the parliament would go every weekend to his constituency 
and speak with people. (Personal communication, December 18, 2012) 
 
In turn, Apostolopoulos describes the partisan nature which often characterized these spaces, 
referencing “blue and green kafeneions,” referring to the colors of the New Democracy and 
PASOK political parties respectively (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
Notably though, “kafeneio” is a term that can and often is used with derision, at least with 
reference to standards of political discourse. As explained by Adamidis: 
Public dialogue [in Greece] is always heated and does not submit to many rules. This 
model, in conjunction with the idiosyncrasies of the Greek people, which are similar in 
nature, meaning they are used to arguing more with emotion and less with assertions, led 
to the development of the public sphere along these lines…This is what we call in Greece 
a “kafeneio-style discussion”…without a set agenda or specified questions, where the 
rules of debate are never followed… (Personal communication, April 10, 2013) 
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Panagopoulos also arrives at the same conclusion while highlighting the partisan nature of these 
coffee hours: “[The public sphere] never functioned. It was a “kafeneio,” a coffee shop, the 
continuation of the agora, where the newspapers were read. There were the coffee shops of the 
socialists, the rightists, the leftists” (personal communication, May 31, 2013). 
5.2.4 – Social Media Enters the Picture 
 
5.2.4.1 – Impact of Social Media 
 
 Amongst the individuals interviews, a wildly diverse range of thoughts and opinions was 
expressed regarding the impact of social and new media tools upon the public sphere and public 
discourse in Greece during the years of the economic crisis. For many, the influence of social 
media has been both significant and positive, empowering citizens, influencing public dialogue, 
and filling an existing void left by traditional media. Some respondents highlighted the impact of 
social and new media on news coverage provided by traditional media outlets, and their role in 
bringing previously little-known issues into the mainstream. For others, social and new media 
served as a release valve for frustrated and angry citizens during the crisis years, while providing 
a voice and means of public expression for the previously voiceless and to marginalized groups. 
Still others believe that social media merely reproduced the previous dual hegemonic and 
unofficial spheres, or are simply less influential than believed. 
 Niflis describes social media as “the number one medium of influence in Greece today,” 
(personal communication, December 18, 2012), while according to Boubouka, "[w]hat changed 
most sharply and what is changing most rapidly is…from the moment that the public began to be 
active and to express itself online, it has slowly begun to conquer a significant percentage of the 
public discourse” (personal communication, May 31, 2013). 
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 Efimeros stresses the role of social and new media in filling a void that mainstream 
media had left in Greece, in terms of providing news and information: 
For me, social media are the news at this time. I believe that social media are today’s 
newspaper…In Greece specifically, they have taken on a burden of news reporting and 
true journalism that has not been taken by professional journalists…When journalists 
themselves aren’t covering the news, there will be citizens who…will dedicate their own 
time to fill this gap. At this time, Twitter and Facebook have taken on a much bigger 
burden from that which I believe they should have…because mainstream Greek 
journalism lacks seriousness. (Personal communication, July 18, 2013) 
 
Niflis, on the other hand, argues that social media “now influence traditional media…a video 
[documenting a newsworthy event] will first go online, will go viral, and then conventional 
television will be forced to broadcast it, radio will be forced to report it, and newspapers will be 
forced to publish photographs” (personal communication, December 18, 2012). 
 Sofia Apostolia, a producer with Radiobubble and web editor for the Greek division of 
Doctors Without Borders, connects this influence of social media on the mainstream media with 
the “mainstreaming” of previously lesser-known social initiatives. Referencing the mining 
activities in Skouries and the “No Middlemen” (or “Potato”) movement12, Apostolia states: 
All the movements now, even the potato movement last year, the information about that 
was mainly transmitted through social media and you see a lot of news right now that you 
have first seen on social media and the into the mainstream media. Skouries is another 
example…You see how something that has been in social media for a long time, 
eventually it crosses over to the mainstream. (Personal communication, March 6, 2013) 
 
Similarly, Ypopto Mousi argues that the biggest impact of social and new media has been to 
provide a voice to those who previously did not have an outlet where they could be heard: 
People that didn't have any voice before, now they do. And actually there are people who 
should have a voice, but the existent system didn’t let them. So using the social medium 
that makes you have an impact on public dialogue, is a way of speaking up, of having a 




voice, and it's a way of being exposed and criticizing and being criticized. And that's the 
meaning of the public dialogue. (Personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
 
Fotinaki argues that this has had an empowering effect on segments of Greek society: 
 
A person who in the past may have felt that they were powerless and without a means to 
be heard, and may have been resigned to not being heard, now through social and new 
media, even these people…have a wide open door to actively participate [in the public 
sphere]. This has been a game changer, because it has activated people who may have 
been indifferent in the past. It has encouraged them to become more actively involved in 
society and issues of concern to society. (Personal communication, July 5, 2013) 
 
An additional empowering role is attributed to the use of informal language, which is accessible 
to a wider swath of the population. As stated by Amalia Zepou, an adviser to the Mayor of 
Athens Giorgos Kaminis on civil society networking: 
…[T]he way that these people communicate between them and the kind of language that 
social media like Facebook allows you to use, is very different from the official Greek 
language…There is a kind of official way of saying things and an informal way of saying 
things. The informal way has never had so much [space] as it has had lately through 
social media. People can communicate between them in the way they talk orally. I think 
that has given a kind of unconscious self-confidence to the way people act…[It] has 
given the self-confidence and helped new kinds of relationships to progress and to step 
into the public sphere. (Personal communication, January 11, 2014) 
 
Boubouka highlights the role of commenting in helping citizens vent their frustration at the time 
of the onset of the crisis, but notes that commenting activity later waned: 
Compared to a year and a half ago…there has been a change in the stance of the public… 
My colleagues and I have noted that people who in the first year of the crisis actively 
commented on our articles, even in a vulgar manner…are now refraining from doing so, 
and this is something that concerns us, this withdrawal from commenting…We believe 
that this has to do with the public…reading the news, getting informed, but choosing not 
to lose their time arguing or cursing online. They will get informed and then we don’t 
know what they do afterward. (Personal communication, May 31, 2013) 
 
Niflis attributes to social and new media the role of serving as a release valve for frustrated and 
angry citizens during the crisis years: 
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In the years of the crisis and memorandums, public dialogue has become more intense on 
social media…due to the anger of the Greeks regarding the difficulties they faced… 
Internet users increased sharply and the reason was that people wanted to express 
themselves and the problems they faced. (Personal communication, March 15, 2017) 
 
Vicky Foteinou, a volunteer with the Boroume non-governmental organization, argues that social 
media’s role as a release valve was particularly evident amongst the youth: “Young people use 
social media in order to express their anger about the political environment, about the political 
situation and spread it…to the society” (personal communication, December 14, 2012). For 
Epiteidios, social media served as a different kind of release valve, providing an escape for a 
troubled populace: “Sometimes, people go to social media to get away from [discussions about 
the crisis], because you can talk about other things and not feel so depressed” (personal 
communication, July 17, 2013). For Gazi though, social media provided a new space for public 
discourse during the crisis, for people that could no longer afford to participate in Greece’s café 
culture: “[i]n recent years Greeks have become more introverted due to financial factors, but 
there is social media serving as an outlet” (personal communication, January 11, 2013). 
 Christina Tachiaou, a journalist with the protagon.gr news and opinion portal, connects 
the longstanding societal divides Greeks felt, longstanding clientelism and the end of the period 
of economic prosperity, with the growth in online public dialogue: 
There are very few decades that Greece has been calm. We shouldn't forget that in this 
country, until 1974, democracy was something very fragile, and we had wars, we had the 
junta, From there until the crisis we had been trying to find a new country to live in 
democratically and how to live together. Money was conquering everything, because we 
were not poor…from a poor country, we [were] among the richest countries in the world. 
As long as money was covering everything, we all knew that public dialogue was a kind 
of a zoo….the public dialogue was a kind of blackmail in order to keep privileges…After 
the crisis, it was the first time that we realized that we don't know what kind of country 
we want…so now we are trying to have some public dialogue for the first time, I think, a 
real dialogue. (Personal communication, February 23, 2013) 
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For Theodoridis, however, far from serving an empowering role, social media have simply 
created an echo chamber, where people choose to surround themselves only with people and 
with news they already agree with: 
Specifically in Greece I remember in 2015, the summer when the referendum happened, I 
remember lots of people writing on Facebook…[users would say] everybody who was 
against my position, I will cut them out of my timeline and I will leave them. And 
practically if they have done this, what they actually did was to even enlarge the echo 
chamber or make it more closed…we like to listen to our own views and opinions, we 
feel that this empowers us, but it's not true (Personal communication, January 27, 2017) 
 
This could be seen as fostering the reproduction of dual, competing public spheres which do not 
interact with each other. Panagiotis Oikonomou, a producer with Radiobubble, states: “[d]ay-to-
day life in Greece, especially on Twitter and Facebook, is much different from the day-to-day 
life of the average Greek who watches television” (personal communication, February 13, 2013). 
Lardikou adds “I think the discussion stays in small groups…in my opinion the biggest part of 
the population learns about the news from the mainstream media” (personal communication, 
February 20, 2013). Epiteidios, in turn, downplays the impact of social media in public 
discourse, highlighting what could be described as reverse reproduction: 
I'm afraid I don't believe they have a large impact. Most of the people who use social 
media do it because they are social. There the main content is what their friends say and 
do, not the politics. We haven't seen many initiatives starting from Facebook, which is 
the most popular, and none of them has gone to become something really big…mostly I 
think it's the traditional media or the large websites that give more clout to Facebook. For 
example, recently there were some racist, there was the case a Greek of Nigerian origin 
basketball player [Giannis Antetokounmpo] who became the best Greek basketball player 
in the NBA…and the [Golden Dawn] leader said that okay, you can have a name with a 
Greek flag but that does not make him Greek. There were some…parodies about what he 
said in Facebook, but most people learned about them from traditional websites referring 
to what was said in Facebook. Social media have an appeal of their own which may not 
be very great, but since what happens there is often republished and transmitted…in the 
media, their importance increases" (Personal communication, July 17, 2013) 
 
In the view of Tasos Oikonomou, this means that there is not a separate online sphere: 
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I would say that the online public sphere appears as a closed communication environment 
but isn’t under any circumstances…If there is an academic view that it is a closed system 
of dialogue that serves as a counterweight to the real public sphere, that is an incorrect 
approach…That which today is part of the public electronic dialogue will tomorrow be a 
part of the public dialogue at large. A television station, a radio station, a newspaper will 
report it. These remain the mediums through which public dialogue occurs. There is 
nothing else. (Personal communication, April 10, 2013) 
 
Tasos Krommydas, a member of the executive committee of the Green Party of Greece, believes 
that social media’s impact on the public sphere has been marginal at best: 
Of course there is an impact in the public dialogue, but I think it's still marginal, at least 
in Greece. The users in Greece that use the social media in order to influence the public 
dialogue is a very small minority, so I would say that most of these impacts are in a 
microcosm of these users. The public sphere in Greece is still influenced mainly by the 
parties…and traditional media (Personal communication, October 16, 2013) 
 
Contogeorgis argues that the “technonet,” as he calls the internet, has merely shifted offline 
political activity online, without impacting the activity itself: “[t]he technonet has contributed to 
the shifting of sociopolitical activity, of non-institutional activity, from the physical sphere to the 
network sphere. But the politics in the technosphere remain the same with those which develop 
in the physical sphere” (personal communication, December 19, 2016). Finally, Yalourakis stated 
his belief that social media in Greece were still at a nascent level of influence: “[s]ocial media in 
Greece are still in their infancy…From a scale of 1 to 100, I would say that their impact is at 50 
or 60, but this is trending upwards” (personal communication, December 15, 2012). 
5.2.4.2 – Greek Cultural Mentalities and Public Discourse 
 A cultural characteristic noted by several interviewees with regard to how the Greek 
people may have embraced social media for political expression, is the intense politicization and 
extroverted nature of the Greeks. This is stated succinctly by Gregory Farmakis, a candidate with 
the “Dimokratiki Simmahia” (“Democratic Alliance”) party in the 2012 parliamentary elections: 
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“Greeks breathe and speak politics all the time, you could speak politics with your friends at a 
café or in the workplace. Now you have another 10 or 20 friends who you discuss politics with 
on Facebook” (personal communication, April 15, 2013). Contogeorgis makes a similar 
argument, pointing out that “[a] difference between the Western citizen and the Greek citizen is 
that the Greek citizen is much more politicized,” adding that this contributes to intense doubt 
towards official institutions that would not exist even under similar conditions in the north 
(personal communication, December 19, 2016).  
For some, this mentality is deeply rooted and ingrained in the Greek culture. Vasilis 
Vasilopoulos, at the time deputy director of ERT’s multimedia department, describes the cultural 
mentality of the Greek people as such: “[in] Greece, sociological conditions create people who 
externalize that which they are thinking, feeling, and wish to express” (personal communication, 
June 5, 2013), while according to Gazi, “[e]veryone in Greece wants to be an opinion leader…to 
write their opinion, to express their point of view…to find supporters for their point of view, and 
I believe that this need is met in Greece by social media” (personal communication, January 11, 
2013). Katerina Tsatsaroni, then a communications adviser with the Independent Greeks political 
party, describes this as a mentality with ancient roots: 
We have done this since antiquity…Greeks have again found a way to participate actively 
and intensively in day-to-day life, to feel that he is participating… [and] shaping politics. 
I believe this manner of communicating and participating in politics is in the blood of the 
Greeks and they enjoy it very much. (Personal communication, October 13, 2013) 
 
Dimitris Vazouras, a retired banker with the National Bank of Greece, adopts a different view 
however, arguing that public discourse in Greece was always anarchic: “public discourse as it 
developed in Greece was always messy…there were no rules…There never existed a culture of 
socialization in Greece, nor does it exist today” (personal communication, May 31, 2013). 
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5.2.4.3 – Personal Usage of Social Media and the Facebook-Twitter Divide 
 Some insightful feedback was provided by interviewees with regard to how they 
personally utilize and incorporate social media in their own lives and professions. Several 
journalists noted that they do not maintain personal social media accounts, but instead utilize it 
only as part of their professional work. Tsimitakis maintains a very active social media presence, 
including accounts on Twitter, Facebook, and Foursquare, in addition to blogging on several 
different websites (personal communication, February 13, 2013). For Heimonas, Facebook has 
become his initial go-to source for news: “[n]owadays, when I wake up, whereas in the past I’d 
open the television or purchase a newspaper, now I log in to Facebook to see what has 
happened” (personal communication, February 15, 2013). 
Activist and blogger Katerina Moutsatsou, a former actress, highlights the role of social 
media in her life for monitoring and confirming information: 
I follow a wide range of people daily…after the year and a half that I've been doing this 
and that I've been really into social media for politics, the filtering is automatic. I follow 
them very closely and what I find is primary information. I love citizen journalism… 
whoever is on the ground reporting something, posting a picture, posting a video. This is 
what I am looking for when I go on Twitter…and if you've been on Twitter for a while 
you know who they are, so eventually you'll be attracted to them more than others. But I 
do not exclude anyone. I like to follow…even with people that I completely disagree 
with…because it always gets confirmed that they write from a specific angle. (Personal 
communication, February 9, 2013) 
 
Kranidiotis states that while he uses both Facebook and Twitter, he is not as active on these 
networks as people think he is, noting that his main objective is to share his articles from the 
Dimokratia newspaper and antinews.gr, adding that he will occasionally comment or engage in 
dialogue on issues he considers significant (personal communication, December 6, 2013). 
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 For some journalists, their social media activity was exclusively or mostly restricted to 
professional use. As stated by Arvanitis, “my relationship with social media is not personal, only 
professional…I do not have a personal Facebook account and only recently did I create a Twitter 
account” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). Batzoglou mentioned no personal social media 
use, utilizing these tools only for finding information (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
 On the other hand, Psara noted that she combines her personal social media accounts with 
her journalistic accounts, stating: 
I must be one of the few journalists in Greece who have a [personal] Facebook and 
Twitter…I found that Twitter, especially, is an excellent tool for journalists…But what is 
also important is for someone to find me and tell me “I have this information”…or to 
criticize me for a report…or to find me on Twitter to congratulate me. (Personal 
communication, November 11, 2013) 
 
Facebook’s high popularity in Greece was noted by some. Theodoridis described Greeks as “the 
most energetic users of Facebook” (personal communication, December 18, 2012), while Alex 
Hobson, the then-head of new media for the Skai Media Group states: “Facebook usage in 
Greece is just enormous,” while also pointing out the popularity of YouTube in Greece as well: 
“I was reading this statistics for the use of YouTube across the globe...number one was, I think, 
Saudi Arabia, and then number two was Greece” (personal communication, April 9, 2013). 
 Also of interest are ways in which respondents described the differences between Twitter 
and Facebook with regard to their role in the Greek public sphere. Psara says that “Twitter is 
what is used more for ‘public deliberation’…[acting as a] global sphere. Facebook…is a more 
personalized and friendly medium” (personal communication, November 11, 2013). Tolios says 
that Facebook is about “impressions” while Twitter is about “information” and the ability to 
publish “in 140 characters a solid piece of information…” (personal communication, February 
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22, 2017), while according to Masouras, “[p]eople use Facebook to...organize campaigns and 
Twitter to publicize them” (personal communication, February 23, 2013). 
 Several respondents expressed a clear preference for Twitter and the discourse which 
occurs via that medium. Farmakis states: “My personal preference is Twitter. I love Twitter 
because of its brevity and incisiveness. Facebook is more verbose. But I think that Facebook is 
really more far-reaching than Twitter, or even a blog” (personal communication, April 15, 2013). 
Ypopto Mousi adds “[Twitter users are on] a different level than Facebook users…Even though 
there are less users, they are more...qualitative, they are more influential, they do public deeds, 
they work in movements and so on” (personal communication, June 27, 2013). Panagopoulos 
adds his view that “Facebook is for the many, Twitter is for those who truly care about 
information. It is more journalistic, Facebook is more abstract” (personal communication, May 
31, 2013). Boubouka states that the two social networks have “two different audiences,” adding 
that “people who care about news are n Twitter, whereas on Facebook the expression of anger or 
rage…is more evident” (personal communication, May 31, 2013). Maria Kanellopoulou, founder 
of the “Save Greek Water” initiative and a member of the mindthecam media initiative, 
highlights the role Twitter has played in disseminating previously unknown news stories in 
Greece, such as the shooting of migrant farm workers in the Manolada region, stating that 
“Twitter has this virality which is not exactly the same with Facebook” (personal 
communication, October 3, 2013). Lardikou notes that Twitter is more of a closed community, 
stating “Twitter is mostly for the people who are in Twitter. I don't think that someone that 
doesn't know Twitter very well will get into Twitter just to check without having an account or 
being active” (personal communication, February 20, 2013), while Giorgos Christoforidis, 
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publisher of the To Xoni newspaper, notes that “Twitter is not very well developed in Greece, 
much less so than Facebook. And on Twitter…it helps that there are less people, communication 
is more personalized” (personal communication, May 27, 2013). 
 Conversely, Kostas Giannakidis, editor of the protagon.gr news and opinion portal, 
describes Twitter as a left-oriented “kingdom of trolls” (personal communication, April 5, 2013), 
while Al-Saleh describes Twitter as being more vulnerable to bullying and trolling, adding her 
view that “Facebook is a much more democratic organ because discussion takes place, whereas 
on Twitter with the 140 characters you have to make a wisecrack, and the more crude it is, the 
more retweets you will get” (personal communication, January 11, 2014). Giorgos Palamarizis, 
IT director and head of new media for the Democratic Left (DIMAR) political party, adds: 
“[b]ecause Facebook does not have a 140 character limit, you can develop a dialogue. Certainly 
Twitter gives you the ability to quickly find information, but the space where most campaigns 
now take place is Facebook” (personal communication, October 4, 2013). 
 One final notable perspective comes from Dimitra Iordanoglou, assistant professor in the 
Department of Communication, Media and Culture at the Panteion University of Social and 
Political Sciences, regarding social media use by the youth, noting: “The younger generations are 
more fluent, use social media a lot to express opinions…and to state their disinterest in politics. 
In general that generation is apolitical” (personal communication, May 29, 2013). 
5.2.5 – New Initiatives and Interventions within the Greek Public Sphere 
 
 In the years of the economic crisis in Greece, including the 2011-2017 time period 
specifically being studied, there were a number of new initiatives and interventions which sought 
to impact the Greek public sphere. These include new e-governance initiatives, boycotts which 
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were organized online, crowdfunding efforts for the production of crisis-related documentaries, 
and political interventions involving the use of satire and social media. 
5.2.5.1 – E-Governance Initiatives in Greece 
 
 Prior to the onset of the economic crisis in Greece, e-governance and digital government 
transparency initiatives were introduced by the then-government of PASOK led by Prime 
Minister Giorgos Papandreou. As described by Masouras: 
[PASOK] were the first to openly try to conquer the online space…they tried to promote 
the idea of accountability through open data, and that was very vocally promoted through 
the same mechanism that, for instance, the open source community tries to promote 
openness…After the austerity memorandums were signed and the government collapsed, 
they have been quiescent… (Personal communication, February 23, 2013) 
 
Giorgos Karamanolis, Chief Technical Officer and Chief Information Officer at the Crowdpolicy 
consulting firm and former Information and Communications Technology consultant and project 
manager for the Greek government, described three main e-governance initiatives put forth at 
that time by the PASOK government. One such effort was the “Diavgeia” online portal where all 
government decisions, from laws to hirings and appointments, are publicized. According to 
Karamanolis, this was the result of PASOK’s efforts to create internal volunteer-based 
committees that were tasked with developing new initiatives to promote transparency and 
participatory governance (personal communication, October 13, 2013). 
 A second initiative described by Karamanolis is opengov.gr, which he describes as: 
[A]n effort to provide a platform where there would be dialogue and deliberation on 
government policy and proposed legislation. The challenge was how to incorporate 
citizen participation, how their feedback would be incorporated into a final draft law 
which would be voted upon in Parliament, and the need for a follow-up regarding what 
feedback was taken under consideration…this way you “debug” the draft law and 
identify mistakes. (Personal communication, October 13, 2013) 
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In addition, Karamanolis mentioned a yet-to-be-enforced law passed by the then-PASOK 
government for electronic governance, “which emphasizes citizen participation. For example, it 
foresaw a means through which citizens could share their experiences with public services and 
for those services to respond and improve…There were some issues and delays implementing 
this law but it remains active…” (personal communication, October 13, 2013). 
 Papachatzis, who was also involved in the then-government’s e-governance initiatives, 
described some additional efforts which developed during that period. Papachatzis noted that 
“we initially determined that there was nothing in place regarding accountability in the prime 
minister’s office” (personal communication, October 12, 2013). This resulted in efforts to 
redesign the website of the Office of the Prime Minister, to include archival material of all 
former prime ministers (a project which was never completed), and to develop the social media 
accounts of the Office of the Prime Minister, and the website. Papachatzis noted that, 
institutionally, the Prime Minister’s office in Greece is not as strong as the White House or the 
Office of the President in the United States, and therefore efforts were made to increase its 
institutional presence within Greek society. He added one additional initiative which was 
developed during this period, government.gov.gr, which was intended to “gather as many public 
services as possible on one website, and then to replace the separate websites of each ministry. 
According to Papachatzis, this would alleviate a recurring problem where after each new 
government took office, new ministries would be created, others would be dissolved, and others 
would be renamed or merged, creating problems with their websites and their visibility.
 Another initiative of the then-government of PASOK was described by Vlachos: “I 
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launched Startup Greece13 with my team at the Development Ministry, which intended to reach 
young citizens and entrepreneurs, citizens who wanted transparency and collaboration, in order 
to develop a new notion of the public sector” (personal communication, November 26, 2013). 
 Notably, just as Karamanolis noted the failure of the citizen participation law to be 
implemented, Papachatzis stated that after the collapse of the Papandreou government in 2011, 
the website of the Prime Minister’s Office was “taken apart,” the Prime Minister’s Twitter 
account ceased to be updated, while the government.gov.gr project was never fully completed 
(personal communication, October 12, 2013). Despite this, however, Papachatzis noted the 
popularity of initiatives such as “Diavgeia,” as evidenced by the following example: 
“Diavgeia” is another example of an initiative which developed due to citizen demands 
for accountability and transparency. This was evident recently when [the then-coalition 
government of New Democracy and PASOK] attempted to abolish “Diavgeia.” Just the 
suspicion this was about to happen fueled a wave of complaints, which resulted in [the 
bill’s] restructuring… (Personal communication, October 12, 2013) 
 
 Well-intentioned as these e-governance initiatives may have been, there were some who 
called them into question, on the basis of successive government’s practices during the economic 
crisis, and also on the basis of the digital divide in Greece. In the words of Thanos Andritsos: 
When the government creates “Diavgeia” supposedly to encourage citizen participation... 
but at the same time they are passing laws which abolish every regulatory framework 
from everywhere and laws are passed by executive degree, when the new government 
does not even have a vote of confidence and still governs and does whatever it wants… 
some silly website and the supposed “information society” and “participation” means 
nothing, particularly for the poor. (Personal communication, July 23, 2013) 
 
Gounaris addresses the ineffectiveness of these initiatives in light of the existing digital divide: 
 
[These initiatives] were implemented in a country that wasn’t ready. In a country that was 
not ready for this and which does not have the infrastructure, you have to help the 
citizens participate in something like this. What use is it to create e-governance without 
the public having the ability to participate? (Personal communication, October 8, 2013) 
                                               
13 See http://www.startupgreece.gov.gr. 
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Nevertheless, e-governance initiatives have continued to be introduced in Greece to some 
extent. For instance, in 2017, a new online platform for reporting instances of corruption was 
inaugurated by the General Secretariat for Combating Corruption (“Kataggelies,” 2017). 
5.2.5.2 – Online Boycotts 
 
 In April 2013, a backlash followed the broadcast of a popular television talk program, 
“Eleftheros Skopeftis” (“Sniper”), hosted by well-known journalist Giorgos Tragkas and aired on 
Skai TV, where members of the Golden Dawn political party were interviewed. This was at a 
time where Golden Dawn was facing accusations of operating as a criminal organization. 
 The outcry which followed led blogger Ypopto Mousi to organize, via his blog14 and 
Twitter account and utilizing the #xa_advertising hashtag, a boycott of advertisers of the 
“Eleftheros Skopeftis” program. In his words: 
There was a television show that invited some members of the Golden Dawn far-right 
party. Far-right is a very light characterization. They are mostly neo-Nazis, but [Tragkas] 
called them and he tried to make an image of everyday people that are tired of what’s 
going on in politics…I thought, wait a minute, what’s going on? What's the main value of 
our society now? Money. So who is giving money to that guy to make these shows? The 
companies that are getting advertised. So I said, let’s make them feel regret…So I started 
organizing it and I asked people to make a letter, they did, they sent me one or two letters 
that were for these companies that got advertised there. I made a blog post where I said 
“Dear companies, how do you feel about being advertised in a neo-Nazi washing 
machine?”… [E]ngagement was very big, and lots of people tried to send mails and 
tweets and so on, and the companies started apologizing…saying “we didn’t know what 
the show would be, we didn't know the theme, we didn’t know the guys that were called 
there,” and so on. That was a bit of a victory because we made these companies 
apologize, and the biggest victory was that one of them, a supermarket chain, said that 
they wouldn’t…give any more money to that show. The thing that came out of all that 
you can connect offline with online in a way that digital activism can go on in the actual 
physical environment. (Personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
 
                                               
14 See https://ypoptomousi.wordpress.com/2013/04/11/. 
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Social media consultant Stratos Safioleas took part in the #xa_advertising campaign, transferring 
his knowledge from his experience lobbying in the United States. According to Safioleas: 
I thought it was tremendous…the fact that a few advertisers pulled out, if you look at that 
specific show, the economic impact of this, is not tremendous…but it signals what I hope 
is the beginning of a sense that we are not just consumers, we are not just voters, but we 
can be participants in the political play and we can affect with our money and the way we 
spend our money, in coordination with others, how business is behaving, politically, 
morally…The campaign was not a campaign of complaint. It was a campaign for action, 
in a very specific fashion and this campaign resulted in some very impressive results… 
We knew that if we pressed in that direction, [advertisers] would back off, and they did… 
You cannot have everything at once, there was no follow-up, but I think there is a lesson 
here. My sense and what I have learnt in the U.S. is the following: maybe your actions 
don’t necessarily bring the results that you need…at least a public apology and so forth. 
But what you definitely do is make every similar action much more expensive, so the 
next time…he will be much more hesitant to take this course of action. It takes a little bit 
of training of the society to understand that it’s a weapon that is quite potent if they can 
use it properly. So I expect this to increase, and I think it will be only a good thing if it 
happens. (Personal communication, July 10, 2013) 
 
According to Mousi, the #xa_advertising boycott was so successful that a follow-up campaign 
was soon organized following an incident where migrant farm workers picking strawberries were 
shot in the Manolada region of Greece. Utilizing the #blood_strawberries hashtag on Twitter, 
Ypopto Mousi organized this new campaign. In his words: 
It was the same thing…saying to the companies that, do they know that this guy they are 
working with handles his business in that way and so on? And the companies started 
again answering and apologizing, and, that publicity, it was another victory, I believe. 
Because I used to be in that business environment, I can see how cautious they are 
getting. They are trying to be very correct in their activities, and that’s good. They need 
to know that we are watching. (Personal communication, June 27, 2013) 
 
As stated by Olivier Drot, editor of okeanews.gr, a French-language website and blog with news 
from Greece, online campaigns such as this are significant even if people do not actively protest: 
It has an impact because people are talking. They may not be gathering, but they are 
organizing…and this for me is the most important thing in Greece today. The alternatives 
that people are creating and they are talking about with social media… worked very well, 
so I think now it is another way to resist. (Personal communication, May 24, 2013) 
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5.2.5.3 – Crowdfunded Initiatives 
 
It could be said that the protracted economic crisis in Greece served as the impetus for a 
form of collective production which was up until that point largely new for Greek society: 
crowdfunding. In the Greek context, crowdfunding is perhaps best exemplified by three 
documentary films produced by Aris Chatzistefanou, a longtime journalist turned filmmaker: 
Debtocracy, Catastroika, and Fascism, Inc.15 As the titles of these three documentaries suggest, 
the inspiration for these films was the economic crisis in Greece and the social and political 
changes taking place in the country, and all three were released in the public domain. 
 As described by Chatzistefanou, his first documentary, Debtocracy, received a great deal 
of media attention, which boosted its popularity and drew attention to his future work: 
When we decided to make Debtocracy, the mainstream media didn't realize what it 
would be about. They liked the hype, that a group of young professionals want to make a 
documentary and distribute it for free on the internet and social media. So we had the 
support of many mainstream media, and don't forget that I was working also [at] Skai 
Radio…They promoted it, so we became known as documentarists through the 
mainstream media…When the mainstream media realized the political background and 
the ideological background of this documentary, they wanted to pass it down, but it was 
late, because we had created a huge network in the social media. Then, we could promote 
our [work] through the social media. (Personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
 
Chatzistefanou explained that Debtocracy was further aided by having been released while the 
“Indignants” movement was still in progress, which publicly aired the documentary: 
It was very helpful when we made Debtocracy that it coincided with the Indignados 
movement. So it was screened to almost every occupied square in Greece. It was perfect 
timing, a coincidence that helped a lot. But in general, we just uploaded the website and 
tried to promote it to Twitter and Facebook. (Personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
 
                                               
15 See http://infowarproductions.com/debtocracy_doc/, http://infowarproductions.com/videos/catastroika_doc/, and 
http://infowarproductions.com/fasismosae/. 
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In addition, Debtocracy was also broadcast by the workers of the occupied ERT3 television 
channel after state broadcaster ERT was officially shut down by the government: 
We said to all the employees of ERT that of course it's free, they could have done it even 
without asking…It was funny that for the last two or three years our documentaries were 
broadcast through major TV stations in Latin America, in Asia, from Japan to Romania 
and other places, but there was no single nationwide TV station to broadcast it in Greece, 
so ERT3 was the first medium to try it. So it was again through the internet that people 
watched. (Personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
 
According to Chatzistefanou, the mainstream media’s promotion was no longer needed for his 
second documentary, Catastroika: 
So the second documentary [Catastroika], no one said a word about it. We now have 
more than two million viewers and the mainstream media don't even mention the title of 
the documentary, but we don't need them anymore. So it's very helpful to have social 
media networks, but in order to get this, unfortunately you have to, at some point, to 
make yourself known to the mainstream media. (Personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
 
Chatzistefanou described his plans for a third documentary film project, Fascism, Inc. (which 
was eventually released) and the increasing difficulties of launching crowdfunding campaigns in 
the midst of a deepening economic crisis and worsening economic climate in Greece: 
We will make a third documentary…[W]e will continue in the same footsteps. It will be 
about fascism, but not in a traditional way. We want to connect fascism with economic 
and financial elites and the way that they promote extreme right-wing movements in 
history, in Italy of the ‘30s or Germany of the ‘30s, and to find out if we have the same 
phenomenon right now in Greece or in other countries. Again it will be crowdfunded, and 
again it will be promoted mainly by social media, although now we have some access, it's 
a little better because some new newspapers [have circulated]. For example, I work for 
Efimerida ton Syntakton, so they will help with that. We have Unfollow [magazine], that 
they will also [promote]. We now have some access to more progressive, liberal 
[publications] and we see if we will survive. More and more [people want to help], we've 
seen that in the second documentary, but they don't have enough money, so for the first 
documentary they were giving, let's say, 50 euro, in the second they were giving 5 euro, 
and we want to see if they will be able to send 1 euro for the third. So we have an 
increasing base with no money to support us. (Personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
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During this same time period, other crowdfunding initiatives were also in progress. Costas 
Efimeros of The Press Project, which produced Debtocracy, described his organization’s efforts 
to crowdfund the online webcast of the worker-run occupied ERT after it was shut down on June 
11, 2013, and the challenges of crowdfunding in the midst of the economic crisis: 
What I believe should be done on the social media…is an effort to ensure the economic 
survival of the new media. Right now 400,000 people visit us. If they each contributed 10 
cents we would be bigger than [national broadcaster] Mega Channel. We don’t want the 
10 cents from everyone, we want 1 euro from 10 percent, and once again we will make it. 
This is not happening though. The ERT webcast has cost us a total of 23,000 euro, out of 
which we raised 11,000 euros from crowdfunding…The public has not learned, has not 
gone through the trouble of learning that it is of utmost importance that at some point it 
takes ownership over news, adopts it (Personal communication, July 18, 2013) 
 
Nevertheless, Apostolia cites Debtocracy and Catastroika as examples of the public taking 
ownership over what it would like to see: “We have seen documentaries that were crowdfunded, 
[about] the Greek crisis…They are two great examples of how people funded to see what they 
were interested in watching. I expect to see a lot more of that in the coming years” (personal 
communication, March 6, 2013). 
5.2.5.4 – Satire and Parody with a Political Message 
 One of the most emblematic examples of a video that has “gone viral” in Greece during 
the years of the crisis, which could be considered a form of alternative media, was produced by 
actress and activist Katerina Moutsatsou. Less than two minutes in length, Moutsatsou’s video, 
titled “I Am Hellene,”16 quickly spread through the Greek social media realm and elicited strong 
reactions both in support and in opposition. Moutsatsou describes her inspiration for producing 
this video as stemming from an attempt to rediscover national identity in a time of crisis, stating: 
I always use the word “Hellene” because it has a broader meaning…[B]eing Greek is 
kind of problematic. So seeing that impact and realizing how every Greek, every Hellene 
                                               
16 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MFvU18GGM3Y. 
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has a different perception of their Hellenic heritage, history, nature, I realized wow, this is 
a field that needs to be explored and discussed and…I don't pretend that I am, I have 
completely resolved all my Hellenic questions and issues or history or even nature, but I 
still think, even discussing it and exploring it gives you a broader perspective. So that 
was the aim, just trying to find out who am I, because I think that’s where all the 
problems come from. The Greeks have this tremendous weight of their past…but we 
don't realize the meaning of this. When you're such an old people, it's very hard to know 
who you are. That big question, what it means to be Hellene, is where it all started for 
me. (Personal communication, February 9, 2013) 
 
Moutsatsou then discussed the strong reaction the video elicited: 
It’s really painful to get all of this range of reactions, because first of all you're not 
prepared, you were not expecting anything, and there you are, you’re becoming a target 
from nowhere…At the same time, it was great to be enriched by this experience and it 
was great for myself to open my eyes to something completely new, that is, let us know 
each other. I got to learn so many Greeks and what they think and how they think, so that 
was the first thing. The second thing from all those reactions was…I had to explain to 
myself why are they like this. So that was my own personal path. And thirdly, I had to 
come to conclusions, and that's where I am right now. And every video I think always has 
these three stages…What you realize from reactions is that there are very few people who 
are open to discussion…Most Greeks are… anchored in a specific way of seeing their 
identity, their Hellenism. (Personal communication, February 9, 2013) 
 
Finally, regarding satire and parody as a means of transmitting political messages, Moutsatsou 
had the following to say: “It’s a more indirect way to get the word out there, to transmit 
messages. It’s a more indirect, smoother way to get to people, so I really like it, and I think I'm 
going to go on that path” (personal communication, February 9, 2013). 
 While Moutsatsou’s production of parody videos represents one example of using this art 
form to deliver a political message, Greek Twitter users have utilized satirical hashtags to deliver 
political messages during the crisis. Examples include the #free_wifi hashtag after then-Prime 
Minister Antonis Samaras announced plans to provide free wi-fi internet nationwide in 2013; 
#free_liapis, after then-government minister Mihalis Liapis was arrested for driving without a 
license and with fake license plates, and numerous satirical postings on Twitter following a 
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bizarre meeting between Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and United States President 
Barack Obama in Athens in 2016 (#free_wifi, 2013; #free_liapis, 2013; “Tha klapsete,” 2016). 
5.2.6 – Survey Results: Views on the Public Sphere 
 
 Numerous insights regarding perceptions as to how social and new media are utilized by 
the three sample populations studied (newspaper editors, members of the European Parliament, 
and representatives of civil society organizations), and how such tools have impacted the Greek 
public sphere can be ascertained from the results of the electronic survey questionnaire. 
 The overwhelming majority of those surveyed said that they use social media, including 
all of the members of the European Parliament who participated. Facebook largely predominated 
in terms of weekly usage, followed by Twitter and YouTube, and to a lesser extent, tools such as 
blogs, LinkedIn, and Google+. However, among journalists, Twitter usage was slightly more 
prevalent than usage of Facebook, whereas elected officials overwhelmingly used Facebook on a 
regular basis the most, at levels much higher than newspaper editors and civil society 
representatives. A broad majority of respondents stated that they regularly used social media for 
writing and commenting on political, economic, or social issues, particularly members of the 
European Parliament. Facebook was the medium most used for such commentary, especially, 
once again, amongst members of the European Parliament. Conversely, a plurality of 
respondents stated that they never used social media to communicate with a mainstream media 
outlet, while a plurality reported that they had used social media to communicate with a 
politician, political party, or political candidate. An almost even split was measured between 
those who answered that they did not follow the social media accounts of any politician or 
political candidate versus those that did. SYRIZA’s Alexis Tsipras was the most followed public 
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official amongst respondents, trailed by the then-leader of PASOK Evangelos Venizelos, the 
leader of the Independent Greeks Panos Kammenos, then-Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, and 
then-government minister Adonis Georgiadis. Almost half of the respondents said that they 
followed the social media accounts of at least one political party, with SYRIZA and New 
Democracy representing the most followed parties on social media. 
 Specifically regarding the contribution of social media and new media to the Greek 
public sphere, respondents felt that their impact was slightly significant, with results largely even 
across all three populations surveyed. Social and new media’s impact upon the public sphere was 
judged to be slightly negative, with members of the European Parliament and representatives of 
civil society organizations holding a neutral stance compared to newspaper editors, who held a 
somewhat negative view. The overall contribution of social and new media to the Greek public 
sphere was also judged to be slightly negative. By contrast, the contribution of mainstream media 
to the Greek public sphere in the post-junta period was viewed somewhat, with newspaper 
editors—likely reflecting their own biases—viewing mainstream media’s contribution as very 
positive, members of the European Parliament viewing the contribution of mainstream media as 
slightly positive, and civil society representatives maintaining a negative view overall. The 
contribution of mainstream media to the Greek public sphere in the present day was viewed as 
being slightly significant, with civil society representatives providing the highest measure of 
significance among the three populations surveyed. The contribution of mainstream media to the 
public sphere was, however, viewed somewhat negatively overall, with members of the 
European Parliament holding, in relative terms, the most positive (but still slightly negative) 
view out of the three populations. The respondents stated that the level of development of public 
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dialogue and discourse in the post-junta era in Greece was, overall, slightly insignificant, with 
civil society representatives providing an especially low rating and all three sample populations 
falling in negative territory. The quality of the development of public dialogue and discourse in 
Greece was also ranked slightly negatively, with results mostly even across the three samples. 
Overall, the quality of public dialogue and discourse in Greece were ranked as significantly 
poorly developed, particularly among newspaper editors surveyed, while the other two samples 
also returned a very negative outlook. 
 Finally, Facebook was perceived as the most popular social media tool in Greece, while a 
plurality of respondents believed that Twitter was the second most popular social medium, 
followed by a plurality ranking YouTube as the third most popular social media outlet in the 
country. Facebook was also ranked as the most popular social medium in Greece for the purposes 
of discussing political issues, followed by Twitter. 
5.3 – THE TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN GREECE 
5.3.1 – Historical Development of Greek Civil Society 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, for the purposes of this research project, the public sphere and 
civil society comprise two discrete, separate, but related categories of study. Civil society in 
Greece, just as with the public sphere, has long been considered to be underdeveloped or 
deficient in comparison with the countries of Western Europe and North America. This view is 
largely reflected in the responses of many of the interviewees who participated in this study, with 
views ranging from there having been no true civil society historically, to the existence of a 
partisan- or state-dominated civil society, to the impact of a traditionally individualistic culture. 
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However, there also existed significant arguments in favor of the existence of a robust civil 
society in Greece historically, though often unofficial in nature or based around the family unit. 
According to Dora Oikonomides, a producer and volunteer with Radiobubble, civil 
society in Greece has not existed outside of the political party system: 
There was hardly any civil society in Greece in the sense in which people understand that 
word in North America. Everything that would fall under the category “civil society” in 
Western Europe or North America, here was affiliated with a political party. NGOs, labor 
unions are affiliated with political parties…The contribution of civil society to Greek 
society, of course has just been to perpetuate a corrupt political system essentially. 
(Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Skarpelos adopts a similar view, arguing that civil society in Greece was historically tied to the 
political and clientelist system: 
Civil society in Greece was stunted in its development, and it is due to the withdrawal of 
citizens from politics that civil society was subdued…even “citizen’s committees” that 
wished to intervene in public affairs were in reality organized by political actors, which 
used them as a façade for good public relations. For a long time this was the rule. 
(Personal communication, May 29, 2013) 
 
Others, such as Papathanasiou, described a civil society dominated by the state more broadly: 
 
No, in Greece there was never a civil society…it was very primitive, even on issues of 
local governance…even parent-teacher associations at schools were organized by the 
state…For the past two decades at least, things were very difficult, everything operated 
on autopilot, people did not care what was happening in their neighborhoods other than, 
perhaps, sanitation issues. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
As described by Andriotakis, very few initiatives were able to overcome the clientelist system: 
 
Civil society was defunct and everything went through the political parties…It was so 
stifling that anything that attempted to develop outside of this context would die…Due to 
the clientelist system and the primacy of the political parties in the public sphere, civil 
society was almost entirely absent. There were very few groups which operated at the 
level of civil society with any success…Usually some political party would come around 
and stifle it, turn it into its own clientele. (Personal communication, May 27, 2013) 
 
 230 
Roumeliotis connects this situation to the prevalence of corruption and a bureaucratic state: “the 
state is bureaucratic, corrupt, it trips up anything innovative and pioneering. It doesn’t allow this, 
doesn’t give opportunities, and the funds that could go to civil society organizations…are 
squandered or held up or devoured by state actors” (personal communication, April 3, 2014). 
 Katrougalos drew parallels with the dual public sphere which he argued had developed in 
Greece in the post-civil war period: 
The mainstream opinion is that we had a very weak civil society with regard to other 
European countries. I don't fully share this opinion. We had an effort of the state to 
control civil society, but we had also a faction of the society that resisted. This is the main 
characteristic of Greek civil society, its duality. There is a big part of it that practically is 
under the tutelage by the state and in this way underdeveloped, but it had also another 
kind of civil society with a strong tradition of resistance towards this effort of 
totalitarianism...It is clear that civil society in Greece is different [than in Europe] in the 
sense that most organizations that were active in the civil society have been political 
organizations, other political parties or trade unions…The basic reaction against the state 
is not by everyday life associations but from political parties or from trade unions. There 
is a distinction, and of course there is another clear difference: the much more important 
influence of clientelistic policies and patronage, that in a way, it is in a way of controlling 
by the state of the civil society. (Personal communication, July 2, 2013) 
 
For Dimitrakopoulou, there has been a much stronger tradition in Greece of participating in 
demonstrations rather than in social causes: 
There is not a very deeply-rooted culture of participating in movements. We have a very 
big culture in demonstrating, but we’re kind of weak in being organized and especially in 
directing our reaction towards a specific cause…We don’t have a big tradition in NGOs, 
in active pressure groups. (Personal communication, July 5, 2013) 
 
Apostolopoulos, in turn, describes this phenomenon as traditionally being dominated by leftist 
actors: “By definition, civil society had been dominated ideologically by the left in Greece. 
Whoever spoke of civil society, meant it as developing something against the government with a 
leftist hue. Therefore, conceptually it was abused” (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
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 Baltzis links the perceived lack of development of Greek civil society with cultural 
factors, namely prevalent individualism: 
What we call civil society, that is, organizations that are not for profit, that are not state 
organizations, and at the same time they offer some type of social services, this is 
relatively new in Greece…I could say that it is not very well developed. I must link this 
with the culture of people in Greece. All research done on the everyday culture of people 
in Greece shows that individualism is one of the main values of most people. So from this 
point of view, the movement of volunteerism has not been very well developed. It started 
to develop maybe 10 years ago. The Olympic Games was one of the major attempts to 
develop a mass volunteer movement. (Personal communication, February 23, 2013) 
 
Panagiotis Oikonomou adds that “we had not learned to participate in collective actions” 
(personal communication, February 13, 2013), while Kristina Tremonti, founder of the “Edosa 
Fakelaki” initiative, connects this to decades of relative prosperity: “we don’t have a notion of 
active citizenship…There isn’t a feeling of solidarity and being connected over the same social 
issues. The reason was that before the crisis…nobody really had the financial anxieties that the 
majority of people connect over today” (personal communication, March 5, 2014). 
 Alex Afouxenidis, senior research fellow at the National Center for Social Research, 
adopts a different view, highlighting the existence of a robust unofficial civil society sphere: 
I think that in various countries including Greece…you have variations of civil society. 
You don't just have one model. There isn't one model of civil society…[Y]ou have two 
categories. The first category has to do with the non-profit sector. Within that category 
there are various organizations, from NGOs to philanthropic institutions. And the second 
big category is related to various actions by citizens who come together on a smaller 
scale. We had many examples of this in Greece recently, with local networks of 
assistance…various small scale, small to medium scale voluntary activities. These 
voluntary activities…some may turn into small social movements. But they have a 
temporal nature. They may work for a few months, for a couple of years, but then they 
tend to disappear and reappear somewhere else…depending on the case. The first 
category which has to do with a more formal, institutionalized part of civil society 
[which] lasts for much longer, because it is based on funding, state funding or other 
private donations. (Personal communication, December 16, 2016) 
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Afouxenidis highlights the historical existence of volunteerism connected to civic acts such as 
fire protection in Greece, and identifies two distinct time periods in the historical development of 
Greek civil society: one until the mid 1990s, where civil society largely consisted of “small scale 
voluntarism, small scale activities by various NGOs and other similar organizations and the 
volunteer work within lobbies and political parties” The second period, according to 
Afouxenidis, began when Greece became a member of the Development Aid Corporation (DAC) 
in 1997 and developed “a strategy of dealing with NGOs and other similar organizations, which 
meant funding” and which “became an essential aspect of government policy.” As explained by 
Afouxenidis, this “brought civil society up to the way we know it in other countries, brought it 
up to the forefront” (personal communication, December 16, 2016).  
Zepou emphasizes the history of local groups working for the common good in Greece, 
which continues into the present day: 
Even though there is no tradition in volunteerism as there is in Northern Europe and the 
United States, there is a very deep and old tradition of participation in the common good 
that one can see especially outside the urban centers…It has not been described in the 
same way, and the crisis has surfaced this also in the urban centers in the form of 
"parees," groups of people, family, sometimes extended family, and those are the ones 
that have taken a lot of initiatives and have been energized to solve small problems in the 
neighborhoods, small-scale issues, not big things, but to participate in the common good. 
(Personal communication, January 11, 2014) 
 
Roumeliotis also highlights this history, arguing that civil society was active in Greece dating 
back to the 19th century with the “Ambelakia” initiative, a co-operative which he describes as the 
predecessor to the present-day collaborative movement. Roumeliotis adds his view that the 
media in Greece have rendered such movements invisible: 
The hegemonic mass media…never showed this, never presented it, either because it did 
not interest them, or because they did not know, or if they did present it, they did so 
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selectively and one could not understand that these were alternative proposals for a third 
way between the state and the private sector. (Personal communication, April 3, 2014) 
 
Fay Koutzoukou, supervisor of the HumanGrid initiative and a volunteer member of 
TEDx Athens, also argues that civil society initiatives were present in Greece, but that there was 
no entity to bring these groups into contact with one another or to learn of their existence: 
The problem with Greece was, and still is, that one group does not know what the other is 
doing. We had very many organizations which could have even been in the same region, 
doing exactly the same things, and one did not know about the other…The state never 
developed a registry of such organizations. (Personal communication, February 12, 2014) 
 
Vlachos, in turn, highlighted a lack of cooperation between civil society groups: 
If we have in mind the Anglo-Saxon model of civil society…then in Greece it was 
limited. If you include the associations, the local communities…you would find dozens 
or hundreds in every region of Greece…The issue was that each group did not believe 
that it could achieve its objectives in collaboration with another group. (Personal 
communication, November 26, 2013) 
 
Finally, some interviewees noted the importance of the family structure in Greek civil society. As 
stated by Konstantopoulou: 
Greece was always a left-leaning country philosophically…there was always a solidarity 
among citizens, there was a civil society…to help a fellow man. It may not have been 
provided by the state but due to the traditions of the Greeks, of family, one person would 
help another, we could say that from a humanistic point of view Greeks have this trait. 
(Personal communication, February 15, 2013) 
 
Having examined the historical context in which civil society developed and functioned in 
Greece, the next two subsections will present two illustrative examples of civil society initiatives 
which were active in Greece during the period being studied. 
5.3.2 – Illustrative Example: Boroume 
 
 During the years of the economic crisis in Greece, Boroume (“We Can”) developed a 
reputation as a civil society organization which was largely borne out of Facebook, and which 
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itself was a product of the crisis. The organization serves as an intermediary between restaurants 
and other entities which have leftover food which they would like to donate, and organizations 
which are in need of food donations. 
 According to Xenia Papastavrou, co-founder of Boroume, her inspiration for founding 
the organization stemmed from her previous job at a food bank: 
I was a volunteer in a food bank for many years. I could see that the donations of food 
were dropping and on the other hand the demand for food was rising because many of the 
institutions were…receiving less funding from the state. Realizing that there was that 
discrepancy between the amount of food in need and the amount of food being donated, I 
was trying to find a way of, not solving the problem, but presenting a solution. That's 
how I came up with Boroume. (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
Papastavrou stated that Boroume began informally and quickly established an online presence: 
When I started Boroume, the first thing I did was, I found one bakery that wanted to 
donate fresh bread and one kitchen that needed that amount of bread…[T]here was no 
organization at that point. It was just an informal connection between two points. On the 
same level, I thought of the name Boroume, which means “we can” and at that point I 
registered the domain name…[T]he next thing was to make two or three web pages on 
the site and just present the idea…It was just me as an individual, as a volunteer, trying to 
see if this thing could work. I hadn’t thought of the next step at that stage. I thought I 
would make the website, I had just a few pages explaining the idea behind Boroume, and 
saying that we are creating a network here for people to come and pitch in. So it was not 
a fully formed idea about how the organization would be created. It was a website that 
was explaining an idea. (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
Alexandros Theodoridis, co-founder of Boroume, noted that the idea was initially born in May 
2011 but the organization was founded in its current legal form in January 2012 (personal 
communication, December 18, 2012). Papastavrou describes the organization as one that is “not 
a food bank” but which “connects donors of food with institutions in need,” adding that this 
structure “maximizes our impact, because we don’t have logistics, we don’t have high running 
costs, we can move food…very quickly, and we can be present across Greece without actually 
having to be physically present” (personal communication, April 15, 2013). 
 235 
 Athinais A., a volunteer with Boroume, described the organization as an example of a 
“third way” organization, while connecting its activity to the economic crisis: 
This attempt [operates] outside more traditional routes and governmental associations to 
take matters in their own hands and to do something about it, and I think that is 
something you see from the current crisis. There is a much greater activity and awareness 
about both the problems people are facing but also about how people are creating 
movements and organizations to deal with them. So it's definitely improved. It’s gone 
beyond the sphere of family. I think years ago we used to rely on the state, we used to 
rely on our family, but now you see that third sector alliance a lot more than you did 
years ago. (Personal communication, February 11, 2013) 
 
 For Boroume, social media played an important role in the organization’s development 
and growth from its earliest days of existence. As explained by Papastavrou: 
I think that it was critical from the beginning. First of all, we were discovered by many 
journalists from our presence on Facebook and Twitter…I didn’t have to advertise our 
message anywhere, other than social media and our website, so it was crucial in that 
sense. Also it got many people involved. It helped, it just triggered companies donating 
food, volunteers as well as institutions, coming into contact with us….It provided a body 
of people interested in supporting this idea. (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
Theodoridis further elaborated on the impact of social media for Boroume in its early days: 
 
From the beginning we realized that social media can be a very powerful tool for what we 
are doing, because we can communicate the needs of welfare institutions for example, we 
can communicate what we do and set up a very positive example for others to mimic. We 
set up a Facebook page from the beginning and a Twitter…and right now, in 11 months, 
we have almost 8,000 Likes in our Facebook page. [We have reached] 1.4 million people 
on Facebook and our website [has] several thousand unique visitors per month…[Social 
media] got us known. Then it helped us communicate to a broader public specific needs. 
A good example is this school with kids with special needs in Piraeus we assisted, where 
journalists saw that in Twitter and retweeted it and then someone else saw it and they got 
to it on the newspapers and then it exploded, I mean there was a wave of donations just 
from social media. (Personal communication, December 18, 2012) 
 
Theodoridis further noted that Facebook was the organization’s most-used social medium, 
followed by Twitter (personal communication, December 18, 2012), while Papastavrou 
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mentioned some limited use of Foursquare, adding the following regarding the content Boroume 
posted on its social media accounts: 
The purpose of the content that we upload is not to promote our organization, but to give 
people ideas about how they can help, and also to advertise different needs. So if there is 
an institution for example in need of vegetables or whatever it is on that day, we’ll put 
that on Facebook and then people will start donating food. It’s a mechanism to increase 
the amount of food that's donated and also to help explain what we do, so that other food 
companies can come into contact with us. (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
According to Papastavrou, the organization attempted to develop a conversational, informal tone 
in its social media postings: 
We've adopted a very informal way of talking to people on social media. We're trying to 
address them directly and say good morning, say good evening…we’re trying to actually 
communicate with people. So we ask them directly to respond to something…instead of 
feeling like they are facing an organization that is distant. We’re trying to break down 
that distance and say, this is what we are doing together, we are not here to help people, 
we are here to get you to help people… (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
Theodoridis adds: “we never [post] political comments or similar comments that...we never 
comment a certain thing that is happening in society or the political sphere. We never do that. We 
are a-political” (personal communication, December 18, 2012). 
Another initiative of Boroume which utilized new media tools was the organization’s 
“Map of Need.” Volunteer Vicky Foteinou describes this as “a map in which all the institutions 
which are in need, which have a lack of food, are presented, connected through Google 
Maps…you can find the exact address and further information about the institutions,” noting that 
while the map is not interactive, members of the public can submit locations to be added 
(personal communication, December 14, 2012). Papastavrou describes the map as: 
…something that’s an integral part of our website…we want the people to know where a 
need exists. We don’t want to feel that people have to come into contact with us in order 
to help. The philosophy behind Boroume is that everybody can help in their 
neighborhood, so we want them to know about the different points [in] their 
 237 
neighborhood…I think the map is a way to help the people to realize the problem and 
also to get actively involved. (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
Theodoridis describes other types of interventions in civil society that have resulted out of the 
social media presence of Boroume and interactivity with the public: 
We answer all the comments on Facebook and all the messages that we have, because we 
feel that this is our responsibility. We have from a couple in a day to up to 30-40 in a day. 
This is also good for us because we get some insight, we see what inspires people, what 
triggers the interest of people, specific subjects. We also use their suggestions in order to 
contact other possible donors, for example what we have done is that we have taken 
several e-mails and posts in Facebook about the food waste in military camps…we went 
actually to the chief of staff of the Greek military and we showed him that people are 
talking about this and this is an issue in social media… He was very fond of the idea to 
get started with that. (Personal communication, December 18, 2012) 
 
Some of the organization’s volunteers also learned of Boroume via its social media presence and 
were inspired to get involved. Foteinou described her experience: 
I had heard about Boroume…I [visited] the Facebook page of Boroume and from that 
time I [contacted] them and now I am a volunteer for over a year. I liked all the activities 
of Boroume and all the articles they had on their Facebook page, and this was something 
that caught my attention from the first time. The main reason why I found Boroume was 
through Facebook. (Personal communication, December 14, 2012) 
 
Theodoridis estimated that out of 20-25 volunteers, 5 or 6 had discovered Boroume through its 
social media presence (personal communication, December 18, 2012). 
 Looking at the overall impact of Boroume on civil society and Greek society as a whole, 
Papastavrou stated: 
I think that we’ve helped in many different ways. First of all, we’ve helped raising 
awareness about the problem of hunger. We’ve helped the institutions become more 
extroverted as they [have started] voicing their needs instead of having problems and not 
knowing how to present them. We are getting more people actively involved and wanting 
to help, because actually we are presenting them a way to help…I think that some people 
are in need of some encouragement, of some positive [reinforcement]…it might sound 
very simplistic but I think it’s true because we get people saying to us “we look forward 
to your post on Facebook, because we need somebody to tell us that something good is 
happening around us, that some people around us are interested in helping people.” I 
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think it’s reinforcing a sentiment of…things will be alright, because so many good things 
are happening around us. (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
Athinais A. noted the contribution of Boroume in helping to overcome societal taboos in 
discussing poverty or hardship, and in raising awareness of such issues in Greek society: 
I think that we discuss issues that used to be taboo or uncomfortable…even the fact that 
so many people who used to be able to afford food and to feed their families and now are 
going to shelters and food banks…I think it’s definitely brought things to the surface that 
makes a lot of people uncomfortable but they are necessary to be known…It has been 
really big…in terms of the sensitivisation for the needs of so many people in Greece that 
have some basic need like food. In that sense it has really contributed, and also to 
highlight how much food waste went on in previous years and there was nothing people 
did about it…I think it's really grown the awareness and highlighted the importance of 
the specific problem. (Personal communication, February 11, 2013) 
 
Theodoridis mentioned using his professional contacts in the political realm and the visibility of 
Boroume to lobby for legislative changes: 
In my profession I am very close to politicians every day, and we are trying right now to 
change a specific, a certain paragraph in a law, that until now [acts as] an obstacle to 
people, to a restaurant, to a bakery, to donate the food, instead of destroying it. Now for 
them it’s better to destroy the food…than to donate it….We want to change it and I am 
speaking with certain politicians in the three parties that are in the government and when 
the paragraph will be ready from our office…I will give it to them and they will bring it, 
pass it by law. (Personal communication, December 18, 2012) 
 
While the above interviews were conducted in the 2012-2013 time period, a follow-up interview 
conducted with Theodoridis in 2017 provided some insights into how the organization and its use 
of social and new media tools evolved in the interim: 
[Boroume] has changed enormously in terms of our efficiency to save and donate food. 
When we spoke we were talking about a few thousand meals per day. In 2013 we saved 
something close to 700,000 portions of food. In 2014 we saved 1.4 million. In 2015 we 
saved 3.7 million. And in 2016 we saved over 6 million in one year…Since then, we have 
created several programs that approach the whole problem of food waste, a food saving 
program for farmer’s markets…we [have gone] to more than 100 schools and we talked 
to thousands of kids…We grow our own field outside of Athens for educational reasons 
and…in order to enable people to volunteer more… We have more employees. I would 
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say it’s a different organization in terms of impact. In terms of DNA, in terms of how the 
people function here, it’s the same. (Personal communication, January 27, 2017) 
 
Theodoridis also highlighted changes in the way Boroume utilizes social media: 
 
We thought it was really important to post every day on a permanent basis. Now we don’t 
think that it’s so important any more. We think it’s better to post fewer but better 
posts…and we have learnt that it’s really difficult to make out what post brings the most 
views and likes…We don’t think Twitter is relevant at all in Greece anymore. It never 
was that important, but I don’t think we are posting anymore because it’s not relevant at 
all…Instagram is more powerful now in Greece, I would say in the past one or two years, 
so we started posting on Instagram…We have our YouTube channel. We don’t have that 
many videos to post, because in order to make a video, even in an amateur way…it takes 
time to edit it, to look at it, and this is time we unfortunately do not have…it’s not 
something that is high in our priorities. We are still keen on posting on Facebook…I 
would say 3 or 4 times a week. (Personal communication, January 27, 2017) 
 
Finally, despite reducing the organization’s overall emphasis on Facebook, Theodoridis noted its 
continued importance in recruiting volunteers: 
Facebook is not important any more to us in terms of general projection of what we are 
doing. In terms of getting volunteers interested in that, it’s really good. Yesterday, we 
posted on Facebook for volunteers for the farmers’ market on Saturday and we already 
have three people volunteering through that post…It's now the most important source of 
volunteers. (Personal communication, January 27, 2017) 
 
5.3.3 – Illustrative Example: Radiobubble and Civil Society 
 
Radiobubble is an online radio station which gained tremendous prominence during the 
years of the economic crisis in Greece, for its alternative news programming and its very visible 
profile and activity on social media and particularly Twitter. These aspects of Radiobubble’s 
operations will be analyzed in chapter 7. However, Radiobubble’s activity expanded beyond the 
confines of social and new media into the realm of civil society. These initiatives included 





5.3.3.1 – Hackademy 
 
 Oikonomides describes Hackademy as an educational program for professional and 
amateur journalists, focusing on the usage of new media: 
Hackademy, is a very useful service to civil society, because it was launched as an 
educational program for journalists or for people who would like to be journalists or for 
people who de facto are journalists, even though they were never trained in it. It focuses 
on the use of new media. So you will have training on how to write and manage a blog, 
how to use Twitter as a news tool, how to use Facebook, how to create a web radio. It's a 
total of 96 hours on Saturdays. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Papathanasiou describes Hackademy as “a civil society initiative but not a solidarity initiative,” 
noting that it works with paid instructors from all over the world. He characterizes Hackademy 
as an “innovative lab for new media,” adding that the course offerings are split into two groups: 
journalism and web radio (personal communication, December 17, 2012). 
 Zaira Konstantopoulou, a volunteer with Hackademy, described this initiative as being 
borne out of Radiobubble and out of the need for people to discuss topics that they are passionate 
about, without a profit motive. Acting “as a branch of Radiobubble,” Konstantopoulou noted that 
Hackademy was self-organized, and was promoted through Radiobubble, adding her view 
though that it was “not marketed properly.” Despite characterizing Hackademy as “innovative” 
for Greece and “probably the first [initiative] of its kind,” Konstantopoulou also expressed 
reservations about its potential, stating that “she cannot predict the future of Hackademy” in the 
unstable broader context of crisis-hit Greece (personal communication, February 15, 2013). 
5.3.3.2 – Tutorpool 
Tutorpool was described by Papathanasiou as “one of the first, if not the first, online 
solidarity movements in the field of education,” organized in late 2011-early 2012 (personal 
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communication, December 17, 2012). Tutorpool brought together teachers who volunteered 
tutoring services at no cost to families who could not afford private tutoring for their children. 
As explained by Christina Lardikou, a volunteer with Tutorpool, Tutorpool was not 
directly borne out of Radiobubble as Hackademy was. Instead, it was a product of the 
“Indignants” movement in Athens in 2011: 
We met in Syntagma Square and the idea came through a tweet in last November from 
[Twitter user] @doltsevito…she had the idea, “what about doing something for 
education?” and then @SatanikoKoutavi replied, “okay, let's do something.” They had 
this idea and they gathered in the beginning 10 people…the idea was creating a 
community, actually creating an internet site [to make connections with] teachers and 
professors for offering free private lessons, because there were huge problems in 
education…in order to enter a Greek University you have to have private lessons, and 
more and more people didn't have this ability and lots of families couldn't afford paying 
private lessons for their children. (Personal communication, February 20, 2013) 
 
However, it was Radiobubble’s café in central Athens which served as the meeting point for 
those interested in this new initiative, while Twitter served as a networking tool. Lardikou states: 
It all started from Syntagma Square. I cannot remember how exactly happened, but we 
sort of started gathering up here [at the Radiobubble café]…because apparently the whole 
Twitter community started to know each other and they all came here, so we started 
coming here. And I met in Syntagma also lots of people from Twitter and we became 
friends and we started being locals here. (Personal communication, February 20, 2013) 
 
According to Lardikou, “we [have] something like 600 or 700 professors teaching, and around 
500 families. That may mean that maybe...two children, two students…people are asking for it 
because they cannot afford such an expensive thing [as] private lessons,” adding that several of 
the instructors involved with Tutorpool learned about the initiative on Twitter (personal 
communication, February 20, 2013). 
 The platform around which the Tutorpool service was centered was Google Maps. As 
described by Lardikou, the map displayed the locations of available tutors as well as students 
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who were in need, and incorporated the services of other similar groups around Greece with 
which Tutorpool had developed close relationships and who also wished to offer their services as 
part of the Tutorpool platform (personal communication, February 20, 2013). 
While social media was important for Tutorpool’s activities, Lardikou noted that the 
group had to turn to mainstream media as well, to promote the initiative: 
…we use social media to spread the news…we have a bigger response from social media 
from professors than from students, because most parents don’t have Twitter accounts. 
We had articles in newspapers or some in magazines and newspapers, we have also 
[appeared on a televised talk show hosted by] Eleni Menegaki. There was a big debate 
about it, but it had a big response, because fathers and mothers were [watching], and 
that's the target” (Personal communication, February 20, 2013) 
 
Lardikou added that Tutorpool’s involvement with the media also expanded to a monthly show 
on Radiobubble, focusing on educational issues (personal communication, February 20, 2013). 
 Regarding the societal role of Tutorpool and its impact on civil society, Lardikou stressed 
that Tutorpool was not a non-governmental organization or a replacement for the Greek state: 
From my experiences from Tutorpool, the need of doing something in a different way, 
was very big…It’s mostly about solidarity than for doing that for free…It is building new 
communities and people who are actually going to be involved and give back what 
they’ve earned. What we ask from students and what we want to create is that somebody 
offered that for you and helped you, you should offer it next or try to get involved as 
much as you can…We are not trying to replace the state…that’s why we are not 
becoming at the moment an NGO or something like that, free education is something that 
the state should do and it’s not our job to do it, but in this time of need, there are people 
who are actually losing the right to free education, and we are trying to do this to help 




Tutorpool is by any possible definition a civil society organization. The only thing about 
Tutorpool that is not an organization, it is a group of people, there is no structure, there 
are no paid people, they are all volunteers, they have no a clear job description...it 
functions as a network, not as an organization. So I think that this is an interesting new 
development for this country, because the traditional civil society's structures have failed 
so badly, people are going for something entirely different now, which is actually 
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bypassing the traditional structures, not only the state, but all the traditional structures 
that you would expect to fulfill that role. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Finally, Apostolia described Tutorpool as “… the perfect example of self-organization and trying 
to help others that need assistance” (personal communication, March 6, 2013). 
5.3.3.3 – Doctors Without Borders and Radiobubble 
 A third venue through which Radiobubble opened its doors to civil society was through 
the development of a radio program with the Greek branch of Doctors Without Borders. Noting 
that communications and social media were the second most important aspect of Doctors 
Without Borders’ operations after its medical work, Sophia Apostolia, the web editor for the 
Greek branch of the organization, explained that she discovered Radiobubble from Twitter and 
particularly from its active #rbnews hashtag (to be presented in detail in chapter 7). As stated by 
Apostolia, she attended a Hackademy seminar on how to use #rbnews and “was very impressed 
by the fact that #rbnews was a tool that had a proper scientific background behind it and 
guidelines,” in contrast to the credibility crisis of mainstream news. With World AIDS Day 
approaching a few days after the seminar, arrangements were made to schedule a one hour radio 
program focusing on AIDS and a new musical CD released by Doctors Without Borders with an 
AIDS theme. This initial contact opened the door for Doctors Without Borders to attain a 
timeslot on Radiobubble’s schedule (personal communication, March 6, 2013). 
 According to Apostolia, the radio program was scheduled for one hour monthly and 
hosted by two individuals including herself, focusing on major health concerns in Greece and 
airing interviews with Doctors Without Borders volunteers. Social media was the main vehicle 
for promoting the program, as Apostolia noted: “[s]ocial media is actually the main channel of 
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advertising the program, and we do invite people to ask their questions or to just say their 
comments” (personal communication, March 6, 2013). 
 In summarizing the relationship of Doctors Without Borders with Radiobubble, Apostolia 
said the station represents “a community that is very close to our mentality,” and an example of 
“citizen journalism, safeguarded with guidelines” (personal communication, March 6, 2013). In 
turn, Panagiotis Oikonomou described Radiobubble as a “microcosm” of civil society, one which 
uses social media to create a “social radio” (personal communication, February 13, 2013). 
5.3.4 – Other New Civil Society Initiatives during the Crisis 
 
 In addition to the two illustrative examples presented above, several other civil society 
initiatives which developed in Greece during the period being studied (2011-2017) and which 
maintained a significant social media presence, will be detailed in the following subsections. 
5.3.4.1 – Atenistas 
 The “Atenistas”17 are a citizens’ group in Athens concerned with organizing actions with 
the goal of improving the urban landscape and quality of life in the city. Examples of actions 
undertaken by the “Atenistas” include painting school buildings, converting abandoned lots into 
small parks and green spaces, and organizing “open walks” of the urban area. Founded in 2010, 
the group has maintained an active social media presence. Nantia Papadimitriou, a volunteer 
with the “Atenistas,” described the group’s philosophy:  
Atenistas is an open group of people living in Athens, of Athenians let’s say. Our name, 
we translate it as “Athenians in action.” It’s not an NGO, it's not [related to] the political 
parties, the state, or the municipality. It’s just an open group of people…that really 
believe that there are so many things [to do] in the city, that they have to live it and feel it 
and enjoy living here. Of course there are a lot of things that we don’t like, so we want to 
change them and ameliorate our everyday life and [that] of our neighbors and our friends 
                                               
17 See https://www.atenistas.org. 
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and in the neighborhood that we don't really live but other people live and they really are 
in need of a better civil environment. (Personal communication, October 4, 2013) 
 
Andriotakis described the group’s beginnings, which occurred via the early Greek blogosphere: 
The Atenistas were launched by two people—I had the luck of attending their early 
meetings—Dimitris Dimopoulos and “Stathis”…who met each other via “Stathis’” 
blog…Athensville, which was about Athens. [Inspired by the blog] they decided to launch 
Atenistas, which has faced sharp criticism from the left, because the left generally never 
liked anything having to do with civil society, they haven’t embraced it. Anything that is 
not revolutionary, they reject. (Personal communication, May 27, 2013) 
 
While the “Atenistas” were not a creation of the crisis, Papadimitriou notes that the economic 
crisis made the need for such an initiative more acute: 
Atenistas was meant for the people…[The founders] wanted to do it back in 2010. The 
crisis was not so obvious in Greece….I think that the crisis, it made what the Atenistas do 
more obvious, but it’s not the reason why it was created. The two guys wanted to do 
something for the city. They wanted Athenians to spend more time in the public space. 
This was a need…for all times and periods. (Personal communication, October 4, 2013) 
 
Papadimitriou considers the “Atenistas” a civil society organization, and further notes that the 
“Atenistas” exist unofficially, and do not accept money: 
The Atenistas are much different from everybody else, because we don’t have a legal 
personality. We are not a legal entity. We are not an NGO. We don't have money at all, so 
even the things we do…we accept some donations but only materials, we never accept 
money, we don't have money. This has helped us to create this transparency and this trust 
with the people and the Athenians. (Personal communication, October 4, 2013) 
 
Papadimitriou also stressed that “[t]he people that are participating in the Atenistas don’t 
consider themselves volunteers. We consider ourselves a group of people that we just believe in 
the same things…” (personal communication, October 4, 2013). 
Regarding social media usage, Papadimitriou noted the group’s robust Facebook account, 
with over 70,000 likes, and a Twitter account used only for posting announcements, which had 
approximately 19,000 followers. Papadimitriou added that each “Atenistas” subgroup maintained 
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its own secret Facebook group, and that “in our organization…our main way of working is 
Facebook” (personal communication, October 4, 2013). 
Finally, Papadimitriou observed the influence of the “Atenistas” on other similar groups 
which developed in Greece during the crisis: 
Atenistas was the first this kind of group that appeared in Athens. A lot of people have 
been inspired by Atenistas, not only in Athens but also in other cities around Greece. 
More than 17 organizations have a similar name, like -istas in the end and have been 
created after us. We don't have a direct contact with them or something to do with them. 
They just got the inspiration. (Personal communication, October 4, 2013) 
 
5.3.4.2 – Edosa Fakelaki 
 “Edosa Fakelaki”18 translates as (“I Gave an Envelope”) and refers to a longstanding 
practice of offering a bribe to personnel at public hospitals or at other public services, in order to 
receive better service—or sometimes, any service at all. It was such an experience with her 
family that inspired Kristina Tremonti to launch this initiative in October 2012. In her words: 
That [experience] was very shocking to me. I returned to Yale that fall semester…and I 
wanted to write about corruption for my senior thesis, and I realized that I had zero data 
on corruption in Greece. Yes, there were some Transparency International statistics that 
said that six of ten Greeks paid a bribe in their lifetime. And then I realized that that didn't 
suffice. I didn't know what the average price was for a bribe, how many people resisted 
paying a bribe, what was the price for a C-section versus a natural birth, things like that 
which are very important, which we all knew happened around us. How did we not know 
the exact numbers and patterns and where the most corrupt services were across the 
country? I was determined to go out and find the data for myself, and I set up Edosa 
Fakelaki, which is a crowdsourced website separated across four categories. Edosa 
Fakelaki is the first EU initiative that has ever managed to harness the collective energy 
of citizens to fight corruption. (Personal communication, March 5, 2014) 
 
The website’s four categories are “I Paid a Bribe,” “I Didn’t Pay a Bribe,” “I Accepted a Bribe,” 
and “I Reported a Bribe.” In each category, users could submit their experiences with bribery, 
including naming public services and civil servants who requested a bribe and their decision 
                                               
18 See http://www.edosafakelaki.org. 
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whether to pay or not to pay, explaining the reasons why a bribe may have been demanded—
such as low wages—and success stories with reporting bribery. Tremonti noted that “only 
anonymous reports are made on the website” (personal communication, March 5, 2014). 
 Tremonti also described how “Edosa Fakelaki” went “viral” soon after its launch: 
This project had zero marketing budget…everything was social media-driven. Social 
media was the key into achieving what we've achieved so far in just a year. No 
professionals were hired, it's just the website on its own…We launched in October one 
evening, and within 24 hours through social media we had gathered approximately 300 
likes. And through those likes we got a radio interview on zougla.gr…It was a catalyzing 
effect. After Zougla it was Mega Channel, after Mega it was Alpha TV…then we had 
BBC, we had France 24, we had Der Spiegel. (Personal communication, March 5, 2014) 
 
Noting that “Edosa Fakelaki” is active on Facebook and Twitter, with a limited presence on 
YouTube, Tremonti described the initiative’s social media accounts as serving the purpose of:  
…letting our followers know what we are doing, but also I've turned our Facebook page 
into a news outlet for corruption-only material. Any major decision, legislation that has to 
do with corruption gets published immediately on the Facebook page. Any news that has 
to do with [corruption]…gets posted. (Personal communication, March 5, 2014). 
 
 Tremonti noted several “success stories” of reporting instances of corruption via the 
“Edosa Fakelaki” website, including a university professor who was under investigation for 
demanding a bribe to pass a student in his class, and a public official responsible for government 
contracts who was fired. Despite this, Tremonti stated that the government and state had not 
responded to the extent that she had hoped: “I'm very sad to say it's one of the most bitter aspects 
of this journey, it's not they have not embraced this effort as much as I'd wished they had.” 
Tremonti noted that “Edosa Fakelaki” was operating in risky territory, as Greece did not have 
any laws protecting whistleblowers, putting the site at risk of facing charges of libel and 
defamation. As noted by Tremonti, via her platform, “[c]itizens for the first time are given a 
collective voice that is public information, something that was entirely in [state] control before. 
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So yes, there are some bumps along the road. I feel they are warming up slowly to the idea, given 
the public's response, the media's response,” adding that “Edosa Fakelaki” had just been featured 
on “Public Television” (ERT’s interim replacement) (personal communication, March 5, 2014). 
 Finally, Tremonti described her future hopes for “Edosa Fakelaki,” stating: 
 
My future vision would be to see Edosa Fakelaki as a non-profit organization, a powerful 
tool for the citizens to report, in real-time, bribery going forward. Now the majority of 
our stories are in retrospect. If we could go forward using this in real-time, that would be 
amazing, but also engaging citizens across the nation, from remote villages to different 
provinces through social media, and building an awareness campaign, making it cool to 
say no. Saying no to bribery, standing up for each other, learning from each other, and I 
think social media will be key for that. (Personal communication, March 5, 2014) 
 
5.3.4.3 – Enallaktikos.gr 
 Enallaktikos.gr (meaning “alternative”) is a portal dedicated to the “third sector” in 
Greece, featuring news about civil society organizations, grassroots groups, volunteerism, as well 
as a listing of all such organizations active throughout the country. In the words of founder 
Andreas Roumeliotis, a former journalist for the Eleftherotypia newspaper: 
We developed a Google Map where you can enter and see in each region which are the 
groups which are active, and from there visit their website, Facebook, and Twitter…The 
news we post includes topics such as local crop varieties and biodiversity, water, energy, 
the collaborative economy, personal liberties and social rights, migrant rights, animal 
rights… (Personal communication, April 3, 2014) 
 
According to Roumeliotis, enallaktikos.gr was the result of five years of research and visits to 
over 50 cities throughout Greece. Enallaktikos.gr “recorded and presents online over 3,000 
organizations, initiatives, and groups, many of which are unofficial, without a legal status, what 
we call social and collaborative economy” (personal communication, April 3, 2014). 
 Roumeliotis states that his inspiration for launching enallaktikos.gr was the lack of media 
coverage of what he described as “the largest solidarity movement seen in Europe.” The website 
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was developed as a result, with a heavy emphasis on social media. Roumeliotis further noted that 
future plans for enallaktikos.gr included the launch of alternative web radio and television 
outlets, and the establishment of a grocery store featuring responsibly sourced local products 
(personal communication, April 3, 2014). 
5.3.4.4 – HumanGrid 
 Founded in late 2012, HumanGrid19 is a project which concerns the mapping and 
networking of civil society organizations and NGOs throughout Greece. Similarly to the example 
of enallaktikos.gr, HumanGrid is a platform based on Google Maps, while incorporating a blog 
as well. As detailed by Koutzoukou: “[HumanGrid] uses as its basic tool a website based on 
Google Maps, with pins and notes wherever there are volunteer organizations and citizens’ 
groups…We also have a blog where we post content and interviews with individuals who are 
active in the civil society sector…” (personal communication, February 12, 2014). 
In addition, an active Facebook and Twitter presence was maintained by HumanGrid, 
used in part to help link civil society groups with one another: 
We want to communicate the content of different organizations…so they can speak with 
their own voice about what they are doing. On social media we act as a platform to 
communicate the actions of other groups. We are more active on Facebook, but we try to 
be active on Twitter, especially live tweeting from events that may interest our audience. 
(Personal communication, February 12, 2014). 
 
Regarding these organizations, Koutzoukou noted that 140 such groups were listed on 
HumanGrid at that time, and that the site had recently expanded beyond Athens and had begun 
including initiatives from the rest of the country. However, aside from listing these organizations 
and publicizing their activities, HumanGrid also became a conduit for individuals seeking 
opportunities to volunteer. As stated by Koutzoukou: “[q]uite often we receive an e-mail or a 
                                               
19 See http://www.HumanGrid.gr, http://blog.HumanGrid.gr. 
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message on Facebook seeking volunteer opportunities,” citing at least one example of a 
volunteer finding a service opportunity via HumanGrid. Furthermore, Koutzoukou noted several 
instances where inter-group linkages were achieved, from organizations that discovered one 
another via HumanGrid (personal communication, February 12, 2014). 
5.3.4.5 – Illegal Signs 
 Though this is an initiative which was only active for part of the period being studied 
(until 2013), having launched prior to the economic crisis, it is being included both for its long-
lasting impact and also due to the fact that it was not continued by successive governments. 
“Illegal Signs” refers to a website and social media platform20 which allowed citizens to report 
illegally constructed billboards in urban areas throughout Greece. This initiative was an 
extension of the e-government initiatives of the Giorgos Papandreou-led PASOK government. 
 Manos Andriotakis, a journalist at the time, describes the idea behind this initiative: 
As a journalist…I was investigating illegal billboards. Our investigation led us to families 
of individuals whose children were killed as a result of these billboards. From that day I 
became involved in the issue. I began to track these individuals’ efforts to attain justice, 
produced a documentary, blogged, posted on Facebook and especially on Twitter, this 
was in 2009 and 2010, when my documentary was screened at the Thessaloniki Film 
Festival…I was an investigator but also a type of activist…Giorgos Papandreou was 
Prime Minister and took notice, and [the government] constructed an application and 
website…where anyone could submit a complaint and a photo. This worked very well, 
thousands of signs came down. (Personal communication, May 27, 2013) 
 
Papachatzis describes the “Illegal Signs” initiative as “a means of pressure on the part of 
citizens,” which earned the attention of the Prime Minister, who assigned two or three staffers to 
the project. As stated by Papachatzis, over 2,500 billboards were removed just in Athens and 
remains evident today. Papachatzis further noted the symbolism of the marketing campaign for 
                                               
20 See https://web.archive.org/web/20130630051910/http://www.illegalsigns.gov.gr, 
https://www.facebook.com/illegalsignsgr, https://www.twitter.com/illegalsignsgr. 
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the “Illegal Signs” initiative, utilizing legal billboards in locations such as Athens Metro stations 
(personal communication, October 12, 2013). 
 Similar to the fates of other e-government initiatives inaugurated at around the same time, 
Andriotakis noted that, as of 2013, the website was no longer functioning, as the new post-
Papandreou government did not continue the initiative (personal communication, May 27, 2013). 
5.3.4.6 – Metropolitan Community Clinic of Ellinikon 
The Metropolitan Community Clinic of Ellinikon21 is based in the Athens suburb of 
Ellinikon, and is located in a facility that is part of the city’s former international airport, which 
has been decommissioned. The clinic became widely known throughout Greece for providing 
free medical services and prescription medication to poor citizens who were in need and who 
were uninsured or could not afford medical treatment. 
Christos Sideris is a founding member of the clinic and head of its communications team, 
the clinic was initially the idea of a cardiologist by the name of Dr. Giorgos Vichas, while Sideris 
was part of a group of six doctors who participated in the protests of the “Indignants” in Athens 
in 2011. It was the first such clinic in the Athens area and the largest in Greece. Sideris states: 
Dr. Vichas, from an early stage, realized that many people were coming to him at the 
clinic where he's working, [within] the public health system, and many of his patients had 
lost their insurance coverage, and as a result they couldn't go to a doctor or get any 
medication. He told us the idea of creating a community clinic where people would come 
free…and receive medications and everything for free, and we decided to go ahead 
because we saw this clinic as a way to resist…this economic warfare that's been waged 
on the Greek society. By September 2011 the idea had matured in our heads and we came 
in contact with the local municipality in Elliniko-Argyroupoli, and the mayor was very 
positive, so they decided to give us this building where we are here today. Within two and 
a half months we made numerous calls on the internet asking for help from people, to 
give us excess medication that they had at home, and many doctors came forward, so the 
initial group of six people became sixty, within two and a half months. So by December 
2011 we were ready to start. (Personal communication, November 26, 2013) 
                                               
21 See http://www.mkiellinikou.org/en/. 
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Sideris described the key role social media played in the development of the clinic: 
The social media have played a very important role, the most important role perhaps, in 
the way that this clinic has grown. From the first instance we created a blog and we 
posted our pleas and then we reposted on our Facebook. Through Facebook many people 
shared our initial plea and we saw an ever-increasing number of people sending us e-
mails requesting more information, how they can help, they would come to our meetings, 
the initial meetings before the clinic started, and we discussed everything with [them]. 
Everything happened through Facebook. (Personal communication, November 26, 2013) 
 
Sideris noted that social media also played an important role in attracting volunteers to the clinic, 
noting that there were 230 individuals working as volunteers: “[t]hey found us through Facebook 
and our blog, they would send us their contact details and we would…ask them to come to the 
clinic…if we saw that they could help us, we would go ahead and recruit them” (personal 
communication, November 26, 2013). 
 Regarding the clinic’s usage of social media, Sideris noted that there were now two blogs 
in operation, one in Greek and one in English. A Twitter account was created as well as a 
secondary Facebook group, in addition to the clinic’s official page. Content posted on social 
media included calls for help, such as requests for donations of medication, in addition to press 
releases and notices, information for patients—including details regarding how they could 
navigate the public health system—and details about the doctors and services available at the 
clinic. New media tools were also used for the clinic’s internal operations according to Sideris, 
including Google Groups and Google Drive. Sideris added that patients used the clinic’s social 
and new media presence to contact the clinic for medication or assistance, often even from 
outside of Athens. However, as stated by Sideris, perhaps the most important role of the clinic’s 
social media presence was to protect its very existence: 
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[Social media] is the biggest protection that we have, because we are not “legal.” We do 
not have any legal papers, covering this clinic. Everything is self-organized…So the way 
that we protect ourselves is through publicity, and we gain this publicity through our 
social media, the social media and also through our blog, the press releases and we get a 
lot of feedback from people. Journalists from abroad read our press releases and they visit 
us here, all through the media... (Personal communication, November 26, 2013) 
 
Such protection became necessary for the clinic on at least one occasion, as described by Sideris: 
When we were raided by the anti-drug police, instantly we went on Facebook, we told 
everybody that we were being raided, we will let you know in a few minutes when we 
have more information why they're raiding us. It was incredible the way people supported 
us. The feedback we got back was amazing. We had people, without even asking them, 
coming down here and saying to us “what do you want us to do, just tell us what you 
want us to do.” It was amazing, we got so many messages. It's like you're investing 
something and you get back ten times more. So yes, social media play a very important 
role for us, it's our voice. (Personal communication, November 26, 2013) 
 
Sideris notes that this know-how in terms of using social media has been used to help other 
similar initiatives throughout Greece: “…they came to us first and we explained to them how 
important it is to go on Facebook and Twitter and other social media to spread the word. Some of 
them are doing this and it’s very nice to see” (personal communication, November 26, 2013).  
Conversely, according to Sideris, the mainstream media had been hostile to this initiative. 
As described by Sideris: 
[The mainstream media] are terrible. They were ignoring us totally. At the moment 
they're trying to manipulate us, they're trying to invite us to certain TV shows, but they do 
not let us voice our concerns, they do not allow us to have a discussion with the Minister 
of Health, for example. They just put us in the background and perhaps…in the last few 
minutes they will let us ask one question…We do not like to be manipulated in such a 
way, so recently we walked out of a TV show and we publicized this, because the people 
that come to us have very important problems and we are their voice. We cannot become 
accomplices to this crime, and by playing the game of the Greek media, we're helping the 





5.3.4.7 – The Omikron Project 
 The Omikron Project22 is an online initiative which sought, primarily through a series of 
animated videos and sketches, to dispel commonly-heard stereotypes about Greece and the 
Greek people. As described by Mehran Khalili, the initiative’s founder, the Omikron Project was 
established in March 2012, and is a volunteer group “dedicated to fighting what we call 
‘Greece’s image crisis’ through creative productions and other events and projects” (personal 
communication, June 4, 2013). Khalili explained his inspiration for this project, which was 
named after the public space—the Omikron Bar in central Athens—where the group would meet: 
Me and some friends were sitting around looking at the headlines and saying that 
international media headlines are disconnected from the reality of what’s happening in 
Greece. They are quite unrepresentative of what’s happening and they are reinforcing 
very negative stereotypes about Greek people, that Greeks are lazy, violent, corrupt. We 
wanted to do something about it, we wanted to respond to this, because there was zero 
crisis management from the state and we believed that the image crisis that was 
reinforcing of these headlines and stereotypes creates is enormously damaging to Greek 
people psychologically and economically and has a cost today. So, that’s how the idea 
came about. (Personal communication, June 4, 2013) 
 
Khalili stated that the group, which consisted of seven main members and about 40 individuals 
who attend its meetings, mainly produced and uploaded videos (such as their “Alex” series of 
animated videos) and noting that the group has no budget for anything other than social media, 
used as its primary media tools social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 
Tumblr, though out of these, Facebook was used the most.  
 Referring to the coverage of the Greek economic crisis in the mainstream media and the 
Omikron Project’s efforts, Khalili stated that: 
Media sensationalism is a problem across the board…Every time we upload something, I 
get this kind of thing in the comments, somehow I talk about putting a positive spin and 
ignoring all of Greece's sins or the corruption…Reform has to happen. But in parallel 
                                               
22 See http://www.omikronproject.gr. 
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with that, you need crisis management, you need to manage the image, because it has 
devastating economic and psychological effects on Greek people in Greece and across the 
world. (Personal communication, June 4, 2013) 
 
 Finally, one additional significant part of the Omikron Project’s crisis management 
efforts, aside from the videos and images produced, was a map of grassroots initiatives in 
Greece23, in an attempt to dismiss the stereotype that Greeks were sitting idle during the crisis. 
5.3.4.8 – Save Greek Water 
 During the years of the economic crisis and austerity in Greece, the privatization of 
publicly-owned assets is an issue which has often been at the forefront. Successive governments 
have moved forward with a regime of privatizing important public assets, ranging from airports 
and harbors to the national lottery, while other assets have long been threatened with 
privatization, such as the public electric and water utilities. Maria Kanellopoulou, founder of the 
“Save Greek Water” initiative24, explains how her experience participating in the “Indignants” 
movement in 2011 helped her launch this effort: 
Having the experience of the squares and…we started with a very small group of people 
the formation of this citizens’ initiative…for the non-privatization of water in Greece. As 
we started it, we thought “how can we have the maximum results by pushing our message 
in Greek society, what have we learned up until now?” The idea was to be adaptive and, 
in a way, technocratic as well…It was a political experiment of a completely different 
kind from what the square was about…it was a mainstream façade of something really 
radical. The idea was to keep our position the way it is, which is in a way radical, and on 
the other hand, have the whole communication strategy built on the idea that most of the 
people need to be persuaded about this. (Personal communication, October 3, 2013) 
 
For Kanellopoulou, social media and blogging were two important pillars of this strategy: 
 
Of course the social media and the blog were very important from this point of view. Our 
blog is fully bilingual…it was a strategic choice to be able to communicate with the rest 
of the world what was the situation in Greece and taking into consideration the fact that 
actually the privatization of water was imposed by the lenders….And this is how we 
                                               
23 See http://www.omikronproject.gr/grassroots. 
24 See http://www.savegreekwater.org. 
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[built] our credibility…for example [if there is] any public dialogue about the issue, we 
are definitely going to be there. We have used Facebook very much, we have our 
Facebook page, we also have a closed group in Facebook where we coordinate our 
everyday works. [We organize] assemblies are once a month, not more than that, and the 
rest of the time we work through the internet…The Facebook page by now has something 
like almost 4,000-5,000 followers…I think we have been successful enough to actually 
put the water privatization into the public dialogue. Before that, there were not any 
comments, not even on mainstream television, not anywhere, about what was going to 
happen with water. (Personal communication, October 3, 2013) 
 
As an example of both a successful intervention and a collaboration with another activist group, 
Kanellopoulou describes an appearance on the occupied worker-run ERT soon after it was 
officially shut down by the Greek government in June 2013: 
We have the example of when we went on ERT in the first days after its closure, and we 
revealed the fact that there were hidden debts of the public sector towards EYDAP [ the 
water utility of Athens], and this created a lot of problems for the government. They 
spent all summer and basically September too, to try to regulate these debts in order to 
continue with the privatization. So in a way, this was not [an] immediate response, but it 
was a response to our actions that we initiated. We revealed this situation, they tried to 
compensate for it and to carry on with the privatization, so at least we gained some time 
through this. (Personal communication, October 3, 2013) 
 
“Save Greek Water” is not the only such initiative in Greece. Roumeliotis referenced the 
efforts of social responsibility corporations such as the “136 Movement” in Thessaloniki, a 
citizens’ movement which has proposed buying the local water utility from the state in order to 
prevent its privatization and to collectively manage it. The movement even gained the support of 
Bill Gates (personal communication, April 3, 2014). In May 2014, the “136 Movement,” with a 
significant social media campaign, including the #vote4water hashtag on Twitter, organized an 





5.3.4.9 – SynAthina 
SynAthina is an online platform25 established by the Municipality of Athens, upon which 
civil society and community groups can publicize their activities. As described by Amalia Zepou, 
the Mayor’s adviser on civil society networking, “SynAthina was the idea of the mayor [Giorgos 
Kaminis], who wanted to create a systematic and coordinated mechanism to link municipal 
services with civil society and community groups that have been emerging in the past few years 
in the neighborhoods of Athens” (personal communication, January 11, 2014). 
Zepou notes that SynAthina, which was founded in July 2013, encompasses a “web 
platform, which has a site upon which community groups can upload the activities that they are 
going to do in the city, and it’s also a mobile application,” in addition to maintaining a presence 
on Facebook and Twitter. According to Zepou, SynAthina: 
…was first made to be used as a calendar of activities throughout the city, so that citizens 
of Athens can see what kind of activities are organized in their neighborhood, what date, 
what hour, and what kind of activity…the site has eight different categories of activities, 
from solidarity events to artistic events. (Personal communication, January 11, 2014) 
 
Aside from listing community events in Athens, however, SynAthina has also helped generate 
linkages between civil society actors and groups. As described by Zepou: 
[SynAthina] has generated as new types of communication, new relationships between 
several different groups that did not know each other's existence. Another one was the use 
of SynAthina as a site of funding. People that want to participate in these activities by 
giving, not money, but helping in the activities themselves, for example buying garbage 
bags and offering them, so matchmaking between people who want to donate in kind, and 
those activity groups. Also, institutions that come up to be in contact with those activity 
groups, generating new initiatives, such as for example, the Council of Public Libraries of 
Attica have wanted to use SynAthina to come in contact with those groups to generate 
new initiatives around public libraries. (Personal communication, January 11, 2014) 
 
                                               
25 See https://www.synathina.gr/en/. 
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 Finally, in addition to its internet presence and as noted by Zepou, SynAthina bridged the 
online and offline worlds via the “Stegi SynAthina,” a physical meeting point in central Athens 
that is made available to civil society and community groups to hold meetings and organize their 
activities, offering free wi-fi internet (personal communication, January 11, 2014). 
5.3.4.10 – Time Banks and Alternative Currencies 
 Yet another initiative which was borne out of the “Indignants” protest movement of 2011 
was the Time Bank of Athens and Syntagma Square.26 Based on the concept of an exchange or 
barter economy, the Time Bank provides a platform for members to swap goods and services.  
As stated by Christina Papadopoulou, co-founder and member of the communications 
team for the Time Bank: 
[The Time Bank] began in Syntagma Square in May 2011, when the big protests were 
taking place. I was one of the first members…there were many people there with the 
same idea. There was a secretariat at the square where you could submit ideas for 
committees or towards committees. 5-6 people had the same idea for an exchange 
network…That’s how this group got started, we began to hold meetings, we had a table at 
the square for 3-4 months…When the protests were dispersed, we continued to gather in 
various public spaces to hold meetings, and in October 2011 our website was ready. [Our 
website designer studied in San Francisco and participated in the local time bank], and so 
our website is a copy of San Francisco’s. But [Syntagma] Square was very important, it 
was the space which united us. (Personal communication, February 2, 2014) 
 
According to Papadopoulou, the Time Bank of Athens and Syntagma Square was the largest in 
the Athens region, with about 500-600 active users on its web application and a total of 2,300 
accounts, while 1,200 individuals were members of the team’s Facebook group, while no Twitter 
account had yet been created due to a lack of time and resources. Papadopoulou adds that “there 
is no leader, there is no hierarchy, all our members can participate in our meetings and make 
decisions…” (personal communication, February 2, 2014). 
                                               
26 See http://www.time-exchange.gr. 
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 Regarding the Time Bank’s social media use, Papadopoulou notes that it is not 
professional by any means, stating: “We use social media…to publicize our actions, our 
meetings…and to recruit…Those who are not members mostly find out about us from 
Facebook…The website is mostly for existing members,” adding that the Time Bank is entirely 
run by volunteers and resources for the web are limited. In Papadopoulou’s view, social media is 
politics, with the Time Bank representing an example. Papadopoulou expresses the political 
nature of the Time Bank, as well as her hope that its existence won’t be ephemeral: 
We did not develop the Time Bank as an opportunistic solution during a period of 
crisis…The crisis may have been the cause but it’s not the essence of what we are doing. 
We want the Time Bank to be a proposal removed from capitalism and the profit motive. 
We want it to be a way of life…We’ve seen in other countries where there was a crisis, 
such as Argentina for example, that many similar networks were created which collapsed 
when the crisis there ended…The public used them opportunistically only during that 
period. We truly want this to be a daily way of life and to lead us to the world we dream 
of, a world of solidarity, exchange, far removed from profit and the capitalist system, 
putting humans first instead of profit. (Personal communication, February 2, 2014). 
 
Papadopoulou further states that it is difficult to gauge the Time Bank’s overall impact on civil 
society, but that an important first step has been taken: 
Our contribution is very important as it proves that without money, without a budget, 
without support from any party or institution, you can do things to help yourself and 
those around you. For me it is a seed which has been planted, and this seed needs time to 
blossom. It is not an easy process, but the seed has been planted. But it still needs work. 
(Personal communication, February 2, 2014) 
 
Papadopoulou further notes that the Time Bank has garnered media attention, but 
expresses the group’s suspicion of journalists: 
We always eye journalists with suspicion, in the sense that we want to know who they 
are, what they do, why they are interested in us, because we are not interested in all 
journalists or the interests which are hidden behind them. We are selective and usually 
choose independent journalists and…independent documentaries…The problem is when 
they cover us superficially…that “there is a Time Bank and you can exchange services 
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for free.” That’s a shallow approach. The correct approach is to explain why we exist and 
our underlying philosophy. (Personal communication, February 2, 2014) 
 
Finally, Papadopoulou described the Time Bank’s future plans, including finding 
volunteers for the group’s social media presence, and to network with other time banks and to 
help them develop in every city in Greece, noting that they had already helped one such initiative 
launch in Lefkada. Papadopoulou also expressed an interest in networking with other groups 
within the alternative economy, not just time banks (personal communication, February 2, 2014). 
 The Time Bank of Athens and Syntagma Square is one representative example of an 
initiative operating within the alternative economy, which according to Roumeliotis, grew to be 
quite robust during the crisis, mentioning the existence of 50 time banks and 49 alternative 
currencies in Greece (personal communication, April 3, 2014). 
5.3.5 – Survey Results: Views on Civil Society 
 
 Several valuable insights can be garnered from the results of the electronic survey 
questionnaires that were conducted across the three sample populations. The prevailing view 
among respondents was that the civil society sphere in Greece had not sufficiently developed in 
the post-military dictatorship period. Interestingly, representatives of civil society groups 
provided the lowest score, while newspaper editors and members of the European Parliament 
provided a slightly less negative view. Views were even more negative with regard to how well-
developed civil society was in Greece at the present time. Here, members of the European 
Parliament provided, in relative terms, the highest ranking, closely followed by members of civil 
society groups, while newspaper editors ranked civil society’s present-day development, and 
with all three samples in negative territory. Social media tools were viewed as having a relatively 
significant influence upon the growth and development of civil society in Greece, with civil 
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society representatives providing the highest ranking, followed closely by newspaper editors and 
members of the European Parliament, and with all three samples in positive territory. Social and 
new media’s impact upon the growth and development of civil society initiatives was also 
viewed somewhat positively, with, civil society representatives again providing the highest 
ranking, followed by newspaper editors and members of the European Parliament, all of which 
were again in positive territory. 
 Further useful insights can be found in the special sub-questionnaire which was only 
made available to representatives of civil society organizations. Facebook was listed as the most-
used social/new media tool, followed by Twitter, blogs and Google+, YouTube and LinkedIn, 
and forums and message boards. Social and new media tools were most frequently used for the 
purpose of publicizing meetings and events; followed by publicizing news about the organization 
and posting multimedia content; organizing meetings and events, providing commentary on 
relevant issues, and republishing news and content from other websites; then followed by 
communication and interaction with the public, and finally, the usage of such tools to hold online 
meetings or chats. Also notable was the fact that no group listed recruitment of new members or 
volunteers, or fundraising and requesting donations, as activities they conduct using social and 
new media tools. 
 Overall, social media’s significance for these specific groups was viewed quite positively 
by civil society respondents across the board, while the impact of social and new media upon the 
respective movements’ growth and development was viewed even more positively. Interestingly, 
when considering the previous non-response regarding the use of social and new media tools for 
the purposes of recruitment, social and new media tools were very highly ranked for their 
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significance in recruiting new members and for their positive impact with regard to recruitment. 
The significance and the positive contribution of social and new media in the day-to-day 
operations of these movements and organizations were also viewed highly positively, as was the 
significance and positive contribution of such tools for these organizations’ ability to interact and 
communicate with the general public. 
 One-third of the organizations which responded stated that they had been founded in 
whole or in part via the social media, and most respondents stated that social and new media had 
helped their group communicate or coordinate action with other similar organizations. Also 
notably, three of the groups which responded listed their year of establishment as 2012, in the 
midst of the economic crisis in Greece, while one-third of the groups listed the “Indignants” 
movement of 2011 as a direct inspiration for their establishment. Finally, civil society 
respondents anticipated both a very significant and a very positive role for social and new media 
in relation to their organization’s activities in the coming years. 
5.4 – DISCUSSION 
 Many diverse perspectives were provided by the interviewees who participated in this 
study, regarding the potential overall impact of social and new media upon the Greek public 
sphere and Greek civil society, and the transformation or changes, if any, which have occurred 
due to the influence of these technologies. Perspectives were generally more positive for the role 
social and new media have played in bolstering Greek civil society, rather than the broader 
public sphere at large. Regarding the public sphere, opinions ranged from the development of a 
new public sphere, the expansion of the existing sphere, the increased visibility of previously 
marginal voices, and a transformation in the public sphere or split into alternative spheres, to 
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opinions which held that the previously-existing public sphere has merely been reproduced 
online, that new public spheres are ephemeral in nature, that public discourse has become 
shallow and devoid of substance, or arguments that there has been little to no overall impact or 
even a negative impact. Regarding civil society in particular, opinions also varied, from 
discussing a civil society that is more developed, a population that is more aware of what is 
happening around them, and the discrediting of traditional institutions such as the state, to 
descriptions of Greek civil society as “trendy” and doubts as to there having been any change or 
tangible effect, while some interviewees were largely unaware of its existence. 
 Hrisos describes a severe disruption of the hegemonic public sphere: “A lot of subjects 
that have been in the frontline of the news have emerged through social media…The media 
sphere has been severely disrupted by the social media and I believe that the corporate media 
will keep losing their power” (personal communication, July 2, 2013). Zenakos describes an 
opening up of the public sphere to more voices: 
It’s obvious that we have taken up some space. We do determine or…affect a part of the 
discussion. How much is an open question…There are people that participate in a 
dialogue…and this dialogue has some relationship to the rise of more progressive 
political ideas in the central political scene. (Personal communication, July 19, 2013) 
 
This expansion, according to Gazi, has given more people the opportunity to be opinion leaders: 
Greeks heavily use the internet, and so the public sphere moved there and there is 
pluralism…the internet was never censored in Greece. With social networks, political and 
social and sociopolitical dialogue moved there, with the result that online personalities 
began to develop which today have the opportunity to influence society…someone can 
now be an opinion leader…The way Greeks receive information has changed. It’s 
spasmodic, sources are not checked anymore, it’s often anonymous, but there is a lot of 
information available…Rhetoric changed, especially the written word. Greeks write a lot 
today, I think more than they ever did before, and we have for the most part all become, 
in some way, content creators. (Personal communication, January 11, 2013) 
 
Karamanolis describes the formation of a parallel public sphere which cannot be ignored: 
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There is a parallel digital public sphere which cannot be overlooked. You cannot make 
correct decisions as a politician if you don’t follow it…One can express themselves 
within this sphere…you did not have this 5 or 6 years ago…You have the opportunity to 
express a political viewpoint and for it to be read by many. This completely alters the 
public sphere. (Personal communication, October 19, 2013) 
 
Arvanitis describes a public sphere that has been reborn: “[Social media]’s influence is 
recognized and is impacting the public sphere which in Greece is being reborn, primarily by 
rupturing the traditional public sphere as we knew it since the fall of the dictatorship” (personal 
communication, July 4, 2013), while Fotinaki adds that “Outside of politics…and some specific 
[radio or television] programs, there was no direct communication…now anyone can express 
their opinion. This is a radical change versus the past” (personal communication, July 5, 2013). 
For Ypopto Mousi, the main impact is that “[p]eople that didn’t have any voice before, now 
do…The existing system didn’t let them…lots of people that wanted to do things [and] 
understood that they can actually do something. They don’t need to wait 3 or 4 years to vote” 
(personal communication, June 27, 2013). Quick describes online discourse as being “more 
authentic,” adding that even with all the noise online and problems with trolling, “I prefer this 
public discourse a thousand times over the non-existent dialogue in Parliament and the media” 
(personal communication, November 14, 2013). 
 Madalena Papadopoulou, president of the youth division of the Independent Greeks 
political party, notes that “in the past three years, due to the crisis…more youth are getting 
involved [in the public sphere]” (personal communication, November 11, 2013). Skarpelos also 
observes the re-involvement of the youth and a process of re-politicization: “[a]fter about 20 
years of the public sphere being apolitical, it has become so again” (personal communication, 
May 29, 2013). Andriotakis adds that even if it is not always used properly, “[t]he biggest change 
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is that citizens have a platform to be heard” (personal communication, May 27, 2013). Tasos 
Oikonomou highlights a transformation which began during the turbulent period of December 
2008 and which was further bolstered by the “Indignants” movement of 2011: “There the public 
sphere began to change. In Greece, with the movement of the ‘Indignants’…such issues began to 
have a more organized presence in the public sphere…After 2008...the public sphere ruptured 
and changed,” comparing this rupture to the historical shift towards a bourgeoisie public sphere 
(personal communication, April 10, 2013), while Boubouka highlights the importance of 
visibility in the online space, stating that “if something is not expressed [online] it will disappear 
from a very dynamic part of the public sphere” (personal communication, May 31, 2013). 
 Several other interviewees detected a split in the public sphere. Masouras notes that the 
online public sphere, as exemplified by Twitter, is unrepresentative of the public sphere at large: 
“[t]he sphere that operates on Twitter isn’t exactly homogenous with the rest of Greek 
society…you see different tendencies, political tendencies in Greek society that aren’t 
represented [in the mainstream].” Masouras further notes that “…mainstream Greek society 
nowadays is anti-austerity, all of it…there’s hardly a segment of the population that…agrees with 
the austerity measures. That’s also the same online. [However], political representation in the 
online sphere isn’t the same as in the offline (personal communication, February 23, 2013). Gazi 
also described the public sphere as being split between pro- and anti-austerity voices, stating that 
“the sharpening of this divide is due to the internet” (personal communication, January 11, 
2013). Skarpelos observes the formation of a secondary, alternative sphere to the political sphere: 
[Outside of the political sphere]…a margin has opened up for discourse between citizens, 
without political parties, in a secondary level that is a semi-public sphere, one which 
allows commenting, decrial, statements of support…and in a time of crisis where due to 
the economic situation very few people can dedicate their time to participate in a protest, 
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or are afraid to participate in public expressions of resistance, [these tools] multiply the 
ability for citizens to share views. Where the “kafeneio” has ceased being a space to meet 
and share political perspectives…where the square, due to clashes with police, has ceased 
operating as a public space…the internet and social media have replaced them, have 
allowed this discourse to shift into this space. (Personal communication, May 29, 2013) 
 
Gounaris, in turn, argues that “what social media have achieved is to transform the formerly 
private sphere into an [alternative] public sphere, open to all” (personal communication, October 
8, 2013), while Panagiotis Oikonomou describes a public sphere as a “televisual democracy” that 
“is operating in lieu of the public,” adding that society is closer to the rhetoric expressed on 
alternative mediums such as Radiobubble (personal communication, February 13, 2013). 
Broumas describes a clash between the old and the new public sphere: “[a]nother kind of public 
sphere [has formed] that collides with the old public sphere of the daily newspapers and the TV 
that’s disintegrating right now (personal communication, July 3, 2013). 
 Oikonomides also describes a split in the public sphere, in adverse terms: 
At this time, I would say that the public sphere in Greece is…under threat…the streets, 
workplaces, unions, public parks…this is exactly what is being threatened…This is what 
is happening, either for political reasons, or because of violence or because people don’t 
talk to each other any more, which is a very big problem. There are no places any more 
for people to meet, that’s a problem. This means that the public sphere is not one, but has 
split into semi-private spheres. And then if you look in the left, which is the part of 
society that I know better, it tends to be split into smaller and smaller and smaller spaces, 
which means that nothing is public any more. It’s all private or semi-private space. 
(Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Meanwhile, Thanos Andritsos highlights the mass media’s reaction to the alternative public 
sphere, noting that pre-crisis may have given some limited coverage to a social movement, but 
are no longer doing so: “the space being provided to such movements in the official media is 
shrinking” (Personal communication, July 23, 2013). 
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 Adamidis argues that online public discourse, despite theoretically allowing many or all 
to participate, has reproduced the level of discourse of the official public sphere: “Social media 
have managed to reproduce the same standards…we see that in Greece public discourse occurs 
without particular standards and indeed with great pathologies” (personal communication, April 
10, 2013). Apostolopoulos also observes such a reproduction, which he connects with a culture 
of clientelism: “There is a mirroring…which is due to the fact that public discourse in Greece is 
characterized by irrationality and is impacted, in my interpretation, by the clientelist system, 
where you feel obliged to defend your side and not the other” (personal communication, May 24, 
2013). Farmakis also notes this reproduction, stating “[t]he medium has changed, but the content 
has not changed. I think it’s the same discussion that was before done in a cafe or in the place of 
work…It’s the same, even the same atmosphere” (personal communication, April 15, 2013). 
 Kounenakis argues that there was a period of change, but that this was ephemeral: 
There is a tremendous change between the years of 2010-2012. These two, three years 
were very active and very intense as I told you, there was a lot of violence in the public 
sphere, a lot of rage, which at this point…what is called “movement” by many people, 
doesn't exist any more or it has died out. It has turned into either passiveness or isolation 
or people trying to survive in these terms, trying to make it through the day, but the 
political involvement has dropped significantly. (Personal communication, June 13, 2017) 
 
Dimitrakopoulou puts forth a similar argument, referencing the ancient Athenian demos: 
The crisis is supposed to have changed the way we define the public sphere….If we take 
into account that the ideal type of democracy has started in Greece, we are somehow 
expecting that this ideal of direct democracy could be evident in modern Greece as well, 
but this was not the case in contemporary Greece…[W]e can see cases where the public 
sphere seems to be more empowered, that citizens are becoming more aware of the public 
issues and public affairs and that they are developing actions against politicians, but I see 
that so far they have been kind of specific cases and not kind of a whole change of 
paradigm” (Personal communication, July 5, 2013) 
 
 268 
Furthermore, Dimitrakopoulou downplays social media’s impact, stating “I’m not one of the 
advocates who say that social media have introduced a revolution. For me, they are more 
empowering tools, but only tools in the hands of people who would be active anyway” (personal 
communication, July 5, 2013). 
 Thanos Tzimeros, president of the “Dimiourgia, Xana!” political party, the volume of 
online information and discourse leaves no time for critical reflection: “A problem for me is that 
social media do not allow time to convert information to knowledge, convert knowledge to 
awareness, and transform awareness to wisdom. We are bombarded with unprocessed 
information and the time to sit and reflect…doesn’t exist” (personal communication, June 5, 
2013). Tasos Anastasiadis, an unemployed journalist formerly with the To Vima newspaper, 
highlights the issue of noise and information overload online: 
…people have the illusion that they have access to information and this is true…but it is 
deceptive. I believe there is a great deal of noise, the amount of information is staggering, 
you have the impression that you can find critical or alternative information. Often it may 
be true information but it’s lost in the noise. (Personal communication, June 6, 2013) 
 
Vasilopoulos adds his view that “public discourse today occurs on the basis of titles, headlines, 
and quotes, with no depth” (personal communication, August 22, 2017), while Christoforidis 
whether this has led to tangible change: “[Social media] provides pluralism despite the noise. 
Has this resulted in a significant change? In my opinion, no…generally the Greek people do not 
have access to a different type of public sphere” (personal communication, May 27, 2013). 
Tolios questions the extent to which there has been an impact, stating: “I am not sure 
if…political dialogue within the public sphere is better than it used to be. It’s more direct…more 
immediate and sometimes it can be…aggressive… I think that Greek society [is] much more 
political than it used to be” (personal communication, February 22, 2017). Krommydas argues 
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that “the public dialogue in Greece [remains] very much behind what we would consider as 
public dialogue in most other European countries” (personal communication, October 16, 2013), 
while Katerina Sitzani, a social media and communications volunteer with the To Potami 
political party, states that there is “no public sphere independent of mass media in Greece” 
(personal communication, November 11, 2014). 
For Mandravelis, a problem is the aggressive nature of online discourse, which has 
replicated offline discourse: “In Greece unfortunately, the idea of dialogue is still a problem. This 
is evident in Parliament, but it is also evident below, in social media” (personal communication, 
June 11, 2013). Apostolos Mangiriadis, a political correspondent with Mega Channel, similarly 
states: “I’m very disappointed by the level of the political dialogue in the social media. I 
wouldn’t say they had an impact…I haven’t seen the mainstream voices yet, being the majority” 
(personal communication, July 23, 2013). Dimitrakopoulou adds that online political dialogue is 
usually “influenced by sentiment and not by political rationale. It’s not based on any form of 
structured deliberation. It’s spontaneous…personal attacks are also very frequent [and] evident. 
I’m not sure that this can lead to an organized development of public dialogue” (personal 
communication, July 5, 2013). In turn, for Aganidis, “[w]hat is most influential after the crisis is 
social media as a means of expressing rage. Pre-crisis it was a means of organizing information, 
participating, of thought and dialogue…anger, indignation and the discrediting of the political 
system have led to logic being crushed” (personal communication, December 16, 2012). 
Turning specifically to civil society, Roumeliotis highlights the important role that civil 
society plays in Greece today. Describing it as an alternative third sector, Roumeliotis argues that 
“Greece is standing on its feet today due to the largest social solidarity movement ever seen in 
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Europe,” which he compares to post-Soviet Russia or to crisis-hit Argentina. Roumeliotis further 
adds that there are “so many groups it’s unbelievable,” and that the mass media has not covered 
this phenomenon (personal communication, April 3, 2014). According to Afouxenidis, today 
there are over 6,500 civil society groups in Greece, though approximately 80 percent of them are 
situated in Athens. Afouxenidis highlighted the proliferation of neighborhood and citizen groups 
in the years of the crisis, as a result of the space created by the major political rupture of this era 
(personal communication, December 16, 2016). Boubouka notes that “while social media 
existed, the crisis had to arrive for people to search for a means of expression, survival, 
collaboration in order to face their challenges…Neighborhood collectives...would have been 
unheard of until recently” (personal communication, May 31, 2013). Zoehrer credits social 
entrepreneurship groups with preventing a political revolt in Greece, stating “it is considered a 
form for Greece…that would foster against an upheaval in the country” (personal 
communication, June 4, 2013). Koskinas adds: “throughout the centuries, [Greek culture has] 
survived by developing community organizations rather than state organizations. And the 
community organizations that we are right now looking at in Greece now…develop in virtuality. 
Communal life in Greece has been almost disappeared” (personal communication, June 6, 2013). 
Koutzoukou focuses on volunteerism. Highlighting the role of social media and 
referencing a survey conducted by HumanGrid, she says the results showed “exactly that there 
has been an increase in volunteerism in recent years in the midst of the crisis” (personal 
communication, February 12, 2014). Foteinou, in turn, argues that Greek society now displays 
less of an individualist nature: “[Greeks] are more sensitive to social issues. That’s what I see, 
civilians are more sensitive…they try to offer something back to society. They don’t care only 
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for themselves, but also for the progress of their society (personal communication, December 14, 
2012). For Konstantopoulou, social media have “strengthened personal relationships,” fostering 
new civil society initiatives (personal communication, February 15, 2013). 
For Vlachos, civil society organizations have been “freed” from a prior mentality where 
“each collective did not believe that it could achieve its objectives in collaboration with other 
communities” (personal communication, November 26, 2013), while for Karamanolis, social 
media “are the primary tool for self-organizing, networking, and transferring experience and best 
practices from one organization to another” (personal communication, October 19, 2013). 
Papastravrou highlights the role of social media in helping people bypass the state: 
“[w]hat we have seen is that the crisis has made the people start to get more interested in what 
was happening around them…as people take things into their own hands instead of waiting for 
them to be solved by the state” (personal communication, April 15, 2013), while Oikonomides 
adds that traditional civil society institutions are also being bypassed: “[t]he traditional civil 
society's structures have failed so badly, people are going for something entirely different 
now…bypassing the traditional structures, not only the state, but also all the traditional structures 
that you would expect to fulfill that role” (personal communication, December 17, 2012). 
Chatzistefanou, however, notes the potential dangers of fully discrediting traditional institutions: 
“I’m afraid that we are losing some experience gathered by trade unions, by political parties. 
People hate these institutions, but unfortunately they throw away also the experience that was 
gathered through many decades” (personal communication, June 26, 2013). 
Panagopoulos differentiates the Greek civil society sphere from that of the associational-
based civil society of United States, pointing out that “[h]ere we have communities around 
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surviving the crisis and everyday life. We don’t have niche groups” (personal communication, 
May 31, 2013), while in the view of Lardikou, this may just be a fad: “I think the crisis built the 
need for [civil society] in a trendy way” (personal communication, February 20, 2013). Masouras 
points out the lingering suspicion in Greece towards NGOs in particular: “[c]ivil society in 
Greece is a controversial topic for many people [because the] NGO sector [has] a bad reputation 
at large…the word NGO by itself causes suspicion” (personal communication, February 23, 
2013). Theodoridis notes that NGOs “had a very negative stigma” and that despite improvements 
in recent years, “the majority…associates MKO negatively,” adding that in many Greeks’ minds, 
civil society is still associated exclusively with volunteering, not a career. Theodoridis further 
states that “[In Greece] we are still far away from even the most modest, low levels of other 
countries…this has to do with people’s attitudes and people's attitudes do not change in such 
important issues overnight” (personal communication, January 27, 2017). Thanos Andritsos 
questions the true impact of social and new media on civil society, asking whether those who are 
being helped (such as migrants) even have internet access (personal communication, July 23, 
2013), while Bakounakis notes that no citizen pressure groups exist “to fight against 
unconstitutional laws” (personal communication, March 8, 2013). 
Finally, perhaps highlighting the divide between the “official” public sphere and the 
citizenry, one final notable observation comes from two professional journalists who admitted 
that they were not very aware of civil society and activity taking place within this sector. 
Mangiriadis stated that “I'm not the right person to answer the question because I haven't been 
following [civil society]” (personal communication, July 23, 2013), while Efimeros said that “I 
have not followed this [civil society] very much” (personal communication, July 18, 2013). 
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Chapter 6: Social and New Media’s Influence on Political and Social 
Movements 
 
6.1 – INTRODUCTION 
 Since the fall of the military dictatorship which governed the country between 1967 and 
1974, the Greek political system has operated as a multi-party parliamentary republic. National 
elections are scheduled every four years—even though snap elections are not an uncommon 
occurrence—for representation in Greece’s unilateral Parliament, which consists of 300 seats that 
are distributed across regional electoral districts. A system of weighed proportionality is used to 
determine the distribution of parliamentary seats, while the first-place party in the elections, 
regardless of percentage, receives a 50 seat parliamentary “bonus.” 
 From the fall of the junta up until the onset of the economic crisis, the two dominant 
political parties in Greece were the center-left PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and the 
center-right “Nea Dimokratia” (New Democracy) party. However, numerous smaller political 
parties existed, and at least one smaller party was always represented in parliament. In recent 
years, however, starting with the onset of the crisis, the incumbent political structure has 
splintered: the shares of New Democracy and especially PASOK have collapsed, while the 
previously marginal SYRIZA (Coalition of the Left and Progress) made rapid gains and won the 
January 2015 and September 2015 snap parliamentary elections, ruling during that period in a 
coalition government with the newly formed populist-right “Anexartitoi Ellines” (Independent 
Greeks) party. Numerous other smaller parties have also managed to enter parliament in recent 
years as the electoral map has increasingly splintered, with two additional smaller parties, LAOS 
(Popular Orthodox Rally) and DIMAR (Democratic Left), each having the opportunity to co-
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govern at separate times as part of broader governing coalitions. There is a 3 percent electoral 
threshold in order for a party to attain parliamentary representation. 
 As of this writing, parliamentary elections were most recently held in September 2015, 
while every five years, elections for the European Parliament, where Greece presently holds 21 
seats, are held. These elections were last held in May of 2014, concurrently with elections for 
local municipalities and regional governments in Greece, also for a five-year term. 
 Recent years, however, have also seen the rise of large-scale political protest movements 
in Greece, as signified by the “Indignants” protests held in central squares of Athens and other 
cities and towns in the spring and summer of 2011, and the ongoing and highly politicized 
activist movement against the controversial gold mining activities in the Skouries region of 
northern Greece. While political protests, demonstrations, and strikes have long been a part of 
the landscape in Greece, the size (in the case of the “Indignants”) and longevity (in the case of 
the Skouries movement) of these protests are unique in Greece’s modern history. 
 In this chapter, the influence and impact of social and new media on political and social 
movements in Greece during the 2011-2017 time period will be analyzed. This analysis will 
examine the ways in which social and new media may have contributed to political change, 
changes in political behavior, or the formation of new political movements in Greece, how public 
institutions have employed social and new media to engage with the public, and how social and 
new media potentially contributed to the formation or growth of protests and activism 
surrounding various causes in Greece. This will be accomplished through a focus on one of the 
five illustrative examples of this study, the Independent Greeks political party, as well as an 
examination of social media use by other political parties, including Greece’s major parties as 
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well as smaller and newly-formed political parties and movements. The impact of social and new 
media on electoral contests will also be examined, as well as examples from the implementation 
of social and new media tools by government ministries, municipalities, and upstart political 
movements. Turning to social movements, the “Indignants” protest and Skouries movement and 
their usage of social and new media tools will be examined in detail. Results from the electronic 
survey questionnaire pertaining to both political and social movements will be presented and 
analyzed, followed by a discussion of the overall impact of social and new media upon such 
movements. This analysis will directly correspond to RQ2 and subquestions 1 and 2 of this 
research project. 
6.2 – ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: THE INDEPENDENT GREEKS POLITICAL PARTY 
6.2.1 – Introduction 
 
 In a word, the “Anexartitoi Ellines” (Independent Greeks) can be described as a 
phenomenon, one that was directly borne out of the economic crisis. Founded in February 2012, 
the Independent Greeks have developed a reputation in Greece of being “the party of Facebook,” 
as the party announced its launch via this particular social medium and conducted many of its 
early public deliberations via this platform as well. 
 Panos Kammenos, president of the Independent Greeks, referred to the Independent 
Greeks as “a popular movement, not a political party” (personal communication, October 11, 
2013). Within months of its establishment, it attained electoral shares of 10.61 percent and 7.51 
percent in the parliamentary elections of May and June 2012, respectively.27 Since January 2015, 
the Independent Greeks have been the minority governing partner in a coalition with SYRIZA. 
 
                                               
27 See http://ekloges.ypes.gr. 
 276 
6.2.2 – Establishment 
 
 Kammenos stated that the establishment of the Independent Greeks can be attributed 
entirely to social media, and described the party’s early activities using these mediums: 
The founding of this movement and its visibility and sustentation are exclusively due to 
social media and will remain so…I often hold referendums, even for candidates [via 
social media], the whole movement was built via social media and the party’s platform 
was developed with public deliberations which took place on Facebook. I can say that 
over 35,000 people participated from the first moment and that almost the entire platform 
of the party was developed by people whom we do not even know. 100 percent is due to 
social media and we were the first movement in Europe that was developed using these 
tools. (Personal communication, October 11, 2013). 
 
Kammenos further stated that it was citizens communicating with him via social media who 
convinced him to start his own political party, after being a member of parliament with the New 
Democracy party for 21 years: “The citizens with whom I had a dialogue on Facebook were 
those who motivated me to develop this movement, and that’s how it was born” (personal 
communication, October 11, 2013). Ioannis Moiras, secretary of the department of political 
strategy for the Independent Greeks, further explained how Kammenos launched the party: 
Kammenos was very deeply involved himself in social media, with an…extremely 
popular Facebook page and…a frequent and very keen Twitter user…as a member of 
parliament, he already had a wide circle of friends and co-users…within the world of 
social media…He announced his decision to go against the existing political system and 
vote against the memorandum and he found not only wide popular support through social 
media, but also a huge massive claim for something new, for a political party that would 
actually vote and stand against…the memorandum…This political movement started 
from the social media with a direct involvement of 200,000 users, who sent some very 
serious input regarding the political manifesto of the party and the whole effort for its 
establishment…through e-mails, Facebook, direct messages on Twitter…something that 
had never happened in this country before. (Personal communication, February 15, 2013) 
 
Vasilis Syriopoulos, a communications adviser with the Independent Greeks, provided additional 
insight into the online deliberation which took place: “The public deliberation was based on our 
founding manifesto…which supported certain specific positions…the proposals we received had 
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to be compatible with it” (personal communication, October 13, 2013). Communications adviser 
Katerina Tsatsaroni, in turn, stated that Kammenos “wanted to come in direct contact with the 
citizens. The only way to do this…was via social media. There is no better way” (personal 
communication, October 13, 2013). Syriopoulos added that “this was the first time in Greek 
history that the president of a party came in direct contact with the public on a daily basis” 
(personal communication, October 13, 2013). 
 Tsatsaroni also mentioned that in the early days of the party, the Independent Greeks 
recruited candidates via social media: 
The selection of parliamentary candidates occurred through an invitation sent out via 
social media. Ordinary citizens sent us résumés, came to our offices, and were selected as 
candidates by a committee…most of our members of parliament right now do not stem 
from political backgrounds…most were professors, lawyers, ordinary citizens. (Personal 
communication, October 13, 2013) 
 
Rachel Makri, then a member of parliament with the Independent Greeks, explains how she 
came into contact with Kammenos prior to the formation of the party, and how she was invited to 
declare her candidacy for Parliament via social media: 
I heard a speech of Mr. Kammenos’ after he resigned from New Democracy…that led me 
to look for him on social media, I became his friend on Facebook, and together with 
others we contacted him, exchanging our views and concerns, and we asked him to 
establish a party. He was reluctant at first but he later formed this party…Kammenos’ 
idea was to select young people who were not connected to politics…but he also 
developed a team of older parliamentarians who had voted down the memorandum… 
when the ballots were being prepared and because in Greece 30 percent of your 
candidates must be female and because the party was having difficulty filling out its lists 
of candidates, I was invited by Kammenos’ advisers to contribute, to become a candidate 
from my district [Kozani]. I ended up campaigning on my own exclusively via social 
media, with no office, no budget or anything else, coming into contact with the public 
only via the internet” (Personal communication, November 12, 2013) 
 
Regarding the public deliberation and selection of candidates, Terrence Quick, a member of 
parliament with the Independent Greeks and the party’s press representative, stated: 
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We used social media, Twitter and Facebook and also blogs, to discover who would be 
interested in running as a candidate with us, as well as how we would organize, how we 
would develop our first volunteer organizations and local chapters in the periphery…We 
posted our platform online for deliberation. We posted the names of our parliamentary 
candidates online to gauge local reaction. We all passed through a process of public 
deliberation. (Personal communication, November 14, 2013). 
 
According to Dimitris Yalourakis, a social media volunteer with the Independent Greeks, it was 
“an order from [Kammenos], that he wanted the public to participate…to contribute to the 
development of our platform and proposals…We took all these [proposals] and inserted them 
into our political platform…developing our final pre-election proposal,” further noting that the 
party attempted to reflect the way the average Greek was thinking. Significantly, Yalourakis also 
added that the party’s social media presence was influenced by the protests of the “Indignants”: 
“The Independent Greeks were developed with the same model which was developed for the 
squares” (Personal communication, December 15, 2012). 
 Moiras noted that the Independent Greeks were also influenced by political developments 
in the United States: “It’s necessary to confess that we stole experience and ideas and 
background from America, from the Barack Obama campaign” (personal communication, 
February 15, 2013), while Yalourakis added that aside from the Obama campaign, there were 
also strong influences from Germany’s SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) and 
Scandinavian parties (personal communication, December 15, 2012). 
 Notably, Tsatsaroni, now the press representative for the Independent Greeks and for 
Kammenos, who is now Greece’s Minster of Defense and who has worked with Kammenos 
since 2000, indicated that the party’s use of Facebook during its inception was part of a broader 
communications strategy: “Things are not as simple as people believe…from 2000 we’ve had a 
specific strategy…and in November 2011, we developed our new strategy with Kammenos as 
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the protagonist on social media and especially Facebook, and we were active around the yes-no 
issue,” referencing the heated memorandum versus anti-memorandum divide at that time 
(personal communication, March 6, 2017). 
 The initial social media efforts of the Independent Greeks caught the notice of other 
interviewees for this study. Baganis noted that with the contribution of social media tools, the 
Independent Greeks “were founded within 10-15 days” (personal communication, December 19, 
2012), while Batzoglou highlighted the Independent Greeks as “the most characteristic example 
of a party which attained electoral success…without a budget…starting from zero and utilizing 
new media” (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
6.2.3 – Entering Parliament 
 
 Moiras states that the participation of the public via social media was vital for getting the 
Independent Greeks voted into Parliament: 
…this movement became very massive because of the participation of so many users and 
the direct communication with the president…We increased our impact on young crowds 
and you can find that in the analysis of the election result and in all the surveys that we 
have been examining for the last ten months…you become more familiar, more friendly, 
more close to the people, especially young ages, so it really was a pivotal point for our 
electoral success, the use of social media, because getting 10 percent the first elections 
was really surprising and magnificent a result for a new party. Let me point out that the 
Communist Party of Greece, has been operating for…almost a century, right? They never 
had the chance, or succeeded to catch such a percentage of 10 percent. So it was a 
surprising result and a magnificent result, and social media really played a very serious 
role. (Personal communication, February 15, 2013) 
 
Alcestis Baboussi, director of social media for the Independent Greeks, stated that “without 
social media, what we accomplished in two months would never have been possible. [Social 
media] are our alpha and omega” (personal communication, December 15, 2012). 
 280 
Makri noted that, as a result of utilizing social media exclusively for the 2012 elections, 
“[t]here was no access from older people who did not use [social media]…but to a large extent, 
young people used social media and discovered me there” (personal communication, November 
12, 2013). Syriopoulos noted that the party receives many messages each day from individuals 
who are not technologically savvy, but who created social media accounts to communicate with 
the party (personal communication, October 13, 2013), while Kammenos shared his experience 
from a visit to an isolated village in the Greek region of Evros, where in a “kafeneio” he 
encountered an elderly man who stated he had heard of Kammenos from YouTube, describing 
how his “grandson brings his laptop and connects it to the television set in the kafeneio and plays 
the videos” Kammenos posts (personal communication, October 11, 2013). 
Finally, Syriopoulos emphasized that the party did not have a communications team set 
up during the period of the May and June 2012 elections, with volunteers handling these 
responsibilities (personal communication, October 13, 2013). 
6.2.4 – Usage of Social Media 
 
 Yalourakis described the difference between the way the Independent Greeks utilize 
social media, compared to other parties: “For our party, social media listen. For other parties, 
social media speak. That’s the key difference” (personal communication, December 15, 2012). 
Makri, accordingly, described the party’s utilization of social media in the following terms: 
…we are the party that truly uses social media, as the other parties have not organized 
their social media presence. We even have a social media department…organizationally I 
have not seen this in any other party. I’ve seen social media usage only on a personal 
level, by the members of parliament and personnel themselves, but not so much by the 
parties. We publish everything online, even our new party platform which we announced 
a few days ago was posted online… (Personal communication, November 12, 2013) 
 
Kammenos described the manner in which he uses social media tools as the party’s leader: 
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I personally respond via Twitter and Facebook to all our voters, I post items before they 
are officially announced by the party. I am the only administrator. No one else has access 
to my account on Facebook and Twitter. I do not use communications experts, they have 
no place in my postings on Facebook and Twitter. I respond personally to the citizens and 
am available 24 hours per day. [My phone] is next to me even when I sleep and I attempt 
to be perpetually in contact with the citizens…My postings are often not politically 
correct, I post videos, some songs or photographs…this is not the usual style of 
communication for a political leader of an elected party, but I remain who I was before 
the party was born and that is how I will remain. This is often misunderstood by Greek 
society, which is a little conservative. (Personal communication, October 11, 2013) 
 
Makri, in noting her own social media use, emphasized that she is not a career politician: 
 
I will say that I personally administer my [social media] accounts myself. I attempt to 
respond to all of the messages I receive from citizens, to read them all, and I have 
introduced many issues in Parliament…even from individuals who are not from my 
electoral district but who contacted me…I am not a professional politician…I was an 
ordinary citizen…Therefore I would not like somebody else to [post on social media] for 
me, as I consider it an expression of my own thoughts towards others, a personal 
communication and contact with how the citizen thinks and how I communicate. 
(Personal communication, November 12, 2013) 
 
Makri further noted that she uses Twitter more than Facebook, with the bulk of the material she 
posts consisting of press releases and announcements, though there were occasions where she 
would respond to other politicians, citing an exchange she had on the day of this interview with 
the outspoken then-government minister Adonis Georgiadis (personal communication, 
November 12, 2013). Conversely, Quick, who has a journalistic background stated that he writes 
his own press releases and authors his own tweets, but prefers face-to-face contact with the 
public: “I use Twitter only to post my announcements, my press releases. I do not use it to 
engage in dialogue with the public. I assure you that I prefer to have a more constructive 
dialogue on the street” (personal communication, November 14, 2013). Syriopoulos noted that at 
the time the party first entered parliament, none of its elected representatives “were informed as 
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to how to utilize social media, so we took on the task of training them” (personal 
communication, October 13, 2013). 
 Kammenos stated that the party “will continue to communicate with the citizens…and the 
citizens with us, deciding together the party’s positions and policies via the social media, which 
will continue at a level of importance of over 90 percent [for the party].” Kammenos added that 
“[w]e will not turn to traditional media and we will try to implement direct democracy via 
communication with the citizens” (personal communication, October 11, 2013). 
 Papadopoulou described how the party’s youth department utilizes social media, 
including Facebook, Twitter, and a blog. She noted that in comparison with the New Democracy 
youth wing (ONNED) or the Community Party Youth (KNE), the Independent Greeks aim to 
utilize social media “not just for sloganeering and exhortations but to make an argument” 
(personal communication, November 11, 2013). 
 Regarding the party’s structure with regard to operating its social media presence, Moiras 
stated that “[h]aving no money, we try to be competitive in regards with other parties, and we do 
that practically with volunteers,” while adding that the party’s social media posts are unmediated: 
“[w]e don’t use to impose any kind of strict rules or tactics upon our members or even 
executives. We really prefer to be very sincere and very direct when we use our social media” 
(Personal communication, February 15, 2013). According to Yalourakis, as of late 2012 there 
were five people officially on the party’s social media team, in addition to volunteers and 
members of the party’s youth, adding that “there’s no specific methodology” employed with 
regard to the social media presence of the Independent Greeks. Yalourakis further added that 
following the 2012 elections, the party’s website was deemphasized in relation to their social 
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media accounts, stating: “[w]e want the website to plainly be the source of information for the 
party organs, meaning the press releases from each department, from the president, from the 
members of parliament” (personal communication, December 15, 2012). 
 Tsatsaroni agreed that social media played an immense role in the electoral success of the 
Independent Greeks, but said that (as of 2013) there were plans to better organize the party’s 
social media presence, warning that “going forward, they could be catastrophic, if you cannot 
place social media within a context, a structure, and assign roles and an objective to each page. 
[If this doesn’t happen] then it will become a ‘kafeneio’ [in the negative connotation of the 
term]” (personal communication, October 13, 2013). 
 Reactions from other interviewees regarding the social media presence of the 
Independent Greeks were also notable. Mangiriadis (personal communication, July 23, 2013) and 
Farmakis (personal communication, April 15, 2013) mentioned the party’s effective use of social 
media tools, while Karvounopoulos cited Kammenos as the politician who “best understood” the 
potential of social media (personal communication, June 28, 2013). Conversely, Krommydas 
expressed the view that the populist rhetoric of the Independent Greeks is “much more easy to 
disseminate through social media” (personal communication, October 16, 2013), while 
Heimonas described the online rhetoric of the Independent Greeks as “based on conspiracy 
theory” (personal communication, February 15, 2013). In turn, Safioleas cited Kammenos’ often 
bombastic nature as a possible factor for his success: “Perhaps the medium, because by 
definition it allows easily for a motto, for a scream, less for a discussion, it avails itself more to 
people like him” (personal communication, July 10, 2013). 
 284 
 One final noteworthy observation comes from the party’s handling of an internal crisis in 
January 2013, following the sudden resignation of several members of parliament and members. 
According to Baboussi, in contrast with the significant and often sensational coverage of the 
mainstream media regarding this issue, the party, via its social media platforms, “handled the 
situation in a low-key way,” stating that articles were released unofficially to blogs and to 
Facebook pages friendly to the party, but that the party itself made no social media postings 
about the issue other than its official press release (personal communication, January 24, 2013). 
6.2.5 – Impact and Importance of Social Media 
 
For Kammenos, one of the most significant ways in which social media impacted the 
Independent Greeks was by delivering the youth vote. As stated by Kammenos, “if you examine 
the qualitative analysis [of our voters], 90 percent are between 18-44 years of age, while our 
shares for voters over the age of 65 are in the single digits” (personal communication, October 
11, 2013). Papadopoulou noted that this demographic profile is reflected in the party’s leadership 
ranks, “where even in organizational committees of the party there are people below the age of 
30” (personal communication, November 11, 2013). Kammenos further noted that “out of our 
elected members of parliament, I was introduced to 90 percent of them through Facebook. I did 
not know them beforehand” (personal communication, October 11, 2013). 
Kammenos noted that the party’s emphasis on social media is in contrast to its stance 
towards traditional media outlets: “we are totally isolated, by our own choice, from all the 
newspapers. We have no access to any newspaper, other than sending press releases,” adding that 
the ESR had penalized major Greek television stations for not providing airtime to the 
Independent Greeks as a parliamentary party (personal communication, October 11, 2013). 
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According to Yalourakis, Greece’s major television stations “are under ‘orders’ in order to 
not provide any coverage of the Independent Greeks,” describing the impact on the party as “a 
major problem…especially how to communicate to those over the age of 50” (personal 
communication, December 15, 2012). Tsatsaroni added that “very few [television stations] give 
us airtime, and when they do, their coverage is negative. Therefore for us [social media] are a 
necessity” (personal communication, October 13, 2013). 
In response to this media blackout, Yalourakis stated that plans were in the works on the 
part of the party to develop an online television presence: “our only solution is web TV. That’s 
the most important initiative we are working on right now…,” while mentioning that the party 
also was planning to launch an e-magazine (personal communication, December 15, 2012). 
Baboussi added that the party planned to bolster its Twitter presence, which in contrast to the 
fiery rhetoric of Kammenos’ personal account, was mundane, containing mostly press releases.” 
Baboussi also stated that for the party’s upcoming congress, a social media platform would be 
developed in order for members to submit ideas and proposals (personal communication, 
December 15, 2012). Moiras further clarified this, stating the party’s readiness “to elect some 
congress members through this platform” (personal communication, February 15, 2013). Finally, 
Yalourakis stated that the party’s use of social media will not change even if it enters government 
(personal communication, November 2, 2013). 
6.2.6 – 2017 Follow-up 
 
 Some interesting contrasts are evident in the manner in which the Independent Greeks 
political party utilized social media as of 2017, as compared to the 2012-2013 time period.  
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 According to Tsatsaroni, the party’s high level members, including Panos Kammenos, 
continue to use their own Twitter accounts, but the party’s official Twitter account defunct: “[w]e 
usually use Twitter in a satiric way, in a way to answer to New Democracy and other parties. We 
don’t use it actually, we don’t have a strategy on Twitter. Our strategy is, we have to answer. 
That’s it.” As stated by Tsatsaroni, this limited use of Twitter was due to a lack of resources: 
“[i]t’s a matter of having the resources to have such a Twitter account…you need a huge team 
actually…to have a strategy and to implement this to Twitter, so it’s almost impossible.” 
Tsatsaroni added that the party’s official Facebook page remained active, and that each 
regional coordinating body had its own Facebook page as well. Communication online was, 
according to Tsatsaroni, connected to “communication strategy pillars…the main…pillar that we 
have is anti-corruption…to reveal the scandals, to change the whole system with transparent 
procedures.” Notably, Tsatsaroni also mentioned the party’s relationship with unofficial blogs: 
“Like every other party in Greece, we have blogs. Not blogs of Independent Greeks, but blogs 
that support the Independent Greeks…As you realize, I can’t tell you the names of the blogs.” In 
addition, Tsatsaroni mentioned the party’s strong presence on YouTube, while one similarity with 
2013 was the official website’s continued use as a bulletin board of press releases and party 
announcements. Tsatsaroni mentioned that the party now operated with approximately 100 
people working on its social media presence, but that only two individuals, Kammenos and 
herself, were responsible for strategy (personal communication, March 6, 2017). 
Tsatsaroni noted a certain “division of labor” amongst party personnel with regard to 
their social media postings, where different members of the party and parliamentary 
representatives tweet about specific topics, such as one MP (Dimitris Kammenos) tweeting about 
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religious issues. Tsatsaroni also described the party’s careful stance towards governing partner 
SYRIZA, responding on social media “only if the party’s ideology is attacked…we will never 
come out firing first against SYRIZA however” (personal communication, March 6, 2017). 
The Independent Greeks openly campaigned as an anti-memorandum party in 2012, but 
quite ironically, according to Tsatsaroni this strategy changed in both the January and September 
2015 elections to a message portraying the Independent Greeks as the party that “can implement 
them in the fairest possible way,” while attacking the New Democracy party for corruption and 
emphasizing the weaknesses of SYRIZA. Tsatsaroni mentioned that the same public relations 
company was hired to handle the party’s television and social media campaign for both of the 
electoral contests in 2015, campaigning as the “moderating force” of the electoral system in 
January 2015, and stressing the need for an “experienced” party such as the Independent Greeks 
to be in Parliament, in the September 2015 campaign, while emphasizing the party’s key 
platform issues, including taxation and religion (personal communication, March 6, 2017). 
Perhaps the most notable statement of all, however, came in relation to a question posed 
about the party’s interaction with the public via social media, a key aspect of the party’s early 
web presence. Tsatsaroni stated: “[w]hoever tells you that there is an organized dialogue on the 
part of any party with the citizens is lying” (personal communication, March 6, 2017). 
6.3 – ELECTORAL CONTESTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
 Aside from the meteoric electoral rise of the Independent Greeks political party, social 
and new media could be said to have played an important role for at least some of the parties 
which have participated in elections dating back to at least 2009, at a local and national level, 
and also for the European parliamentary elections of 2014. 
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 Though these two electoral contests occurred before the 2011-2017 that this study has 
focused on, the 2009 national parliamentary elections and the 2010 local elections are notable, as 
they provide early examples of social media usage and implementation which became more 
common after 2010. The 2009 elections, as noted in chapter 5, were won by PASOK under the 
leadership of Giorgos Papandreou, and a major plank in the party’s electoral platform was 
transparency and e-governance. This emphasis was evident in PASOK’s campaign as well. As 
stated by Papachatzis, the party organized an online discussion with citizens in 2009, which in 
2012 moved to enikos.gr. Also in 2009, an online debate between various experts was also 
organized by PASOK, one which in later years moved to the protagon.gr news and opinion 
portal, and then to Google Hangouts (personal communication, October 12, 2013). Quick feels 
that social media “was one of the basic reasons why Papandreou grabbed the vote of the Greek 
people in 2009” (personal communication, November 14, 2013). 
 Social media were said to have played a direct role in the outcome of the 2010 mayoral 
elections in Athens. According to Gazi, Giorgos Kaminis was able to defeat his opponent Nikitas 
Kaklamanis, who was favored, due to a communications gaffe on the part of Kaklamanis which 
social media users at the time picked up on. Despite little mainstream media attention, the gaffe 
went viral on Facebook and Twitter in the week prior to the elections, overturning the result in 
Gazi’s view (personal communication, January 11, 2013). 
 It is the 2012 national parliamentary elections, however, which could be said to have 
been the first elections where social media began to play a leading role for many of the parties 
which were participating, including the aforementioned Independent Greeks. According to Iliadi, 
 289 
the 2012 electoral contest was where many politicians began using social media as a campaign 
tool for the first time, but perhaps not with the intended results: 
Many began campaigning [on social media] believing [it would help] or doing so because 
they had been told that there were a lot of potential voters on social media, and they 
began a dialogue with the public. But many fell into a trap. They were used to talking 
without receiving a reply…when they started receiving responses, they began arguing, 
banning, blocking, and this was not good for public discourse. To ban someone means 
you don’t have an argument to make. (Personal communication, May 26, 2013) 
 
For Quick, the most significant impact of social media on the 2012 elections involved young 
people, stating: “I believe that in [the 2012 elections] social media helped the promotion of 
young and middle-aged candidates from all parties and backgrounds” (personal communication, 
November 14, 2013), while Fotinaki attributed the impact of social media during the 2012 
electoral season to the growth of online discourse: “…more and more people are…expressing 
themselves online, and one person influences the other. Most people have a specific perspective 
they express online, and if I come in and read everything, there’s a good chance I will be affected 
or swayed” (personal communication, July 5, 2013). 
 Zenakos highlights the potential impact of the digital divide and possible differences in 
how people with internet access voted in 2012, compared to those who were not online: 
If you look at the qualitative analysis of the results…you would see that the so-called 
anti-memorandum parties and particularly SYRIZA had a majority in urban areas, mostly 
younger generations, mostly well-educated people, and mostly either public- or private-
sector employees. Private sector voted SYRIZA by majority, basically people that you 
would probably describe as more active in their everyday pursuit of news and political 
expression. New Democracy on the other hand was voted overwhelmingly in rural areas, 
older ages, farmers and…housewives. There is a correlation here. You can’t quantify it, 
but it stands to reason that those people in rural areas, of a lower educational standard or 
self-described housewives, are mostly informed from TV. It would again stand to reason 
that a person who works in an office, probably works at a computer, probably has access 
online…In some social groups, the pressure of social media was felt, and you can see this 
because traditional media were overwhelmingly pro-memorandum, pro-government to a 
scandalous degree, yet you had all these people that somehow got their information, 
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somehow SYRIZA got the message out, so there has to be a mechanism for that…We 
can’t quantify it, but that’s probably it. (Personal communication, July 19, 2013) 
 
Kapi also cast light on this potential digital divide, highlighting the results of a survey conducted 
prior to the June 2012 elections, where approximately 80 percent claimed that they had not gone 
online to read the campaign platforms of any party (personal communication, June 3, 2013). 
 In looking at the performance of specific parties, Adamidis highlighted the efforts of New 
Democracy, which “attempted to do a lot of work with new media in the last elections with 
dubious results, while smaller parties for some reason, perhaps due to the sense they are 
excluded…were more successful in spreading their message via new media” (personal 
communication, April 10, 2013). In the opinion of Tasos Oikonomou, the economic crisis, the 
subsequent anger felt by many citizens, and the closure of many publications led much of the 
public to go online. Parties that had the best presence on social media were, therefore, those 
which benefited the most in the 2012 elections, naming the Independent Greeks, SYRIZA, and 
Golden Dawn in particular (personal communication, April 10, 2013). These same three parties 
were the biggest electoral beneficiaries according to Heimonas, but for a more indirect reason. 
As stated by Heimonas: “the internet played a major role, not so much during the election period 
but previously, via the development of the so-called ‘anti-memorandum bloc.’…I believe it was 
responsible for the strong numbers received by SYRIZA…Golden Dawn and the Independent 
Greeks” (personal communication, February 15, 2013). Specifically looking at Golden Dawn, 
Dimitrakopoulou argued that despite their weak official online presence, “they are very effective 
in spreading their views and in using mirror sites for reposting what they post online.” In 
addition, Dimitrakopoulou argues that a media blackout of Golden Dawn prior to the May 2012 
polls may have also helped the party: 
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In the first elections of 2012, the Golden Dawn members didn’t appear in any media, 
either traditional or online, so no one knew who these people were, what they looked like, 
the traditional media excluded them from the political debates, especially on television. 
After the results of the first elections, there was a growing debate that how could Golden 
Dawn get that high a percentage in the elections, and many people…blamed their lack of 
presence in the media for their high percentage. (Personal communication, July 5, 2013) 
 
 For others, the results of the 2012 elections were most notable for the success of small 
political parties. Notably, in the May 2012 elections in particular, 19.02 percent of the total vote 
was received by extraparliamentary parties, a higher percentage than the first place party, New 
Democracy, which received 18.85 percent.28 According to Psara, social media played a major 
role “in the visibility of smaller parties…due to the intense doubts towards the political system in 
the past three years [of the crisis]” (personal communication, November 11, 2013). 
Antri Constantinou, a social media and communications volunteer with the To Potami 
political party, also noted the example of the “Drasi” (“Action”) political party and the potential 
“magnifier effect” of the social media. In her words: “[Drasi] in 2012 which had a huge presence 
on the internet. If you were going online you would think that it would do well in the elections. 
In the end it received one percent” (personal communication, November 11, 2014). 
 Electoral contests in 2014 and 2015 seem to have been marked by the popularity of 
online question-and-answer sessions, primarily via the Twitter platform. In the 2014 mayoral 
elections in Athens, upstart candidate Gabriel Sakellaridis, supported at the time by SYRIZA, 
organized a live Twitter interview via his profile, @gabriel_athens (“Sizitisi,” 2014). Though 
Sakellaridis did not win, was said to have been aided by his strong social media presence. 
 Leading up to the 2015 national parliamentary elections, Alexis Tsipras, leader of the 
then-opposition SYRIZA party which was favored to win, organized a live question-and-answer 
                                               
28 See http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012a/public/index.html 
#{%22cls%22:%22level%22,%22params%22:{%22level%22:%22epik%22,%22id%22:1}} 
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session via Twitter, utilizing the #asktsipras hashtag. This session was moderated by several 
prominent Greek Twitter users at the time (SYRIZA, 2015). This interview session was so 
popular that it was the third most popular “trend” on Twitter on that day, with approximately 
32,000 tweets in total (January 14, 2015) (“Oxi na allaxoume hora,” 2015). Prior to the 
September 15 snap national parliamentary elections, other parties followed SYRIZA’s example, 
organizing Twitter interviews of their own, including the To Potami political party, using the 
#askstavros hashtag named after party leader Stavros Theodorakis, and ANTARSYA, via the 
#ask_antarsya hashtag, which trended first on the Greek Twittersphere on September 14, 2015.29 
6.4 – IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES 
6.4.1 – New Democracy 
  
New Democracy, the majority governing partner in the coalition government which was 
in power in Greece between June 2012 and December 2014, was not viewed particularly 
positively by most interviewees in relation to its social media use. A general consensus seemed to 
exist that New Democracy did make efforts to build up its social media presence, but without the 
expected results. Dourou described New Democracy’s usage of social media as such: 
The way New Democracy approaches social media is so instrumentalized that very 
quickly many citizens who would have wished to be informed via these accounts were 
turned off, just as they were turned off by many privately-owned [television and radio] 
upon discovering that they don’t represent news but specific interests. (Personal 
communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
Kyriaki Petriti, DIMAR’s press officer, cited demographics for New Democracy’s perceived lack 
of social media success: “New Democracy is making an attempt but I don’t know how successful 
it is, because New Democracy has older voters” (personal communication, October 7, 2013). 





Among more successful aspects of New Democracy’s social and new media presence, 
Farmakis indicated that blogs may be an area of online success for New Democracy: “New 
Democracy relied more on the blogosphere. They have a network of associated bloggers and so 
they distribute blog posts. So it’s a party that uses that in a different way, depending on their 
target group” (personal communication, April 15, 2013). Kranidiotis, who had previously been a 
candidate with New Democracy and who advised Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, chose to 
speak in generalities about the party’s social media presence, stating that “there are always 
interventions and organized responses on the social media on the part of the Prime Minister’s 
press office and the party and the government” (personal communication, December 6, 2013). 
Adopting an entirely different view, Thanos Andritsos described New Democracy’s 
online rhetoric in highly negative terms: 
I believe that this government in particular is a very extreme right-wing government, and 
the methods that it uses online in its official rhetoric…resembles the rhetoric of the right 
in Greece during the civil war. It is extremely anti-leftist, anti-communist, anti-worker, it 
uses unprecedented lies and defamation…it is strongly based on distortions and on 
flirting with the most extremist, racist, sexist, nationalist viewpoints which exist within 
Greek society. (Personal communication, July 23, 2013) 
 
Much of the blame for such rhetoric was ascribed to New Democracy’s so-called “Omada 
Alitheias” (“Truth Team”), an anonymous online group of internet users which intervened in 
discussions on Twitter, Facebook, and elsewhere, promoting New Democracy’s positions. 
Kranidiotis once again spoke in generalities regarding the “Truth Team” and its effectiveness: 
[Such teams] exist in all parties from what I know, there are organized teams which track 
social media and intervene…this is true for all, not just the government. If you ask me to 
evaluate it…I would say that the attacks [New Democracy] receives are such that you 
would need a whole army to deal with it… (Personal communication, December 6, 2013) 
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Vaxevanis shared the view that all political parties operated similar teams, before focusing on 
New Democracy’s “Truth Team,” and its alleged leader, Giorgos Mouroutis, a close adviser of 
then-Prime Minister Antonis Samaras: 
The “Truth Team” of Mouroutis is indeed an example…other parties have such 
teams…but since we are talking about the “Truth Team,” this is a team of young people 
from DAP [New Democracy youth organization], hiding behind an avatar and pretending 
to be ordinary citizens. The problem isn’t that they disagree with you or restore the 
“truth”…They are profane towards the writer…they attempt to diminish his credibility. 
The “Truth Team” is a profanity team. (Personal communication, March 6, 2013) 
 
For Chatzistefanou, efforts such as the “Truth Team” exposed the weaknesses of these parties: 
…it didn't help them. In a way, it showed some small weaknesses of some politicians, 
because of the way that they have to react immediately, without being able to ask for 
support from professionals, they just enter and reply and you see how stupid they are, or 
how aggressive they might be…You have the example of the press officer of Prime 
Minister Samaras, George Mouroutis, who is replying to everything in a way that could 
be my nephew, a 10 year old boy…and you say, before that you couldn’t expect that a 
guy like that would be in such a serious position within the government. So in a way, it 
shows some weaknesses. (Personal communication, June 26, 2013) 
 
Many interviewees, however, highlighted Adonis Georgiadis, at the time a government minister 
with New Democracy, as a highly effective Twitter user, despite his often controversial nature. 
Zenakos, responding to a common perception that the Greek Twittersphere is dominated by the 
left, stated: “As a counterargument, you get some of the most active Twitter users people like 
Adonis Georgiadis for example, who is perhaps one of the most competent Twitter users that I’ve 
seen. He's completely on the right” (personal communication, July 19, 2013). Finally, Boubouka 
cited Georgiadis as an example of increased sophistication in social media use: 
You see Adonis Georgiadis…who lives and breathes Twitter, two years ago he was like 
every last person on the far-right, tweeting silly things in all-caps, whatever he discussed 
in ‘kafeneia’ with various types…and suddenly now he tweets in such a way that you 




6.4.2 – SYRIZA 
 Long before the 2015 elections where SYRIZA rose to power, and well before the 
success of #asktsipras, SYRIZA had begun to develop a reputation of a party that was both 
youth-oriented and friendly towards social media and new communications technologies. In 
January 2008, when Tsipras was a candidate for the leadership of the party, which was still 
known then as “Synaspismos,” an online interview was organized with prominent bloggers, 
which was live streamed and posted on YouTube and blip.tv.30 This was followed by another 
online interview with well-known bloggers in 2011.31 These videos could be said to have boosted 
Tsipras’ image as a youthful leader who was tuned in to social media and new technology.  
Vlachos agrees with the view that SYRIZA’s message was successful with young voters, stating 
“SYRIZA had an excellent online campaign and drew the attention of the youth, who would have 
voted for them anyway, but when they see something dynamic and fresh they gravitate towards 
it” (personal communication, November 26, 2013). 
 Moiras cited SYRIZA as having the biggest social media presence at the time of the 2012 
elections and afterwards, other than the Independent Greeks (personal communication, February 
15, 2013), and this seems to have been the case prior to the 2014 and 2015 elections as well. 
Referencing SYRIZA’s online interviews, Tolios, who was then a member of SYRIZA, states: 
In my opinion, it was really smart to present Tsipras, and in the European elections of 
2014 or the municipal and the local administration elections of 2014, to present the 
respective leaders, Tsipras or Gabriel Sakellaridis in Athens, or [Rena] Dourou, and 
expose them in open social media dialogue through Twitter. This was a really effective 
strategy, not because it actually creates a…strong political dialogue with solid arguments, 
but rather because of its symbolic value, that “I am a candidate, I am not afraid of 
anything, I am not afraid of exposure, and here I am answering all of your questions.” 
And I think that this had really good feedback. I think that artistically speaking, the 
                                               
30 See http://www.mediafire.com/download/o9tdbz43wa1ldrq/o+alexis+tsipras+stous+bloggers.mp3. 
31 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3OvDzhDLeEU. 
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presentation, illustration, web design and promotion of the electoral campaign of 
SYRIZA was really, really strong, and was a milestone for ages to come, and of course 
we should not forget the role of the youth. I mean, for example, I can recall very, very 
good video from the youth of SYRIZA, which very vividly and in an abstract ways could 
make young voters really relate to the problems that were presented, mostly about 
unemployment and immigration and so on. (Personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
Tolios adds his view that it was an excellent strategic move to hold the #asktsipras Twitter debate 
in 2015, as the outgoing Prime Minister had not agreed to a televised debate: “[That year], 
Samaras, the Prime Minister, chose not to have a TV debate…social media actually covered a lot 
of ground that was left empty, because of very little television exposure of political debates. 
Tolios added SYRIZA’s successful articulation of the message delivered by the “Indignants” 
movement in 2011, as another factor in the party’s success: “SYRIZA really took all the political 
essence of this movement and said ‘what you were trying to say, I am going to take it to the 
Parliament.” That’s why it was so successful” (personal communication, February 22, 2017). 
 Aside from the “Indignants” movement, SYRIZA was viewed as having benefited by the 
protest movement surrounding the shutdown of ERT in June 2013. As stated by Vasilopoulos: 
“SYRIZA took advantage of this dynamic, with its strong presence [at the protests] and its 
promises to restore ERT” (personal communication, August 22, 2017). Tolios ties SYRIZA’s 
success among young voters with its strong connection to grassroots movements more broadly: 
Being a member of SYRIZA at that point, I strongly believed that this was our really 
strong point, that the campaign was operated by people with a lot of experience in social 
media and on grassroots movements that also played a very vital role in social media 
political dialogue…younger people…that could actually relate to social media, I think 
that SYRIZA made a much more successful campaign that actually hurt other left-wing 
parties. (Personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
Petriti attributes some of SYRIZA’s success to a network of affiliated sites, stating: “SYRIZA 
has been aided by social media, because it has a team that handles them well [and associated 
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websites] such as Red Notebook and left.gr. All of this helps” (personal communication, October 
7, 2013). Dourou, however, noted that mediums such as “Avgi [SYRIZA’s newspaper] and ‘Sto 
Kokkino’ [SYRIZA’s radio station] do not have the reach that the major media possess…” 
(personal communication, July 3, 2013). 
 Finally, as a candidate and member of parliament with SYRIZA, Dourou stated that: 
 
I take into account the fact that I represent thousands of citizens and the main opposition 
party. I also attempt to be instructive [with my online behavior], because there is an 
incorrect manner of approaching such mediums on the part of the government and the 
Prime Minister’s office, the rest of us have to display morals…To be specific, I do not 
enter [online] dialogues easily—whereas in the past I would have—to joke around about 
political figures about other parties. I am careful with the words I use…I try to operate on 
Twitter and Facebook more maturely. (Personal communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
Dourou stated that she decided to show restraint with her social media use during her electoral 
campaign in 2012: “If one goes back…[they will see] that I was probably more restrained than I 
was before or since, as I did not want to seem like I had just discovered social media and was 
deploying them for my campaign,” adding that in her next electoral contest, “I will abstain [from 
social media]…for the reasons I stated earlier and because the personnel of SYRIZA don’t forget 
that battles require a physical presence…during the campaign I will be with the public at 
kafeneia and neighborhoods…” (personal communication, July 3, 2013). 
 Notably, popularity online does not necessarily translate to popularity at the ballot box, as 
seen by the example of Asteris Masouras. Tachiaou highlighted his candidacy with SYRIZA in 
the 2010 municipal elections in Thessaloniki, where despite his active social media presence, 
“Asteris unfortunately had the incredible number of 58 votes in Thessaloniki” (personal 
communication, February 23, 2013). This could be viewed as an example of social media’s 
potential to create a “magnifier effect.” 
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6.4.3 – PASOK 
 In chapter 5, the initiatives introduced by PASOK in the 2009-2012 time period 
pertaining to e-governance and digital transparency were introduced. While platforms such as 
“Diavgeia” and “Illegal Signs” were introduced to the broader public and could be said to have 
been successful to a great extent, PASOK also implemented many such initiatives for its internal 
party affairs. Masouras noted that while the post-2012 PASOK was quiet, they had previously 
pioneered online political discourse: “PASOK…tried to promote the idea of accountability 
through 'open data,' and that was vocally promoted…After the memorandums were signed and 
the government collapsed, they have been quiescent mostly, because center-left politicians are 
torn between parties and they’re fragmenting (personal communication, February 23, 2013). 
 Karamanolis detailed the implementation of e-government tools for its internal 
operations, including an online policy deliberation platform32, and committees of online 
volunteers (personal communication, October 19, 2013). These largely went defunct after the 
PASOK government collapsed in late 2011. Vlachos described PASOK’s efforts at the time as 
centered around two core areas: “…democratic participation and effective governance through 
transparency and accountability,” adding that for its internal operations, “we developed a 
database, direct mail and newsletters, many online forums, online streaming, at a time when the 
others did not know what these were” (personal communication, November 26, 2013). As 
summarized by Boubouka, “PASOK was the first to bring social media to politics. This may 
have to do with its relationship with the Anglo-Saxon political sphere which first adopted these 
ideas. PASOK copied them and imported them to Greece” (personal communication, May 31, 
                                               
32 See https://web.archive.org/web/20120102011032/http://dialogos.pasok.gr:80/xoros/, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110818142332/dialogos.pasok.gr/programma. 
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2013). Stavros Katsoulis, a member of the communications team of the United Popular Front 
(EPAM) political party, noted that “while such tools may have at times helped with citizen 
feedback, the end result was that they did not prevent the political collapse of PASOK” (personal 
communication, May 30, 2013), while Farmakis notes that the 2009-2012 period was the only 
period where “they were really very innovative in using [social media]” (personal 
communication, April 15, 2013). 
 The general consensus amongst interviewees was that PASOK had, since 2012 at least, 
been hurt by social media. Aphrodite Al-Saleh, a former social media volunteer with PASOK, 
stated that “PASOK is very weak on social media because it is the de facto space where PASOK 
and all its personnel are attacked” (personal communication, January 11, 2014). Odysseas 
Konstantinopoulos, then-deputy Minister of Development and a member of parliament elected 
with PASOK, argued that “PASOK suffered a crisis in 2009 when social media were inundated 
by people who were negative towards our party, and used [social media] as a defamatory 
mechanism,” adding that “this began to change after the 2012 elections…our supporters on the 
internet made a strong showing and today…we have great penetration in the social media space” 
(personal communication, September 3, 2014). Mangiriadis posited that 
PASOK wasn’t ready…they didn’t have a unit that would respond to attacks…during the 
whole period that they were in power…They were hurt because a lot of people came up 
from social media on Papandreou being a traitor, putting us down to the IMF. A lot of that 
was generated in that period” (Personal communication, July 23, 2013) 
 
For Zoehrer though, PASOK’s decline was not impacted by social media in any way: “No. They 
failed on their own…PASOK simply got, let’s say, its penalty for not doing what it said it would 
do before the elections” (personal communication, June 4, 2013). 
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 Konstantinopoulos stated that as of 2014, PASOK primarily used Facebook and Twitter 
for its social media presence. In looking at its electoral campaigning in 2012 and 2014, he stated 
that “PASOK’s campaign was not centered around social media to the extent it is in other 
countries,” though there was an emphasis on Facebook. Regarding his personal social media use 
as a politician, he stated that he maintains two Facebook accounts and a Twitter account that he 
alone posts to, while his associates maintained his Facebook “fan page.” Konstantinopoulos 
added that he used social media “as a tool of interactive communication,” and that he receives 
20-30 messages a day from citizens. Finally, Konstantinopoulos expressed his reluctance for 
using social media extensively for the purposes of campaigning, due to the prevalence of trolls 
(personal communication, September 3, 2014). 
6.4.4 – Communist Party of Greece (KKE) 
 The political party which has the reputation of being perhaps the most averse to social 
and new media in Greece is the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). This apparent aversion was 
noted by several of the interviewees who participated in this study. According to Broumas, the 
KKE “had a critical stance on the internet,” and “banned its members from writing on the 
internet, at least openly, [saying that] whoever is a member of the Communist Party should not 
write, because we should only have the official views of the party on the internet” (personal 
communication, July 3, 2013). Masouras adds: “[t]he Communists aren’t online at all…there 
have been some vocal alpha-bloggers who sell themselves as Communists and are very vocal in 
favor of the Communist Party, but by and large the Communist Party is offline, by choice” 
(personal communication, February 23, 2013). Tolios notes that the KKE has lost young voters to 
parties such as SYRIZA as a result (personal communication, February 22, 2017). 
 301 
 Boubouka, however, notes a slow embrace on the part of the KKE towards social media: 
“The KKE attempted to abstain from this space and snubbed it openly…but [recently they 
launched] 902.gr, where they live-blogged…they likely realized suddenly that there exists an 
audience and a means of covering news…which they had missed out upon” (personal 
communication, May 31, 2013). 
 Liana Kanelli, a member of parliament elected under the KKE banner, provides her 
insights into the party’s stance towards social media: 
We don’t use it for electoral campaigning. We use it in a journalistic, informative and 
communicative way. There is a big blog [902.gr]. They abandoned the idea of television 
[former KKE-owned station 902 TV] and all these things. So, the ideas, the critiques, the 
conferences, everything is published in this blog. You can get in, you can find out, you 
can use the videos, you can spread your ideas. But if you wash this, you will never find, 
and this is something that truly makes me proud about the Communists, you will not find 
easy speech…Sometimes they accuse us of being difficult, not being “pop,” but you 
cannot speak on the problems of people, use them to make a film that is going to sell a 
few tickets and then abandon them. So it is a tool for politics, but…the party believes and 
I personally agree with them, that face-to-face experience and speaking and conversation 
will never disappear from this world. (Personal communication, June 11, 2013) 
 
Finally, regarding her own use of social media, Kanelli notes that she does not maintain a social 
media account, but a popular “friends of” page had been created for her on Facebook, where for 
a while she participated in online question-and-answer sessions. In the words of Kanelli: 
At least once a month, I [tried] to do it live…this happened for a few months and then, 
dead end. Why? Three hours were not enough, four hours were not enough. Questions 
and requests were 5,000, 10,000…so I apologized and I said “You can write anything you 







6.5 – IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON SMALLER POLITICAL PARTIES 
6.5.1 – ANTARSYA 
 
ANTARSYA33, the “Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left,” is an extraparliamentary 
party which is actually a coalition of various movements and groups of the far left in Greece, and 
which is notable for being “leaderless,” instead being led by a governing committee. 
Thanos Andritsos, at the time a member of the governing committee of ANTARSYA, 
stated that social media had greatly helped the movement, particularly before the first national 
parliamentary elections of 2012. As explained by Andritsos, a press office was formed by 
ANTARSYA which was staffed by younger people who were experienced with social and new 
media, many of whom were bloggers. This staff “managed for a month and a half to combine the 
traditional workings of a press office, which issues press releases, sends them to the media, 
follows up by phone…with the usage of new media, including online press conferences and 
chats.” Andritsos highlighted the importance of ANTARSYA’s online presence at a time where 
the party, which supported a Greek exit from the Eurozone, was shut out of discussions about the 
issue on mass media outlets: “…we were among the few political forces which had a clear 
position in favor of leaving the euro. There were thousands of discussions on Greek television 
about this and we were not invited to even one” (personal communication, July 23, 2013). 
 According to Andritsos, the party operated a website which incorporated multimedia 
tools such as audiovisual content, two Facebook pages (an official page and one belonging to the 
party’s press office), a Twitter account, and a YouTube channel. Most local ANTARSYA 
committees also maintained a Facebook presence and a blog, while Andritsos also noted the 
party’s close relationship with 10-20 widely-read blogs. Andritsos also stated ANTARSYA’s 
                                               
33 See http://www.antarsya.gr. 
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intention to launch an online news portal which would be favorable to the party and also contain 
“alternative news” (personal communication, July 23, 2013). 
6.5.2 – Democratic Left (DIMAR) 
 
 Founded in June 2010 by longtime politician Fotis Kouvelis, DIMAR (“Democratic 
Left”)34 entered parliament for the first time in the May 2012 elections and served as the third 
governing partner of the government which was formed following the June 2012 elections, 
alongside New Democracy and PASOK. DIMAR’s participation in this coalition government 
lasted for one year, until June 2012, when it departed following the shutdown of ERT by the 
state. The party began a period of decline following this and participated in the “Dimokratiki 
Symparataxi” (“Democratic Alignment”) electoral coalition along with PASOK in the September 
2015, managing to elect one of its own candidates as a member of parliament. 
 Giorgos Palamarizis, IT Director and head of new media for DIMAR, stressed the 
importance of social and new media for DIMAR: “DIMAR, because it does not have a big 
budget for its campaigns, and as a younger party, placed a great emphasis on new media,” listing 
the party’s active presence on YouTube, where all audiovisual content pertaining to the party, 
including media appearances, speeches, and announcements, would be posted and then shared 
via Facebook and Twitter (personal communication, October 4, 2013). Petriti mentioned the 
party’s official Facebook page as well as separate Facebook pages for each local branch of the 
party and online groups—open, closed, and secret—for party members, Twitter, YouTube, and 
accounts on Flickr and del.icio.us. As stated by Petriti, all of the above were primarily used for 
posting interviews, speeches, newsletters, press releases, and parliamentary proceedings 
                                               
34 See http://www.dim-ar.gr. 
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(personal communication, October 7, 2013). In essence, these mediums were used as an online 
bulletin board, as is commonly seen with other Greek political parties. 
 Petriti also noted one way in which the party’s online and social media presence was used 
after its departure from the governing coalition: “When we left the government…all of our 
ministers, not only ministers, the people that were working for the government…they wrote [a 
report of] what they did in the last year, and we published all that through social media” 
(personal communication, October 7, 2013). 
 Palamarizis noted the impact of the party’s social media presence on its electoral results: 
It was a major impact, and this was noticed by the global press…We were interviewed by 
the Associated Press and CBS, who were surprised by how quickly we organized our 
campaign. We were only [on social media]…we do not have our own newspaper or radio 
or television station, so the full weight of our campaign was there, and I believe we were 
successful as we had very good results, particularly among the generations that use 
Facebook and Twitter. (Personal communication, October 4, 2013) 
 
Petriti added: 
[W]e used [social media] a lot, because we were a new party and we didn’t have a lot of 
money…We used Google Hangouts a lot, we used Twitter, we used YouTube so that we 
can broadcast some speeches and our spots…We used a lot of Facebook…It was a very 
good tool, especially Facebook. (Personal communication, October 7, 2013) 
 
 Regarding DIMAR’s social media practices, Palamarizis stressed that “we have one rule, 
which is not to negatively comment. We do not troll at all, we only answer on a political basis, 
and I think this is respected by a large part of the community.” He added that there was no party-
wide policy for what its elected representatives could post on social media and that “every 
member of parliament and every staffer…has the freedom to say what they want,” referring to 
the unmediated content posted on Facebook and Twitter by the members of parliament 
themselves (personal communication, October 4, 2013). Petriti noted that the party’s social 
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media presence was mostly managed by volunteers, with only one professional staffer 
(Palamarizis) (personal communication, October 7, 2013). 
 Finally, Palamarizis noted DIMAR’s future social and new media plans, including the 
launch of a web radio station and an e-magazine (personal communication, October 4, 2013), 
while Petriti stated that the party planned to expand its use of social media in the 2014 European 
parliamentary elections and at its party congress (personal communication, October 7, 2013). 
6.5.3 – Dimiourgia, Xana! 
 
Another party which earned a reputation in Greece as having launched via social media is 
“Dimiourgia, Xana!” (“Recreate Greece”)35. Officially founded on March 11, 2012, the party 
managed, within two months, to receive 2.2 percent of the votes in the May 2012 parliamentary 
elections. As stated by the president of the party, Thanos Tzimeros, who is also a columnist with 
protagon.gr and Athens Voice, the party did not consist of politicians, and publicly “raised issues 
which up until then were taboo,” adding that the election result was a surprise: “[w]e weren’t 
expecting such a high figure...and all of the polls had us below 0.5 percent. Notably, no poll 
mentioned us until the elections…either they were way off or something else was happening. We 
know that often polls are part of the political game” (personal communication, June 5, 2013). 
Tzimeros credits the party’s social media presence for its early success: “[this] 
technology is what allowed parties like ours to have such reach and such growth so quickly.” 
Notably though, Tzimeros admitted that he was not a social media user and did not like 
Facebook and Twitter: “I hated Facebook, because I felt you lose your time on worthless 
things…I also disliked Twitter…because in 140 characters it is difficult to express an opinion 
without it being misunderstood,” noting that he prefers writing articles and commentaries. 
                                               
35 See https://www.dimiourgiaxana.gr. 
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Nevertheless, Tzimeros notes that the party’s first Facebook group was launched a day before the 
party itself was officially launched, and that the party maintained both an open and a closed 
Facebook group, noting that there were about 20 regular writers and 100-200 individuals who 
commented regularly. Tzimeros added that approximately 10 people were involved in managing 
the party’s overall social media efforts (personal communication, June 5, 2013). 
 Tzimeros emphasized that social media was especially important to the party as it was a 
victim of “diaploki” on the part of the major media outlets, stating: “[t]he media treated us as a 
sideshow initially. They could not imagine our momentum…but overall they were positive. 
When they saw we received 2.2 percent, their stance changed,” adding that television stations 
operated on a “pay to play” basis, where the party would have to pay a certain amount of money 
in order to secure a certain amount of appearances (personal communication, June 5, 2013). 
 In addition, Tzimeros noted the party’s implementation of e-voting tools: “We are the 
only party up until now in Greece which has elected the president and committees via electronic 
voting, indeed using a tool developed by the state, the ‘Zeus’ system’…” Tzimeros also stated 
that the party avoids expensive print jobs of posters and pamphlets, stating that a younger person 
can print such material for an older relative (personal communication, June 5, 2013). 
 Tzimeros, through his social media presence, was no stranger to controversy. Two such 
instances resulted from tweets where Tzimeros warned about the “Islamic threat” in Europe, and 
where he commented on an incident where two students died of carbon monoxide poisoning after 
lighting coal inside their apartment, writing that it was a sign of failure of the Greek educational 
system that they had not been taught about the dangers of carbon monoxide.36 According to 




Tzimeros, the meaning of these tweets was intentionally twisted “in order to defame myself and 
Dimiourgia, Xana,” adding that “social media create a secondary level of ‘he said, they said’ 
news” (personal communication, June 5, 2013). 
 Finally, Tzimeros stated his party’s goals to develop online radio and television platforms 
in the future (personal communication, June 5, 2013).  
6.5.4 – Dimokratiki Simmahia 
 
 “Dimokratiki Simmahia” (“Democratic Alliance”)37 was a liberal-right party founded in 
2010 by Dora Bakogianni, the daughter of former Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos 
Mitsotakis. Though the party was disbanded after the May 2012 national parliamentary elections, 
Bakogianni’s name recognition helped the party garner a fair amount of mainstream attention. 
 One of the most visible candidates with the party was Gregory Farmakis, who was on the 
party’s ballot for the May 2012 elections. As stated by Farmakis, he maintained a very visible 
presence on Twitter prior to becoming a candidate:38 “I used social media a lot before the 
campaign…I had a very good and a very consistent presence in social media, especially Twitter, 
and a quite successful blog, which was, I say it was quite successful based on the statistics of the 
visits.” Farmakis, however, noted that during his electoral campaign, he deemphasized social 
media, focusing more on television, radio, and the press. In his words: 
Social media is not something that you can [exclusively] focus on for a campaign…A lot 
of politicians, either professional politicians or amateur politicians like me, did something 
wrong: they only used social media during the campaign…but nobody really cares about 
that in the social media sphere…During the campaign, things go so fast and because it 
was a very [brief] campaign, these elections were [one month away], so you do not have 
the time to…engage in the social media, because you have to go and see people live, in 
public…you don’t have the time to engage in social media interactions. I used social 
media during the campaign to distribute material and to advertise [media appearances], 
                                               
37 See https://web.archive.org/web/20120520083844/http://www.dimsim.gr. 
38 See https://twitter.com/gregoryfarmakis. 
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but only…as complimentary to the typical campaign. I think that in elections, the art of 
coming in contact with persons is much more important, real contact, going to people’s 
houses and speaking. So during the campaign, the social media were only complimentary, 
but before it was the main instrument. (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
Nevertheless, Farmakis stated that usage of social media as a “bulletin board” by politicians is 
ineffective: “If the account becomes too impersonal, like okay, this is a press release, than 
nobody pays attention anymore,” adding that this was a mistake made by “Dimokratiki 
Simmahia”: “…the people who are doing this thing in the parties, the communication experts, 
tend to see these as another mechanism of distributing press releases. So they had a mailing list 
and they had a list of journalists, now, okay, they tweet a press release. This is boring for 
people.” Farmakis listed three primary ways in which he believes social media should be used 
politically: commenting, debating, and distributing information with added commentary. 
Farmakis shared his view that politicians should engage with social media themselves rather than 
through an intermediary: “…you have to do it personally. People readily understand where it is 
not you that uses the account,” adding that “I had people assisting me with the Facebook page, 
loading, preparing the material, the videos or the radio recordings, but for the comments no, it 
was me” (personal communication, April 15, 2013). 
 For Farmakis, social media served as the impetus for entering politics: 
In my case, the political activity came as a result of the social media activity…I became 
known for my opinion and my work due to the social media, and that’s how I had 
proposals from different parties and finally chose this one, but I had proposals from 
different parties to cooperate with them. I think that for people who are more active 
citizens, so to say, social media is a very effective way to showcase what you have to say. 
But this is something that you have to keep on doing. This is not something that you do 
only for elections. (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
Finally, Farmakis further stated that he planned to be involved in politics again, but would make 
some changes to the way in which he uses social media:  
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When you’re not a full-time politician…you don’t have the luxury to do it as a full-time 
job. Social media there can be quite effective, because you can continue to be involved at 
a low cost, in terms of time. So I will do it and I will use it heavily. What will I do 
differently? In the previous elections I used more Twitter and less Facebook, because of 
my personal preference for the Twitter medium. I love Twitter because of its brevity and 
incisiveness. Facebook is more verbose. But I think that Facebook is really more far-
reaching than Twitter, or even a blog…Having posts on Facebook can be much more 
influential than having a typical blog…I will put more emphasis on Facebook…What I 
will do differently is that I think this time I will hire a professional to organize that, 
because if you want to do it very effectively in a short time, then you really need 
somebody who knows the tricks of the trade. So next time I will have some budget for a 
professional communication expert. (Personal communication, April 15, 2013) 
 
 Finally, as with the previous example of Asteris Masouras, Tachiaou highlighted 
Farmakis as an example of an online “magnifier effect,” where an individual’s popularity on 
social media does not necessarily lead to votes. Highlighting that Farmakis received only a few 
hundred votes despite his large online following, Tachiaou stated: “Gregory Farmakis' campaign 
proved that social media did not work at all” (personal communication, February 23, 2013). 
6.5.5 – Enosi Kentroon 
 
 The “Enosi Kentroon” (“Centrists’ Union”)39 is not a new party on the Greek political 
scene, as it was founded in 1992. However, the party was elected into the Greek parliament for 
the first time in the national parliamentary elections of September 2015. Vasilis Leventis, the 
president of the “Enosi Kentroon,” was himself known to audiences from the television station 
which he owned in the 1990s, “Kanali 67” (later renamed “Kanali 40”) and his television 
program, which remained on the air up until the time of his election to parliament. 
 Leventis noted that the party’s website is named “antidiaploki,” referencing the prevalent 
issue of “diaploki” in the Greek political and media sphere, where the party also operates a web 
TV station in addition to a presence on major social media platforms. As stated by Leventis, “I 
                                               
39 See http://www.antidiaploki.gr. 
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can’t say that we’ve made a great deal of progress. We’re still at the beginning but we’ve 
understood that we have to invest in this area in order to not fall behind.” Nevertheless, Leventis 
credited social and new media with helping the party in the September 2015 elections, 
particularly in the city of Thessaloniki, where the party had its strongest showing: “They played 
a significant role, particularly in Thessaloniki, where some young people reproduced some of my 
old videos and the nine planks of our platform and made them available to the public,” adding 
that the videos of his old television appearances which circulated proved that what he had said in 
the past was correct, thus resonating with voters. Leventis further noted the party’s popularity on 
YouTube, with videos garnering up to 40,000 views (personal communication, March 22, 2017). 
 Nonetheless, Leventis notes that he does not use Facebook, hailing “from a different 
generation,” but noted that a Vasilis Leventis parody account on Facebook ultimately helped 
bolster his popularity, adding that other members of parliament from the party do use social 
media for their work. Finally, Leventis noted that for future electoral campaigns, “I will make 
appearances [online] every few days if I see that I am censored by the television stations. I will 
give 5-10 minute talks, because I’ve found that it’s short videos which attract the largest 
audience” (personal communication, March 22, 2017). 
6.5.6 – EPAM 
 
 One party which perhaps more than any other made a name for itself as an anti-
memorandum and pro-“Grexit” movement is EPAM (“United People’s Front”),40 popularly 
associated with the outspoken economist Dimitris Kazakis.41 As stated by Stavros Katsoulis, a 
member of EPAM’s communications team at the time: 
                                               
40 See https://www.epamhellas.gr. 
41 See http://dimitriskazakis.blogspot.com. 
 311 
EPAM was born out of the demonstrations of 2010-2011. These demonstrations were to a 
great extent organized by the use of social media…there is a petition that we have 
received from that movement, which was to use social media and the internet to expose 
our positions and organize ourselves. (Personal communication, May 30, 2013) 
 
Regarding the party’s social media use, Katsoulis stated: “Currently EPAM uses the most 
popular, available methods of socializing its message, which means Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, Google+…and also we use a few custom applications within the organization in order 
to communicate our users’ information in a more productive way,” adding that Facebook is the 
most-used social medium for EPAM (personal communication, May 30, 2013). Regarding 
Facebook’s importance in particular, Katsoulis stated: 
I think the most important way we use Facebook is to deliver an alternative message to 
the people in order to then be able to have a different view and a different explanation of 
current events, because progressively in the last three years the official mainstream media 
has evolved into a completely one-sided view of things, and basically it does not present 
an alternative view, and if it does present an alternative view, it presents it in the context 
of complete negativity. (Personal communication, May 30, 2013) 
 
Regarding Twitter, Katsoulis adds: “Twitter is a little bit different: we usually use it in order to 
make our views perceivable by specific people who belong to the social sphere, in order to create 
awareness, and in order to social dialogue on specific issues.” Katsoulis also emphasized the role 
of blogs in EPAM’s communications efforts: 
EPAM has its main blog…and many dozens of blogs belonging to the main cause of 
EPAM or to the wider groups. Individuals have their own blogs and also there are third-
party blogs, perhaps people who don’t belong to EPAM but who post the most prominent 
writers, bloggers, articles and positions. (Personal communication, May 30, 2013) 
 
Katsoulis also mentioned EPAM’s expansion on YouTube: “practically any event, especially 
talks about Dimitris Kazakis or other members of EPAM, or events, demonstrations, are… 
immediately posted on YouTube. Also lately there has been an attempt to create more quality 
videos and also documentary-like productions.” Nevertheless, Katsoulis emphasized that “our 
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position is that the connection we must develop with the people must be a real-world connection. 
Whatever social media we use, our aim is to meet in person in the real world and not get 
entangled…in the virtual world.” According to Katsoulis, EPAM’s communications team began 
as an unofficial group but later became official, consisting of 6-7 individuals involved directly 
with EPAM’s social media efforts (personal communication, May 30, 2013). 
 Katsoulis noted that Dimitris Kazakis used to host a radio program which was shut out of 
a mainstream radio station, leading EPAM to turn to web radio, noting, however, the difficulties 
in attracting a new audience: “It seems that it is much easier to get new listeners from by using 
real FM radio rather than web radio. Web radio has the same audience that we already have.” 
Despite this, Katsoulis highlighted the importance of social and new media for EPAM due to the 
lack of coverage the party enjoyed from the mainstream media: “Mainstream media in a practical 
sense, did not present EPAM at all” (personal communication, May 30, 2013). 
6.5.7 – Golden Dawn 
 
 The most controversial political formation in Greek politics is undoubtedly the far-right 
Golden Dawn party (“Xrysi Avgi” in Greek).42 Golden Dawn is not new, publishing a magazine 
since 1980 and participating in politics since 1993, but it did not enter the Greek Parliament until 
the elections of May 2012, in the midst of the country’s economic crisis, and has been re-elected 
ever since, including earning representation in the European Parliament in the 2014 elections. 
 According to Vasilis Karakostas, a representative of Golden Dawn’s parliamentary press 
office, “the television channels, the press do not broadcast our positions. They have shut us out. 
Therefore the only way for the public to learn of our positions is our own mediums…our 
                                               
42 See http://www.xryshaygh.com. 
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website, newspaper, and magazine” (personal communication, June 12, 2014). Karakostas 
described Golden Dawn’s unconventional approach to social media and the internet: 
We do not maintain anything official [on social media], just our website...However, 
personnel, members, and supporters of the movement are asked to help influence the 
public on the internet, via Facebook, Twitter, or anywhere else. Also on YouTube. We 
are speaking of isolated instances and of individuals who are not paid for this work. It is 
their own voluntary effort. (Personal communication, June 12, 2014) 
 
Karakostas stated that he did not know why no official social media accounts were maintained, 
but noted that the aforementioned setup “is especially beneficial,” adding that social media: 
…have given us the opportunity to be in direct contact with the public…and for the 
public to be in direct contact with us…[social media] has tremendous power, and it is 
significant that we have the ability to transmit our positions and to have our compatriots 
view our political battle…in a positive light. (Personal communication, June 12, 2014) 
 
Karakostas also mentioned that Golden Dawn operates an online radio station, and noted the 
popularity of Golden Dawn’s website, stating that it was within Alexa’s top 50 or 60 websites in 
Greece, ahead of the websites of other parties (personal communication, June 12, 2014). 
 According to Karakostas, the impact of social media and the internet was especially 
positive for Golden Dawn prior to the 2012 electoral contests: “…our ideas and policies became 
known to a wider public, which we could not have done through our newspaper…via the internet 
and the reproduction of our writings by other blogs, the public found out what Golden Dawn is,” 
noting that the party was also helped in the same manner by social and online media prior to the 
2014 European parliamentary elections. Karakostas added that there was no change in Golden 
Dawn’s internet strategy between 2012 and 2014. Regarding the elections themselves, 
Karakostas said that the party does not use Facebook to select candidates, stating that it was “not 
a popularity contest,” adding that “we want to take advantage of the internet, not to be taken 
advantage of” (personal communication, June 12, 2014). 
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 Golden Dawn is a party which also elicited many reactions from other individuals who 
were interviewed as part of this study. Vlachos described it as a “mash party,” which “combines 
the mass party movements of the 1920s and 1930s with digital technology” (personal 
communication, November 26, 2013), while Adamidis noted the significant help that its network 
of blogs has provided it (personal communication, April 10, 2013). Koskinas characterized 
Golden Dawn as a “dominant” force on the Greek internet, estimating that it operates over 150 
blogs (personal communication, June 6, 2013). Psara argued that Golden Dawn’s online 
supporters “have understood more than anyone else social media and its power,” with the caveat 
that it was not aided electorally by social media due to the older demographic which supports it, 
but that instead, social media has “given their views credibility” online (personal 
communication, November 11, 2013). Bakounakis stated that “Golden Dawn would not be a part 
of the public sphere if it wasn’t for social media” (personal communication, March 8, 2013). 
 Other interviewees viewed the role of Golden Dawn’s online and social media presence 
as being less significant or important. For Al-Saleh, it’s not the medium or how effectively it is 
used, but the message: “It has nothing to do with how [Golden Dawn] uses social media…What 
matters is your message. If you try to spread a message on social media of responsibility, hope, 
peace, harmony, love, you’ve failed. If you peddle hate, social media work magnificently” 
(personal communication, January 11, 2014). Wherlock argued that Golden Dawn does better on 
Facebook than on the “very left wing” Greek Twittersphere: “I don't think Golden Dawn finds it 
easy to survive [on Twitter]. I think their natural home would be Facebook... it’s got more reach” 
(personal communication, April 3, 2013), while Efimeros claimed that the Greek Twittersphere 
“has thrown out” most Golden Dawn supporters (personal communication, July 18, 2013). 
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 Dimitrakopoulou, in turn, stated her belief that Golden Dawn benefited from being 
excluded from the mainstream media, especially before the May 2012 elections, despite their 
“effective” use of social media (personal communication, July 5, 2013). Vasilopoulos stated that 
Golden Dawn is an “exception” to ERT’s rule of providing airtime to parties represented in 
Parliament, stating: “no airtime is made available to Golden Dawn” (personal communication, 
August 22, 2017). Conversely, Vasilis Papadopoulos, the president of the steering committee of 
the “Den Plirono” movement, expressed his view that “Golden Dawn is in large part a media 
creation” (personal communication, November 26, 2013). 
6.5.8 – Kinima Den Plirono 
 
 Both a political party and a social movement, the “Kinima Den Plirono” (“I Don’t Pay 
Movement”) was established in 2008 initially as an activist group performing public acts of civil 
disobedience, such as allowing drivers to bypass highway toll booths in protest of dangerous 
road conditions and the high cost of tolls, and clandestinely reconnecting electricity to 
households whose electric service was cut off due to their inability to pay. The group was later 
established politically in March 2012, and it participated in the May 2012 elections. 
 According to Vasilis Papadopoulos, the president of the steering committee of the “Den 
Plirono” movement, “new media served as a catalyst” for the group, noting that when “Den 
Plirono” was first established, a video of the group’s activism at a toll plaza posted on YouTube 
“was enough to make us known to hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens” (personal 
communication, November 26, 2013). Papadopoulos described the content of the videos posted 
by “Den Plirono,” emphasizing video’s continued significant role for the movement: 
Our activist actions are 90 percent of [the videos] we post, in particular because we 
believe that you are not what you claim but what you do. And because the public has 
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gotten tired of lofty words all these years, they have to see what is actually happening. 
The actions we post, for example, include reconnecting electricity, actions at toll booths, 
actions at anti-fascist and anti-racist demonstrations, actions borne out of labor battles, 
general strikes, freeing public beaches. Whatever has to do with our constitutionally 
protected rights…” (Personal communication, November 26, 2013). 
 
Papadopoulos stated that “Den Plirono” formulated a multimedia team which produces videos 
and other audiovisual material of a professional quality, despite a lack of resources, noting that 
“Den Plirono” is “rich in imagination,” and emphasizing that the movement is comprised of “80 
percent young people.” According to Papadopoulos, social media was viewed as a significant 
medium for Den Plirono in light of the mainstream media’s hostile stance towards it: “[t]he 
television stations, private and public, air us rarely if ever, because they belong to the major 
contractors who are our opponents. It’s natural that they would want to show us only to defame 
us” (personal communication, November 26, 2013). 
 As stated by Papadopoulos, “Den Plirono” is a citizens’ movement, but distinct from so-
called “citizens’ movements” established by political parties to expand their influence, citing 
such groups as “our enemies.” Social media, according to Papadopoulos, serves as a protector of 
the movement’s image in this regard. In commenting on the actions of “Den Plirono,” Batzoglou 
cited the group as an example of a “classical citizens’ movement,” which successfully used its 
blogs to organize actions at locations such as toll plazas, and then effectively moved to other 
mediums, such as SMS text messaging, when its blogs began to be tracked by the authorities. 
Finally, Papadopoulos added that “while we are interested in being heard within the 
opportunities provided to us by the system, within Parliament…it’s something limited, because 




6.5.9 – Laiki Enotita (LAE) 
 
“Laiki Enotita” (“Popular Unity,” abbreviated “LAE”)43 is a left-wing party which broke 
off from the governing SYRIZA party in August 2015, in opposition to SYRIZA’s decision to 
agree to and ratify the third memorandum of austerity measures. Despite being established only 
one month prior to the September 2015 snap parliamentary elections, the party did participate in 
that electoral contest, failing, however, to enter Parliament. 
 According to Aris Tolios, a member of LAE’s political council, the party is “trying to 
involve younger members…people that are actually involved in social media debates, that have 
strong accounts,” adding that “it’s not just the digital presence, but it has to be the physical, the 
actual presence that matters.” Concerning LAE’s social media presence, Tolios stated that the 
party is “prove our artistic and graphic presentation” while it is also attempting to “have social or 
political relations with the whole media space that especially after the Referendum of 2015 and 
the political turn of SYRIZA…are now orphaned.” Tolios mentioned that LAE mostly utilizes 
Facebook and Twitter, while the party also used Tumblr to disseminate posters prior to the 
September 2015 elections. Prior to the elections, LAE also created a secondary twitter feed 
which, according to Tolios, was an attempt to create an “anti-memorandum counter-news 
network.” Tolios stated that approximately 15 people are involved in LAE’s social media efforts 
(personal communication, February 22, 2017). 
 Tolios noted that LAE was in the process of launching “a political campaign of informing 
the Greek people of our basic political views…a campaign that informs people about a true 
alternative strategy.” Social media’s role in this campaign would be “to clarify and make as 
simple and popular as possible our basic points.” As stated by Tolios, despite being represented 
                                               
43 See http://www.laiki-enotita.gr. 
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in the European Parliament (via a member initially elected with SYRIZA), the mainstream media 
were enforcing what he described as an “intentional ban” against LAE, further necessitating a 
strong social media presence (personal communication, February 22, 2017). 
6.5.10 – Oikologoi Prasinoi 
 
The “Oikologoi Prasinoi” (“Ecologist Greens” or “Green Party”)44 are not a new presence 
within the Greek political landscape, as it has been active since 2002. The party, since the 
January 2015 elections, has supported SYRIZA electorally and two of its members were 
represented in Parliament as part of the SYRIZA coalition.  
 For Tasos Krommydas, social media afforded the Green Party the opportunity to be 
heard, stating: “we use social media in order to have access to a larger audience that we could 
not access through publications or through TV appearances…” The Green Party, according to 
Krommydas, is most active on Facebook and on Twitter, with content on the two platforms being 
90 percent duplicate, while YouTube was used by the party “to a lesser extent.” Notably, the 
Green Party also seemed to reproduce the “bulletin board”-style usage of social media of many 
other Greek political parties. As stated by Krommydas, “[w]e mainly use social media as a 
broadcasting instrument, [posting] press releases and public statements or our policy papers or 
our activity events.” Notably though, the Green Party organized a question-and-answer session 
via Facebook during the May 2012 campaign period. As described by Krommydas: 
During the election period we were much more active on a daily basis on social media 
and we had two occasions…where we invited users of social media to post their 
questions and replied to them…[the] impact was only positive…but I cannot say if that 
positive impact was of any significance. (Personal communication, October 16, 2013) 
 
                                               
44 See http://www.ecogreens-gr.org. 
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Finally, Krommydas stated that the party would not adopt a new social media policy for 
the 2014 European parliamentary elections, stating that social media would be used in the same 
manner (personal communication, October 16, 2013). 
6.5.11 – Pirate Party of Greece 
 
 The Pirate Party of Greece45 is an ordinary member of the “Pirate Party International” 
and is affiliated with Pirate Parties that are active in numerous other European countries. It is a 
party known for its advocacy of digital rights and individual liberties. The Greek Pirate Party 
was established in January 2012, participating in the May and June 2012 parliamentary elections. 
 According to Thanasis Gounaris, a founder and member of the governing board of the 
Pirate Party, the party itself “was not a result of the crisis,” noting that the party would have been 
established regardless and that efforts were underway to launch the party since 2006. It is a party 
which, however, “essentially began online,” in the words of Gounaris. Gounaris described the 
party’s social media and online presence as encompassing two Facebook pages and accounts on 
Twitter, YouTube and Google+, a website with a forum, Facebook pages for regional sections of 
the Pirate Party of Greece, members-only policy deliberation pages, and a Mumble platform for 
inter-party discussion and voting. Gounaris noted that most members and most candidates of the 
party maintained a social media presence (personal communication, October 8, 2013). 
 As described by Gounaris, as part of the party’s campaign efforts for both of the electoral 
contests of 2012, campaign videos were developed promoting the basic positions and values of 
the party, which were posted on YouTube. Campaigning also took place via Facebook, Twitter, 
Google+, and blogs. Gounaris also mentioned a rather innovative concept, where the Athens 
Wireless Metropolitan Network was used to provide information about the Pirate Party in 
                                               
45 See https://www.pirateparty.gr. 
 320 
exchange for providing free SSID internet access. According to Gounaris, although the party was 
required to maintain a physical presence in order to be registered, “our real office is the internet” 
(personal communication, October 8, 2013). 
 Gounaris also described the Pirate Party’s educational wing, “Pirates in Education,” 
which participated in nationwide elections of the Greek Teachers’ Federation in 2013 and earned 
over 10 percent of the vote, surpassing the educational wings of parties such as PASOK and 
SYRIZA. According to Gounaris, the party’s promotion for these elections simply consisted of a 
Facebook page and a Wordpress page46 (personal communication, October 8, 2013). 
 In keeping with the Pirate Party’s ideology, Gounaris also explained how the party 
incorporated digital rights and transparency into its pre-election platform in 2012. According to 
Gounaris, any member of parliament elected with the Pirates would not be obliged to vote 
according to a party or committee line. Instead, online referendums would be held, policy would 
be constructed in consultation with citizens, and that would be translated to the vote of each 
member of parliament (personal communication, October 8, 2013). 
6.5.12 – To Potami 
 
“To Potami” (“The River”)47 was established in early 2014 by prominent television and 
print journalist Stavros Theodorakis, who also founded protagon.gr and had long been a familiar 
face on Mega Channel. Within months of its establishment, it successfully won two seats in the 
European parliamentary elections of May 2014, later earning representation in the Greek 
Parliament in the January 2015 and September 2015 national elections. 
                                               
46 See http://www.piratetimes.net/history-in-the-making-first-ever-pirate-unionist-elected-in-athens/. 
47 See http://www.topotami.gr. 
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Antri Constantinou, a social media and communications volunteer with “To Potami,” 
described the party as “the party of the internet,” and as “a movement, not a party,” noting that 
the party is entirely volunteer-run and does not have members, regional offices, or a president. 
Constantinou claimed that initially, To Potami had been shut out of the mass media, but “the 
traditional media were ultimately obliged to mention it…the buzz on the internet was so great.” 
In Constantinou’s view, “the internet was for To Potami the most essential tool upon our launch” 
(personal communication, November 11, 2014). 
 Regarding the usage of social media by To Potami, Constantinou stated that Facebook, 
Twitter, Google+, Instagram, YouTube, and Soundcloud were all used by the party, in addition to 
operating a web radio station, adding: “[w]e use Facebook and Twitter daily, and YouTube and 
Google+ and anything else you can imagine. Where we differ from the other parties is that we 
only use our own accounts,” insinuating that To Potami does not engage in the practice of 
trolling online using fake accounts. Image is also emphasized according to Constantinou, who 
stated “we upload a lot of high quality photos and videos, because I believe that social media are 
based largely on images nowadays.” In terms of interaction, Constantinou as well as Katerina 
Sitzani, social media and communications volunteer with To Potami, stated that the party tries to 
reply to everybody except troll accounts. Constantinou stated that there were four people 
regularly involved with the social media efforts of To Potami, in addition to others who were 
involved on an ad hoc basis (personal communication, November 11, 2014). 
 According to Constantinou, in the party’s few months of existence, great strides were 
made in getting the parties representatives and candidates to adopt social media, stating that 
almost all were utilizing such tools. Constantinou added: “We are a party without money and we 
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try to do everything ourselves. We don’t have paid advisers to manage the social media of our 
personnel. They manage their accounts themselves, and honestly they do a very good job.” 
 In terms of the party’s usage of social media for its pre-election campaigning in 2014, 
Constantinou explained: 
What social media reproduced was that which we wanted to make known since our 
establishment: who we are, our basic positions, that we’re the third party, a party without 
money, without backers, a party starting from zero…Other parties were started by 
longtime politicians. (Personal communication, November 11, 2014) 
 
Constantinou added that social media were also used to present the party’s candidates for the 
2014 elections, where the party emphasized candidates who did not have a political background 
(personal communication, November 11, 2014). 
 Regarding the stance of To Potami towards the mass media, Constantinou noted that the 
party’s founder, Stavros Theodorakis, “has many years of experience with the traditional media 
and knows…how these media formulate the news,” noting that many news items, even those 
released by the party itself, were manipulated by the media.  
 On the topic of volunteerism, Sitzani noted that the party “does not actively recruit, they 
come to us,” while Constantinou added that “[w]hoever wants to find us can do so online. If 
there’s a need for face-to-face communication, there’s our coordinators…[working] from their 
homes and phones. If a meeting must be held, it will be at a café or their living room,” hinting at 
Greece’s prevalent café culture (personal communication, November 11, 2014). 
Finally, regarding the future plans of To Potami regarding its social media presence, 
Constantinou stated that what the party would like to accomplish is more interactivity between 
the official postings of the party being shared by its volunteers, and the party sharing more of the 
social media content of its volunteers (personal communication, November 11, 2014). 
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6.6 – OTHER GOVERNMENT BODIES 
6.6.1 – Government Ministries 
 
 A few notable insights can be gathered by examining the stance of government ministries 
towards social media, using the Ministry of National Defense as an example. According to 
Ioanna Iliadi, press adviser to the ministry in 2013: 
There exists a paradox. The Ministry of National Defense has not recognized the 
existence of social media. This should not seem peculiar to you, it’s true. When the 
Ministry announces something, it announces it only to traditional media…sends the press 
release only to traditional media. However, in the press office they have set up an RSS 
feed and they sit and follow what the blogs are writing. They never respond or comment, 
they just keep abreast of what is being written. They never engage with them…They 
don’t accredit blogs or bloggers. (Personal communication, May 26, 2013) 
 
Regarding the website of the Defense Ministry, Iliadi described it in 2013 as a “bulletin board”—
a theme which has recurred with the online presence of other political actors in Greece. Iliadi 
described the website as “non functional, containing only the Ministry’s announcements.” 
According to Iliadi, this was because “the staff was not trained, there were no people who ever 
worked with social media,” adding that it is prohibited for military personnel to write on social 
media. Iliadi added that the Defense Ministry, like other Greek government ministries, did not 
engage in online dialogue with the public (personal communication, May 26, 2013). 
 In a 2017 interview, Katerina Tsatsaroni, press representative for Defense Minister Panos 
Kammenos, stated that the Ministry of National Defense works only within “official channels,” 
even though there existed many military blogs which would reproduce the Ministry’s content. 
Tsatsaroni added that the armed forces “cannot be politicized,” and this leads to major 
differences in the social media strategy to be employed compared to other government 
ministries. Notably, Tsatsaroni mentioned that part of the Ministry’s official communications 
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strategy is the development of a web-based series, with a male and female protagonist, that “will 
reflect all Greeks” while boosting the image of the national armed forces. This series would be 
heavily promoted via social media. (Personal communication, March 6, 2017). 
6.6.2 – Local Municipalities 
 
 Yiannis Boutaris, the mayor of Thessaloniki, Greece’s second largest city, has developed 
a reputation in Greece and abroad as being both highly innovative and outspoken.48 Leonidas 
Makris, an adviser to Boutaris, described the mayor as someone who is “introducing innovative 
things to the Greek public sphere and Greek politics” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
Interestingly enough, however, despite Boutaris’ youthful and innovative image, he was not a 
major presence on social media. 
 According to Makris, Boutaris has earned the reputation of an effective, albeit unusual, 
communicator, describing him as “far from being charismatic” and “extremely honest,” someone 
who “talks spontaneously to the press and to the electronic media, which makes him different 
from most politicians.” Makris added that Boutaris is “not very careful in a sense to construct a 
certain image that applies to the modern needs of the media…but this is exactly his advantage as 
well.” In Makris’ view, Boutaris “uses language that reaches the average voter well, even though 
this is not something cultivated from his side, there’s not a structure, it’s not based on a certain 
plan to approach the media…” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 Despite Boutaris’ effectiveness as a communicator, Makris noted that the mayor was 
inactive in the online sphere: “…the mayor still holds a web page that needs to be updated since 
the last elections [in 2010],” adding, however, that “now that we’re approaching the elections of 
                                               




2014, we anticipate that it is going to be updated and is going to be used as a vehicle to 
communicate with the voters." Makris also stated that leading up to the 2014 municipal 
elections, “we might develop an account in Facebook as well, but this is again due to happen 
very close to the elections and not yet.” In Makris’s view, Boutaris’ lack of a social media 
presence was due to his age, stating: “[h]e’s 71 years old now, he’s not familiar with the way they 
work.” Makris did recognize the need for change, however: “In the future, we need and he needs 
to adjust and it’s quite probable that he’s going to develop an account in Facebook and…Twitter, 
or the group that is going to be appointed for this job” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 Makris did indicate that despite Boutaris’ official absence from social and online media, 
they did play a positive role in his election in 2010: 
Through the internet there was an extended network that was following what was 
happening in the political movement of Boutaris…his political movement had an 
extended list of e-mail accounts that were reaching up to 2,000-3,000 participants… 
which themselves, the participants of this list were sending to their own friends these 
messages. (Personal communication, July 4, 2013) 
 
Makris also noted that Boutaris’ campaign webpage in 2010 doubled as a blog: 
 
The webpage had the use of a kind of a blog as well. There was a committee that was 
dealing with the promotion of the political movement and was really publishing their 
views about…certain important issues of the political campaign in this website, and in 
some cases it was used as a blog as well, to keep the electorate updated about certain 
views of the mayor and the political movement. (Personal communication, July 4, 2013) 
 
Makris noted the success of the online activity of Boutaris’ associates in reaching young voters: 
“[t]hrough the use by his associates of certain electronic media, this can really reach young 
people…and the proof of this is the fact that most of young people are voters of Boutaris as well” 
(personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
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 Finally, Makris noted that while blogs are treated as an unofficial medium and are 
unrecognized by the municipality, Boutaris “follows all the information published in the local 
blogs of the city, so he’s informed about what they write about his policies and administration… 
he’s informed about what social media write about him” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 Moving on from the city of Thessaloniki to the small island of Symi, a local blog based 
on the island took on the role of serving as the official opposition to the local mayor, who had 
run unopposed. Stella Zervou, the founder of the “Symi Today” blog, explained her rationale for 
creating the blog in 2010, a year in which municipal elections had been held: 
The reason I started the blog was because there was no other way to express our 
discontent regarding our local problems, and because in the most recent municipal 
elections there was no opponent. A voice was needed for us to express our disagreement. 
That role was adopted by the blog. An opposing voice was needed and I had no other way 
to do this but through the blog… (Personal communication, June 3, 2013) 
 
According to Zervou, the blog contained local news and important information for the local 
community such as ferry boat schedules, “anything that I believe an active citizen should know, 
especially his rights.” She also noted that locals occasionally send in stories or photographs for 
possible publication. A chat feature existed on the blog as well, but Zervou stated her opposition 
to profanity, personal attacks, and anonymity (personal communication, June 3, 2013). 
 In Zervou’s view, the blog “helped quite a bit, bringing into the open issues that [the local 
government] had concealed.” This did not go unnoticed by the local authorities, according to 
Zervou, who said that “they waged war…when you tell the truth and do so eponymously, which 
is what matters most, they fight you.” Despite this, Zervou noted her intention to keep the blog 
operating even after the 2014 municipal elections and regardless of the winner, operating in a 
watchdog role (personal communication, June 3, 2013). 
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6.7 – SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF A POLITICAL NATURE 
6.7.1 – Introduction 
 
Beginning on May 25, 2011 and continuing for approximately two months, the 
“Indignants” protest movement was inarguably the largest mass movement to occur in Greece’s 
post-war history. Based in Syntagma Square in central Athens, the movement spread to major 
squares and public spaces in practically every other major city and town throughout the country. 
In a year where the world saw the development of the “Arab Spring” in North Africa, the 
movement of the “Indignados” in Spain (after which the “Indignants” of Greece borrowed their 
name), and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States and elsewhere, the movement 
of the “Indignants” also garnered global attention from both the media and activists.  
The “Indignants” movement was not the only major social movement to take place in 
Greece during the period being studied, however. Another significant example is the long-
standing activist movement in Skouries, an area in the Halkidiki region of northern Greece, 
where for years controversial gold mining operations have been underway. The opposition to the 
mining activities is of both an economic and environmental nature, and has garnered support 
from activists and solidarity movements both in Greece and internationally. 
In the subsections which follow, the role of social media in inspiring these movements 
and the manner in which social and new media have been used by the activists and protesters 
participating in these movements, will be examined, as will the overall contribution of the social 
and new media use stemming out of these protests, on the public sphere and civil society at large 
in Greece during the years of the economic crisis. 
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6.7.2 – Movement of the “Indignants” 
For Papathanasiou, the “Indignants” protests of 2011 represented a moment of rebirth for 
the Greek public sphere. “It had been years since the public had come out to talk with their 
neighbors, to discuss day-to-day issues which did not have to do with the stock market or 
lifestyle issues,” said Papathanasiou. “2011 was an important year. In 2011, the public was given 
the opportunity to come out onto the squares” (personal communication, December 17, 2012). 
How did it all begin, however? In the days leading up to the launch of the movement, an 
invitation began to circulate on Facebook, calling the Greek public down to Syntagma Square on 
the evening of May 25. According to Christina Papadopoulou, this invitation was the reason she 
decided to participate: “Facebook played a crucial role. The invitation originated from there. 
That’s how I saw it and decided to go. I would not have gone otherwise” (personal 
communication, February 2, 2014). Vazouras, however, viewed the Facebook invitation with 
suspicion. Noting that the Facebook invitation was supposedly the product of one or more young 
people, aged approximately 18-21, Vazouras expressed his opinion that the invitation: 
…contained a rhetoric that was very polished, very cultivated, very revolutionary, and I 
felt that behind this amazing rhetoric, this amazing text that I read, there’s no way young 
people are involved. It was definitely people who are guiding, quote unquote “teachers.” 
(Personal communication, May 31, 2013) 
 
A hint may be provided by Alcestis Baboussi and Dimitris Yalourakis, who stated that they were 
both members of the social media team of the “Indignants.” According to Baboussi, “we 
developed the social media presence along with some other kids,” to which Yalourakis added: 
“the whole [social media] tree was developed by three people.” This included the official 
Facebook page, “Indignants at Syntagma,” which according to Yalourakis had reached 167,000 
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likes. Yalourakis stated: “[w]e took it down, there was no further need for it, the square was 
dispersed” (personal communication, December 15, 2012). 
 Nevertheless, whatever the origins of the Facebook invite and the initial call for citizens 
to come out and protest, the “Indignants” movement took off. Interestingly enough, another 
meme which is said to have circulated on Facebook at this time and which has been credited with 
encouraging the public to come out, may itself have been “fake news.” As Heimonas notes: “The 
‘Indignants’ movement began via a fake news story which circulated on the internet, that the 
Spanish [Indignados] had supposedly raised a banner which read ‘shhh, don’t wake the Greeks,’ 
which never actually existed” (personal communication, February 15, 2013). 
 Social media played a preeminent role in the operation of the protest movement within 
Syntagma Square. As noted by Tsimitakis, “Every other night there was a public assembly which 
was broadcast live online, so everybody could see what was being discussed. There were two 
websites. There was a very active Facebook account” (personal communication, February 13, 
2013). Broumas shares his own perspective on how the movement developed, and how, aside 
from the aforesaid “fake news,” it was influenced by the “Indignados” and other movements: 
The internet helped to bring the Arab Spring, the Spanish Indignados experiences to 
Greece. The whole thing happened when some people spontaneously, on the internet, 
made an appointment in Monastiraki [a central Athens neighborhood] and there were also 
many Spanish people among them, many of them came also from here, from this social 
center [Nosotros], and they believed in direct democracy. And these people decided that, 
okay, we assembled here but from tomorrow, we will go to Syntagma and stay there with 
tents and call for everybody to come. Then the movement of the Indignados of Greece 
started, it became massive, there was a general assembly taking place in Syntagma 
Square which was taking decisions and actually, the general assemblies spread in every 
part of Greece. (Personal communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
Panagopoulos, however, argues that the manner in which the protests developed and the way in 
which social media utilized, mimicked what the “Indignados” of Spain were doing: “[t]heir early 
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operations were mimetic. We did whatever the Spanish ‘Indignados’ did. And because we did 
whatever the Spaniards did, it wasn’t authentic” (personal communication, May 31, 2013).  
For Lardikou, however, social media “was the purest form of knowing what is going on,” 
and served as an important informational and coordinating tool for participants: “they 
[announced] the gatherings…every moment where to go, where not to go, when something 
dodgy was going on, and so it helped for your safety just to know what was going on” (personal 
communication, February 20, 2013). Similarly, for Konstantopoulou, social media played an 
important but secondary role in the movement: 
The [protests] demonstrated a very clear change in the cultural attitude of Greeks. Via 
social media there was more communication. Instead of 25 people speaking, 1,000 people 
could communicate and gather and inform one another about what was happening at 
Syntagma Square…for what supplies might be needed at the square’s medical center, at 
what intersection the cops were waiting…The social media weren’t the impetus for the 
public to arrive, but they were a tool. (Personal communication, February 15, 2013) 
 
 The epicenter of the media and communications activity of the “Indignants” movement 
was the square’s Media Center, which consisted of a multimedia team and a communications 
team According to Kanellopoulou, the Media Center was borne out of the early confusion of the 
first few days of the protests, noting that: 
…some people who had some organizational skills, through some leftist parties or 
student organizations, they tried to [organize an] assembly over these 500,000 people. Of 
course one has to understand that not all could participate in the assembly, but after some 
days and some occasions, we managed to have an assembly of about 2,000-3,000 people. 
This was already too much to handle, and there was a whole substructure [created] in 
order to service the General Assembly. There were a lot of groups. One of them was a 
communication group, multimedia team…[Texts approved by the] General Assembly, 
were transferred to the rest of the population through the social media and our site. There 
was a basic site, let’s just say, the voice of the assembly of Syntagma Square and, in a 
way, the voice of the movement…It was very important, because it spread out to the 
squares of the other cities…It was the central referral point [for the movements in the 
other cities]. (Personal communication, October 3, 2013) 
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Kanellopoulou further noted that anyone who was not a member of the communications team 
could not enter material onto the website without approval of the General Assembly. The strong 
social media presence was maintained as well, according to Kanellopoulou: “The movement had 
the site, but also the Facebook group…Twitter not so much, and the multimedia site…which was 
actually all the audiovisual material that was produced in the square” (personal communication, 
October 3, 2013). Hrisos further described the role and impact of the Media Center: 
The General Assembly…made an early decision about not letting the mainstream media 
film the square’s activities, because people believed that mainstream media in Greece are 
corrupt, so they didn't want them to tell our story through their own disruptive lens. 
That’s why the multimedia team was created. Social media was used to tell the story to 
people that were not present at the square, and also to other cities all around Greece, and 
also to cities all around the world actually, because during those days we had many 
solidarity activities from many countries, from Spain, even from Turkey and other places. 
We used the social media to communicate with these groups and people. They helped us 
form a network. Eventually this network developed into something that is still active 
through e-mailing groups and lists. (Personal communication, July 2, 2013) 
 
Tolios was also a member of the Media Center and details his experience, noting that it was the 
first time that he used Twitter: 
I was then a member of the self-organized Media Center…The movement had three 
milestones: The 15th of June 2011, and the 28th and 29th of June 2011. On the 15th there 
was a great strike which had to be covered by us…in several spots in the city. I can 
remember sitting in a café using wi-fi and tweeting what was going on in the center of 
Athens, and of course the [tear gas] and the police brutality and so on. It was the first 
time in my life that I used Twitter myself, and I could see from then how powerful one 
piece of relevant information, how one relevant photo could become so powerful and 
could shape public opinion. There were some really strong images, for example, of 
policemen beating up bloody, unarmed protestors. Now, you have this image and it is 
really strong. Normally, you would not expect it to be reproduced by traditional media. 
We didn’t expect it, because traditional media were all on the side of the government and 
the memorandum, but it didn’t matter because we could reach [millions of] people at the 
speed of a second. And it was like, what we say, an image is like 1,000 words. It spoke 
for itself. I can remember that we really, as parts of the movement, we didn’t have much 
to write. What was important was to cover, either live or by a photo or video, what was 
going on in downtown Athens. (Personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
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Tolios noted that the Media Center was aided by individuals with prior experience as journalists: 
 
We had a lot of journalists…and activists that were really experienced, trying to create a 
network, especially with foreign media…[I]n the first days, we were trying to set up a 
very standard practice of media correspondence and media communication. Then when 
the great workers’ strikes and the great social mobilization took place…we were trying to 
set up media points in all across Athens, because…the center of Greece was blocked by 
police. At the same time that there was an effort to…penetrate the police [roadblock] and 
go into the square and protest in front of Parliament, there had to be a lot of people that 
were covering it with photos and tweets and Facebook posts and so on. So, this was 
second, to actually set up a social media network that could cover what was going on in 
the city. I think that this became pretty much the greatest bet that we had to achieve…to 
create an anti-news network. (Personal communication, February 22, 2017) 
 
The “Indignants” movement was also significant for the initiatives which were themselves borne 
out of the activities within Syntagma Square. The mindthecam media initiative, for instance, 
was, according to Hrisos, “created…right after the Syntagma Square movement...in September 
2011,” (personal communication, July 2, 2013), while Kanellopoulou noted that several 
members of the multimedia and communications teams founded mindthecam “because we didn’t 
really want to say that there was no square anymore…It just felt like the right thing to do, to keep 
posting things in the blog, to keep it alive” (personal communication, October 3, 2013). 
 Another media initiative borne out of the square was the #rbnews hashtag employed and 
promoted by Radiobubble. Though the hashtag was originally used during the December 2008 
riots, Papathanasiou described how it helped Radiobubble develop its foreign language service: 
Radiobubble brought together many people from Spain who were retweeting news which 
pertained to Syntagma Square. As with everything else at Radiobubble, it wasn’t planned 
but it happened. People at Syntagma who found, via #rbnews, a space to communicate 
what was happening and to come in contact with other people at the square, ended up in 
Radiobubble’s physical space…at some point later that year, Dora [Oikonomides] 
showed up to Radiobubble one day and said “I’m here.” She was the basis for the 
development of…Radiobubble International…a radio program and Twitter [postings] and 
even a publication. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Papathanasiou also described the linkages which were formed with other activists: 
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We came into contact with the communications team of the square…some of its members 
came [to Radiobubble], some joined the Radiobubble team, some others who did not join 
us continued to collaborate with us on social issues. For example, the material we 
collected on Skouries…was obtained from people who had gone there and who were 
present at Syntagma Square… (Personal communication, June 27, 2017) 
 
Indicating social media’s vast reach during the protests, Kounenakis stated that #rbnews was the 
most popular Twitter hashtag in Greece in 2011 (personal communication, June 13, 2017). 
Christina Papadopoulou, whose description of how the Time Bank of Athens and 
Syntagma Square also stemmed out of the “Indignants” protest movement appeared in chapter 5, 
noted that the Time Bank’s implementations of direct democracy procedures was directly 
influenced by the movement, as well as the formation of other new initiatives: 
The concept of non-violent communication, non-violent resistance developed at the 
square, so for me what happened there is extremely significant. And as a result, the Time 
Bank was born and other teams as well, such as the Festival for Solidarity & Cooperative 
Economy, which did not exist. We are speaking again of an initiative without money, yet 
you see everything working so well and people learning things, getting involved, and it’s 
really nice to see this happening. (Personal communication, February 2, 2014) 
 
Other initiatives, movements, and political parties borne out of the “Indignants” protest 
movement have been detailed in earlier chapters, including the Metropolitan Community Clinic 
of Ellinikon, Save Greek Water, Tutorpool, and the United People’s Front (EPAM). 
 Some interviewees, however, argued against the significance of social media in the 
formation of the protest. As stated by Mandravelis: “I’m still wondering who began [the 
movement], because supposedly it started through social media. But what I know is that if a 
young person was so successful on social media, he’d announce it everywhere” (personal 
communication, June 11, 2013). Skarpelos argues that the true significance of the movement 
arises not from the usage of social media, but from what tangibly occurred at the square: 
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Surely many of the people who participated in these movements were young and had a 
connection to social media…and knew how to use them as a mobilization tool and 
wished to do so. And at specific times when it was necessary to quickly mobilize people, 
they were successful. Yet, I believe that their role was not as important as ascribed…The 
true essence was found in real life, in the real meetings in the squares, where there were 
islands of participatory democratic procedures, albeit for a short time. Regardless of what 
mobilized participants to come out for the first time, to repeat it or to remain in the square 
was primarily the result of these procedures. (Personal communication, May 29, 2013) 
 
In Katrougalos’ view, social media’s impact “…was spectacular in the beginning and very weak 
afterwards. They triggered the initial presence of the Indignants in Syntagma Square, but after 
that they played more a role of critique than a role of assembling people” (personal 
communication, July 2, 2013). Gazi also expressed her doubts: “The ‘Indignants’ movement 
theoretically began out of social media, theoretically Greeks came out…when that news from 
Spain circulated…and supposedly that’s how the self-organization of Syntagma began, which 
was a bubble” (personal communication, January 11, 2013). 
Dimitrakopoulou noted the ephemerality of the movement and questioned its impact: 
In Greece we have clusters of people who get together…act as dynamic pressure groups, 
but I think we are lacking in turning this dynamic, into pursuing a specific goal. I mean, 
for example, the movement of the “Indignants,” it was there for almost two months, it 
was very active, a lot of people from very different political backgrounds participated 
there, and after that, the movement dissolved. Where are the “Indignants” now? Did 
things get any better and we didn’t realize that? So, I think that we are lacking in turning 
this reaction into a specific action” (Personal communication, July 5, 2013) 
 
For Tolios, “this movement could have gone on if it had political aims,” (personal 
communication, February 22, 2017), while Masouras was blunter with his assessment: “[t]o be 
frank, the Indignant movement didn’t manage to stave off austerity. They weren’t effective in 
enacting legislation, in getting dirty politicians out of power. They weren’t effective in changing 
the status quo in Brussels” (personal communication, February 23, 2013). 
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 Broumas, however, sees the “Indignants” movement as having had two substantial 
impacts: “[t]he first was that it further delegitimized the system, and the second was that it gave 
people the thought that they had the power in their hands and they could reimagine again what 
kind of society they would like” (personal communication, July 3, 2013), while Efimeros’ in 
view, “it’s often said that the ‘Indignants’ haven’t accomplished anything because they died out. 
In reality, three governments changed…the system was forced into bringing in its backups, 
Papademos, [former interim Prime Minister] Pikramenos…the political system was rattled” 
(personal communication, July 18, 2013). 
6.7.3 – The Skouries Activist Movement 
 
 In a picturesque and rural forested area in the Halkidiki prefecture of northern Greece is 
the region of Skouries, where for several years, a protracted activist movement has been in 
progress, protesting controversial gold mining activities in a privatized tract of land which was 
turned over to Canadian mining conglomerate Eldorado Gold and its Greek subsidiary, Hellas 
Gold, owned by Giorgos Bobolas, for a long time a shareholder in Mega Channel and other 
major mainstream media outlets. The opposition to the gold mining activities is primarily on 
environmental grounds, as it is occurring in an area of virgin old-growth forest and has put the 
surrounding region, sea, and water table at risk of contamination. Opposition also arises based on 
economic arguments that the Greek State’s agreement with Eldorado Gold and Hellas Gold is not 
beneficial to public coffers. Two activist groups are leading the Skouries movement, Antigold 
Greece and SOS Halkidiki, whose activities and usage of social media will be presented. 
 Maria Kadoglou, founder of Antigold Greece, has been participating in the anti-mining 
cause since 1997, initially against a different company, TVX, which was mining in the area. 
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According to her, she started her first activist website in 1999 with little impact, and launched 
her current blog49 in 2008 which received a minimal amount of visitors until the Skouries issue 
became widely known in early 2013. This blog contains news not just from Skouries, but other 
similar cases throughout the country and the world. Kadoglou notes that “we don’t want to be a 
populist blog, we try to maintain standards, to rebut arguments with scientific evidence…” while 
adding that “we have no business engaging in dialogue with private investors. Our dialogue is 
with the Greek State” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 Regarding Antigold’s online presence, Kadoglou states that two individuals actively 
work on the organization’s social media accounts, the group is active on Facebook and Twitter, 
where updates and stories which don’t get published on the main blog are also posted, as well as 
photos, as well as retweets and shares of stories pertaining to mining activity from around the 
world. Twitter, in particular, was singled out by Kadoglou for its influence: “Twitter, especially, 
has greatly helped in the immediate dissemination of information, such as last August [2012] 
when riot police invaded Ierissos [town near Skouries] without cause or reason. I posted two 
words on Twitter and within minutes it was chaos.” Kadoglou highlighted another incident, an 
arson attack at Skouries, as the spark which finally attracted mainstream attention to Skouries, on 
the part of mainstream media and activists from outside the region: 
Response increased dramatically…after the arson attack in Skouries. Until then there was 
total silence by the media and the internet. No one covered us, we would organize 
demonstrations with thousands of participants and nothing would be heard. Everything 
changed when they could hide it no longer hide the issue. From that point forward there 
has been a tremendous amount of support for the cause from all over Greece, the public is 
very interactive on the blog, Twitter, and Facebook, whereas in the past the blog was not 
very well known. (Personal communication, July 4, 2013) 
 
                                               
49 See https://www.antigoldgr.org. 
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Kadoglou notes that online outlet Omnia TV (to be introduced in chapter 7) and Radiobubble 
were the first outlets to draw attention to the cause, along with social media, while many foreign 
journalists learned about Skouries via the Antigold blog. Kadoglou further stated that her group 
began blogging in English 3-4 times per week, in addition to posting English-language videos, in 
order to internationalize the issue. Kadoglou added that the organization disseminates videos as 
well, but only video recorded by other individuals. (Personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 According to Kadoglou, response was swift from the political system: “[e]specially on 
Twitter, with those two superstars Adonis Georgiadis and Giorgos Mouroutis. Nothing more 
need be said. They’ve taken on the responsibility of supporting the investment, writing nonsense 
to which I don’t respond…The most you can do is embarrass them.” Kadoglou also described a 
sharp division within the local community, including an incident where a local Facebook page 
supporting the mining activities pictured Antigold members under a banner reading “traitors.” 
Kadoglou further noted an incident where Hellas Gold’s Facebook page was exposed for having 
10,000 fake likes from Russian accounts. According to Kadoglou, after the issue went viral on 
Facebook, the fake likes were removed (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 Environmentalist Mary Christianou is a volunteer with the region’s other activist 
organization, SOS Halkidiki,50 administering the organization’s blog and social media accounts. 
She stated that she had been actively participating in the cause since early 2012 and that she 
worked professionally for Katerina Igglezi, a member of parliament with SYRIZA.  
 Christianou explained the reasons SOS Halkidiki was founded: “Τhe media, especially 
the Greek media, didn’t pay any attention at all, so we were kind of silenced. We really needed 
to get the message out and inform people and tell them about both this social movement, but also 
                                               
50 See https://soshalkidiki.wordpress.com. 
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the scientific facts.” While SOS Halkidiki maintained an active Facebook and Twitter presence, 
Christianou said that the blog was the most important medium in the organization’s view, noting 
also the difficulties with operating it: 
The blog is more official than Facebook and Twitter. Twitter, we usually use it for fast 
transfer of information, like “two people were arrested, please help because this 
happened,” and we also use it for informing that there is a new post on the blog. What is 
uploaded on the blog is a bit of a difficult process, because it is supposed to represent an 
organization of many people coming from different political and philosophical 
standpoints.…The other thing is that we have to cross-reference our information. We 
never upload something that we are not sure of…We compromise on the speed to have 
more accurate information. (Personal communication, July 6, 2013) 
 
In addition, SOS Halkidiki also publishes an e-magazine and also heavily uses YouTube to post 
videos. Foreign language content was also produced and published by SOS Halkidiki. In all, four 
people were actively involved with the organization’s blog and social media accounts, plus four 
more individuals who were active on occasion. Christianou stated that SOS Halkidiki was 
launched with the participation of 30-40 people, that an average of 100-150 people attend its 
local assemblies, and that committees have been established in each village in the region 
(personal communication, July 6, 2013). 
 Similarly to Kadoglou, Christianou noted significant variations in the amount of visitors 
the blog received, depending on local developments, citing an average of 2,000 visitors per day 
and spikes when “something big happens.” For instance, the blog had 10,000 visitors in a three-
day period when riot police invaded Ierissos. Christianou expressed her belief that SOS Halkidiki 
“needs to somehow find a way to…attract more permanent readers.” Regarding the attention 
afforded to the issue by the mainstream media, Christianou said that the lack of coverage: 
…was on purpose. They were directed. Maybe they had orders not to bring it up. In this 
situation following the crisis, they don’t want to bring this issue that is connected to what 
is happening to the country, selling out natural resources, destroying the environment. 
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They are very delicate issues the mainstream media don’t want to inform people about. 
It's on purpose. (Personal communication, July 6, 2013) 
 
When, according to Christianou, the issue could no longer be concealed, “...the mainstream 
media tried to twist the message and presented it as we are the terrorists or we are completely 
uneducated and don’t want development. But because the [issue] became known… we got into 
the game through internet and social media.” Additionally, through these online efforts, as stated 
by Christianou, the issue became known in Canada (where Eldorado Gold is based) and drew the 
attention of activists there, including Naomi Klein (personal communication, July 6, 2013). 
 According to Panagopoulos, “No one in Greece would have learned what was happening 
in Skouries without social media…it’s been going on for years and the public just found out 
now” (personal communication, May 31, 2013), while Wherlock noted that through the activists’ 
efforts on social media, the issue drew attention outside of the Skouries region, with many 
activists involved with the Skouries issue being based in Athens (personal communication, April 
3, 2013). Drot noted that #skouries had trended second in the world on Twitter earlier in 2013, 
and that through the coverage he provided to the issue on his own site, okeanews.gr, the issue 
became known in France, leading to a journalist from Le Monde reporting on the story (personal 
communication, May 24, 2013). Conversely, Tachiaou cited Skouries as an example that has 
been magnified on social media: “There was a demonstration yesterday. I was there and there 
were very few people. If you look at Facebook and Twitter…everybody is against this 
investment…there were not more than 1,500-2,000 people. Facebook and Twitter…are not very 




6.8 – SURVEY: VIEWS ON SOCIAL MEDIA’S IMPACT ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 The results of the electronic survey questionnaire provide a wealth of insights relating to 
the views of the respondents in the three populations sampled—editors of major Greek 
newspapers, Greek members of the European Parliament, and representatives of civil society and 
citizens’ organizations—on the potential impact of social and new media on politics, political 
movements, activism, and social movements in Greece during the period studied. 
 The political preference of respondents, with regard to the party they voted for in the 
2014 European parliamentary elections, was greatly divided, with a plurality expressing their 
support for SYRIZA, with the next highest parties (New Democracy, Golden Dawn, and the 
KKE) far behind, though over a fifth of respondents did not provide an answer. A more even 
split was observed when respondents were asked about their party preference for the 2014 local 
and municipal elections, with SYRIZA ranking first (with less than a fifth of respondents), 
followed by PASOK (running as “Elia”), Golden Dawn and independent candidates, and over a 
quarter of respondents not providing a response at all. Going back to the 2009 European 
parliamentary elections as a point of comparison, SYRIZA again finished first in terms of 
support amongst respondents, followed by New Democracy and PASOK. For the 2010 local and 
municipal elections, SYRIZA was again first in terms of support but at low levels (less than one-
sixth of the sample) and over a quarter of respondents not answering. For the national 
parliamentary elections of May 2012, SYRIZA was first amongst respondents with a plurality 
and was trailed significantly by PASOK-Elia and Golden Dawn, while once again, over a quarter 
of the sample did not reply. There was a slight shift in terms of preference for the June 2012 
parliamentary elections, with SYRIZA’s support declining but still remaining first, followed by 
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New Democracy, PASOK-Elia and Golden Dawn, and over a quarter of participants not 
responding. The results of the prior six questions showed a marked preference amongst 
newspapers for “mainstream” left-wing parties, while representatives of civil society 
organizations generally preferred parties further to the left of the political spectrum. 
 Regarding politics and media bias, an overwhelming majority of respondents—
particularly newspaper editors—agreed that the mainstream media in Greece are biased against 
certain political parties. Here, a much smaller of members of the European Parliament, but 
nevertheless a majority of such respondents, agreed. A clear majority of the sample felt that the 
mainstream media demonstrated a bias in favor of New Democracy, PASOK-Elia, and To 
Potami in that order, while on the contrary, a plurality of the sample (and a particularly low 
percentage of elected officials) believed that there was a mainstream media bias against 
SYRIZA, followed by Golden Dawn and the Independent Greeks. Furthermore, SYRIZA was 
overwhelmingly cited as the party which was believed to enjoy the most support amongst social 
media users in Greece, followed far behind by Golden Dawn and To Potami. Interestingly, 
despite a reputation as being “the party of Facebook,” only approximately one-sixth of 
respondents named the Independent Greeks as being the party with the most social media 
support. Overall, almost two-thirds of respondents, and an overwhelming majority of newspaper 
editors polled, agreed that the discourse which takes place on social media is biased against 
specific political parties. Notably here, almost half of elected officials answered “no” compared 
to less than one-sixth of the overall sample. New Democracy was cited as the party which was 
believed to have experienced the biggest decline in support as a result of the coverage it received 
on social and new media, followed closely behind by PASOK-Elia, mirroring the electoral 
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decline of the two previously incumbent parties in Greek politics. On the other hand, a small 
plurality of respondents felt that Facebook and Twitter users were biased towards SYRIZA, 
while notably, the Independent Greeks barely registered despite its social media reputation. 
 On the topic of perceptions regarding the way in which politicians and political parties in 
Greece used social and new media, the extent to which social media tools were implemented by 
politicians and parties in their daily operations was viewed as fairly significant by respondents, 
with scores relatively even across all three sample populations. Facebook was cited as the most 
commonly-used social media platform for politicians, followed closely by Twitter. Regarding the 
influence of social and new media on the quality of governance in Greece, respondents displayed 
near-neutrality in terms of significance of impact. Furthermore, social media’s impact on the 
quality of governance was viewed as slightly negative in terms of influence, with members of the 
European Parliament again providing the highest (and only slightly positive) score, while 
newspaper editors provided viewed the impact of social media on quality of governance as fairly 
negative. 
On the issue of social and new media’s impact on government transparency, a slightly 
positive impact on transparency was ascertained by respondents, with members of the European 
Parliament and newspaper editors providing the most positive outlooks on both accounts. 
Regarding the positive or negative impact of social and new media on the transparency of 
political parties, respondents were almost neutral overall, with members of the European 
Parliament providing the most positive outlook and representatives of civil society groups 
providing the most negative. On whether social and new media were influential in terms of the 
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outcome of the parliamentary elections of 2012, a slightly significant outcome was found, with 
members of the European Parliament most strongly agreeing. 
 Regarding which party or parties were believed to have benefited the most from social 
and new media, SYRIZA was overwhelmingly the top choice, followed far behind by To Potami, 
Golden Dawn, and the Independent Greeks. Specifically looking at the parliamentary elections of 
May 2012, SYRIZA was cited as the party which benefited the most from social and new media, 
with almost half of overall respondents and almost three-fourths of elected officials sharing this 
view. SYRIZA was followed by Golden Dawn, New Democracy, and the Independent Greeks. 
Results were almost exactly the same among respondents with regard to the June 2012 
parliamentary elections. KKE, mirroring the commonly-held sentiment that the party was 
technophobic, was widely cited as the party which benefited the least from social and new 
media, followed by the two previously incumbent parties, New Democracy and PASOK-Elia. 
KKE was also cited as the party which benefited the least from social and new media prior to the 
May 2012 elections and again prior to the June 2012 elections. SYRIZA was overwhelmingly 
noted as the party which, overall, makes the most effective use of social media in its operations, 
followed far behind by To Potami and Golden Dawn. Among parties that were believed to make 
the least effective use of social and new media, New Democracy was first, followed by the KKE. 
An almost even split was found between those who believed the outcome of the 2012 
parliamentary elections would have been different if not for the influence of social and new 
media, with a small plurality answering “yes” or “probably yes.” The effectiveness of 
candidates’ overall implementation of social and new media in their campaigns for the 2012 
parliamentary elections was viewed as neutral, while the effectiveness of the usage of social 
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media tools by candidates and political parties participating in the 2014 was viewed as having 
improved, with a slightly positive score overall. The highest assessment was provided by 
members of the European Parliament and the lowest by newspaper editors, who nevertheless 
viewed the effectiveness as slightly positive. A slightly lower—and slightly positive—evaluation 
regarding the effectiveness of social media use by candidates and parties in the 2014 local and 
municipal elections was provided by respondents, with newspaper editors providing the most 
negative outlook, and representatives of civil society organizations the most positive. 
Overall, respondents agreed to a significant extent that the internet, social media, and new 
media provided the public the opportunity to learn more about candidates in the 2014 elections in 
Greece, as compared to years past, with representatives of civil society groups and members of 
the European Parliament providing an extremely positive outlook on this account. On social and 
new media’s impact upon the quality and level of campaigning for the 2014 European 
parliamentary elections, the three populations agreed that there was indeed impact, while the 
social and new media’s impact on the quality of campaigning was just above neutral, with the 
highest score provided by civil society representatives. Looking at the local and municipal 
elections in 2014, social and new media’s significance upon the quality and level of campaigning 
was neutral, while the impact of social and new media on the quality of campaigning for these 
elections was determined to be slightly negative, with newspaper editors providing the most 
negative view, and representatives of civil society the only positive view on this measure. 
Regarding the impact of social and new media on the transparency maintained by the 
parties and candidates participating in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, the survey 
results illustrated that these media did favorably affect transparency, with the highest assessment 
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coming from members of the European Parliament. The quality of impact was found to also be 
slightly positive, with members of the European Parliament again providing the highest 
evaluation. Looking at transparency and social media’s impact in the 2014 local and municipal 
elections, a slightly higher rating was found for local elections compared to the European 
elections, with members of the European Parliament again providing the highest ranking. 
Regarding the political party or parties which were felt to have benefited the most from 
social and new media in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, SYRIZA was 
overwhelmingly first, followed by To Potami and Golden Dawn, while the Independent Greeks, 
the purported “party of Facebook,” were barely measured. For that year’s local and municipal 
elections, SYRIZA was also overwhelmingly first, trailed by New Democracy and Golden 
Dawn. In terms of the one party which was believed to have benefited the most from social and 
new media in the European parliamentary elections, a plurality chose SYRIZA, followed 
significantly behind by Golden Dawn. Once again, the Independent Greeks were barely 
measured. Concerning the party which was felt to have been hurt the most by social and new 
media in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, a plurality selected New Democracy, 
followed by the “technophobic” KKE, and PASOK-Elia. Identical results were recorded for the 
2014 local and municipal elections. 
When asked whether they believed social and new media impacted the final outcome of 
the 2014 European parliamentary elections, a plurality of respondents answered “yes” or 
“probably yes.” Regarding that year’s local and municipal elections, however, a tie was recorded 
between those who answered “yes” or “probably yes” and those who responded “no” or 
“probably no,” though the single most popular response was “probably no.” A majority felt that 
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the usage of social and new media tools increased in the electoral contests of 2014 as compared 
to the 2012 parliamentary elections, while none of the respondents answered “no.” 
In the section of the survey questionnaire made available only to members of the 
European Parliament, an overwhelming majority stated that they maintained official social media 
accounts as part of their elected position, with Facebook being by far the most popularly used 
social medium, followed by Twitter and YouTube. Facebook was also the social medium most 
utilized during the 2014 electoral campaign, and also the social medium most widely used as part 
of the elected officials’ political duties. 
Overall, the impact of social and new media on the candidates’ campaigns was viewed as 
fairly significant, with no elected official providing a negative response. Social media was also 
evaluated as having a fairly positive impact upon the elected officials’ jobs. A plurality of the 
respondents stated that they spent 1-2 hours per day on average for the maintenance of their 
online presence and social media accounts, while a small majority of the elected representatives 
stated that they planned to increase their usage of social and new media tools in the next electoral 
contest that they participate in. 
Interestingly, almost half of the elected representatives did not provide an answer when 
asked whether they personally wrote and posted on their social media accounts or had a staffer or 
adviser for this purpose. A wide majority of the elected representatives stated that they interacted 
with voters and the general public via social media, and an equal percentage felt that social 
media aided them in their ability to communicate with their constituents and the general public. 
The elected representatives were entirely neutral when asked whether the feedback they received 
 347 
from the public via the internet and social media impacted their positions or their political work, 
though the responses provided leaned negative. 
In evaluating the specific ways in which the elected representatives used social and new 
media, the most popular ways in which these mediums were used were: answering messages 
from constituents, publicizing news about themselves and their political activity, and publicizing 
articles that they have written. These were followed by the publicizing of press releases, 
responding to comments or tweets on social media, political commentary, and posting 
multimedia. One step down from the above was the utilization of social and new media for the 
purposes of distributing a newsletter or communicating with other members of the European 
Parliament. Below this, just less than half of respondents answered that they utilize social and 
new media to communicate with other members from the same party, to communicate with 
journalists, to repost or share news about their political party, to follow other politicians’ social 
media accounts, to follow other parties’ social media accounts, or to post non-political content 
about themselves. Just over a quarter of respondents stated that they used social and new media 
to communicate with European Union officials, to communicate with international officials, to 
republish articles from other sources, or to follow the social media accounts of journalists or 
media outlets. 
Trolling was identified as a problem impacting the quality of online political discourse in 
Greece by a large majority of elected officials, with its prevalence ranked as slightly significant 
and its impact on the quality of online discourse ranked as significantly negative. 
Out of the elected representatives, a wide majority stated that their party maintained an 
official social media presence, with Facebook, Twitter and YouTube equally chosen as the most 
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preferred social mediums, followed closely by blogs. Furthermore, Facebook and blogs were 
equally cited as the single most used social media platform by the elected representatives’ 
political parties. Out of the respondents, an overwhelming majority stated that their political 
party had utilized social media for electoral campaigning in 2014, with Facebook cited as the 
most commonly used social medium. Notably, almost half of the elected representatives declined 
to respond when asked whether their party maintained an official social media policy. A large 
majority of elected officials stated their belief that their party more heavily emphasized social 
media for the purposes of campaigning in the 2014 elections, as compared to the 2012 
parliamentary elections. 
Specifically looking at the 2014 European parliamentary elections, the significance of 
social media’s impact on the campaign efforts of their political party was viewed with an 
increased level of significance, while the quality of social media’s impact also increased, to a 
fairly positive score. Looking ahead, the elected officials felt that social and new media would 
play a significant role in Greece’s political landscape in the upcoming years, while their 
expectations as to the quality of this impact were somewhat positive. 
Finally, returning all 23 responses and examining the impact of social and new media 
upon social movements, respondents felt the role of social and new media in inspiring protests 
movements in Greece in recent years was fairly significant, with results similar across the three 
populations. They also believed there was an important role ascribed to the role of social and 
new media in inspiring the “Indignants” protest movement in 2011, with representatives of civil 
society organizations—likely the most connected to social movements—providing the highest 
score. Significantly a majority of respondents answered “no” or “probably no” when asked 
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whether they believed if a movement such as that of the “Indignants” would have been possible 
without the influence of social and new media, while only approximately one quarter of 
respondents answered “yes” or “probably yes.” 
Overall, what can be observed from the preceding survey results is a general view that 
SYRIZA is the political party which was most helped by social and new media, followed to a 
lesser extent by To Potami, while the parties that were generally viewed as having been helped 
the least by social and new media were the KKE, New Democracy, and PASOK-Elia. The 
Independent Greeks, with a reputation as the “party of Facebook,” were not identified as having 
been particularly assisted by social media or particularly effective as a party in utilizing such 
tools. Optimism towards social and new media and their impact on transparency in government 
and the political sphere was modest, was the impact of social and new media upon political 
campaigning, although an upward trend was noticed between 2010, 2012, and 2014. Their 
impact was also viewed as being more significant and positive overall for candidates running in 
the European parliamentary elections, as compared to local and municipal races. The primacy of 
Facebook for political use was noted, especially amongst elected representatives, as was an 
increasing trend towards social media use by members of the European Parliament. Finally, the 
significant impact of social media on the development of social movements and protests in 
Greece in recent years was demonstrated by the survey results. 
6.9 – DISCUSSION 
 The general consensus amongst interviewees was that social and new media had 
impacted politics to some degree in Greece, though the extent to which such tools had played a 
role in altering the political landscape was up for debate. Likewise, social and new media were 
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recognized as having had some influence upon social movements, though again, the full extent to 
which such tools had influenced protests and activism in Greece was debatable. 
 For Oikonomou, the role of social and new media in the public dialogue became more 
prominent in Greece concurrently with the collapse of the post-dictatorship two-party system, a 
development which is “not unrelated” in his view (personal communication, April 10, 2013). In 
the view of Panagopoulos, social and new media had not impacted the political landscape per se, 
but he noted three impacts on politics more broadly: exposure (where politicians are exposed to 
commenting and feedback), memory (where their words—and gaffes—remain online after the 
fact), and campaigning (as it has shifted online due to a lack of financial resources during the 
economic crisis) (personal communication, May 31, 2013). Broumas argues that: 
…nobody right now in Greece, no power, any kind of power, economic, political, can 
ignore the power of social media. If something starts getting viral…it cannot be ignored. 
Immediately they have to answer. I believe that the old parties don’t have a specific 
model, they are trying to find models. (Personal communication, July 3, 2013) 
 
Similarly, for Karamanolis, the use of social and new media as a “bulletin board” by politicians 
had been prevalent until around 2011 or 2012, but he observed a “paradigm shift” where 
politicians could “no longer ignore” social media, noting its agenda-setting role: “…the political 
agenda is altered by the internet and the organized participation of the public and their 
expression of dissatisfaction or some opinion as to what direction things should head towards” 
(personal communication, October 19, 2013). 
 For Andritsos, social media have helped place politicians in Greece under public scrutiny 
for the first time, stating: “[t]here is a problem with accountability in Greece...[social media] 
place the politician under a form of social oversight and accountability” (personal 
communication, April 12, 2013), while Hrisos notes that “because this dialogue is public, 
 351 
[politicians] are kind of obliged to respond. If they don’t respond, then they form a bad profile” 
(personal communication, July 2, 2013) 
 For Adamidis, social media now play a prime agenda-setting role in the news cycle: “a 
politician may give…a very interesting interview on a television program. If this interview is not 
reproduced on social media…few people will notice. But even a mundane interview, if 
reproduced on social media, creates a new cycle of publicity” (personal communication, April 
10, 2013). Boubouka adds that “a substantial portion of public dialogue has moved to social 
media…Whereas you used to await the intervention of a politician or party in the evening news, 
this has shifted to their Twitter accounts in the morning” (personal communication, May 31, 
2013), while Niflis notes that many politicians “now send press releases to online media first 
before sending them to traditional media” (personal communication, December 18, 2012). 
Similarly, Konstantinopoulos notes that the political system has been transformed because 
anything a politician tweets becomes news, adding that politicians no longer have a need to “call 
journalists or grant an exclusive interview” (personal communication, September 3, 2014). 
Contogeorgis argues that governments “…have lost the advantage of controlling and 
disseminating information. They’ve lost the communications monopoly” (personal 
communication, December 19, 2016), while according to Vasilopoulos, many politicians prefer 
Twitter and Facebook [in order to] bypass journalists and uncomfortable questions in order to 
present what they want (personal communication, June 5, 2013). In Tzimeros’ view, “[political] 
communication is no longer unidirectional, you can learn and grasp the pulse of the public” 
(personal communication, June 5, 2013). Kanellopoulou feels that social and new media “have 
not really played an important role…to really create from zero something really new. But they 
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have played a really important role of discrediting the status quo” (personal communication, 
October 3, 2013), while Karvounopoulos describes a political landscape that is “in shock” 
because “…politicians were not accustomed to hearing from citizens and to often be humiliated 
by one message while being unable to respond” (personal communication, June 28, 2013). 
Vlachos argues that social and new media have enabled political parties to target “specialized 
demographics” (personal communication, November 26, 2013), which may relate to the view of 
Valios Roupis, social media manager at enikos.gr, who argues that the mass political rallies of 
the past are now dead in the social media era (personal communication, April 12, 2013).  
 Dimitrakopoulou argues that social media have been instrumentalized by politicians: 
…as a new tool for getting votes. There is no new media strategy on behalf of the 
politicians. There are very few cases who actually have a group of experienced people 
who understand how new media work and use this media in favor of enriching the 
relation of the politician with the citizenry. (Personal communication, July 5, 2013) 
 
In turn, Andriotakis adds that the use of social and new media by politicians “is shallow and 
without understanding…They’re not afraid of social media but they’re paralyzed…[social 
media] are too interactive for them. It’s not just that politicians are incapable, it’s that they are 
very conservative” (personal communication, May 27, 2013). Mandravelis notes that there has 
been “very little” impact on politics from social media (personal communicat ion, June 11, 2013), 
while Psara argues that “very few politicians have used social media as a component of their 
policymaking” (personal communication, November 11, 2013). In turn, Kapi argues that social 
and new media have become “fashionable” for politicians, who think that they are coming closer 
to the public via these tools, adding that “there have been no substantial political discussions and 
interventions in the political sphere” as a result of these tools (personal communication, June 3, 
2013). Makri argues that the political dialogue taking place via social media has replicated 
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offline dialogue, stating that these tools have been used “…aimlessly, for petty issues and rumors 
and innuendo. They are not used for political purposes…” (personal communication, November 
12, 2013), while Al-Saleh, highlighting an example with SYRIZA-owned newspaper Avgi was 
caught utilizing fake accounts on social media, expresses her opinion that social media are being 
used “against democracy, against the truth” (personal communication, January 11, 2014). 
 With regard to the potential influence of social and new media on social and protest 
movements, Zenakos notes two impacts: “[f]ueling activism, particularly the decision of 
someone to participate on the one hand, and in documenting police violence, I think that social 
and new media have been instrumental” (personal communication, July 19, 2013). Christos 
Kotsireas, a photoreporter and journalist with Vmedia.gr, argued that the political system: 
…is beginning to understand that the impact of media from below and of social media is 
something that they ultimately underestimated. They were counting on the public 
engaging in clicktivism, but things are not so simple. We saw the major role that social 
media played in the protests of 2011 and 2012 in Greece, where they were also used as a 
means of organizing. (Personal communication, July 2, 2013) 
 
Tsimitakis stated that “[e]very possible strike, every possible demonstration in the center of 
Athens, is followed by tens or hundreds of Twitter users, Facebook users, bloggers, who follow 
the events, report on the events, talk about the events, constructing a narrative around them” 
(personal communication, February 13, 2013), while Contogeorgis credits social media’s impact 
for creating movements which occur in physical space, while also formulating a political critical 
mass, adding his view that social and new media have fostered political intervention based on 
individual action instead of mass action, even if the individual participates with others (personal 
communication, December 19, 2016). Panagopoulos views social media’s impact as significant 
for issues such as Skouries, but also for small, ad hoc protests (personal communication, May 31, 
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2013), while Iordanoglou argues that social media have helped “those who already had an active 
role [in activism] organize more easily” (personal communication, May 29, 2013). 
 On the contrary, Giannakidis views social and new media as a double-edged sword when 
it comes to activism: “sometimes they mobilize the public, as with the ‘Indignants’ but the 
opposite also occurs: people don’t mobilize, don’t take to the streets, they prefer to make a ‘like’ 
on a protest page and that’s it” (personal communication, April 5, 2013), while Dourou notes that 
social media have served as an outlet for people’s anger, but it remains to be seen what political 


























Chapter 7: Social and New Media and their Impact on the Media Sphere 
 
7.1 – INTRODUCTION 
 In chapter 2 and in chapter 4, several of the longstanding pathologies of the Greek 
mainstream media landscape were introduced. These include the prevalence of clientelism and 
“diaploki,” the overly politicized nature of the press and most mainstream media outlets, the 
haphazard and inconsistent regulatory framework within which the broadcast sector has operated 
in Greece, the closed market for broadcast news outlets created by the existing legislation, and 
the credibility crisis suffered by institutions such as the mass media and the press. 
In this chapter, the manner in which new, primarily online-based or online-only media 
outlets have differentiated themselves from Greece’s traditional media outlets (television 
stations, radio stations, and the press) will be examined, as well as the manner in which social 
and new media tools have been adopted both by these newly-formed outlets. Furthermore, the 
extent to which these new online outlets may potentially be serving as alternatives to Greece’s 
mainstream media, presenting differing perspectives on political and social issues, will be 
analyzed. In addition, the credibility of these newly-created media outlets and of social and new 
media more broadly as sources of news and information, and the extent to which they may be 
considered more credible than mainstream media outlets, will also be examined. 
Interviewees’ perspectives on the issues of clientelism and “diaploki” and on the 
perceived credibility crisis of the Greek mainstream media will be presented. This will be 
followed by three illustrative examples, focusing on three distinct media entities: the Skai Media 
Group, enikos.gr, and Radiobubble. Following this, the role of ERT and the impact of the protest 
movement and worker-occupied broadcasts following the closure of ERT, including the role of 
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social and online media in this movement, will be looked at. Mainstream media and the extent to 
which they have adopted social and new media will then follow. After this, several new media 
initiatives and entities, many of which are primarily or exclusively based online, will be 
introduced and presented, with an examination at how they might be operating as alternatives to 
Greece’s mainstream media outlets, how they have implemented social and new media in their 
operations, and to what extent they could be said to have been borne out of the economic crisis 
or the mainstream media’s credibility crisis. Results of the electronic survey questionnaires will 
then be presented, followed by a discussion on the overall impact of social and new media upon 
Greece’s mediascape during the period of the economic crisis. This chapter directly correlates 
with RQ3 and subquestions 3 and 4 of this research project. 
7.2 – PERSPECTIVES ON CLIENTELISM AND “DIAPLOKI” 
 For Zenakos, “diaploki” is synonymous with political power: 
The state in Greece is political power, is judicial power, is a very tight group of financial 
players that control the vast majority of the sectors of the economy: shipping, 
construction, mining, tourism, the big things. They’re in the hands of perhaps 10 people 
between them, who also own the media. It’s like saying the state is the courts, the state is 
the police, the state is the dueling parties, the state is the businessmen, and they’re all 
together, they flock to each other. (Personal communication, July 19, 2013) 
 
Contogeorgis, in turn, sees “diaploki” as a reproduction of the central state and political system:  
Without a doubt, the central system reproduces itself at all levels, from local government, 
to the media, the political parties, the unions, the collectives, everywhere it reproduces 
itself, specifically its personality-driven and individualist character which produces 
clientelist politics…[Television] is transformed into a space where politics is produced, it 
is the space where the political system is constructed and where it operates in reality… 
The Parliament may be the government, the stage, but in reality this stage is constructed 
at will by television, determining the agenda, who will be represented, who will speak, 
who won’t speak… (Personal communication, December 19, 2016) 
 
Christoforidis, in explaining the system of “diaploki,” defines it as distorted: 
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There existed this distortion where those who owned newspapers were businesspeople 
who were active in other industries. They did not seek to operate a media outlet that 
would be viable or profitable and to make a living from that, with some few exceptions. 
They sought to take advantage of this medium in order to earn profits from their other 
ventures. This meant, of course, that the news was biased. Successive governments took 
advantage of this to shape public opinion and to pass through the major media outlets the 
government’s perspective. (Personal communication, May 27, 2013) 
 
Vaxevanis connects the “diaploki” system with the lack of enforceable broadcast regulation: 
 
The mass media landscape in Greece is anarchic, and this is intentional. It did not emerge 
as the result of some oversight. In Greece, to operate even a kiosk you need a permit, yet 
the television stations are unlicensed. They’re illegal, their legal status is renewed each 
year [by the Parliament]…and this happens because in this way, a hostage situation 
develops between the media moguls and the political system. Prior to elections, the 
government will blackmail the television stations that they will not receive a license, and 
for the next four years the television stations will blackmail the government as to whether 
they will provide it with support or not. (Personal communication, March 6, 2013) 
 
Kotsireas describes the development and existence of the “diaploki” system as “the biggest 
problem which exists today with regards to how the public is informed” (personal 
communication, July 2, 2013), while Efimeros described how his outlet, The Press Project, was:  
…approached by a major business mogul, who told us that he liked very much what we 
were doing and didn’t not want an under-the-table agreement, just to be informed if there 
were any stories about him he should be aware about. In other words, not to target him. 
(Personal communication, July 18, 2013) 
 
In Tsimitakis’ view, this situation has become harmful for Greece’s mainstream media system in 
the midst of the economic crisis: “[t]he media industry in Greece is collapsing due to the crisis. 
Not only the economic crisis, but also the particularities, the certain vulnerabilities of the specific 
national media industry in Greece, which has to do with corruption” (personal communication, 
February 13, 2013), while Kammenos connects the “diaploki” system with an increase in 
popularity of social media for news and information: “I believe that in terms of their intervention 
in public life, social media will continue to play an even bigger role because the Greek mass 
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media are controlled by people who maintain business relationships with the state” (personal 
communication, October 11, 2013). 
7.3 – PERSPECTIVES ON THE MASS MEDIA’S CREDIBILITY CRISIS 
Karvounopoulos connects “diaploki” with the growing credibility crisis suffered by the 
mass media in Greece, though he cautions that the credibility crisis itself predates social media:  
[t]here is a huge credibility crisis, which is due to the fact that the citizens have become 
convinced, for years now, that the news and information they receive is part of the 
‘diaploki’ system, which these days they consider primarily responsible for the situation 
the country is in. (Personal communication, June 28, 2013) 
 
Vasilopoulos, in turn, connects both “diaploki” and the media’s crisis of credibility, with the 
economic crisis and the stance of the media towards the economic policies of austerity: 
There is a major credibility crisis, because in Greece the publishers are intertwined with 
state and economic interests. These are the same public works contractors who in all the 
preceding years got wealthy due to their transactions with the state. They are heavily 
indebted, dependent on the banks, and only the protection afforded by the state and the 
banks is keeping them afloat…The public realized this in a very odious way during the 
economic crisis…while the same mass media and publishers tell them how great the 
policies of austerity are, and the cuts and firings. (Personal communication, June 5, 2013) 
 
Vaxevanis noted that journalists were very much a part of this system of “diaploki,” stating: “the 
fourth estate, instead of serving as a watchdog towards other institutions, became part of 
them…Dozens of journalists are employed in government press offices while also working as 
journalists, a conflict of interest” (personal communication, March 6, 2013). 
Beyond just questioning the reliability of the media, some interviewees described the 
credibility crisis as being the product of anger towards the media and other national institutions 
more broadly. In the words of Fotinaki: “There is not just a crisis but anger too, and it’s 
understandable…when the audience realizes that it is being fooled, at some point it withdraws its 
trust” (personal communication, July 5, 2013). Niflis notes that “nowadays the public is angry at 
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everyone, including the journalists and all the media, and does not trust television and the 
newspapers, because…they have shown that they represent certain interests” (personal 
communication, December 18, 2012), while Skarpelos highlighted one of the rallying cries at the 
protests of the “Indignants” in 2011, “bums, snitches, journalists,” which were accompanied by 
an open palm gesture towards journalists which is considered insulting in the Greek culture 
(personal communication, May 29, 2013). Dourou connects the media’s credibility crisis to a 
broader institutional credibility crisis: “We are living in a period where the citizens have not just 
discredited privately-owned television [but also] the unions, the parties, the Parliament and 
parliamentary procedures, and not without reason” (personal communication, July 3, 2013), 
while Andriotakis noted that political forces on both the left and the right have also utilized 
“extreme rhetoric” against the traditional media when deemed to be politically expedient 
(personal communication, May 27, 2013). 
 Other interviewees cited a chasm between the media and the public. As stated by 
Mandravelis, “[the media] never cared about the audience…they did not strive to serve the 
audience but instead to serve and not to disappoint the politicians” (personal communication, 
June 11, 2013). Madalena Papadopoulou stated that young people “have often seen a disconnect 
between the images of a televised report and what is actually being said…and realizes that it is 
an attempt at propaganda” (personal communication, November 11, 2013). Zenakos referenced 
his own personal experience working at a major newspaper, claiming that: “you were always 
encouraged to look down on your readers. It was very clear that you were in a position of 
power.” (personal communication, July 19, 2013). Baganis stated that, for years, journalists “did 
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not know the truth [about corruption]…it’s not that they knew and they concealed it, it’s that they 
didn’t know what was going on” (personal communication, December 19, 2012). 
 Another factor which was cited in the media’s credibility crisis was their unreliability, 
missing or refusing to cover major stories, such as the financial crisis. As stated by Mangiriadis, 
“There is an issue with the credibility of the traditional media, for the most part because they 
were not able to predict the financial crisis that was coming” (personal communication, July 23, 
2013). Freelance journalist Nikolia Apostolou cited the media’s biased coverage of the 
“Indignants” as a possible turning point:  
… I remember there were one million people on the streets, there was a lot of tear gas, a 
lot of violence with no reason, so when people went back home that day and they turned 
on the TV and saw the news, the mainstream media…said that the police didn’t use that 
much violence. So the people saw that there was a different world that the mainstream 
media was broadcasting…I think that it may not have been the only turning point, but I 
think that this helped people see that they are not always telling the truth or they are only 
giving one part of the truth. (Personal communication, May 24, 2013) 
 
Vazouras cited the public opinion polls that are publicized, claiming that the mass media “have 
the ability to intervene in their outcome” (personal communication, May 31, 2013), to which 
Tolios adds “…we are also experiencing a crisis in political tools…such as polls. They were also 
shaping public opinion favorably for this party or the other. I think that people are losing faith in 
polls as well” (personal communication, February 22, 2017). 
 Economic factors were also cited by some interviewees. According to Panagopoulos, “the 
market was too small to sustain so many media outlets and journalists, and the result was that in 
order to survive and make money, they became parrots…” (personal communication, May 31, 
2013). Trimis described most major media outlets as “…unviable, bankrupt…and in order to 
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survive they are increasingly turning towards the political and economic and banking elite” 
(personal communication, May 29, 2013). 
 For other interviewees though, the mass media’s credibility crisis is overstated. Boubouka 
cited her experience as an active user of the #rbnews hashtag, stating that quite often, 
information that was circulating online and which was attributed to citizen journalists often 
originated from mainstream media reports (personal communication, May 31, 2013). Along a 
similar vein, Bakounakis noted the results of an exercise he performed with his students: 
I’ve conducted an exercise with my students at the university, telling them: ‘you’ve 
learned that the Prime Minister is resigning and the government is collapsing, where will 
you turn to get informed?’ The overwhelming majority of students, who are 19-20 years 
old, answer that they will turn to a traditional media outlet, because they believe it is the 
most credible. (Personal communication, March 8, 2013) 
 
Kotsireas, however, addressed the issue of habitual viewing and people’s perceptions that they 
can see through what the mainstream media is reporting: 
The public has gotten used to being informed by these [mainstream] outlets all these 
years. Slowly but surely they’re beginning to understand that the information they are 
receiving from these mediums are associated with the interests of the owners of those 
outlets. I often hear people claim that they know the media are lying but they have the 
ability to filter what they hear. That’s a myth, it’s not possible, I’ve studied semiotics and 
understand that it’s a myth that you can filter. (Personal communication, July 2, 2013) 
 
Finally, Marios Lolos, president of the Greek Photojournalists’ Union, noted that while there is a 
major credibility crisis on the part of the public towards the mass media, it is not applicable to all 
those who are working in the media: “[The public] understands that we are doing our job…we 
take photos based on certain standards…and we photograph violence against protesters…so 




7.4 – ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: SKAI MEDIA GROUP 
 Serving as the mainstream media focus organization among the five illustrative examples 
for this study, the Skai Media Group is one of Greece’s largest companies within the media and 
broadcasting sector, encompassing national broadcaster Skai TV, the Skai 100.3 FM news radio 
station in Athens, the skai.gr online portal, several other specialized websites and mobile 
applications, and other non-news radio stations. Also associated with the Skai Media Group is 
the Kathimerini newspaper and its online English-language edition, e-Kathimerini. 
Skai and Kathimerini have developed a reputation of being the mainstream outlets of 
record in Greece, viewed by many as being more “serious” than many of Greece’s other major 
media outlets. Kathimerini, in particular, is recognized as a newspaper with an influential 
editorial page and op-ed section which has often features contributions from intellectuals and 
academics, while skai.gr is one of the most popular online news portals in Greece. For others 
though, Skai is part and parcel of the same system of “diaploki” as all of the other major media 
entities in Greece, and is viewed as one of the most vehement supporters of the economic 
austerity measures which have been implemented in Greece since 2010. As a point of illustration, 
Tasos Oikonomou, a journalist with Kathimerini, characterized the newspaper’s political 
perspective as “center-right” and stated his view that the newspaper has “a credibility which is 
connected to its political stance” (personal communication, April 10, 2013). 
 In 2013, Alex Hobson, then the head of new media for the Skai Media Group, provided 
an overview of the company’s social media presence and efforts. Hobson highlighted the 
company’s “big social media footprint in Greece,” including a Twitter account with over 100,000 
followers at that time, a Facebook page with approximately 85,000 likes as of the time of the 
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interview, a YouTube channel, and applications for iPhones, smart TVs and other devices. 
Hobson emphasized the importance of Skai’s Facebook page for delivering visitors to the main 
skai.gr portal, stating that “60-75 percent of traffic is [from] Facebook,” while visitors from 
Twitter accounted for far less traffic. Hobson stated that Skai’s Twitter feed was automated, using 
a tool called Deliberate which grabbed news items from an RSS feed, while Skai’s Facebook 
page was managed manually, as according to Hobson, “manual posts compared to automatic 
posts, have ten times more virality than the automatic posts.” Hobson added that “[w]e have also 
given access to most of our journalists to our Twitter account who can post to our Twitter 
account or they can post and feed group tweets, which is another good tool that we use.” 
Conversely, Skai’s journalists did not engage in blogging or live blogging according to Hobson, 
who said that “[t]here is no reason behind it. We mainly use Twitter as a sort of live blogging 
experience for users.” Hobson noted that Skai does engage in some interactivity with the public 
via social media, though not to a great extent: “when we have answered or participated on the 
Twitter conversation, it’s been in a sort of friendly first person voice and that has been on 
purpose. We don’t want to appear as just a frigid neutral web news source,” adding that “we 
don’t have enough resources, and…some of these conversations are very edgy.” Commenting, 
however, was permitted on skai.gr via the Disqus platform, which Hobson noted was a 
significant driver of traffic to the website. Two journalists were responsible for approving 
pending comments (personal communication, April 9, 2013). 
 Newsroom functions had also begun to be converged as of 2013. Hobson stated that 
initially, television, radio, and the online portal had separate news teams, but that “internet and 
radio have converged into a one-use room,” adding that “the first role of all our journalists are 
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for Skai” and that Skai’s eventual strategy was to also converge the television newsroom. This 
convergence was implemented, according to Hobson, for “[e]fficiency mostly, but also to keep 
everyone on the same page, to have better editorial control over all media, [to] get people to be 
more flexible and more internet-aware.” Adamidis, an editor and journalist with Skai TV, added: 
“[t]here is interest on the part of the journalists for their work to also appear on social media, but 
there was no systematic process for this. There was no unified set of editorial guidelines…This is 
still uncharted territory [for us] and management is still studying it carefully.” Adamidis further 
added that “television reporters…don’t prepare separate copy for the web. Their work is simply 
republished” (personal communication, April 10, 2013). 
 Regarding the popularity of Skai’s social media and online presence, Hobson remarked: 
We are the leading news Twitter account right now in Greece by far…We are definitely 
in the top 10 websites. People have associated Skai with breaking news, so whenever 
there is something very important going on, they visit the website. For example, our 
record high was last year with the elections, we had 42 million page views in May of 
2012. (Personal communication, April 9, 2013) 
 
Noting that Twitter is advertised seven times per day on Skai TV, Hobson added that “[w]e are 
trying to be active participants on the Twittersphere, and that’s why we promote it so much. It’s 
not a source of revenue for us, but we realize that the nature of Twitter is mostly news-based.” 
Hobson also emphasized that traditional television was still a major source of traffic to skai.gr: 
“TV is also...a big driver of traffic to the website…anytime a news presenter mentions something 
about skai.gr, you can see a lot of traffic” (personal communication, April 9, 2013). 
 In looking at the Kathimerini portal, which is separate from skai.gr, Oikonomou stated 
that the site is split into three sections: real-time news, news from the print edition, and 
comments and opinions from users on Kathimerini’s editorials and opinion pieces. Oikonomou 
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added that all of the site’s content is shared on Twitter but that only selected articles are posted 
on Facebook, while the newspaper was, at the time, while the newspaper’s YouTube presence 
was under development. No original, web-exclusive content was posted on either the Facebook 
or Twitter accounts of Kathimerini (personal communication, April 10, 2013). According to 
Hobson, the amount of visitors to Kathimerini’s website was comparable to other Greek 
newspapers but lower than that of skai.gr (personal communication, April 9, 2013). Pashos 
Mandravelis, a journalist with Kathimerini, described the newspaper’s online strategy as 
“shoveling,” stating that “90 percent of what is published is simply material from the print 
edition…and some few young kids who are working there, very few, are trying hard to publish 
other content but it isn’t enough.” Mandravelis also highlighted the three ways he uses social 
media as a journalist: posting his articles online, posting articles by others that are of interest to 
him, and posting his thoughts and musings that are not substantial enough for a full article 
(personal communication, June 11, 2013).  
 In looking at Skai TV’s connection to social media, Hobson noted that many of the 
station’s personalities used Twitter extensively to communicate with the audience, highlighting 
the example of late morning host Popi Tsapanidou, “who has a major Twitter account in Greece, 
she has more followers than Skai itself and she uses her account to communicate with her 
viewers on a daily basis.” Hobson noted that there was no such interaction on the part of station’s 
newscasts with social media, however (personal communication, April 9, 2013). Adamidis noted 
that there was no official station policy regarding the maintenance of a social media presence for 
television programs, stating that such a presence exists because “our personnel want to be [on 
social media] and to gain that audience” (personal communication, April 10, 2013). 
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 Skai 100.3 FM Radio had also introduced some interactive elements into its operations. 
Hobson described an online application that was developed for this purpose: 
If you go to the radio station website, you can click on the form we have, so while you 
are listening, you can send a comment to the person on the microphone, so for example 
we send a message and the radio produces inside the station has access, there’s a page 
where he can see all the comments, so this is visible only to the news room inside, so he 
can see what people are sending while they are listening to the show and he comments on 
these posts during the live show. (Personal communication, April 9, 2013) 
 
Interviewees not affiliated with Skai also largely highlighted Skai for its effective and prevalent 
social media use, at least as compared to other major media outlets in Greece. According to 
Iliadi, Skai was a pioneer in getting its television personalities on Twitter, noting that “Twitter 
became popular [in Greece] when it began to be promoted on TV” (personal communication, 
May 26, 2013), while Kapi stated her opinion that Skai “is probably one of the only outlets 
which has attempted to tap in to the immediacy and essence of social media and their 
interactivity” (personal communication, June 3, 2013). 
 In a follow-up interview in 2017, Maria Alafouzou, head of new media for the Skai 
Media Group, described the company’s holistic view of social media and the shift from medium-
based operation to operating as a unified brand across multiple platforms and services: 
Considering new and social media as a contribution to a media group’s strategy is in itself 
flawed. Media has moved from medium-based companies such as television and 
newspapers, to brands that have all platforms. It doesn’t matter whether you’re a 
television station, a newspaper or a website, you need to think about translating your 
content across all mediums. If you’re a TV station, how does the story translate to the 
internet? To written form? To a tweet? To an engaging snap? To a short video for 
Facebook? If you’re a website, how does the article you’re writing translate to a video? 
How can you edit that video so that it can access more users on Facebook? Stories and 
content no longer have a beginning and an end, they’re spherical and need to be able to 
survive on all platforms. (Personal communication, April 7, 2017) 
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As a result, social media in itself is also viewed as a competitor: “It’s a competitor for every 
publication and on many different levels…in the sense that you’re losing readers to platforms 
like Facebook and Apple News, where users still access your content but you don’t get a hit on 
your analytics.” This, in turn, has led to questions about which social media strategy to best 
implement: “One of the issues we’re having at the moment is trying to figure out how each 
product under the Skai umbrella fits in and what role it plays. Should Skai have a breaking news 
Twitter? An entertainment account?” (personal communication, April 7, 2017). 
 Alafouzou noted that Skai’s newsroom was unified, but similarly to 2013, there was no 
dedicated social media manager: “We have one person on our digital team who oversees content 
on social media, but she also has a full time job as an editor, so we don’t actually have one 
specific person dedicated to social media,” adding that “[w]e work together as a newsroom to 
publish our social media, with individuals from separate shows pitching in to write their tweets 
specific to their shows.” In Alafouzou’s view, however, “[i]n an ideal world we’d have a social 
media manager, and indeed that’s the direction we’re moving in, but for now we have several 
members from the newsroom involved.” Alafouzou noted that Skai continued to be very active 
on Facebook and Twitter, with Facebook still providing the highest conversion rate for skai.gr, 
but due to a lack of resources, Skai was not on Instagram or other social mediums. Alafouzou 
further stated that, similarly to 2013, each individual program made its own decisions regarding 
its social media presence. As stated by Alafouzou, “Involvement for personalities and shows is 
on an individual basis, whether the person or show has an interest in social media. That needs to 
change…it’s a question of bringing [them] together under one umbrella in a way that makes 
sense.” Finally, Alafouzou stated that Skai was not as active in terms of interaction with the 
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audience using social media: “Not as much as we’d like to. We use hashtags and will respond to 
some users on social media but it’s more of a lack of resources as opposed to a lack of desire to 
do so” (personal communication, April 7, 2017). 
 Skai was no stranger to controversy and to questions regarding its credibility. In chapter 
5, the example of the #xa_advertising Twitter campaign was highlighted, which stemmed from a 
controversial television program which was broadcast on Skai TV where members of Golden 
Dawn appeared. Adamidis stated that in response to the backlash, “the station did not have an 
official response. The official policy of the station is that we don’t censor our programming in 
any way.” Adamidis added that “I am not certain whether the station should have implemented a 
crisis management strategy” (personal communication, April 10, 2013). Hobson noted however 
that despite receiving a lot of negative comments online via Disqus, visits to skai.gr spiked 
following the controversy (personal communication, April 9, 2013). 
 Journalist Aris Chatzistefanou highlighted another controversial instance involving the 
Skai Media Group, where he used to produce a radio program on Skai Radio. This controversy 
was related to the release of his first documentary, Debtocracy, noting that he “was fired just a 
few days before my documentary went online” (personal communication, June 26, 2013). 
 Nikos Andritsos highlighted his view that Skai’s impact on the Greek public sphere was 
positive: “I believe that Skai is a serious source of news…[a] news source where you can learn 
what’s happening, see ideas, get all the perspectives which exist and where there is a clear line 
between news and commentary” (personal communication, April 12, 2013), while regarding 
credibility, Alafouzou remarked: “[t]hrough our social media we are very careful to confirm 
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sources and information on breaking news rather than jumping the gun. We’re looking for 
accuracy and speed, but accuracy always comes first” (personal communication, April 7, 2017). 
7.5 – ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: ENIKOS.GR 
 Founded in 2011, enikos.gr is an outlet which could be said to combine elements of both 
traditional and online media, including the operations of an online news portal, blogging, citizen 
journalism, and conventional television. Founded in 2011, it was the creation of journalist Nikos 
Chatzinikolaou, who has had a long career as a television news presenter and talk show host on 
both television and radio, and who is one of the most prominent media personalities in Greece. 
Chatzinikolaou is the owner of the widely circulated Real News Sunday newspaper, and the top-
rated Real FM 97.8 and Real FM 107.1 radio stations in Athens and Thessaloniki, respectively. 
 Manos Niflis, the editor of enikos.gr, described the concept behind the site as “combining 
the immediacy of news blogs with accurate reporting.” According to Niflis, the idea for enikos.gr 
originated with Chatzinikolaou, who wanted “a blog, not a portal with many different sections 
and long articles, but something very immediate and quick which would inform the public about 
everything, to be everywhere, with photos, video and short pieces.” Giorgos Baganis, a journalist 
with enikos.gr, remarked that the site “was created to fill a void in immediate and accurate news 
reporting from the entire news spectrum,” adding that a gap of even 5-10 minutes between 
postings results in a 20-25 percent drop in visits (personal communication, December 19, 2012). 
Batzoglou described enikos.gr as a “child of private television” which is operating as a “real-
time wire service with very short articles, sometimes as little as 40 words, and content from the 
audience” (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
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 Valios Roupis, social media manager with enikos.gr, noted that the site carries the name 
of its founder (“e-Nikos”), and as such means that the site’s journalists “are very careful with 
what they are publishing to ensure that everything has been cross-checked and verified” 
(personal communication, April 12, 2013), while Baganis, referring to the name recognition of 
Chatzinikolaou, described him as the “guarantor” of the site’s accuracy and credibility (personal 
communication, December 19, 2012). Interestingly, enikos.gr bears a striking resemblance to the 
former Troktiko blog, and remarking on this, Roupis stated that the site was designed purposely 
to resemble a blog, adding that Chatzinikolaou “already operates a portal [real.gr], therefore he 
did not want enikos.gr to be yet another portal” (personal communication, April 12, 2013). 
Baganis, in turn, stated that enikos.gr is indeed a blog and not a portal (personal communication, 
December 19, 2012), a view which Boubouka disagrees with: “[i]t’s a blog, a personal blog, yet 
it isn’t, because behind it is a newsroom, but journalists don’t sign their names. Chatzinikolaou is 
the visible face,” whilst adding that “even though Chatzinikolaou owns Real News and real.gr, 
his true investment is in enikos.gr” (personal communication, May 31, 2013). Regarding the 
political stance of enikos.gr, Niflis commented that the site is accused of being both on the left 
and on the right, “which means we are neither” (personal communication, December 18, 2012). 
 On the topic of feedback and interaction with the audience, Roupis stated that enikos.gr 
actively seeks out news from its audience and provides ways for such stories to be submitted, 
adding that 90 percent of e-mails and Facebook messages are replied to, while comments on 
Facebook are not responded to (personal communication, April 12, 2013), while Niflis stated that 
“stories are added which are produced by members of the audience or who want to express 
themselves…it’s something we want to invest in” (personal communication, December 18, 
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2012). Even though enikos.gr did not respond to comments posted on its social media channels, 
Baganis remarked that commenting is free and encouraged, adding that “here, our readers know 
that we will read all of their comments.” Baganis added that Chatzinikolaou’s own social media 
presence51 has helped deliver an audience to enikos.gr: 
Nikos Chatzinikolaou, with the presence he has developed on Twitter, responds to 
everyone who poses a question…he writes about the team he loves, he shares his 
philosophical musings, his thoughts on politics, economics. In doing this he won the 
attention of an audience who…who knew him only as a television personality, and this 
audience in large part does not enter real.gr or purchase Real News. This audience came 
to enikos.gr because they saw a different Chatzinikolaou, who approached them and 
opened up to the public. (Personal communication, December 19, 2012) 
 
Social media was described by Niflis as the “the main pillar of our strategy,” with an active 
presence on Facebook and Twitter, noting that many news stories were also reported to enikos.gr 
via this avenue (personal communication, December 18, 2012). Baganis added that enikos.gr was 
built around Chatzinikolaou’s own social media presence, and that Facebook and Twitter were 
the main drivers of traffic for the site (personal communication, December 19, 2012). According 
to Roupis, two staffers were primarily tasked with social media duties, including one individual 
for data analysis (personal communication, April 12, 2013). 
 One of the main attractions of enikos.gr during the 2012-2013 time period was the Ston 
Eniko web TV program, which was a continuation of a television program by the same name 
which Chatzinikolaou had hosted on broadcast television stations. This was an extended 
interview and discussion program where Chatzinikolaou featured one or more panelists, often in 
front of a live studio audience, which would also submit questions. Baganis described the show 
as “an experiment which is being attempted for the first time in Greece, to show that it is 
possible in the future to combine the speed and liveliness of television, with the web” (personal 
                                               
51 See https://www.twitter.com/nchatzinikolaou. 
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communication, December 19, 2012), while Roupis stated his belief that the web TV show was a 
reflection of Chatzinikolaou’s “desire to host a program as he would want to do it and as he 
imagined it…without the restrictions which any given television station could impose” (personal 
communication, April 12, 2013). Niflis highlighted the live chats with candidates for office 
which Ston Eniko hosted during the 2012 election cycle, while noting that programs were not 
aired on a set schedule as the program was still in an experimental phase, but typically new 
programs were produced every one to two weeks. Niflis also described the changes made by 
Chatzinikolaou when the program was transferred from broadcast television to the internet: 
“Nikos Chatzinikolaou changed the format of the show…Now there is a live audience, around 50 
to 60 people who submit questions. In essence, Chatzinikolaou doesn’t host the show, the 
citizens do…The online audience is more active” (personal communication, December 18, 
2012). Roupis described the audience’s response to Ston Eniko: “…the viewers literally bombard 
us with questions via phone calls to enikos.gr, via Chatzinikolaou’s Twitter account, and via the 
Twitter and Facebook accounts of enikos.gr,” adding that the interactive nature of the program 
was later copied by major broadcast television stations, who started bringing live studio 
audiences to their shows (personal communication, April 12, 2013). Batzoglou noted that the 
online version of Ston Eniko had “no limits” as compared to the broadcast version, as it had the 
freedom to stick to one topic and to run as long as necessary instead of being confined by a 
program schedule (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
 In remarking on the audience’s overall response to enikos.gr, Niflis noted that in its first 
10 months of operation, the site had entered Nielsen’s top 10 websites in Greece and Alexa’s top 
20 (personal communication, December 18, 2012). Baganis stated that this was accomplished 
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only with advertising within the same media group (Real Group) (personal communication, 
December 19, 2012), while Roupis commented that Chatzinikolaou’s credibility and name 
recognition had helped (personal communication, April 12, 2013). Niflis stated he considered 
enikos.gr an “alternative” medium due to the way it operates: “speed, credibility, contact with the 
audience, integration of social media”—in other words, being alternative to its main competitors 
(personal communication, December 18, 2012), while Baganis noted the site’s impact on the 
political sphere: “[u]sually when we write about a politician or a government minister or ministry 
and we publish a complaint from a reader, within the next 20 minutes at most…there is a 
response from the ministry or from the minister or politician” (personal communication, 
December 19, 2012). 
 In a follow-up interview in 2017, Niflis described the continued strong emphasis of social 
media in the operations of enikos.gr, describing them as “the basic communications tool for the 
dissemination of our news and postings,” adding that Facebook and Twitter remained the main 
pylons of the site’s social media presence, while other social media tools were not used. Niflis 
stated that five people were now working mostly on social media, but the entire staff had 
received training in its use (personal communication, March 15, 2017). 
 Niflis remarked on some of the changes which had occurred at enikos.gr since 2012-
2013: “[we] are attempting to tailor and customize our content for the needs of social 
media…this was a necessity.” Notably, Niflis described the site as a portal—which he did not do 
in 2012—but one which visually resembles a blog and one which was different from a static 
news website. As was the case in 2012, “speed and immediacy” remained the site’s selling 
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points. Finally, though the Ston Eniko web program had stopped its webcasts, Niflis stated that it 
would “probably return” (personal communication, March 15, 2017). 
7.6 – ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: RADIOBUBBLE AND #RBNEWS 
7.6.1 – Introduction 
 
In chapter 5, the illustrative example of Radiobubble was examined from the perspective 
of civil society, via the initiatives which it helped to launch, Hackademy and Tutorpool, and via 
its collaboration with Doctors Without Borders. In this chapter, the programmatic and news 
aspect of Radiobubble will be presented and analyzed. Radiobubble is an online radio station 
which became widely-known in Greece and worldwide for its news programming, including 
coverage of the “Indignants” protest movement and other social movements, and also as a result 
of its very prominent and innovative presence on social media, particularly Twitter via its 
#rbnews hashtag. The station was also known for its physical location, a café in central Athens 
where its studios were located, although the café closed in 2014, obliging Radiobubble to 
relocate its studios. 
7.6.2 – Concept 
 
Dora Oikonomides, a volunteer with Radiobubble, described the station as such: 
Radiobubble is a very strange animal in Greece, because it is an online community 
essentially. Radiobubble as a whole has many components. One of it is the news 
component, which I contribute to, there is one part which is about music…one part is 
blogs, where basically there is a team of people monitoring the Greek bloggers here and 
selecting what they find interesting. There is one section called “the community,” where 
anyone can choose to create a radio show or a podcast and upload it to that section. The 
idea overall is user-generated content. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Radiobubble was founded in 2007 according to Petros Papathanasiou, a producer with the station 
(personal communication, December 17, 2012), and initially “was a group of people who knew 
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each other. And then they met other people and met other people, and then they also started 
meeting people through Twitter, so it expanded slowly and it became what it is now,” as stated by 
Oikonomides, who added that the initial founding team consisted of 5-6 people (personal 
communication, December 17, 2012). Panagiotis Oikonomou, a producer with Radiobubble, 
described the station as a second chance to create what is known in Greece as “free radio”: 
“[w]ith the advent of privately-owned radio, the frequencies were taken over by certain 
businesspeople and ‘free radio’ could not develop. We’ve made an attempt, through the 
opportunity provided to us by new media, to establish a free internet radio station,” adding his 
belief that “traditional radio in Greece is dead.” According to Oikonomou, the main distinction of 
Radiobubble when compared to other media outlets is its self-organized nature and collective 
decision-making, noting that the station operates commercial free with no financial backer 
(personal communication, February 13, 2013). 
 Oikonomides described Radiobubble as a station which has earned a strong leftist 
reputation, but which is open to and desires other viewpoints: “[w]e are called a left-wing station 
or an anarchist station, and we would like to have a bigger diversity of opinions to be presented 
here than what we already have,” adding that the station used to feature certain programs from 
individuals of a right-wing political persuasion. However, “because after the elections [of 2012] 
the political divide of Greece became so deep, they just stopped coming… I would like to have 
more liberals and neoliberals in here (personal communication, December 17, 2012). 
7.6.3 – Café and Community 
 
 Having earlier introduced Greece’s longstanding “café culture,” it is perhaps fitting that 
Radiobubble is a station which in its initial years of existence developed a community which 
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centered around its physical space, a café in the Exarchia district of central Athens—a region 
which has long been a hub of political and activist activity, as well as resistance and rebellion. 
 Papathanasiou described the Radiobubble community as one which transcends the local 
geographic community of Athens: “[t]he community of Radiobubble does not have a local 
character. Yes of course initially it was centered in Athens and then in Greece, but it collected 
people, students that were overseas and who were tweeting and following the station.” The café, 
in Papathanasiou’s words, served as a catalyst to bring this online community into the physical 
world: “…from there where a typical internet community had started developing, a group of 
many friends arose who knew each other in person precisely because Radiobubble exists” 
(personal communication, December 17, 2012). Christina Lardikou, a producer with 
Radiobubble and volunteer with Tutorpool, described the café as an advantage for Radiobubble: 
“…you can hang around here, you can have your show, you can listen [to the station], but if you 
want, you can also come here and drink a coffee and be here…it’s not something that is only in 
the internet,” while social media is also added to the mix: “[the café] has many people who are 
very into social media and blogs and have really good blogs right now and have shows and hang 
around here (personal communication, February 20, 2013). Konstantopoulou described the café 
as a space which served as a “meeting point” for individuals who initially met each other online 
(personal communication, February 15, 2013), while Papathanasiou described the café as “a 
catalyst” for the Radiobubble community to get to know each other and as a space where issues 
pertaining to politics, economics, and communications issues were discussed (personal 
communication, December 17, 2012). Oikonomides described the significance of the café: 
To create a public space, real or virtual, is a service to society. So I would say that the 
existence of this community is a service to society, because you will have people from 
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different backgrounds, with different centers of interest, who will disagree on pretty 
much everything, but who still think it’s useful to operate as a network. So this is our 
contribution. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Within this space, according to Oikonomides, numerous initiatives were born: 
I think that Radiobubble’s contribution is that it provides a public space where things can 
be debated, different opinions can be discussed, different initiatives can be undertaken, 
because another thing you will find here is that many of the most interesting initiatives in 
Greece over the past year, started inside Radiobubble. Tutorpool started inside 
Radiobubble. Hackademy, the new training project, is a Radiobubble project. This is a 
place, that not only physically, but even virtually, ideas develop. I think that’s the real 
contribution to the public sphere. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Notably, the online world had a pervasive influence even in the offline physical setting of the 
café. As stated by Oikonomides: “…a lot of people continue calling each other by their Twitter 
names, even after they’ve known each other for months and months and months. I mean there are 
people whose real names I don’t even know.” Regarding the Radiobubble community at large, 
Oikonomides described it as including “anybody who wanted to be a part of it,” including 
listeners or those who tweeted using the #rbnews hashtag (personal communication, December 
17, 2012). Oikonomou described the melding of the station’s radio programming and the 
physical meeting space: “…there is another type of communication, the studio as you can see is 
upstairs, the host on the air is visible, so anybody can see him, go up and have a drink, and chat 
with him. We’re not faceless” (personal communication, February 13, 2013). 
7.6.4 – Programming 
 
 According to Oikonomides, “the basic rule is that there is no rule” at Radiobubble. The 
station, she says, has no editorial policy and values diversity of opinion, adding that there are no 
restrictions when it comes to music: “…you have anything, from jazz, to Greek music, to 
rock'n'roll, to reggae, to anything you can imagine” (personal communication, December 17, 
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2012). As stated by Papathanasiou, the station, by design, maintains an “amateur” aesthetic: 
“…the show producers have full freedom as to what they want to do. The station intentionally 
maintains an amateur feel. Even producers who are professionals maintain this amateurism” 
(personal communication, December 17, 2012). 
 Oikonomides hosted Radiobubble’s foreign-language radio program, Radiobubble 
International, describing its structure and audience: 
The first half hour is a news bulletin of the week in English, then there is a one-hour 
show where I interview someone, and it can be on the news of the week or it can be on a 
specific topic. And then in the end, we have news bulletins in English, in French and 
Spanish, for the international audience. We realized that there was a need for this type of 
independent information for people who are abroad. One reason is that the “Occupy” 
movement happened at the same time and then a lot of non-Greeks started becoming 
interested in what was happening here, so we found that there was a need to speak to that 
audience as well. So it’s a little bit of hybrid, because we have both journalists and 
activists [listening]. That makes it at times difficult to speak to both, because they are not 
looking at the same things. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Regarding the station’s news programming, Papathanasiou outlined Radiobubble’s philosophy: 
The news department does not invite political figures. Systematically though we invite 
ordinary people, people who are involved in activism, people who are involved in the 
health or education sectors, and we prefer to speak to them even about politics, rather 
than with government representatives. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Oikonomou described Radiobubble’s programming as innovative and pioneering, and listed three 
“firsts” for the station, stating that it was the only radio station in Greece to provide full coverage 
of Barack Obama’s re-election in 2012, with 15 hours of coverage, including reports from 
correspondents located around the world. Secondly according to Oikonomou, Radiobubble was 
the first station in Greece to prepare and present day-long cultural specials for such figures as 
Greek composer Manos Hatzidakis. Third, he noted that the radio station was distinct for its civil 
 379 
society role, supporting via its broadcasts initiatives such as food drives and the Gaza Flotilla 
while “using social media to create a social radio” (personal communication, February 13, 2013). 
 According to Papathanasiou, anybody could join the station and produce their own 
programming, as long as they loved radio and were willing to commit to a schedule (personal 
communication, December 17, 2012). Oikonomou stated that he joined Radiobubble—as well as 
Twitter—following the riots of December 2008, noting that the station “was the only 
medium…which managed to relay the truth about what was happening on the streets of Athens,” 
while his show was as a reflection of his shared Twitter account, @contrabbando. Papathanasiou 
noted that the station’s online program schedule listed the hosts’ personal Twitter accounts 
alongside the name of their shows, connecting their radio shows to their social media presence 
(personal communication, December 17, 2012). In another interesting example, Panos 
Kounenakis described how he was able to become a part of the station’s community from afar: “I 
started my [radio show]…while I was in South Korea. I started back in 2009, remotely uploading 
shows, and in 2011 when I came back in Greece, I got to know the people and I started being 
more active in the community” (personal communication, June 13, 2017). 
Overall according to Oikonomides, the station was reaching approximately 4,000 
listeners per month as of late 2012, with total listening hours ranging between 70,000 and 90,000 
hours per month (personal communication, December 17, 2012). 
7.6.5 – #rbnews and Social Media 
 
 According to Papathanasiou, in the midst of the riots transpiring in Athens in December 
2008 following the shooting death of 15-year old Alexandros Grigoropoulos, the #rbnews 
hashtag was born on Twitter. The impact was immediate. Papathanasiou stated that “an 
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ecosystem developed surrounding this hashtag, through which the individuals appeared who 
developed our news department” (personal communication, December 17, 2012). Noting that 
there were 5-6 regular users of the hashtag per day and an average of 100 Twitter users per week, 
Oikonomides described #rbnews as the news department’s most powerful tool: 
…our most powerful tool is #rbnews. The purpose of that hashtag is for people out there 
in the streets to be able to tweet information about important things that are happening in 
Greece: if there are demonstrations, if there is an important event in your neighborhood. 
Contributors to the hashtag [are] people from Radiobubble…but also people who might 
tweet using that hashtag once a year…The hashtag is a relatively well-known and 
respected institution on Greek Twitter… demonstrations are clearly the best example of 
how you can gather information from users, but we are also very successful in using it to 
know about events that are not mentioned at all in the mainstream media, to report racist 
attacks…even cultural events. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
 
Unlike the “no rules” environment of the radio programming aired by Radiobubble, there were 
some rules connected to the proper use of the #rbnews hashtag, according to Oikonomides: 
…there are some basic rules: for example the fact that we don’t do commentary. We will 
do analysis, but not commentary. On the Twitter feed we are very strict, even amongst 
ourselves. Then, within the Radiobubble news team, there is a group of people who sit on 
Twitter on shifts and who will filter information from the hashtag and upload that 
information to a tool that we have on our main page, where we curate basically the news 
that is forwarded to us by citizens…We are very conscious about putting the news on our 
feed, on our curation tool, because we need to be sure what is happening (Personal 
communication, December 17, 2012) 
Oikonomides noted that her Twitter activity is what brought her to Radiobubble: 
I started tweeting about Greece in June 2011, and then someone contacted me and said 
“why don’t you put the #rbnews hashtag, since you are tweeting mostly news, so that 
people know, people can curate what you say.” Then one day, people from Radiobubble 
contacted me and asked me “do you want to become an administrator on the Twitter 
curation topic? …and then it was to be slowly defined that we should have some form of 
Radiobubble International. (Personal communication, December 17, 2012) 
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It is this curation that likely captured the attention of The Guardian prior to the June 2012 
parliamentary elections in Greece:52 
…the most interesting example was during the second elections in June [2012], when The 
Guardian bought our English language Twitter feed and embedded it in their live blog for 
two days, because they knew that after following it for so long, that it was a reliable 
source of information. In general, I would say that a lot of foreign media had various 
information on the #rbnews hashtag. I don’t know how many of them realized that there 
is a better source of information which is what we curated, because we had already done 
the work verifying everything that is there. (Personal communication, December 17, 
2012) 
 
Kounenakis noted that #rbnews was the most widely-used hashtag in Greece in 2011 due to its 
prominence during “Indignants” movement (personal communication, June 13, 2017). Boubouka 
described #rbnews as an “alternative medium” (personal communication, May 31, 2013), but 
Apostolou questioned whether #rbnews and the news efforts of Radiobubble could be considered 
citizen journalism, “because there are some people that are [professional] journalists” (personal 
communication, May 24, 2013), while Papathanasiou pointed out that the professional journalists 
involved with Radiobubble “wanted to support us and also believe in changing the model of their 
profession” (personal communication, December 17, 2012). 
 Above and beyond the #rbnews hashtag, Radiobubble maintained an active social media 
presence more broadly. In Kounenakis’ view, “The Greek Twitter started practically by the 
community of Radiobubble. It was one of the pioneers and in the beginning it was alongside the 
academic, intellectuals or IT, or political freaks [early adapters]” (personal communication, June 
13, 2017). Papathanasiou explained why Radiobubble was an early presence on Twitter: “From 
the beginning, Radiobubble placed a greater emphasis on Twitter, as Twitter is more immediate 
                                               
52 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/greek-election-blog-2012/2012/jun/17/greek-elections-greece-polls-live. 
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and more expressive than Facebook…it invested [in Twitter] precisely because it understood the 
philosophy of Twitter and it benefited from this” (personal communication, December 17, 2012).  
 The early emphasis on Twitter was evident in the makeup of Radiobubble’s volunteers. 
According to Oikonomou, more than half the people who were involved with the station since 
2008 were “well-known on Twitter” (personal communication, February 13, 2013) while 
according to Oikonomides, the station maintained two official accounts on Twitter, 
@radiobubble and @radiobubblenews (personal communication, December 17, 2012). 
Facebook, by comparison, was de-emphasized, used only for presenting the radio programming, 
according to Lardikou (personal communication, February 20, 2013). 
 In Papathanasiou’s view, Radiobubble maintained “the most vibrant internet and social 
media presence of any web radio in Greece,” adding that separate blogs were also administered, 
including a blog with news content, a blog about music, and a blog about blogging. Using his 
show as an example, Papathanasiou estimated that 90 percent of communication with listeners 
during his program occurs via Twitter, with the remainder via Facebook and e-mail. Overall, 
Papathanasiou estimated that there were approximately 2,000 listeners who engaged with the 
station via social media in some way each month, with about 200 “regulars,” mostly 
technologically fluent young adults (personal communication, December 17, 2012). 
7.6.6 – Early Challenges 
 
 In Oikonomides’s words, Radiobubble has a positive and a negative aspect: “…using the 
internet…It means that of course, we get to reach a very wide and diverse audience. The 
shortcoming is, because internet penetration in Greece is just barely 50 percent, there is an 
intrinsic limitation to what we are doing” (personal communication, December 17, 2012). For 
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Papathanasiou though, finances were the biggest challenge for the station, noting that the café on 
its own did not produce enough revenue to sustain the station, adding however that the station 
had up until that time relied successfully upon donations to stay afloat (personal communication, 
December 17, 2012). For Oikonomou, the station’s biggest difficulties pertained both to financial 
and human resources, noting that time was an issue with the all-volunteer staff (personal 
communication, February 13, 2013). Legal troubles could also not be avoided, as a Radiobubble 
on-air host was sued by prominent businessman Andreas Vgenopoulos in 2009.53 
7.6.7 – Evolution: 2015 and 2017 Follow-ups 
 
 A series of changes were observed in the operation of Radiobubble and in its social media 
activity and presence in follow-up interviews which took place in February 2015 and in June 
2017. Two major changes were the station’s renewed formation as a legally registered 
cooperative, and a change in the physical location following the closure of the café, with the 
station relocating to the Theater 104, located in the Kerameikos district of Athens.  
As stated by Radiobubble volunteer Ioanna Paraskevopoulou, “there is a greater emphasis 
being placed on radio rather than Twitter,” adding that “radio was always the heart of 
Radiobubble. It was never social media, even if this impression always existed because it became 
widely known on Twitter, leading the public to focus on Twitter even if our heart was in radio.” 
Paraskevopoulou stated that the station’s programming had not significantly changed due to the 
change in legal status and that approximately the same number of individuals (around 40) were 
involved with the station as before, while adding that any individual could become a member of 
the collective which was formed. A drawback, however, was the lack of interaction in the new 
                                               
53 See http://news.radiobubble.gr/2012/06/copy-off-m-radiobubble.html. 
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space as compared to the café, which according to Paraskevopoulou was not a result of choice 
but of necessity (personal communication, February 2, 2015). 
Paraskevopoulou did note that news content was largely de-emphasized by Radiobubble, 
with nobody on the station’s staff creating original news content. Curation of content from other 
sources did continue, however, while the station’s @radiobubble and @radiobubblenews Twitter 
accounts remained active, as did its Facebook presence. Radiobubble did perform tweeting of 
special events though, such as the January 2015 national parliamentary elections. According to 
Paraskevopoulou, her tweets for Radiobubble covering the January 2015 electoral campaign 
focused on the candidates and on “juicy” and investigative items of information about them, such 
as whether they had previously voted for the memorandum agreements as members of a different 
party. Overall though, the station no longer maintained news or Twitter shifts according to 
Paraskevopoulou, even though she herself continued to maintain the station’s foreign-language 
social media presence, exclusively on Twitter (personal communication, February 2, 2015). 
Regarding Radiobubble’s social media content, Paraskevopoulou noted that most of the 
content posted by the station consisted of news, show archives, and promotional material for the 
station’s programs. A significant change that was described, however, was the splitting of the 
#rbnews hashtag into two and the creation of the #antireport hashtag. According to 
Paraskevopoulou, the #rbnews hashtag was intended to be “more journalistic” while #antireport 
targets “counter-reporting and the anarchist world,” including protest marches, instances of 
police violence, invitations to rallies, and cases of violence against migrants. Paraskevopoulou 
noted that while the old rules still were applicable for using the #rbnews hashtag, no such rules 
applied to #antireport (personal communication, February 2, 2015). Paraskevopoulou did note 
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one new challenge which faced Radiobubble and its political coverage, following the outcome of 
the January 2015 elections and the victory of SYRIZA: 
With the left I am feeling more insecure regarding news than I did when the right 
governed. Why? Because previously the lines were drawn. There were those who did 
what they did, supporting the system, and there were the alternative media which were far 
left and which opposed the government. What will those far left outlets do now though 
with a leftist government? …As a journalist you have to be across from them and 
scrutinizing them. Here it will become apparent to what extent those sites that are 
friendly to the left will scrutinize the government or will be obliged to spread 
propaganda. (Personal communication, February 2, 2015) 
 
In a second follow-up interview in 2017, Kounenakis shed further light on the changes which 
had transpired at Radiobubble. According to Kounenakis: 
There was a change…before we moved, when we reached a limit when financially it 
couldn’t go on. There was the big question, how do we continue? A significant part of the 
Radiobubble community didn’t want to go the way we did. The majority wanted to go the 
way we did, so there was a split around 2014. (Personal communication, June 13, 2017) 
 
Ultimately the collective was formed and legally registered, with Kounenakis stating that he was 
one of the 10 or 11 people who were its signatories. However, this was not the only change. As 
stated by Kounenakis, “Radiobubble doesn’t contribute much in the public sphere…we are not 
covering news the way we did. We take initiatives in some campaigns, but…through Twitter, 
which was our basic tool, we don’t use it for news broadcasting.” Another major change pertains 
to social media, where according to Kounenakis, “[w]e focus more on Facebook as the 
Radiobubble central account…Facebook attracts more attention at the moment…and this has to 
do with the power of texts and images and interaction. Facebook is more friendly in 
general…and doesn’t have so many constraints.” Kounenakis added that no other social media 
tools are used by Radiobubble. Along with these changes, Kounenakis stated that the #rbnews 
hashtag shifted to #rbdata: “…the team that was working mainly on the news production…and 
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when the refugee crisis exploded, it turned into a team trying to be active on that field…They 
started data mining…So [#rbnews] was turned into #rbdata.” In turn, the #antireport hashtag 
never attained the same level of response and has largely been de-emphasized according to 
Kounenakis, who notes that different hashtags are now used by Radiobubble depending on the 
circumstances (personal communication, June 13, 2017). 
 News and politics were not completely eliminated, however, as Kounenakis noted: 
“[t]here are political shows of course, but they are not trying to be up-to-date and there are 
initiatives concerning refugees that we are trying to participate in and we are running.” Despite 
this, another former cornerstone of the station, its international service, had ceased, as stated by 
Kounenakis: “we do not, for the time being, produce anything in English.” News and political 
content was also deemphasized on Facebook, which was now used mostly to emphasize musical 
content according to Kounenakis, who also described the station’s adaptation of Mixcloud for 
asynchronous broadcasting: “We are looking for new ways. Mixcloud is one of these tools that 
we think it is the future, which is free, open. It’s a broadcast that you can use it any time.” 
Finally, Kounenakis noted that another one of Radiobubble’s prominent initiatives, Hackademy, 
“worked for three seasons, but it collapsed due to financial pressures.” For Kounenakis, 
Radiobubble’s continued existence remained an open question: 
It’s a tough question because we are not committed to continue. We have said that there is 
no stress, we don't owe to anyone anything, we will continue only if we like it and if we 
are useful and if we contribute to society. (Personal communication, June 13, 2017) 
 
7.7 – THE ERT SHUTDOWN AND THE ERT OPEN MOVEMENT 
 National state-owned broadcaster ERT was not, it could be said, a beloved institution in 
Greece. For many, it was a haven of patronage hires, clientelistic relations, and corruption 
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cultivated by successive governments. For others, its programming was uninteresting. And for 
others still, it was a propaganda tool that was not independent from the state in the true sense of a 
national public service broadcaster. Elefteria Farantaki, the head of the Technical Services 
Division for ERT3, ERT’s Thessaloniki-based television station, described the situation as 
follows: “.[p]ublic broadcasting had become state broadcasting, in the full sense of the term. 
Each government and each administration that it pointed maintained a pro-government policy” 
(personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 The coalition government of New Democracy, PASOK, and DIMAR may have counted 
upon this sentiment muting any opposition when on June 11, 2013, in a sudden and unannounced 
move, they shut down ERT, announcing the firing of its entire staff and the impending 
establishment of a new public broadcaster. What began instead was a major solidarity and protest 
movement, where the staff of ERT occupied its main headquarters in Athens and ERT3’s 
television studios in Thessaloniki and kept a number of transmitters on the air, broadcasting a 
non-stop protest broadcast, while protest rallies and concerts were organized on a daily basis 
outside of these facilities. Farantaki described the reaction which followed the shutdown: 
From the 11th of June and thereafter, our communication with the public changed. We 
were no longer inviting the public, the public came on its own to our social media…and 
their concern now is how we are doing, giving us the strength to carry on. The public 
does not accept the shutdown of ERT and the manner in which it occurred, not just in 
opposition to its replacement, NERIT, but also because they understood that the existence 
of ERT was a fundamental issue of democracy. (Personal communication, July 4, 2013) 
 
Farantaki noted that in just three weeks following the shutdown, ERT3’s Facebook page grew 
sixfold, noting that the protest movement grew rapidly via social media. This happened for two 
reasons, in her view: due to the threat the public felt that democracy was coming under attack, 
and also due to the attention ERT’s shutdown garnered overseas, particularly in Europe, where 
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other public broadcasters began to worry that they might be next. Providing another example of 
social and new media’s role in the protest movement, Farantaki noted that ERT3 had issued a call 
to the public to like its YouTube channel, in order to surpass 1,000 followers, which would then 
grant ERT3 the ability to begin streaming live video. As Farantaki stated, this occurred “within 
26 minutes” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 The occupied ERT featured programming which more than likely would never have been 
broadcast on the official ERT, including roundtables with activists, bloggers, representatives of 
worker-run collectives, economists presenting alternatives to the policies of austerity, 
documentaries about social and activist causes (such as the Skouries movement), and live 
newscasts which, however, were freed of official editorial oversight. As Chatzistefanou noted in 
chapter 5, his crowdfunded documentary about the crisis and the politics of austerity, 
Debtocracy, was screened on “ERT Open,” as the protest broadcaster began to be known. 
Farantaki described the programming which was being aired on the occupied ERT as focusing 
not just on news and updates about ERT’s shutdown, but also on “workers in Greece and 
elsewhere and the problems they face.” Farantaki stated her view that the citizens of Thessaloniki 
embraced the occupied ERT3, “visiting the studios…getting to know us,” adding that “we 
exchange perspectives as to what is happening, what was happening previously, to what extent 
ERT had the social character that it should have had and to what extent we as the workers of ERT 
are accomplishing this now” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 For Farantaki, the true reason for ERT’s shutdown was not the austerity measures cited 
by the government and the need to trim the state’s payroll. It was instead another instance of 
“diaploki.” Farantaki noted that at the time of ERT’s closure, a bidding process was underway 
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for the entity that would be granted the right to operate a nationwide network of transmitters for 
digital television. ERT would have been an applicant in this bidding process, but by shutting 
down ERT, the only remaining bidder was DIGEA, jointly owned by Greece’s six largest private 
television channels. In other words according to Farantaki, “the television spectrum nationwide 
is being turned over to a private company” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 Farantaki stated that “…for us, this is not a strike broadcast, nor do we consider ourselves 
squatters. We continued performing our jobs…because we are calling into doubt the executive 
decree and the joint ministerial decision which followed [which dissolved ERT].” She further 
noted that the issue had a swift political impact, noting that DIMAR dropped out of the 
governing coalition in opposition to the shutdown (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 Aside from the network of transmitters which ERT’s workers were able to keep on the 
air, ERT Open was broadcast on the internet as well, with the assistance of The Press Project. 
Efimeros stated the three reasons why The Press Project began to transmit ERT online:  
First of all it was because despite the fact that ERT was a propaganda tool, that did not 
mean that it should be silenced. That was not the solution. Second, because ERT proved 
itself…broadcasting documentaries about Skouries, the memorandum agreements, the 
hospitals and theaters which are shutting down, roundtable discussions we had never seen 
before on television, things we discussed only on Twitter and Facebook and never within 
the official public sphere. The third reason was because we could. It was a way of 
proving that we could transmit ERT’s signal. This was significant for us because…we 
wanted to explain to a 60-year old that the internet isn’t something scary, it’s simply 
another means of transmitting a signal. (Personal communication, July 18, 2013) 
 
Efimeros noted that The Press Project reached out to ERT’s engineers almost immediately after 
the shutdown, and was able to keep the station’s signal on the air in the crucial first few days 
after the official closure. This quick action, in Efimeros’ view, was able to prevent (up until that 
point, as this ultimately occurred on November 7, 2013) a riot police invasion of ERT’s main 
 390 
headquarters. Efimeros stated that this possibility had been foreseen and five redundant systems 
of webcasting ERT were installed and the building was wired with cameras, so that any police 
invasion and arrests would be transmitted to the outside world, noting the significance this would 
have in shaping public opinion. A decision was also made to make ERT’s live stream freely 
available, with an embed code being provided, instead of The Press Project maintaining 
exclusivity. Efimeros stated his view that this was not something that citizen journalists would 
have been able to accomplish on their own and that The Press Project had the necessary means 
and infrastructure to handle such a task (personal communication, July 18, 2013). 
 Vasilis Vasilopoulos, the Director of ERT’s Multimedia Department, shared his opinion 
that ERT had been shut down “because it did not operate as propagandistically as the government 
desired,” adding that during the period in question, “opposition rhetoric was fully dominant in 
the public discourse.” Vasilopoulos added that social media enabled the news of ERT’s closure to 
easily go viral, with the public turning to social media because “the traditional media supported 
the government,” noting that while ERT was not popular or beloved, “its institutional role 
became understood.” According to Vasilopoulos, “when ERT was shut down it had 12,000 likes 
on Facebook and when it reopened [in May 2015] it had 140,000, with visits from 110,000 active 
accounts per week.” Vasilopoulos further noted that ERT’s Facebook timeline from the period 
that it was shutdown “has been saved” (personal communication, August 22, 2017). 
 Vasilopoulos highlighted the significance on what was aired on ERT Open, including full 
news programming, documentaries that were offered by their producers copyright-free, and 
coverage of the Skouries movement as well as causes such as that of laid off cleaning women 
from the Ministry of Finance who had begun camping outside the Ministry building in protest, 
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and that of laid off workers from the Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company. Vasilopoulos stated 
that he had produced and hosted a televised roundtable with prominent bloggers, many of whom 
had previously been known only by their pseudonyms. In Vasilopoulos’ words, “everyone was 
invited to our studios, and not just for one hour” (personal communication, August 22, 2017). 
 Nevertheless, the reestablished ERT, in Vasilopoulos’ view, “…has not managed to 
become a public broadcaster in the ideal sense of the term…but it is not a state broadcaster,” 
explaining that while the government still heavily influences ERT’s news content, this does not 
reflect all of ERT’s staff or producers, while it is still legally obligated to provide airtime to all 
parties represented in parliament (personal communication, August 22, 2017). 
A lasting legacy of the protest period is “ERT Open,” which remains on the air in Athens 
as a union-run radio station. As stated by Vasilopoulos, it is managed by administrative and 
technical staff of ERT and “provides an alternative voice” (personal communication, August 22, 
2017). Tolios describes this as “the greatest achievement [of the protest movement] and…this 
was embraced by pretty much every party, every political organization of the left spectrum…and 
by grassroots movements in general” (personal communication, February 22, 2017). 
7.8 – NEW MEDIA OUTLETS FORMED DURING THE CRISIS 
7.8.1 – Introduction 
 During the period being studied, a number of new media initiatives, both print-based and 
online, were formulated. Some of these organizations will be introduced, highlighting their usage 




7.8.2 – Alterthess 
 According to Lefteris Arvanitis, co-founder and journalist at alterthess.gr, the site is a 
collective which was founded with other journalists and which is based in Thessaloniki. 
Consisting of five main writers in addition to collaborators, Arvanitis notes that there is “no 
boss” within the organization. Arvanitis, who had worked at the Thessaloniki-based newspaper 
Macedonia, described himself as “among the first journalists to be fired” as a result of the 
economic crisis, working at a few other websites and publications before establishing Alterthess 
in 2010 (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 As stated by Arvanitis, the original idea was to establish a newspaper, but this was 
financially prohibitive. Among the founding members were journalists “who then worked in 
traditional media, but who did not have the freedom to write exactly what they wanted and were 
seeking other collaborations.” One of the main goals of Alterthess was to provide coverage of 
activist actions and activities, noting that “there was a very large gap in the news coverage about 
[social] movements…at the time, there was no other website aside from Indymedia which 
covered this segment of the political spectrum” (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 According to Arvanitis, Alterthess is distinct in three ways. First, by “providing censored 
news…stories that are important but which had no place in the pages of a traditional 
newspaper…due to political choice,” secondly via its immediacy, noting that the Thessaloniki 
offices of Greece’s national television stations had been shut down due to the crisis, and third 
distinction being “journalism with a perspective,” as an alternative to the mainstream media. 
However, and despite the Alterthess name, Arvanitis disagrees with the “alternative” label, 
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presenting the outlet as “professional, with limited resources,” and claiming that their website 
attracted more visitors than the city’s newspapers (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
 In relation to social and new media, Arvanitis noted that Alterthess attempts to be entirely 
multimedia, “…using all of the tools we have at our disposal...seeing the entire technological 
aspect as a unified whole. In a story we’ll use text, audio, video, and Twitter, not just to 
disseminate it, but to construct the story.” Alterthess was more active on Twitter than on 
Facebook according to Arvanitis, noting that the Twitter community plays a role in providing 
newsworthy information to the site. Arvanitis added that 80 percent of the site’s visits originate 
from Twitter and Facebook, and that the audience is “broadly on the left and tech literate.” 
Finally, Arvanitis highlighted the relationship Alterthess has cultivated with its audience, noting 
that the site had to “turn to a different economic model” and has sought funding from the 
audience directly (personal communication, July 4, 2013). 
7.8.3 – Hot Doc Magazine 
 
 The journalist who has perhaps received the most attention in Greece during the years of 
the economic crisis is journalist Kostas Vaxevanis, publisher of the investigative Hot Doc 
magazine and the koutipandoras.gr online portal54 (and later the Documento weekly newspaper). 
With a long career as a journalist and a producer of investigative news programs on television, 
including a longtime series which aired on ERT, Vaxevanis garnered international attention in 
October 2012, when he was arrested55 for the publication of the so-called “Lagarde List,” named 
after the Managing Director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde. The list contained the names of 
approximately 2,000 alleged Greek tax evaders with Swiss bank accounts, and Vaxevanis faced 
                                               
54 See http://www.hotdoc.gr and http://www.koutipandoras.gr. 
55 See https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-nevradakis/greek-journalist-arrested_b_2030940.html and 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-nevradakis/an-interview-with-kostas-_b_2126780.html. 
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two trials on charges of violating privacy laws stemming from the publication of the list, being 
acquitted on both occasions. Hot Doc was first published in April 2012, and was described by 
Vaxevanis as “the biggest Greek investigative and opinion magazine, with a circulation of 
approximately 25,000 copies [weekly]” (personal communication, March 6, 2013). 
 According to Vaxevanis, he sought to restore the role of the fourth estate through the 
publication of the magazine, which boasted the slogan “the truth as it is, journalism as it’s 
supposed to be.” Vaxevanis described Hot Doc as an investigative magazine, publishing stories 
based on hard evidence, and credited this content for its success. According to Vaxevanis, most 
of the magazine’s readers were between the ages of 25 and 40, describing this demographic as 
the “audience of the internet, the audience which for decades has cast into doubt television and 
the traditional media” (personal communication, March 6, 2013). 
 Regarding his arrest following the publication of the “Lagarde List,” Vaxevanis stated 
that it would not have been known in Greece were it not for social media, from which foreign 
media quickly picked up the story. Vaxevanis described the almost immediate creation of a 
Facebook page named “Free Vaxevanis,” which he claimed attracted 75,000 likes within an hour, 
while the news of Vaxevanis’ arrest initially became publicly known via a tweet56 he managed to 
send out moments before his arrest and which had thousands of retweets within the first hour. 
According to Vaxevanis, this was how foreign media outlets learned of the arrest at the same 
time that the Greek media “did not say a word” (personal communication, March 6, 2013). 
According to Chatzistefanou, this was because “the same economic elite that support the 
government…are afraid and are very aggressive against journalists who want to express different 
opinions. We had the example of [Kostas] Vaxevanis, who brought up the Lagarde List” 
                                               
56 See https://twitter.com/kostasvaxevanis/status/262479187972079616. 
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(personal communication, June 26, 2013). Further illustrating such “diaploki,” Vaxevanis noted 
that the Ta Nea newspaper, owned by a prominent oligarch, later republished his list with more 
detail, but no legal action was taken against the paper (personal communication, March 6, 2013). 
 In Vaxevanis’ view, “Hot Doc would not exist if social media didn’t exist…in order for 
the news that we publish in our magazine to be learned by a much wider audience than those 
who read the magazine itself.” Vaxevanis noted that the magazine, which uses Facebook and 
Twitter as well as the koutipandoras.gr portal, often “goes viral” on social media, especially 
when scandals are revealed. Vaxevanis also described his plans to launch a web radio station, 
describing this as a way to bypass the closed airwaves, while feeding his programming via the 
internet to regional radio stations” (personal communication, March 6, 2017). 
7.8.4 – Okeanews 
 
 Olivier Drot, editor of the French-language Okeanews.fr website, which features news 
and reporting from Greece, explained why he decided to launch this website: having visited 
Greece as a high school student and later as a tourist, he grew interested in the country and: 
…decided to come back the year after, for one month. It was in 2010 and I lived one 
month…with Greek people all the time…I wanted to really live it from inside. It was just 
the start of the [crisis]…I decided to come back and live here…I took this decision in 
2011, during the “Occupy Athens” movement…I remember that I was crying when I saw 
what happened on end of June 2011…because there was tear gas everywhere. A friend of 
mine was saying that…our government declared war on us. I could see in the mainstream 
media in France, because I was watching what they were saying, that it was completely 
different from what my friends were saying to me. So I decided to talk about it and it 
started like this and now I have the blog…I wanted to make really a small media, 
independent media to talk about all of this. (Personal communication, May 24, 2013) 
 
Drot described the site’s contents as follows: 
I started just by explaining the demonstrations, the austerity measures, by explaining 
what impact [they have] on Greek society. I wanted also to fight against some myths, that 
Greeks are lazy, they deserve all of this that is happening. I was really angry about this 
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because my friends were paying taxes, there was a cut in their salaries, so I wanted to 
explain what really it was. (Personal communication, May 24, 2013) 
 
Drot noted the site’s success in making the Skouries movement known to France, where it had 
not previously been recorded, adding that his audience includes both visitors from France and 
French expatriates residing in Greece. Finally, regarding the presence of Okeanews on social 
media, Drot stated that “Facebook is more to publish the content, Twitter is more to follow, to 
share, to cover when there is a demonstration, something is happening somewhere and we have 
to share it. I participate in the #rbnews hashtag” (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
7.8.5 – Omnia TV 
 
 Omnia TV57 can be described as a video-oriented alternative news portal. Editor Antonis 
Dimopoulos described the site’s beginnings, with efforts having started during the period of the 
December 2008 riots. As stated by Dimopoulos, “[w]e are a team of people which got to know 
each other on the internet and we decided to launch and develop something which did not exist 
in Greece at the time, a web TV station. According to Dimopoulos, the initial conceptualization 
of Omnia TV was based on the principle of openness: 
The thinking behind this effort was for it to be open, for anyone to be able to come here 
and prepare a show…where anyone could express what they want, to write their own 
news or to share their opinions…Omnia TV isn’t exclusively us. It is whoever comes in, 
whoever writes, whoever produces a show… (Personal communication, July 10, 2013) 
 
Dimopoulos stated that this concept was still an uphill battle for Omnia TV, noting that many 
members of the public were not used to a medium such as this, where they could log in and 
create their own content. Nevertheless, Dimopoulos described Omnia TV as being “on an 
upward trajectory.” According to Dimopoulos, social media was used by Omnia TV mostly for 
the purposes of dissemination, with a presence on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Google+, 
                                               
57 See https://www.omniatv.com. 
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with Twitter and YouTube used the most, citing Twitter’s immediacy. Dimopoulos added that 
“most if not all of us participate in the #rbnews hashtag.” Finally, Dimopoulos also described 
efforts to launch “a joint effort with media such as Radiobubble, mindthecam, Indymedia, to 
slowly come together as organizations…this became possible within social media and we have 
started to come together despite our differences…to develop a united voice of the media from 
below” (personal communication, July 10, 2013). 
 
 
7.8.6 – Protagon 
 
 Founded in 2010 by prominent journalist (and current leader of the To Potami political 
party) Stavros Theodorakis, with a long career in Greek television and the press, protagon.gr is 
described by its editor, Kostas Giannakidis, “as a site which primarily features opinion pieces 
and which targets Greece’s opinion leaders…which doesn’t chase news or report on everything 
happening in Greece or the world, but which explains why something occurred, to analyze 
what’s behind the story…” Giannakidis stated that the site is eponymous and that its concept is 
unique in relation to other media outlets in Greece (personal communication, April 5, 2013). 
 Christina Tachiaou, a journalist with Protagon, described the site’s content: “What’s most 
interesting about Protagon and a factor in its success is the fact that you can read 
everything…the opinion of anarchists…of SYRIZA, of [New Democracy], of PASOK…There is 
no line. All opinions are available and respected” (personal communication, February 23, 2013). 
With respect to the resonance of Protagon with its audience, Tachiaou stated: 
You can find Protagon everywhere...even if people agree or disagree. You can find many, 
many comments on our articles, and it’s one of the sites that really contributes to the 
public dialogue…We also have articles by readers, the ones that we consider most 
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interesting and with a subject that may interest more people. So yes, there is a dialogue 
and we also accept proposals by [readers]. (Personal communication, February 23, 2013) 
 
Giannakidis added that Protagon attracted 65,000-70,000 unique users per day and was in the 
top five most influential media outlets in Greece (personal communication, April 5, 2013). 
7.8.7 – Seleo.gr 
 
 Seleo.gr, a local news portal based in the city of Thessaloniki, was founded in 2009. 
According to journalist Christina Fotinaki, it is among the top three most visited websites of 
Thessaloniki and heavily emphasizes local news, with a focus on citizen-submitted content such 
as photographs. As stated by Fotinaki, “the issues that we will cover will most likely not interest 
a television channel.” Interaction with the public via Facebook and Twitter was noted, with most 
of the portal’s content shared via these two mediums. Fotinaki noted that the site was “rapidly 
growing” in popularity, adding that the site had a presence on YouTube and future plans to 
incorporate video into its reporting” (personal communication, July 5, 2013). 
7.8.8 – The Press Project 
 
Earlier in the chapter, the role of The Press Project in transmitting the signal of ERT 
Open on the internet after ERT had officially been shut down was presented. The site, however, 
operates as a news and opinion portal in its own right, in addition to featuring an online radio 
station and web TV programming. The Press Project also collaborates with Wikileaks. 
According to Costas Efimeros, the editor and founder of The Press Project, the site was a 
product of the economic crisis and what was being said in the mainstream media, and actually 
began as a Twitter account in 2010, “based on the need to discuss the things which were not 
being discussed in Greece.” After the initial Twitter account was founded, a website was created 
which eventually transformed into news portal operating with a newsroom. Efimeros emphasized 
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The Press Project’s focus on investigative journalism at the intersection of citizen journalism, 
with a team of four journalists assigned to such work and a collaboration with the Eleftherotypia 
newspaper. Efimeros noted, however, that The Press Project determined that it wished to remain 
within the realm of professional journalism, producing a variety of content, including 
infographics, documentaries such as Debtocracy, and “unfiltered” journalism that a citizen 
would not be able to provide on their own (personal communication, July 18, 2013). 
Efimeros stated that The Press Project started out averaging 5,000-6,000 visitors per day 
to its website, but as of 2013, was surpassing 400,000, rivaling major mainstream Greek news 
portals such as in.gr. In Efimeros’ view, this popularity was largely based on major initiatives 
undertaken by The Press Project, such as its live streaming of ERT Open, as well as revelatory 
journalism, exposing such stories as whistleblower Edward Snowden’s allegations that Greek 
diplomats were being spied upon. Social media played a major role in The Press Project’s 
efforts, particularly via two Twitter accounts: @tppfeed, which acts as a live newsroom feed, and 
@thepressproject, featuring commentary and satire (personal communication, July 18, 2013) 
Notably though, The Press Project was backed by a technology company which produced 
and sold a content management system used by major publishers in Greece. Efimeros noted that 
this provided The Press Project with financial resources, in addition to technological resources 
which other online mediums did not have access to. These technological tools, according to 
Efimeros, enabled The Press Project to develop data mining tools such as “Circular” and “Search 
Lab,” through which government documents and resources, as well as financial statements 
pertaining to Greek politicians, were available and searchable. Access to this data bolstered the 
investigative efforts of The Press Project (personal communication, July 18, 2013). 
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Notably, Efimeros stated that: 
We do not believe we are an alternative medium…other than being forced to be 
“alternative” to the major outlets. We are small because they are big…but we do not want 
to be considered an alternative medium, I want us to be a medium that the audience trusts 
for its daily news consumption. (Personal communication, July 18, 2013) 
 
Efimeros also stated that he would like The Press Project to be a mainstream news source, 
believing that it was better than the others due to its investigative journalism, eponymous 
operation, crediting of photographers, and operation with an internal code of ethics. He added 
that, as a sign of its credibility, The Press Project had thus far been threatened with legal action 
on 13 occasions, but none of the cases went to court, because everything was cross-checked and 
verified (personal communication, July 18, 2013). 
7.8.9 – Unfollow Magazine 
 
 Unfollow58 is a monthly magazine which was founded in late 2011. The magazine is 
printed in a literary format and features long-form pieces, investigative journalism and analysis, 
as well as literature and non-news items. Augustine Zenakos, editor of Unfollow, had worked in 
the mainstream press, for the To Vima newspaper, but departed in 2010. Zenakos described his 
reason for departing: “I couldn’t handle it anymore. The whole idea of how we worked had 
changed a lot because of the crisis.” In Zenakos’ words: “Our plan was to make a magazine that 
would be completely independent, which meant that it would have no funding, no background 
support from any source…Our plan was not to make an alternative medium. Our plan was to 
make an independent one” (personal communication, July 19, 2013). 
Zenakos described the main pillars of Unfollow’s content: 
…the old media that we liked to read at one point were media that would dare have long 
stories, complicated stories, they would assume that the reader would put in the effort to 
                                               
58 See http://www.unfollow.com.gr. 
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face a complicated issue and read it through, even if that would take 10 or 15 pages, even 
if that would take up quite a lot of time. Traditional media went away from that, whereas 
they were the ones that mostly had the capability to do it in the past. Also, this is a type of 
journalism that suits printed media quite a lot. On the internet, a lot of people get tired of 
reading really long things, attention spans are a lot shorter. One thing we wanted to do 
was to go back to that kind of journalism. (Personal communication, July 19, 2013) 
 
Zenakos also noted Unfollow’s inclusion of combining journalistic and non-journalistic work: 
…this is in no sense new but it’s been somehow reintroduced, the idea that a magazine is 
something that keeps you company through a certain amount of time, so it doesn’t only 
go after the expediency of what is now politically relevant…but also something that 
builds up your general attitude to things. So publishing literature, for example, alongside 
journalism, to us makes that kind of sense. (Personal communication, July 19, 2013) 
 
In addition, Zenakos stated Unfollow’s efforts to combine theoretical work with investigative 
journalism. Using the issue of “diaploki” as an example, he explained how Unfollow could 
publish an article which combines the historical background of the phenomenon with the 
reporting of hard facts and the naming of specific figures. 
 According to Zenakos, this brand of journalism had gotten Unfollow in legal trouble, 
citing two lawsuits which had been filed against the magazine by prominent businessman 
Dimitris Melissanidis following investigative articles which were published by the magazine 
which revealed allegations of smuggling, forgery, and tax evasion on the part of Melissanidis, 
who was very close to then-Prime Minister Antonis Samaras. For Zenakos, this was a battle 
against the system of “diaploki”: “[t]he mainstream press is flooded with flattering portraits of 
this guy, the big businessman, the big success story, he is also associated with a football 
team…and so now you have the sports press also praising this guy.” Zenakos added that there 
was a very real threat of being sued into extinction: 
We’re quite confident that our stories are well-documented and I think that he’s going to 
have no luck in court, but we are a small magazine, we’re perhaps 20 people in total… 
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There’s no protection in any kind of institutionalized form if you want to do this kind of 
journalism in this country. (Personal communication, July 19, 2013) 
 
Zenakos noted that social media was a means for making Unfollow’s work known, as the 
magazine “never had money to do traditional advertising.” However, Zenakos explained 
differences in the way the magazine approached online media: “…we didn’t make the mistake 
that many traditional media made…We know the different nature of the two things, and what we 
put on the internet is not our printed material. It’s part of it, but we also…write directly for the 
internet.” According to Zenakos, Unfollow maintained a presence on Facebook and Twitter and 
tried to “engage in a kind of dialogue” but did not have the luxury of responding to dozens of 
comments, which meant that “mostly we try to do things that would invite people to discuss 
among themselves” (personal communication, July 19, 2013). 
Finally, Zenakos discussed the launch of Unfollow’s English-language online edition, 
Borderline Reports, which aimed to provide the information and context that Zenakos felt was 
frequently missing from reports provided by foreign correspondents and fixers reporting from 
Athens (personal communication, July 19, 2013). 
7.8.10 – Vmedia.gr 
 
 Vmedia.gr is a web TV station and online alternative news portal which was founded in 
late 2012. According to Christos Kotsireas, a journalist with Vmedia.gr, the idea behind 
developing the site was “for the public to have the ability to receive news…which is not reported 
at this time by the hegemonic media outlets…and via our web channel, to present people and 
voices who will not easily be heard on the hegemonic media.” These guests included university 
professors and citizen journalists, while other programming included news analysis programs, 
shows on music and the environment, and a satirical program. 
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 Social and new media played a significant role in Vmedia.gr’s programming and 
operations. Noting that the public had a “thirst for alternative news and information,” Kotsireas 
described Vmedia.gr’s web TV programming as mostly live, attracting an audience as large as 
60,000 viewers for significant live events. Kotsireas mentioned the site’s active presence on 
Facebook, a blog, and a chat feature which is active during live programming. Approximately 10 
people were involved in Vmedia.gr’s efforts in total (personal communication, July 2, 2013). 
 Kotsireas mentioned vMedia.gr’s interest in participating in a common platform 
(mentioned previously in the subsection about Omnia TV) which would bring together all of the 
media collectives, “in order to have better penetration within society.” In Kotsireas’ view, social 
media “are the future battleground, but we can’t rely solely on that belief. The most important 
thing is for online clicktivism to become offline action and participation in collective initiatives,” 
stating that this was a goal of Vmedia.gr (personal communication, July 2, 2013). 
7.9 – SURVEY RESULTS: VIEWS ON SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE MASS MEDIA 
 The results of the electronic survey questionnaire provide insights into perceptions which 
exist regarding the impact of social and new media upon the overall media sphere, the mass 
media’s credibility crisis and credibility of the social and new media as a source of news and 
information, the impact of social and new media in making important incidents and events such 
as the “Indignants” movement or the arrest of journalist Kostas Vaxevanis known to a wider 
public, and the usage of social and new media tools by journalists. 
 Respondents, when asked whether they used social media for the purposes of getting 
news and information, widely answered “yes.” The internet more broadly was cited as the most-
used source of news and information for almost three-fourths of respondents, including almost 
 404 
all of the elected officials from the European Parliament, but only three-fifths of newspaper 
editors, likely revealing their favoritism towards print. Newspapers were the second most 
popular primary source of news and information among respondents, far below the popularity of 
the internet, while television and radio barely registered. Nearly half of respondents stated that 
they had never used social media to communicate with a mainstream media outlet. Amongst the 
usage of “non-traditional” media, just over half of the respondents stated that they regularly read 
alternative print media, and almost half listened to internet radio. 
 The next set of responses pertains to trustworthiness and credibility. The impact of social 
and new media in the decline in popularity of the mainstream media was rated as fairly large, at 
found to be significant overall, with the highest response coming from representatives of civil 
society organizations, who provided an overwhelmingly positive response, and the lowest from 
editors of newspapers, with a slightly positive response. The trustworthiness of television as a 
source of news and information was ranked at very low levels, with a still lower ranking 
provided by civil society representatives, and the highest, in relative terms, by newspaper editors, 
perhaps reflecting a mass media bias. However, radio, newspapers, and magazines were all 
ranked negatively by respondents in terms of their trustworthiness as sources of news and 
information, with the lowest levels of trust across the board provided by civil society 
representatives and the highest by newspaper editors, once more belying a likely bias towards 
mainstream media outlets. The highest overall ranking was received by the internet, whose 
trustworthiness as a source of news and information was nevertheless viewed slightly negatively. 
Civil society representatives ranked the internet slightly positively in this regard, as did elected 
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representatives (3.14), while newspaper editors leaned negative, further revealing a likely bias in 
favor of “traditional” forms of mass media. 
Overall, respondents overwhelmingly believed that the mainstream media in Greece were 
suffering from a credibility crisis. This included all civil society respondents and almost all 
newspaper editors who responded. Amongst those who answered “yes” to the previous question, 
the credibility crisis was rated as “severe,” with results almost even across the three populations. 
When asked if they believed the internet was considered to be a more credible source of news 
and information for the majority of people in Greece, a plurality answered “yes,” including a 
majority of members of the European Parliament who responded. As to whether respondents 
believed if the internet was used more often as a source of news and information as compared to 
the mainstream media by the majority of Greeks, a majority answered “yes,” while only 
approximately one quarter of respondents answered “no.” Overall, respondents believed that 
almost half of the news consumed by the average Greek citizen came from online sources. The 
age group believed by respondents to be the most reliant upon the internet and social media for 
news and information was the 25-34 bracket, while for reliance upon mainstream media, the 55-
64 and 65+ age groups combined for almost all responses, reflecting an evident digital divide 
among generations. 
 The next set of responses is related to the relationship of the mass media with social and 
new media. The online and social media presence of Greece’s mainstream media outlets was 
ranked slightly negatively by respondents overall, with civil society representatives providing the 
most negative result and newspaper editors—once again likely to be biased—with a slightly 
positive view. Similarly, the level of integration of new media tools by mainstream media outlets 
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was ranked marginally negative, with members of the European Parliament providing a positive 
outlook. When asked whether they believed Greece’s mainstream media outlets had reacted 
positively or negatively to the popularity of social and new media, a slightly negative score was 
recorded, with a particularly low score recorded for representatives of civil society groups. 
Newspaper editors were slightly negative, while members of the European Parliament were the 
only population to provide a slightly positive score. A presence on social media also was not 
believed to have helped the credibility of mainstream media outlets, with a small majority of 
respondents answering “no” and less than a quarter of respondents answering “yes.” The fluency 
of journalists with social and new media tools was also ranked slightly poor by respondents. 
Interestingly, newspaper editors ranked themselves close to the (slightly negative) average, while 
the lowest score was provided by civil society representatives and the highest, and only slightly 
positive score, provided by elected representatives. The overall impact of social media on the 
quality of Greek journalism was viewed as fairly significant, while civil society representatives 
were neutral on this account. The impact of social media on the quality of journalism was 
nevertheless rated as slightly negative, with civil society representatives once again remaining 
neutral and the other two populations providing a slightly negative score. When asked whether 
they believed if the mainstream media and the news coverage they provide had driven the public 
to search for alternative sources of news online, a very positive score was provided across all 
three populations, with civil society representatives providing the highest ranking of all.  
 The next group of questions asked respondents to gauge the impact of social and new 
media in exposing various issues to the public. Most agreed that social and mew media did have 
a significant role in exposing issues to the public, including the killing of Alexandros 
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Grigoropoulos, the “Indignants” protest movement, the arrest of blogger Geron Pastitsios, the 
arrest of journalist Kostas Vaxevanis, the Skouries mining controversy, the shootings of migrant 
farm workers in Manolada, the shutdown of ERT, the murder of rapper Pavlos Fyssas, and the 
arrests and trial of members of Golden Dawn. In most instances, representatives of civil society 
organizations ascribed the highest levels of impact for the aforementioned issues, though 
newspaper editors attributed a higher level of social media impact on the story of the arrest of 
blogger Geron Pastitsios, and members of the European Parliament ascribed the highest level of 
social media impact to the story of the Golden Dawn arrests. 
In looking at the credibility of the coverage found on social and new media as compared 
to the social media for aforementioned issues and whether the coverage online was more 
credible, slight majorities answered “yes” for the Skouries mining controversy and for the 
movement of the “Indignants” and for the shutdown of ERT; slightly less than half of 
respondents answered “yes” for the arrest of Kostas Vaxevanis, the killing of Alexandros 
Grigoropoulos, the Manolada shootings, the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, and the arrest of Geron 
Pastitsios, and approximately one-third answered “yes” for the Golden Dawn arrests. 
 A final set of results pertains to the questionnaire which was exclusively provided to 
newspaper editors. A majority of respondents stated that their newspaper utilized at least one 
social or new media tool, with Facebook and online video being the most used, followed by 
Twitter, user comments, and an RSS feed. Amongst the editors themselves, Twitter was the most 
frequently used social media tool, followed by Facebook. Overall, Twitter was the most-used 
social media tool by a plurality journalists for the purposes of their journalistic work, followed 
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again by Facebook. Most newspapers were said to maintain a dedicated staff exclusively for their 
social media and online presence. 
 Social media was gauged as having a fairly notable impact in terms of significance and 
even more so in terms of quality, for the quality of the journalism at the editors’ newspapers. The 
impact of social and new media on the editors’ ability to perform their jobs was also viewed as 
significant, while a somewhat positive impact was evident. Interestingly, almost all respondents 
stated that their newspaper did not require them to maintain a social media presence, with none 
answering “yes.” Most editors also stated that they interacted with their readers via social media, 
and half did not believe that the newspaper where they were employed was suffering from a 
credibility crisis. In looking at the online tools used by the newspaper where the editors are 
employed, the most popular tool was an online .pdf edition of the newspaper, followed by 
exclusive online content, an online newsletter, and online video. 
 In looking at their newspapers’ impact on the Greek public sphere and public discourse in 
Greece, a fair amount of significance was recorded, as well as a highly positive impact, once 
more reflecting a likely bias in favor of their own outlets and mass media more broadly on the 
part of the editors themselves. Specifically looking at their newspapers’ online presence, the 
significance of their impact on public discourse was viewed as slightly significant and somewhat 
positive. The overall quality of their newspapers’ online and social media presence was viewed 
neutrally. The impact of the online presence of the editors’ newspapers upon political discourse 
and the political sphere in Greece was rated slightly significantly and somewhat more positively, 
while the popularity and reach of the newspapers’ online and social media presence was, in turn, 
ranked as slightly insignificant. 
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 Regarding a key issue for journalists, self-censorship, almost all respondents stated that it 
was or probably was common in Greek journalism today (with no journalists answering “no”), 
while social and new media was not found to have had a very significant impact in perpetuating 
this practice. Most respondents also stated that they considered social and new media an 
important means of generating visitors and readers for their paper, while the editors estimated 
that almost half of their page views for the website of their newspapers originated, on average, 
from social media postings. 
 Finally, the potential future significance of social media and new media upon the 
journalistic realm in Greece was ranked very highly by journalists, while the quality of this 
impact was expected to be lower, but still positive. 
 Overall, what the above results seem to be indicating is a general sense amongst 
journalists and editors that the online presence of mainstream media outlets in Greece—
including their own—was satisfactory at best. Social and new media’s role in spreading the news 
about significant incidents and events such as the ERT shutdown, the “Indignants” movement, or 
the arrest of journalist Kostas Vaxevanis, was noted, with no ranking across any specific incident 
or event falling below 3.00 overall or among any of the three populations surveyed, even though 
respondents were divided regarding the credibility of the reporting and news found online about 
these incidents and events. Perhaps most significantly, the credibility crisis of the mass media—
and television in particular—seemed to be confirmed, while the internet and social media were 
used most often as a source of news and information, and broadly viewed as being the most 
popular single source of news and information within Greek society today.  
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7.10 – DISCUSSION 
Many and varied responses were provided by the interviewees regarding the overall 
impact of social and new media on the incumbent media outlets in Greece. Some respondents 
highlighted social media’s influence on the mainstream media’s news content, others highlighted 
a slow response or paralysis on the part of the major media outlets in adapting to these new 
technologies. The interviewees also commented on the issue of online credibility, highlighting 
the audience’s search for “truth,” cord-cutting, and usage of social media as a second screen. 
For Mangiriadis, news stories that are trending on social media impacted the newsroom at 
the outlet where he was employed, Mega Channel: 
…there are many times in our meetings before we go on the nightly news, that we discuss 
issues that are coming up via the social media, and we are wondering whether we should 
include that on the nightly news, either as an issue or what's going on with the discussion 
inside the social media. (Personal communication, July 23, 2013) 
 
Zenakos highlighted the immense pressure that mainstream media have felt when stories such as 
incidences of police violence were exposed on social media: “The fact that there were a lot of 
people, non-professional journalists, that recorded what was happening on the street and this 
material became available to a wide number of people…put quite a lot of pressure on the media” 
(personal communication, July 19, 2013). Karvounopoulos stated that some newspapers 
abandoned speed and began providing detailed analysis, while other newspapers went in the 
opposite direction, publishing large photos and short pieces (personal communication, June 28, 
2013). Apostolopoulos argues that television has abandoned its search for mass audiences in 
favor of providing program targeting niche audiences (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
 Dimitrakopoulou cites paralysis on the part of the mainstream media, stating that they 
reacted: “[w]ith great technophobia. It was very apparent that traditional media were paralyzed 
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with the advent of new media, and journalists unions were also very reluctant in incorporating 
the new media into their professional life,” adding that they feared that social media would steal 
their jobs (personal communication, July 5, 2013). Paralysis was also cited by Giannis 
Kessopoulos, founder and editor of thinkfree.gr, noting that the newspapers of Thessaloniki 
“missed the boat completely” as none launched a local news portal (personal communication, 
April 3, 2013). Hrisos argued that “[t]hey try to become part of the game, but it seems that it is 
impossible for them to participate, because it’s a totally different mentality…mainstream media 
just don't want to have a dialogue with the society” (personal communication, July 2, 2013). 
 Other interviewees cited the reproduction of the mainstream media in the online sphere. 
Moutsatsou stated: “[the mass media] haven’t learned their lesson, haven’t understood, they’re 
still reproducing propaganda online (personal communication, February 9, 2013). Vaxevanis 
expressed his view that “when the media oligarchs understood that they were losing the game 
and that the game is played on the internet, instead of looking after their websites…they created 
and pay, along with businesspeople, ‘yellow blogs’” in order to attack opponents (personal 
communication, March 6, 2013). Kotsireas observed “…the following oxymoronic situation can 
be observed: someone who might no longer watch Mega Channel will read Protagon [owned by 
former Mega Channel journalist Stavros Theodorakis], or will turn off Skai but will visit the 
news portal owned by Nikos Evaggelatos [at the time a presenter on Skai TV], and will think that 
he is better informed and ‘sticking it’ to the mainstream media” (personal communication, July 2, 
2013). This was highlighted by Baltzis, who noted that many mainstream media personalities 
have set up their own portals (personal communication, February 23, 2013).  
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 There was also a debate amongst those interviewed regarding whether social and new 
media, and online sources more broadly, could be considered more credible than mainstream 
offline media. Zenakos questioned how online credibility could be measured while noting that 
the audience that has shifted online could be reading anything: “[t]here’s no data that you can 
base assumptions on…How many people go online just to visit traditional media portals?… Or 
even interact with the kind of blogs that are on the far right or somehow connected to Golden 
Dawn?” Zenakos added that “…20,000 people reading something on the internet sounds like a 
healthy number, but if you think about it, it’s not that big a number really, it’s not something that 
you could use as indicative of what people believe” (personal communication, July 19, 2013).  
 Other interviewees cited a search for an alternative on the part of the audience. As 
described by Theodoridis, “If you look at the quality of news being provided in Greek television, 
I mean people were just waiting for an alternative” (personal communication, January 27, 2017), 
while in the words of Christina Papadopoulou, “I believe that you can always find the truth 
online, the truth you can’t find on the newscasts of Mega Channel or Antenna TV…because you 
can find all perspectives online” (personal communication, February 2, 2014). Zoe Georganta, 
professor of applied econometrics and productivity at the University of Macedonia, stated that 
“A lot of people don't listen to Greek TV, especially nowadays, because they all lie…especially 
the major channels. [Citizens] try to get their political information…from blogs and from what is 
discussed over the internet” (personal communication, July 7, 2013). Kranidiotis stated his view 
that online media were not considered more credible by the public, but “the public is now more 
aware, and because it has more opportunities to get informed, it searches more deeply,” adding 
that “instead of opening their television in the morning, quite often they open their computers” 
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(personal communication, December 6, 2013). Vasilopoulos pessimistically warned, however, 
that “the online citizen cannot sort out what is true, documented information. He considers all of 
the information that is online accurate” (personal communication, June 5, 2013).  
 Finally, a merging of online and offline media consumption was also observed, via the 
usage of social media platforms as a “second screen.” Adamidis notes that “a very large 
percentage of comments that are written on Twitter in particular, and also Facebook, have to do 
with things broadcast on television” (personal communication, April 10, 2013), while Farmakis 
jokes that “When there is a strike of journalists…and there are no news bulletins and no 
newspapers circulating, then the debate in social media is empty, as if people do not have what to 














Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 – RQ1: HOW HAVE SOCIAL AND NEW MEDIA ALTERED OR IMPACTED THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GREECE? 
In looking at how (and if) social and new media have altered or impacted the public 
sphere and civil society in Greece, the following indicators could be used as a measure: a 
broadening of public discourse or an opening of public discourse to new or previously 
marginalized voices; a reduction or elimination of clientelism, patronage, and diaploki; increased 
usage of social and new media for matters of public interest and concern; the formation of new 
civil society organizations; the increased visibility of existing civil society organizations; the 
formation of new citizens’ movements, an increase in volunteerism; increased citizen 
involvement in public affairs; and an overall increased awareness of civil society. 
The general consensus revealed from the individual interviews conducted for this study is 
that civil society has been bolstered during the years being studied as part of this project (2011-
2017). This is evident through the establishment of many new civil society initiatives during this 
period, as well as the increased visibility these organizations enjoyed within Greek society. 
Furthermore, many of these new civil society organizations could be said to have incorporated 
social and new media to a significant extent. In chapter 5, organizations and initiatives such as 
the “Atenistas,” “Edosa Fakelaki,” “enallaktikos.gr,” “HumanGrid,” “Illegal Signs,” the 
Metropolitan Community Clinic of Ellinikon, “Omikron Project,” “SynAthina,” the Time Bank 
of Athens and Syntagma Square, and “Save Greek Water” were presented. Many of these 
initiatives were either based exclusively or mostly on the internet (“enallaktikos.gr,” “Edosa 
Fakelaki,” “Illegal Signs,” “HumanGrid,” “Omikron Project”), or maintained a significant online 
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presence that was a major component of the group’s overall activity or an important means of 
communication between the organization and society at large. 
To an extent, the same could be said about the broader interventions into the Greek public 
sphere which were presented in chapter 5. Various boycotts, such as #xa_advertising and 
#blood_strawberries, were entirely based on the internet. Crowdfunding for Aris 
Chatzistefanou’s documentaries also took place online. Satire and parody as interventions in the 
public sphere and political discourse, such as in the case of “I Am Hellene,” also took place 
online, utilizing new media. In addition, e-government initiatives and platforms were also 
presented, which sought to provide an online citizens’ platform for communicating with the 
government and public services while fostering greater transparency and accountability. 
From a “real life” point of view, I can personally attest, through my experience in Greece 
performing research between 2012 and 2017, that the physical public sphere as traditionally 
epitomized by the “kafeneio,” and as epitomized in its modern form as Greece’s present-day 
“café culture,” is alive and well. The existence of these spaces is inextricably linked to a 
common cultural trait of the Greeks, who in large part greatly enjoy discussing politics and 
political issues. Indeed, my own experience has demonstrated to me that political conversation is 
almost unavoidable, regardless of location, sociopolitical status, or demographic. Greeks are 
opinionated and love to express their opinions, and present-day Greek cafés are a space where 
such discussion and debate takes place. It should come as no surprise that for years, Radiobubble 
operated out of a centrally-located café, merging three distinct spheres: its radio broadcasts, the 
online world which Radiobubble was intimately connected to via its social media activity and 
news reporting, and the physical space within the café itself. More broadly, I can attest that the 
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vast majority of cafés in Greece provide free, unrestricted wireless high-speed internet access, 
not just in urban areas but also in smaller towns, villages, and islands. The same is true of most 
other public spaces in Greece, including squares and plazas, airports, bus terminals, restaurants, 
many places of business, and even automatic teller machines. In turn, public squares in Greece 
often are the location of many such cafés, but have also served as spaces which have hosted 
major social movements, as best evidenced by the “Indignants” protests of 2011. 
This may in turn relate to the immense popularity of Facebook, which was evident from 
the results of the 2016 Reuters Institute survey referenced in chapter 2, which found Facebook 
usage in Greece to be at among the highest levels in the world, including the use of Facebook as 
a source of news. Notably, the list of most-read news sites as recorded by the Reuters Institute 
survey included numerous mainstream portals, sites like enikos.gr, but also one of the last 
remaining prominent news blogs, “Tromaktiko.” This may indicate, on the one hand, the 
reproduction of the existing hegemonic public sphere on the internet and in the social media 
sphere, and on the other hand, the existence of a parallel or alternative public sphere comprised 
of an audience that is interested in reading news blogs instead of visiting major news portals. 
When politics is discussed, the problems of the Greek state and its institutions are 
frequently a topic of conversation. This sentiment was also reflected within this study. The 
general consensus amongst the interviewees was that Greece’s public institutions are suffering 
from low levels of credibility. This finding was also evident in a number of recent surveys 
referenced in chapter 2, including the Kapa Research/To Vima survey and the DiaNEOsis survey, 
both of which measured attitudes towards major societal institutions and to civil society at large. 
Despite their existence and development in recent years, e-governance applications and 
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platforms were also infrequently used, as evidenced by the results of the OECD survey 
referenced in chapter 2. This lack of utilization of e-governance tools was also remarked upon by 
some interviewees, who questioned the implementation of such platforms within a society where 
there was no tradition of digital governance. 
 Another survey referenced in chapter 2 was conducted by “HumanGrid” and noted an 
increase in volunteerism in Greece during the years of the economic crisis, while the credibility 
of official non-governmental organizations remained low. This apprehension towards large non-
governmental organizations was also mentioned by many of the interviewees in this study, and 
could be potentially attributed as being a byproduct of the low institutional credibility across the 
board in Greece, and the reputation that such organizations have earned as being close to a state 
that is widely considered to be corrupt. An increase, therefore, in volunteerism may reflect the 
growth in prominence of “unofficial” civil society groups, a development which was noted by 
interviewees and scholars such as Afouxenidis, who described the “unofficial” civil society 
sector as larger and more dynamic than the “official” civil society sector. Looking at 
organizations and initiatives which were presented in this study, groups such as the “Omikron 
Project,” the Metropolitan Community Clinic of Ellinikon, and the Time Bank of Athens and 
Syntagma Square could all be considered representative examples of such “unofficial” groups, in 
the sense that they are (or were not, at the time of this study) legally registered entities. The same 
would also be true of Radiobubble, prior to its “official” formation as a collective. 
 Furthermore, Afouxenidis noted that many of these “unofficial” groups are themselves 
ephemeral, as is the volunteer activity that is often associated with them. In recent years in 
Greece, it could be said that there has been a change in the civil society “agenda,” with the 
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growth in organizations—both official and unofficial—and volunteerism surrounding issues 
pertaining to refugees and migrants. A decline in one area of civil society might be 
counterbalanced by a spike in activity in another sector. 
 In examining the two illustrative examples which most closely related to civil society, 
Boroume and Radiobubble, it should first be noted that these organizations remain active as of 
2018. Boroume, as noted by Theodoridis, has been growing each year since its inception, and it 
continues to be a visible part of the civil society landscape in Greece and one of the most 
recognized organizations of its kind in Greece. Notably though, Theodoridis noted that Boroume, 
which at one time had developed a reputation as having been “born” on Facebook, has since 
scaled down its social media activity, in particular Twitter. While social media tools may have 
played an extremely important role in helping Boroume launch, gain visibility, and attract 
volunteers, social media today seem to be playing a secondary role within the organization. It 
could perhaps be said that the organization has gained enough of a foothold within society in 
terms of recognition, financial resources and human resources, to not have to rely upon social 
media as much as in the earliest years of its existence. 
 Radiobubble, on the other hand and by all accounts, is not as visible as it was in the early 
part of the decade. This was confirmed in interviews with Paraskevopoulou in 2015 and 
Kounenakis in 2017. Radiobubble’s physical space, its café in Exarchia, has shut down as of 
2014, it has shifted the emphasis of its radio programming from news to music, and its once-
active social media activity, as epitomized by the #rbnews hashtag which was once included in 
the Twitter feed of The Guardian during the Greek parliamentary elections of 2014, has been 
greatly scaled back, as stated by Paraskevopoulou and Kounenakis. Moreover, out of the two 
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prominent civil society initiatives which were borne out of Radiobubble, Hackademy is no 
longer active, while Tutorpool seems to be largely inactive as well. Furthermore, in an additional 
sign of ephemerality, some individuals who were at one time heavily active with the #rbnews 
hashtag on Twitter, such as Dora Oikonomides (@irategreek) and @doleross, have not been 
active on Twitter since 2016. 
 Notably though, most of the other groups and initiatives presented in Chapter 5, including 
the “Atenistas,” “enallaktikos.gr,” “HumanGrid,” the Metropolitan Community Clinic of 
Ellinikon, “SynAthina,” the Time Bank of Athens and Syntagma Square, and “Save Greek 
Water,” remained operational as of 2018, maintaining an active presence online and via one or 
more social media outlets. 
 Not all such groups remained active, however. “Edosa Fakelaki” has seemingly been 
inactive since 2016, which is the last time a report regarding bribery seems to have been 
published on its website. The “grassroots map” of the “Omikron Project” has not been updated 
since 2014, while another Radiobubble initiative, #rbdata, does not seem to have been active 
online since 2015. The Athensville blog, credited with serving as the catalyst for the formation of 
the “Atenistas,” has not been updated since 2016. Other initiatives not specifically covered by 
this project but which were formed during the period being studied also seem to have stalled or 
ceased their operations, such as “Mapping Racist Violence,” (website inactive since 2015),59 
“Politeia 2.0” (Facebook page deleted), and “Teleia kai Pavla” (Facebook inactive since 2014).60  
 In looking at public sphere initiatives, it bears noting that there have been no notable 
boycott movements comparable to #xa_advertising and #blood_strawberries since 2013, nor any 
                                               
59 See http://map.crisis-scape.net. 
60 See https://www.facebook.com/teleiakaipavla. 
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crowdfunding initiatives that had the same reach and visibility as documentaries such as 
Debtocracy, which was screened throughout Greece and around the world, including broadcasts 
on major European television stations. It may well be that the public has grown accustomed to 
such initiatives and they no longer generate the interest that they did in the early part of the 
decade. Another possibility pertains to fatigue, which was indicated by Theodoridis in his 2017 
follow-up interview, when specifically referring to Twitter he remarked “perhaps it completed its 
cycle. It never was as relevant in Greece as it was in the States I think,” adding “they were these 
few people and they are the same and they are recycling themselves, so to say. And it’s a very 
very small group of people and after a while people got tired I think.” Looking at social media 
and civil society more broadly, Theodoridis stated: “I feel that other organizations started off 
believing that social media is really, really important. I don’t have the feeling that they think it’s 
that important any more (personal communication, January 27, 2017). With reference to the 
public sphere and political activity, Leventis observes that “the public doesn’t trust anyone [and] 
is distancing itself from the political sphere” (personal communication, March 22, 2017). 
 What, therefore, does the Greek public sphere (or spheres) resemble? In Habermas’ 
earlier conceptualization of the public sphere, he wrote about a society in which private 
organizations begin to assume greater public roles, while the state and public institutions 
increasingly begin to encroach upon the public sphere, and where rational-critical debate is 
supplanted by consumption and the messages delivered by the mass media, creating a “secondary 
realm of intimacy” (1962/1989: 161, 171, 175-176). While Habermas used the welfare state as an 
example, what has occurred in Greece in recent years is, on the one hand, an increasing 
privatization of institutional functions ranging from health care to helping the homeless, while at 
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the same time, the state has become more prominent in the lives of ordinary citizens through the 
austerity measures that it has implemented, such as tax increases and reductions to pensions. In 
turn, the media sphere may have simply shifted from broadcast media and the press to the online 
world, while the sources of news and information remain, to a significant degree, the same. At 
the same time, the increased “unofficial” civil society activity seen in Greece during the years of 
the economic crisis, as well as the development of many initiatives via social media, may more 
closely relate to Habermas’ later conceptualization of the public sphere, one where the potential 
of “communicative action” can unearth the “rational potential intrinsic in everyday 
communication practices,” occurring within a radical democratic framework which would seek 
to protect the “lifeworld”—the realm of personal relationships in society—from the “system” 
(1992: 442-444; Calhoun, 1992: 30). In the case of Greece, “communicative action” could be 
seen as referring to social and new media, the “radical democratic framework” could consist of 
collectively-run, “unofficial” groups and other entities with non-traditional hierarchies, and the 
“lifeworld” could refer to the network of personal relationships which has traditionally been one 
of the strongest aspects of Greek society, and which could be contained within what Habermas 
termed the “plebian public sphere,” consisting of the culture of the common people—and one 
which is separate from the official or hegemonic public sphere (Habermas, 1992: 426-430). 
Zepou, for instance, noted the empowering role of informal language on social media in allowing 
the Greek public sphere and civil society to flourish during the years of the crisis. Habermas also 
made an allowance for the existence of multiple public spheres, a concept also promoted by 
Benhabib, who conceptualized such spheres as being able to come into existence at any time 
while existing autonomously. This in turn relates to Panagiotopoulou’s observation that Greek 
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public spheres have often been ephemeral in nature, highlighting the movement of the 
“Indignants” as an example (2013: 453-454). It is likely that such ephemeral, alternative spheres 
developed in Greece during the years of the crisis, expressing different segments of society and 
differing ideological perspectives (such as the memorandum versus anti-memorandum divide), 
shifting or dissolving, however, as circumstances change. To this, we can also add Fraser’s 
conceptualization of “subaltern counterpublics,” which exist in a contested relationship with the 
dominant publics (1992: 128). It is not a stretch, for instance, to assume that the sphere which 
would, for instance, regularly visit a blog affiliated with Golden Dawn, would be significantly 
different and exist to a large degree autonomously from, for example, the sphere that would read 
Indymedia or listen to Radiobubble or participate in a civil society initiative assisting migrants. 
 In looking at civil society from a theoretical perspective, we can turn to Gramsci, who 
described civil society as the site where hegemony operates (Buttigieg, 1995: 27), but which he 
saw as a space which was up for grabs on the part of the citizenry, who could, via a “war of 
position,” disable the coercive state apparatus (Ibid., 6-7). In the example of Greece, official 
societal institutions, including establishment non-governmental organizations, could be seen as 
comprising this coercive apparatus, while “unofficial” groups, including neighborhood 
committees, alternative currencies, time banks, and unregistered health clinics for the poor, could 
be seen as waging a battle on behalf of subaltern groups as part of the Gramscian “war of 
position.” Such groups can change positions, dissolve and reappear as circumstances allow. As 
noted by Komninou, who is referenced in chapter 2, there has been a tradition in Greece of the 
state absorbing civil society initiatives (2001: 176-179, 195). This may account for the 
dissolution or decreased visibility of certain institutions in the years of the crisis, and particularly 
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after the electoral victory of SYRIZA in 2015. For instance, the activism surrounding the 
Skouries cause seems to have reached its peak in 2013 in terms of being a cause célèbre for 
activists from outside the region, despite the fact that both Antigold Greece and SOS Halkidiki 
remain active in their communities. Some interviewees also discussed how SYRIZA took 
advantage of the political momentum which was borne out of the protests of the “Indignants” in 
2011, coming close to victory in the 2012 national parliamentary elections, winning the 
European parliamentary elections in 2014, and ultimately being elected in January 2015 and re-
elected in September 2015. While economic conditions have remained challenging for the 
majority of Greeks and austerity measures and the memorandum agreements continue to be 
enforced, even today by a government which was elected on a platform of abolishing these 
agreements and ending austerity, a movement akin to that of 2011 has not come close to re-
emerging in Greece. Another notable example illustrating this point comes from the protest 
movement cleaning women who were laid off as a result of austerity cuts in the public sector, 
who were employed at the Ministry of Finance, and who set up camp outside the Ministry in 
protest of their firing. Having earned the support of SYRIZA for their cause, the cleaning women 
were appointed to new civil service jobs in courthouses soon after SYRIZA’s electoral victory.61 
This example also illustrates the culture of clientelism and patronage, which has long been 
observed in Greece and which has been cited as one of the reasons why Greece’s official civil 
society has not been able to develop to the same degree as in other Western countries. 
 The significance of social and new media tools and their impact on both civil society and 
the public sphere as perceived by the respondents to the electronic survey questionnaire, is 
evident from the results. Respondents rated the impact of social and new media upon the Greek 
                                               
61 See http://www.arcadiaportal.gr/news/apo-katharistries-grammateis-sta-dikastiria. 
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public sphere as mildly significant and slightly negative, but nevertheless somewhat higher than 
those recorded for the impact of the mainstream media upon the Greek public sphere, even if the 
quality of present-day public discourse was recorded at very low levels overall. Results were 
more positive for social and new media’s impact on civil society, which was found to be better-
developed than the Greek public sphere, albeit still in negative territory, while the significance 
and quality of social media’s impact on civil society was viewed as positive, and significantly 
higher when compared to the impact on the public sphere. Furthermore, a significant majority of 
respondents responded that they used social media to comment on political and social issues, 
while a plurality stated that they used social and new media to contact elected officials or to 
follow at least one political party on social media. Notably, in predicting the quality and 
significance of the future impact of social and new media upon the public sphere in Greece, the 
three populations were highly optimistic across the board. 
 Therefore, we can conclude that while the impact has not been universally positive or 
sustained, social and new media have, overall, impacted the public sphere and civil society 
positively in Greece. Even though clientelism, patronage, and “diaploki” are still prevalent, 
social media have provided a new space of public discourse which did not exist previously, there 
has been a significant level of usage of social and new media tools for matters of public interest 
and concern, many new civil society organizations and groups have developed (particularly in 
the “unofficial” sphere), and volunteerism is more prevalent than it was a decade or more ago, 
even though institutional credibility remains low in Greece, likely due in large part to the 
ongoing and protracted economic crisis. 
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 Overall, what might be the most significant outcome of all is that which cannot be 
measured yet. Afouxenidis referred to the “collective memory” that participation in various 
volunteer initiatives during the years of the economic crisis may have fostered. If the Greek 
public sphere and civil society are indeed ephemeral in nature, it may well be that this collective 
memory may be employed again at some undetermined point in the future, and will play an 
increasing role in Greek society in the future, as individuals who were young when they 
participated in these volunteer activities during the years of the economic crisis, grow older and 
become more active citizens. 
8.2 – RQ2: HOW DO PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, AS WELL AS CIVIL SOCIETY, CITIZEN, AND ACTIVIST 
ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS EMPLOY SOCIAL MEDIA TO ENGAGE WITH THE PUBLIC, TO 
SPREAD THEIR MESSAGE AND TO ORGANIZE POLITICAL OR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS? 
 In examining how and to what extent social and new media have been used by public 
institutions (such as political parties, government ministries, and local municipalities), by new 
political parties and formations, and by social and activist movements in order to disseminate 
their message and for the purposes of organizing, the following indicators can be utilized: the 
formation of new political parties, the development and growth of new social movements, the 
development of protest movements with the aid of social and new media tools, and changes in 
the political landscape (such as changes in voter behavior or participation). 
 Here we may begin by examining the illustrative example presented in chapter 6, the 
Independent Greeks political party. From its inception in 2012, the Independent Greeks 
developed reputation as being the “party of Facebook,” for three reasons: first, because the party 
first announced that it was launching via Facebook; second, because the party’s founder and 
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president, Panos Kammenos, was himself tremendously active and outspoken on social media; 
and third, because in the first months of its existence, the Independent Greeks used Facebook as 
a tool of public deliberation, for the formulation and development of the party’s initial manifesto 
and policy platform, and also for the evaluation and selection of candidates for the parliamentary 
elections of 2012. This strategy seems to have been successful, as the Independent Greeks 
surpassed 10 percent in the May 2012 elections and surpassed 8 percent in the follow-up 
elections a month later. Since then, however, the party could be said to have traveled in two 
directions concurrently. On the one hand, its voter share has trended downward, receiving 3.46 
percent of the vote in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, 4.75 percent in the January 
2015 national parliamentary elections, and 3.69 percent in the September 2015 national 
parliamentary elections. On the other hand, its share in both January and September 2015 was 
enough to earn representation in Parliament, and this parliamentary representation enabled the 
Independent Greeks to join a governing coalition with the winner of both of those races, 
SYRIZA. While the electoral share of the Independent Greeks has decreased, its influence has 
increased as the party finds itself participating in the government of Greece since January 2015. 
 What has also declined, however, is the party’s usage of social and new media. The 
Facebook page of the Independent Greeks has not been used for public deliberation or voting 
since the first months of the party’s existence in 2012, the party’s Twitter account, as stated by 
Tsatsaroni, is used exclusively for the purpose of responding to opposition political parties, while 
even Panos Kammenos’ once-fiery social media presence can be said to have been toned down 
ever since he became Minister of Defense following the January 2015 elections. This was noted 
by Tsatsaroni in her 2017 follow-up interview, where she admitted that the party did not interact 
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with the public via its social media accounts. Other signs of this decline appear as well. For 
instance, in 2012-2013 the party was discussing plans to establish a web TV channel. This 
initiative now seems to be inactive.62  
 The most significant change, or reversal if one prefers, pertains to the party’s politics, and 
this is likely what has resulted in the precipitous decline of its electoral share after its initial 
strong showing. Having marketed itself as a patriotic, anti-austerity, anti-memorandum party in 
2012, it is now participating in a governing coalition which has continued the previously existing 
memorandum agreement and austerity measures and ratified new memorandum agreements and 
austerity measures as well. Tsatsaroni, in her 2017 follow-up interview, described this political 
shift in diplomatic terms, stating that the Independent Greeks have most recently campaigned as 
the party which would most responsibly and fairly implement the memorandum and austerity 
agreements, a far cry from their rhetoric in 2012. In other words, the Independent Greeks have 
replicated the policies of their predecessors. 
 Moving beyond this illustrative example, the same can be said about the winner of the 
January and September 2015 elections, SYRIZA, the majority partner within the current 
governing coalition. Prior to its initial electoral victory, SYRIZA had campaigned on a “radical 
leftist” platform, promising to abolish the memorandum agreements and roll back the austerity 
measures. This, of course, has not happened. It could therefore be argued that SYRIZA, like the 
Independent Greeks, has replicated the policies of its predecessors in government. Emblematic of 
the party’s “about-face” once in power is the case of Efi Ahtsioglou, who is said to have deleted 
all of the old anti-austerity, anti-memorandum tweets from her Twitter timeline when she was 
                                               
62 See http://www.anexartitoiellines.gr/webtv/livewebtv.php. 
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appointed to a ministerial post in 2016. Notably, it was other social media users who noticed the 
missing tweets, reproducing them online (“E Efi Ahtsioglou,” 2016). 
 However, what should also be highlighted is how SYRIZA was elected in the first place. 
A common sentiment expressed by interviewees is that SYRIZA was able to successfully harness 
the momentum and support of social movements such as the “Indignants” movement in 2011, the 
activism relating to the Skouries mining activities, the protests which followed the closure of 
ERT in 2013, and even less prominent movements, such as the aforementioned protest of the 
dismissed Ministry of Finance cleaning women. Being that most of these movements were very 
prominent and visible in the social media sphere, it is reasonable to assume that SYRIZA itself 
benefited, especially when its politicians and representatives were themselves quite vocal and 
visible within these movements during the period in question. Moreover, SYRIZA’s campaign in 
2012, 2014 and 2015 was recognized by interviews and also by those who responded to the 
electronic survey questionnaire as being by and away the most effective and successful during 
those electoral contests. This is exemplified by the extremely strong popularity and visibility of 
the #asktsipras online question-and-answer session in January 2015, which is said to have 
trended third worldwide on Twitter. It could therefore be said that SYRIZA was helped, not hurt, 
by social and new media leading up to the January 2015 elections in particular, where the party 
rose to power for the first time and made headlines worldwide. This was reflected in the survey 
results, where almost two-thirds of respondents named SYRIZA as one of the parties which 
benefited the most from its presence on social and new media. In addition, almost half of the 
respondents felt that SYRIZA was aided by its social and new media presence in the 2012 
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parliamentary elections, and a majority believed that this was the case in the 2014 European 
parliamentary elections. 
 Another factor to consider is the expansion of the Greek Parliament in terms of the 
number of parties represented, which is itself a phenomenon which has grown during the years of 
the economic crisis. Eight parties entered parliament in September 2015, while seven parties 
earned representation in the January 2015 elections and the May and June 2012 parliamentary 
elections. By way of comparison, four parties earned parliamentary representation in the 2004 
elections and five parties entered parliament in the 2007 and 2009 national elections. Does this 
expansion relate, however, to anything that may have occurred in the online realm? It’s hard to 
say. The new entrant in the September 2015 elections was the Centrists’ Union, which despite a 
series of videos highlighting its anti-corruption platform which went viral, did not have a 
particularly strong social media. Nor is the Centrists’ Union a new political party or “product” of 
the crisis, having been founded in the early 1990s. 
What is more noteworthy is that despite the heated memorandum versus anti-
memorandum and “Europe versus Grexit” schism in Greece in recent years, none of the smaller 
political parties which advocate a Greek exit from the Eurozone, such as EPAM and Popular 
Unity, have been able to attain enough votes to enter Parliament. To Potami represents an 
interesting case, as it also crafted a savvy and youth-friendly social media and online profile 
when the party launched in 2014, but the party also had a visible leader, Stavros Theodorakis, 
who was a longtime journalist and television presenter with wide name recognition in Greece. 
Golden Dawn could be said to be a party that has benefited from social media, but other 
than its website, it does not actually maintain an official social media presence—instead, its 
 430 
supporters have been active on Facebook and in the blogosphere in particular. To what extent this 
truly helped the party is not possible to gauge, and it can be surmised that it is just as likely that 
parties such as Golden Dawn and others are just as much the beneficiaries of a “protest vote” 
from a fed-up and increasingly impoverished populace, as they were the beneficiaries of support 
derived from their online presence. 
The same could also be said about parties who have also seen a dramatic decline in their 
electoral percentage, with PASOK being an obvious example. At one time a governing dynasty 
in Greece, the party has found itself in the single digits in electoral contests since the 2014 
European parliamentary elections. Some interviewees, such as Al-Saleh, described PASOK as 
being the victim of online attacks and trolling relating to its policies and actions (such as signing 
the initial memorandum agreement), and it’s possible that there was some negative impact on its 
electoral performance as a result of this negative online publicity. However, it’s perhaps even 
more likely that PASOK was simply punished at the polls by voters who blamed the party for the 
country’s predicament and economic difficulties. It should also be mentioned that PASOK is 
widely attributed as being the political party which brought social media to Greece in a political 
context, essentially replicating concepts which were already tried and true in countries such as 
the United States, while also implementing e-governance and transparency initiatives. Despite 
these efforts, PASOK was unable to avoid an electoral collapse. 
Still other parties, such as KKE, have remained largely indifferent towards social media 
and do not seem to have been hurt by their absence, though it is impossible to tell whether they 
would have been helped in any way if they did maintain a social media presence. 
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At the municipal level, the example of Yiannis Boutaris, the mayor of Thessaloniki, 
stands out. Boutaris has developed a reputation—both in Greece and globally—as being a 
progressive and innovative elected official and one that is highly outspoken, a trend that would 
theoretically mesh well with social media. Yet Boutaris was not an active social media user at the 
time of his initial election in 2010, but was nevertheless able to garner support amongst younger 
demographics despite his own advanced age. Indeed, Boutaris did not create an official Twitter 
account until September 2017, well after his re-election in the 2014 municipal elections. Boutaris 
therefore represents the example of a politician who can be successful electorally and who can 
craft an image of someone who is forward-thinking, albeit highly controversial, without being 
present in the world of social media. 
Notably, the “Symi Today” blog which was presented as an example of serving as the 
unofficial “opposition” to a mayor who ran unopposed, has not been updated since December 
2014, just a few months after that year’s municipal elections, despite the blog administrator’s 
stated intention to maintain the blog past the 2014 elections in order to serve a watchdog role. 
Other smaller political parties and movements with an early strong presence on social and 
new media have not been able to translate that visibility into electoral success. This includes the 
“Dimiourgia, Xana!” party, despite the fact that its president, Thanos Tzimeros, remains a highly 
visible commentator on Facebook and Twitter. The “I Don’t Pay Movement” represents another 
example, as the party became known on social media for its visible acts of civil disobedience. 
Notably, the movement itself has split into two, the original “I Don’t Pay Movement” and the “I 
Don’t Pay Movement-United Front,” likely splintering the movement’s support. Overall though, 
the crisis could be said to have given rise to a number of smaller political parties, including 
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Popular Unity (LAE), the United People’s Front (EPAM), and the Pirate Party of Greece, in 
addition to To Potami and DIMAR, which was part of the governing coalition between June 
2012 and June 2013. This in itself is significant. 
What was also reflected by the responses provided by many of the interviewees, 
including representatives of political parties but also journalists and other observers, is the 
continued prevalent use of the social media accounts of both parties and candidates as a 
“bulletin” board, where press releases and media appearances are publicized and little else. This 
had been observed by Tsaliki-Kontogianni, referenced in chapter 2 (2015: 546-552, 557-559), 
and seems in large part to remain the case today. Indeed, it should also be noted that over the 
course of the interviews that were conducted for this study, most representatives of political 
parties were relatively tight-lipped about their party’s usage of social media, providing few 
details beyond the basics and in many cases opting to discuss (and criticize, or sometimes praise) 
what other parties were doing instead. The aforementioned “bulletin board” usage could also be 
observed in the example of the Ministry of Defense and likely represents the broader attitude of 
most Greek government ministries towards their online and social media presence. 
One final factor which must be addressed is voter behavior, and more specifically, voter 
participation, which has been on the decline in Greece during the years of the economic 
downturn and crisis. It is clear that social and new media have not been able to prevent this 
decline and to mobilize a similar percentage of citizens to vote as in the pre-crisis days, but it 
remains an open question as to whether the absence of social media would have resulted in even 
further apathy on the part of voters. There is also the possibility that exposure to non-mainstream 
content on social and new media may have dissuaded a portion of the public from voting. 
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 Turning now to social movements, there was a general consensus among those who 
responded to the electronic survey questionnaire that the movement of the “Indignants” in 2011 
would not have been possible without the aid of social and new media, with a majority of 
respondents answering “probably no” or “no.” 
 Iosifidis and Wheeler, referenced in chapter 2, questioned the ability of social media to 
deliver lasting political change, despite their evident role in mobilizing protests in Greece and 
other contexts. In turn, Katrougalos, in his 2013 interview, warned that “the fatigue that is now 
obvious in the society can be turned into complete apathy” (personal communication, July 2, 
2013). And it is this fatigue which is noticeable in Greek society in recent years. After large-scale 
protests in 2010 (the year that the “troika” arrived in Greece), 2011 (the year of the “Indignants”) 
movement, 2012 (with massive protests in February of that year against the signing of the second 
memorandum agreement), 2013 (ERT shutdown) and 2015 (rallies organized around the July 5, 
2015 national referendum), it could be argued that fatigue, disillusionment, and apathy have set 
in, with protests increasingly viewed by many Greeks as ineffective or hopeless, in addition to a 
prevalent fear about being attacked by riot police or other elements. It may also be the case that 
many Greeks have turned to other forms of organizing or getting involved politically which does 
not involve protests and mass mobilizations. 
 It would, however, be a mistake to say that these protest movements were completely 
ineffective or unsuccessful. The Greek electoral map changed drastically during this period and 
much of the political system was discredited. The “Indignants” protest movement could be 
argued to have contributed to the collapse of the Papandreou government in late 2011, and the 
protests of early 2012, in turn, could have hastened the demise of the caretaker government of 
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non-elected technocrat Loucas Papademos. The activist movement which developed in response 
to the mining activities in Skouries drew international attention to the issue and is still ongoing 
today, even if the issue is no longer as prominent as it was in the 2012-2013 period. The massive 
protests which followed the closure of ERT in June 2013 could have been said to have 
discredited ERT’s replacement, NERIT, before it even launched, and arguably precipitated the 
restoration of ERT’s broadcasts in 2015, following SYRIZA’s electoral victory. In addition, a 
legacy remains, as ERT Open continues to broadcast, albeit solely on the radio. Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier, it is likely that SYRIZA was able to gain political momentum from these 
movements, pledging to be the voice of these movements in parliament if elected. And it should 
be stressed that the “Indignants” protest movement, the Skouries activist movement, and the ERT 
protest movement were all extremely prominent on social media. 
 The broader impact of the digital divide should also not be overlooked. According to 
statistics from the 2015 Eurobarometer “Media use in the European Union” survey, Greece ranks 
23rd in the EU in internet penetration. Internet penetration is also lowest amongst the older 
demographics, an observation which was also made by respondents to the electronic survey 
questionnaire, an overwhelming majority of which identified the 55+ age bracket as being the 
age group which used the internet the least for obtaining news and information. This digital 
divide would also mean that it is less likely that older individuals have been influenced by the 
presence of new political parties or movements on social media. Understanding that older age 
groups typically vote in larger numbers, it is possible that the electoral system will see a “delayed 
response” where this decade’s youth will enact change through the ballot box in future decades. 
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Furthermore, as mentioned in the preceding section, a “collective memory” of political 
and activist involvement may persist in the future and may be mobilized at some future point, or 
may translate into differing political mentalities from those of the elder generations, resulting in 
possible electoral changes yet to come in the future, as well as the revitalization of social and 
protest movements in some form. Indeed, though this is outside the time period officially being 
studied as part of this research project, early 2018 saw massive mobilizations in both Athens and 
Thessaloniki concerning a geopolitical issue of national importance, the Macedonia name dispute 
with Greece’s northern neighbor. Hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets of both 
cities to protest any compromise on the part of the government over the name dispute, in crowds 
not seen since the “Indignants” movement of 2011, while the last time a protest regarding one of 
Greece’s foreign policy issues generated such crowds was 1992, again concerning the Macedonia 
name.63 The organizations which organized these rallies maintained a prominent social media 
presence, and it is entirely possible that they contributed to the large turnout. 
Based on the above, and looking at SQ1, we can conclude that social and new media have 
at least partially contributed to political change, changes in political behavior, and the formation 
of new political movements in Greece. The two best examples of this impact are the Independent 
Greeks political party, via its prominent activity and presence on social media in the early days 
of its existence and its relative electoral success which has followed, and SYRIZA, which likely 
was able to harness the support of participants in protest movements such as the “Indignants” of 
2011, the Skouries movement, and the protest movement following the shutdown of ERT. 
Furthermore, numerous political parties have been created in recent years, and at least some of 




these parties have maintained a very prominent social media presence, including “To Potami,” 
“Dimiourgia, Xana,” and to a lesser extent, EPAM and the Pirate Party. Golden Dawn may also 
have been aided indirectly, as there was a strong consensus among participants—also visible in 
the relevant literature referenced in chapter 2—that a wide network of unofficial online media 
helped promote the party via social media. Conversely, attacks appearing against incumbent 
political parties such as PASOK on social media may potentially have contributed to a broader 
decline in their credibility and, accordingly, their electoral share. However, this has not been a 
complete transformation. Many elected officials, as well as government ministries, still seem to 
“go through the motions” with regard to their online and social media presence, and social and 
new media has not been successful in delivering more dramatic political change to Greece, such 
as a departure from the Eurozone or an end to the memorandum agreements and austerity 
measures. Some politicians, such as Thessaloniki mayor Yiannis Boutaris, have also been able to 
craft a progressive and modern image whilst eschewing social media tools. 
In looking at SQ2, we can conclude that social media played a significant role, at least in 
the early years of the crisis, in the formation of social and protest movements. This is 
exemplified by the “Indignants” movement, which is said to have started via a Facebook 
invitation and where social media was heavily used, with Radiobubble’s Twitter hashtag, 
#rbnews, playing a prominent role. The protest movements surrounding the Skouries gold 
mining activities and the closure of ERT also gained prominence on social media. Despite the 
evident fatigue of recent years, it is also possible that the “collective memory” of participants in 
these movements will translate to future political or social action. 
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8.3 – RQ3: DO SOCIAL AND NEW MEDIA DIFFERENTIATE THEMSELVES FROM THE MAINSTREAM 
MEDIA IN GREECE, AND IF SO, HOW? 
 In analyzing the extent to which social and new media have differentiated themselves 
from the mainstream media in Greece, contributed to the formation and development of 
alternative or community-oriented media outlets in Greece (SQ3), and considered to be more 
credible sources of news and information compared to traditional, mainstream media institutions 
in Greece (SQ4), the following indicators may be taken into account: the formation and 
development of new media outlets (including alternative media outlets), the broadening of public 
discourse on existing media outlets, the development of media outlets by civil society groups, 
and indicators as to the credibility of online media (including social media) as compared to 
traditional, mainstream media outlets. 
 The Skai Media Group is the first illustrative example to be examined. Skai continues to 
maintain a preeminent position in both the television and radio landscape in Greece, while 
skai.gr remains one of the most visited news portals in the country, as recorded in the Reuters 
Institute survey (2016). Indeed, the skai.gr portal could be said to easily be the most 
comprehensive and well-developed of any major broadcast media outlet in the country, and 
accordingly, the media group’s social media presence is also very well developed when 
compared to other major media outlets in the country. Kathimerini is still considered the 
“newspaper of record” in Greece, and despite a center-right political stance that is often 
unpopular for its longstanding support of the memorandum agreements and austerity measures 
that have been implemented in Greece, it is considered one of the most credible publications in 
the country. Its role and impact in the broader Greek public sphere and online sphere, however, 
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can simply be described as perpetuating the hegemonic policies being enforced in Greece, while 
it could also be said that its sophisticated and comprehensive social and new media presence and 
emphasis on news content has helped it attain a leading position in Greece’s online news sphere. 
 Enikos.gr represents the interesting case of a hybrid between a traditional news portal, a 
blog, and a mainstream television show hosted by a prominent television presenter, radio talk 
show host, and journalist, Nikos Chatzinikolaou. It was very clearly and very obviously inspired 
by the success of news blogs in Greece in the preceding decade, and its design and philosophy 
(very frequent postings that are short in length and which contain lots of photos and/or videos) is 
a continuation of the formula which made news blogs such as Troktiko popular. The site was well 
integrated with social and new media, including for a substantial period, a web TV program 
produced by Chatzinikolaou. It is also a creation of the economic crisis in the sense, having 
launched in 2011. As was shown in the Reuters Institute survey, enikos.gr maintains a strong 
position amongst news websites in Greece, but this is likely due to the name recognition of 
Chatzinikolaou, the free publicity enikos.gr receives via Chatzinikolaou’s other media ventures, 
and demonstrates the replication of the offline media system into the online sphere in Greece. 
 Radiobubble represents the most interesting and complicated of the illustrative examples. 
One of the earliest web radio stations to launch in Greece (in 2007), Radiobubble was a major 
presence in the Greek social media sphere—and Twitter in particular—roughly between the time 
of the December 2008 riots and the ERT shutdown in 2013, particularly via its #rbnews hashtag 
and its curated news feed based on information received via that hashtag. Radiobubble’s news 
presence was prominent enough that The Guardian incorporated the #rbnews feed into its own 
live blogging of the June 2012 national parliamentary elections in Greece. The radio station’s 
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content could itself be considered alternative, with no impositions regarding the station’s 
political content or news programming. Social media was extensively integrated into the station’s 
programming, and many of its hosts were prominent Twitter “personalities” in their own right. 
The physical space which Radiobubble maintained until 2014, its café in the Exarchia district of 
Athens, featured an openly visible studio which was accessible to the café’s patrons. 
Radiobubble, via both its programming and its Twitter presence, has been credited with helping 
disseminate news about the “Indignants” protests, the Skouries protests, and numerous other 
protests, rallies, cases of police violence and other developments not typically covered by the 
mainstream media, to a wider audience both in Greece and abroad. For instance, the #rbnews 
hashtag was said to have been the most popular Twitter hashtag in Greece in 2011. 
Radiobubble’s international exposure also included radio programming and tweets in other 
languages. Changes, however, began to occur beginning in 2014. The café shut down and the 
station relocated to a less visible location, while the station itself was legally registered as a 
collective, a decision which apparently resulted in a schism within the staff. Since then, 
Radiobubble has much more heavily emphasized music programming and has become much 
quieter on social media, while news programming and Twitter activity have been de-emphasized. 
 This has been a turbulent period for mainstream media as well. Venerable and heavily 
indebted private broadcaster Mega Channel, once the most popular television station in Greece, 
ceased all news programming in 2016 and is (barely) surviving with a lineup of reruns and 
movies. The Eleftherotypia newspaper, long considered a voice of the intellectual left, shut down 
for a second time, not long after its relaunch in 2013. The Lambrakis Press Group (DOL), which 
published such prominent newspapers as Ta Nea and To Vima, collapsed and its titles were 
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scooped up by oligarch Vangelis Marinakis, who already owned the weekly Parapolitika 
newspaper and radio station Parapolitika FM. Vima FM, a news radio station operated by DOL, 
did not survive and has gone off the air as of 2017. Once-prominent radio station Flash 96 
returned to the airwaves after a long absence, operating as a worker-run station, but it too went 
off the air once again, in 2017.  
 Throughout this period, not much progress was made in altering or revamping the 
legislative context governing broadcasting, which among other things has created a closed 
broadcast market for news stations on both television and radio. A licensing procedure launched 
by the SYRIZA-led government in 2016 issued four national television licenses to four 
prominent oligarchs, but was struck down in court as unconstitutional, maintaining the status quo 
for the time being. Tolios noted that “this is a case in which the government presented a poorly 
elaborated piece of legislation…the political backlash that the Government experienced 
ironically had to do more with the fact that they did not punish the channels enough” (personal 
communication, February 22, 2017).  
 Indeed, it could be said that the “diaploki” system continues unabated, despite the 
campaign promises of SYRIZA to challenge the media owners. This can also be seen by the fact 
that despite continuously declining newspaper circulations, already among the lowest in Europe, 
new titles continue to be released, including Documento, Fileleftheros, and Nea Selida 
newspaper. What this seems to indicate, especially based on the existing literature on the Greek 
press and on the remarks made by interviewees, and in light of dramatically falling circulation 
figures, is that these newspapers are launching not with the objective to earn a profit but to serve 
other political and business interests. Newspaper circulation declined 19.6 percent in 2017, a 
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year after sustaining a 15.9 percent circulation decline, yet new titles continue to launch 
(Kokkinidis: 2018). This would seem to reconfirm the continued existence and vitality of the 
“diaploki” system, which perpetuates the credibility crisis which the media industry is facing. 
 The credibility crisis has been overwhelmingly confirmed by surveys by Eurobarometer 
and the Reuters Institute, by the remarks shared by interviewees, and also by the results of the 
electronic survey questionnaire. Regarding the questionnaire, an overwhelming majority of 
respondents stated their belief that the mainstream media are suffering from a credibility crisis 
and a similarly strong majority felt that the media is biased towards certain political parties. The 
credibility of individual mediums—and particularly television—was also ranked at low levels, 
with all mediums falling on the negative end of the scale. This is one area where social media 
and new media more broadly seems to have gained substantial ground: a wide majority of 
respondents stated that they used social and new media for the purpose of obtaining news and 
information, and a similarly high majority said that the internet was the medium they used the 
most for the purpose of obtaining news and information. 
 Nevertheless, this has not meant that there is blind faith or credibility ascribed to online 
media. The survey results delivered a slightly negative credibility score for the internet as a 
source of news and information, albeit higher than the other mediums. Many of the interviewees 
also expressed their reservations about the credibility of social and new media as a news source, 
highlighting how the existing offline media system has, in many ways, been reproduced online, 
with portals and “blogs” owned by prominent journalists, such as Nikos Chatzinikolaou’s 
enikos.gr, emblematic of this crossover from the offline to online media realm. 
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 The general consensus was also that the older demographic was the one which hung on to 
mainstream media the most. This can likely be connected to the digital divide which is still 
evident in Greece. As the older generations are also more likely to vote in elections, it can be said 
that mainstream news and journalism still wields a great deal of political influence in this regard. 
 Notably, many small, independent, alternative, or collectively-run media outlets made 
their appearance during the years of the economic crisis in Greece, many of which were based 
entirely or almost entirely on the internet. Just a few of these were presented in this study, 
including Alterthess, Hot Doc magazine, mindthecam, Okeanews, Omnia TV, Protagon, seleo.gr, 
The Press Project, Unfollow magazine, and Vmedia.gr, in addition to, of course, Radiobubble. 
Many of these remain in operation as of 2018, with sites such as Protagon and The Press Project 
holding a particularly prominent position in the Greek online landscape. 
 Not all of these outlets have survived, including mindthecam and Okeanews (both 
inactive since 2015). As Kounenakis noted, “[a]ll the alternative media that we were acting back 
then, either they have disappeared or they produce almost zero shows or their productions are 
very poor…The social need is different” (personal communication, June 13, 2017). Other 
subsidiary initiatives of many of the aforementioned outlets have also not survived, such as the 
English-language edition of Unfollow magazine, Borderline Reports. Other outlets seem to have 
been absorbed in some form. Unfollow, for instance, has been released via the Parapolitika 
newspaper, while Hot Doc is now circulated via the Documento newspaper. Outlets such as Hot 
Doc and the To Xoni newspaper, which markets itself as “the only anti-austerity newspaper,” but 
has nevertheless fanatically—and ironically—supported the SYRIZA-Independent Greeks 
coalition, including the austerity measures and memorandum agreements it has enacted. 
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 Bailey et al. presented four conceptualizations of alternative media, the fourth of which 
defined alternative media as a “rhizome,” which sees such outlets as non-linear, anarchic, 
nomadic, and constantly in flux. These outlets tend to operate with a high degree of contingency, 
where what is considered “alternative” at one time may become “mainstream” at some other 
point in time (2008: 25-29). To some extent, the aforementioned examples (Hot Doc, To Xoni) fit 
this definition, as both publications marketed themselves as oppositional mediums prior to 
SYRIZA’s election in January 2015, but have now come out in support of policies very much 
similar—if not identical—to those which they once passionately opposed. 
 Atkinson argued that media can be classified as “alternative” if they meet one of three 
definitions, one of which pertains to alternative production methods, independent of corporate 
media industries (2010: 22). Under this classification, collectives such as Radiobubble, 
Alterthess, and Omnia TV could be considered “alternative,” as well as many other smaller 
media outlets which operate on a non-commercial basis or with a non-hierarchical structure. It 
could therefore be said that social and new media have contributed to the development of 
alternative media outlets in Greece (SQ3). 
In turn, looking at SQ4, while the of the credibility of news and information found online 
as compared to offline remains an open question, the general consensus is that the perception of 
a significant portion of the public is that online sources are more accurate and credible. This is 
due to the severe credibility crisis of the mainstream media, which was reflected in the literature, 




8.4 – THEORETICAL AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
The general sentiment of many of the participants in this study, and my own observations 
on the ground in Greece between 2012 and 2017, both contribute to a conclusion that a 
significant percentage of the Greek public felt that it was completely shut out of official channels 
of public deliberation and discourse. This is evident in a variety of ways. Numerous surveys have 
repeatedly found low levels of trust in official societal institutions in Greece. The sclerosis which 
is a marked characteristic of Greek media landscape has resulted in a broadcasting system where 
television and radio stations are unlicensed and do not have to abide by many public service 
requirements which presumably would be a condition of official broadcast licenses. Furthermore, 
the closed broadcast news market ensures that no new voices can enter the airwaves unless they 
have deep enough pockets to afford to purchase one of the few existing stations that is classified 
as a “news station.” This severely curtails the number of broadcast news voices which can 
possibly operate even within a broadcast landscape that is in some ways otherwise anarchic. 
Even the press, which is not restricted in Greece, has shown a general indifference 
towards the needs and opinions of the public at large, as evidenced by the Kaitatzi-Whitlock 
study referenced in chapter 2 which found that only approximately one-third of newspapers 
studied featured a “letters to the editor” section, and by comments made by interviewees such as 
Zenakos, who described his experience being instructed to “look down upon” the readers and to 
address them as if from a pedestal. The survey data, and the questionnaire specifically provided 
to newspaper editors, also highlighted the strong prevalence of self-censorship among journalists 
in Greece. Returning to the mass media landscape more broadly, there was a general sentiment 
that the mass media, via their news practices and reporting, drove a significant portion of the 
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Greek populace to seek out news and information via the internet, while the credibility crisis 
suffered by Greece’s mass media outlets was confirmed by the individual interviews, the 
electronic survey questionnaire that was conducted, by surveys referenced in chapter 2, and even 
by the illustrative example of the Skai Media Group, where it was revealed that the organization, 
despite its significant and in some ways sophisticated social media presence, does not have a 
unified social media policy, nor does it go to any special lengths to interact with the audience via 
social media platforms. 
This indifference was also evident politically. In the survey questionnaire provided 
exclusively to Greek representatives in the European Parliament, many of the respondents stated 
that their policy positions were not impacted in the slightest by communications they received 
from constituents via social media. The illustrative example of the “Independent Greeks” 
political party further demonstrates this indifference. While the party, in the inaugural months of 
it existence, marketed itself as the “party of Facebook” and provided opportunities to the public 
to participate in online deliberation of its policy platform and selection of its candidates, a 2017 
follow-up interview with an advisor to the party’s president (and current Defense Minister) 
Panos Kammenos was revelatory, as it was clearly stated that the party quite consciously did not 
engage in a dialogue with the public via online means. 
Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the assertion that a significant portion 
of the public in Greece felt that it did not have a space to express itself, particularly on matters of 
public importance. It is here where the internet, and particularly social media and new media, 
come into the picture for ordinary citizens. Despite the relatively low broadband penetration rates 
in Greece as compared to most other European Union member states, Greece has been found to 
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have amongst the highest levels of Facebook membership in the world, as well as very high 
levels of using social media for the purpose of obtaining news and information. Certainly during 
the crisis, social media were repeatedly used as a means of political expression that was 
restricted elsewhere, as was evidenced by the “Indignants” movement, the protest movements 
relating to the Skouries gold mining activities, and the protests following the shutdown of ERT. 
Political movements ranging from SYRIZA and the Independent Greeks, to Golden Dawn, to 
smaller extraparliamentary parties such as Dimiourgia, Xana! were, each in their own way, 
effectively able to harness social and new media to make significant electoral gains at various 
times during the period that was examined. Civil society organizations, including many in the 
“unofficial” sphere, also heavily utilized social and new media, as did alternative media outlets 
such as Radiobubble, which was also intimately tied in to both the social movement sphere and 
to civil society via initiatives such as Hackademy and Tutorpool. 
An argument could therefore be made that there has been a great degree of 
communicative action in the Habermasian sense, which has unearthed a radical democratic 
framework which has contributed to the formation and operation of social and political 
movements and certain civil society initiatives, and indeed, the development of multiple public 
spheres, as described by Habermas or Benhabib, or subaltern counterpublics, as conceptualized 
by Fraser. These counterpublics can be quite varied: Downing, for instance, highlighted how 
even fascist or far-right media can itself be considered “radical,” and parallels can be drawn here 
with the effective (even if largely unofficial) use of social and online media by Golden Dawn. 
However, these counterpublics could also be those which used Radiobubble’s #rbnews hashtag, 
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or which organized initiatives such as the Metropolitan Community Clinic of Ellinikon, the Time 
Bank of Athens and Syntagma Square, or the “Save Greek Water” movement. 
Nevertheless it is imperative that social media and its role as a new, digital “commons” 
not be romanticized, and not just due to its potential to also foster potentially regressive political 
forces. Social and new media platforms, whether we are talking about Facebook or Twitter or 
blogs and videos hosted on Google’s Blogspot and YouTube platforms, are privately-owned 
platforms. There is a great danger in relying upon private platforms for the purposes of public 
speech and deliberation, as access to such platforms can be curtailed at any time by the owners of 
the medium itself, or through any number of other technological, economic, or regulatory 
factors. For instance, recent trends in countries such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom have been for anti-neoliberal and, in many cases, political voices from ideological 
backgrounds as varied as the far left and the conservative right to be censored by many social 
media platforms, with videos and social media postings removed and user accounts suspended or 
deleted. While this has been less of a problem in Greece in recent years, the attempted 
crackdowns against “news blogs” a decade ago serve as an example as to how content that some 
find to be inconvenient can be removed from privately-owned platforms such as Blogspot. 
Lawrence Lessig warned about the dangers of “architecture” in the online world and how 
it could be weaponized to serve as the perfect tool of regulation and curtailment of speech. There 
are many ways in which “architecture” can accomplish this, above and beyond Lessig’s original 
conceptualization, ranging from restrictive terms of service implemented by social media 
providers such as Facebook and Twitter, to character limits (such as those which Twitter is 
famous for), to website hosting companies and their ability to remove privately-hosted websites 
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if they violate terms of service agreements or exceed bandwidth limits. Regulatory threats such 
as the elimination of net neutrality protections may also create a situation where network traffic 
is throttled or the amount of bandwidth which individual users can consume is capped, therefore 
limiting the amount of content users can potentially create, upload, and disseminate. Indeed, such 
throttling and capping was already a reality in the United States on mobile networks and even on 
many wired broadband networks, prior to the elimination of net neutrality regulations. 
Downing also referenced the “price of participation,” which for alternative media in 
particular, historically meant the costs of operating an office or of printing and disseminating 
their material. This “price of participation” can potentially be expanded to the price of accessing 
the internet—and even more so if bandwidth caps and throttling are in play. This price can also 
include the costs of hosting a website and paying for consumed traffic and bandwidth, or the 
price of an internet subscription itself. Economic inequalities also lead to inequalities of access—
the well-known digital divide—and in societies such as Greece, there is still a significant 
percentage of households which does not possess broadband access even to this day. Even if we 
accept that the “public sphere 2.0” is one located in privately-owned space, one cannot 
participate even in this “private commons” if they do not have access to it in the first place. 
From a civil society perspective, it could nevertheless be argued that Greece represents a 
case where, similar to Gramsci’s conceptualization of the “war of position” between the 
hegemonic powers and forces from below, civil society is a space which is very much in play and 
which has been hotly contested during the years of the economic crisis. Indeed, the expansion of 
the “unofficial” civil society sphere, with the formation of organizations which are not legally 
registered (such as the Metropolitan Community Clinic of Ellinikon for instance) highlights just 
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such a “war of position,” with social and new media weaponized by such organizations which 
otherwise do not have easy and affordable access to the wider public sphere. Moreover, the 
activities of activists, volunteers, and participants in such civil society activities and in related 
social movements can be viewed in parallel with Gramsci’s conceptualization of the “organic 
intellectual” who arises not from the hegemonic system, but from below. Arampatzi and 
Nicholls, in their examination of urban space in Athens as a space of mobilization, highlight the 
existence of such activists at a local, neighborhood level, and the linkages such activists make 
with other similar activists in other neighborhoods, cities, and regions, converting local 
movements into national ones. Personal ties—which are particularly strong in Greece and 
centered largely around extended families and local communities—play a significant role here, 
and resemble Habermas’ conceptualization of the “lifeworld,” or space of personal ties and 
relationships that is separate from the official public sphere. 
Here, the importance of “local” should be stressed. Castells, in his conceptualization of 
the civil society, accurately notes that such organizations have increasingly taken on social roles 
which were previously the realm of the state. This has certainly been the case in Greece, where 
we have seen, in a strong sense, the privatization of many institutional functions, paralleling the 
Habermasian view that the public sphere can be co-opted by strong private actors, such as 
privately-owned media outlets. However, Castells foresaw such civil society organizations 
operating on a global scale. What we have seen in Greece, however, is a great deal of 
“unofficial” and local, community-based civil society activity, much of which remains strictly 
within the local realm. Roumeliotis, for instance, highlighted the important role of such local 
groups in creating a silent civil society revolution never before seen in Europe. At the same time, 
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certain prominent movements, such as the Skouries activist movement, have effectively utilized 
social and new media to become known outside of the local community, initially in the rest of 
Greece, and later in the rest of the world. Castells’ civil society conceptualization, therefore, 
could be altered to be bidirectional, recognizing that while civil society may indeed be co-opting 
the traditional role of the state on many levels, linkages between such groups are made not just 
on a global level, but also on a local, and sometimes hyperlocal, level. Downing’s 
conceptualization of “generational resurgence” also comes into play here, as it closely parallels 
Afouxenidis’ idea of “collective memory.” It is possible that the “collective memories” of 
participants in civil society initiatives and social movements during the years of the economic 
crisis may, at some undetermined point in the future, lead to a “generational resurgence” with 
unknown implications for Greece politically, socially, or otherwise. 
Nevertheless, it is important to not romanticize the potential role of social media in 
fostering civil society activity or encouraging and aiding social movements. The example of the 
Ukraine, for instance, and the “Maidan Revolution,” largely driven by social media, serve as an 
example, as this “revolution” ultimately resulted in the installment of a politically regressive 
government and the further impoverishment of large swaths of the population. A similar 
argument could be made regarding the outcome of the “Arab Spring” in countries such as Egypt. 
In Greece, a somewhat similar phenomenon potentially occurred with the “Indignants” 
movement. While there is much evidence to suggest that most of the participants in this 
movement were there with legitimate intentions and in genuine opposition to foreign-imposed 
policies of neoliberalism and economic austerity, comments made by Yalourakis and Baboussi, 
who claimed to have been part of the team which launched the Facebook invitation which 
 451 
spawned this movement, and who said that they were also the administrators of the movement’s 
central Facebook page which later disappeared, suggest that the movement’s beginnings were not 
as innocent as often presented. Indeed, they could be interpreted as suggesting that the movement 
was launched to serve as a “release valve” for an increasingly infuriated populace. The ultimate 
failure of such movements to deliver more radical change—such as the abolition of the austerity 
measures and memorandum agreements or a Greek exit from the Eurozone or even the European 
Union itself—could then serve as a demoralizing factor for a population which may feel that, 
despite its best efforts, attempts to change the system are in vain and doomed to fail. 
Indeed, even a development which may initially appear as a victory might turn out to be a 
replication of the incumbent system. SYRIZA’s electoral victory in January 2015 on a “radical 
leftist” and anti-austerity platform serves as a case in point, as the party’s politics, once in 
government, very quickly began to parallel the pro-austerity politics of its predecessors. The 
same can be said of SYRIZA’s coalition partner, the Independent Greeks, who also had once 
campaigned on an anti-austerity platform. In other words, incumbent politics have ended up 
being replicated, while parties such as SYRIZA could be said to have either utilized radical 
rhetoric, alternative media from the left, and social movements as a means to the end, or to have 
simply been unable to withstand pressures from global neoliberal forces. 
The danger of co-optation of social movements, civil society, and alternative media 
context was highlighted by Bailey, Lievrouw, and Rodríguez. Lievrouw, for instance, wrote 
about the cycle of capture, co-optation and subversion common to such initiatives. Parallels can 
be drawn here with formerly politically alternative or radical media outlets such as Hot Doc 
magazine, the To Xoni newspaper, and Unfollow magazine. The first two, upon SYRIZA’s 
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electoral victory, continued to support SYRIZA—even through its about-face from anti-austerity 
to pro-austerity politics. The latter, which was collectively run, is now circulated as an insert in a 
weekly mainstream newspaper owned by a major oligarch. In turn, Costas Efimeros of The Press 
Project spoke about his desire to replace the mainstream media by becoming the mainstream, 
while the portal’s parent company handled technological contracts for major mainstream 
publishing groups in Greece. This reflects a warning from Ioanna Paraskevopoulou, a volunteer 
with Radiobubble, who soon after SYRIZA’s initial electoral victory in 2015 questioned the 
willingness of many left-wing alternative media outlets to question a left-wing government in the 
event that it moved away from the positions which earned it an electoral victory in the first place. 
The aforementioned examples highlight the fears of Bailey, Lievrouw, and Rodríguez that 
such media outlets can be co-opted, captured, or penetrated by their funding sources, central 
authorities, or other major actors (such as political parties). Bailey’s concept of the “rhizome,” 
which is ephemeral and ever-changing and which can be alternative in one context and 
mainstream in another, is also largely applicable. The “rhizome,” however, was de-centralized, 
but it can be argued that such examples as that of Unfollow highlight how a previously de-
centralized (in this case, collectively-run) initiatives can themselves be absorbed and become a 
component of the centralized, hegemonic system. 
It is here where “diaploki” comes into the picture. We have seen how outlets which 
presented an alternative perspective can and have been co-opted in Greece. We have seen how 
“radical” political movements can themselves be co-opted or move in directions quite different 
from their original platform and rhetoric. We have, at the same time, seen the expansion of the 
public sphere and civil society in Greece, but with much of this new discourse taking place 
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within privately-owned space (social networks). Another factor to consider is the replication of 
the incumbent mass media system from the offline world to the online world. In the case of 
Greece, mainstream media outlets such as Skai and prominent mainstream journalists such as 
Nikos Chatzinikolaou (founder of enikos.gr) have attained a prominent place in the country’s 
online news sphere. As the public has increasingly moved to the internet as its primary source of 
news, the information that it is receiving is, in many cases, coming from the same journalists and 
media outlets which represented the mainstream media sphere offline, and which were 
beneficiaries of the “diaploki” system and the “Polarized Pluralist” media system which 
historically existed in the country. 
Therefore, I would like to put forth a new conceptualization of “diaploki,” which we can 
name “diaploki 2.0,” representing a system which is still based around the traditional pillars of 
the “diaploki” system—namely, the interplay between the state and political parties, major media 
moguls, and the major business and economic interests these oligarchs represent. However, in 
this system, the offline “Polarized Pluralist” model has been replicated online, via outlets which 
are either owned and operated by the same offline actors, or which have been co-opted by such 
actors in various ways. “Diaploki,” in other words, is reproduced and arguably even expanded, 
while online users who may be under the impression that they are turning their backs on the 
mainstream by obtaining news and information from online sources, may in the end be exposed 
to the same information from the same actors as those they believed they had eschewed.  
Furthermore, to this triangle we may add a new pillar: privately-owned social media, 
which serve as the sites where “alternate” or “subaltern” public spheres often exist and develop, 
and where a substantial portion of public discourse and deliberation takes place today, expanding 
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the public sphere and civil society activity on the one hand. Such private ownership of spaces of 
public discourse place this very discourse at risk of being co-opted or simply shut down, due to 
online “architecture” ranging from terms of service to character limits, to an expansion of 
“regulatory capture,” where existing laws are used simply to stifle inconvenient speech, as could 
be said to have been the case with legal actions taken against bloggers a decade ago in Greece. In 
conjunction with an offline media system which continues to be largely inaccessible to the public 
and a regulatory system which itself can be said to be subject to regulatory capture, “diaploki 
2.0” can be said to be a more refined, and potentially more dangerous, incarnation of the 
“Polarized Pluralist” system. 
The case of Greece can therefore be said to make these theoretical contributions to the 
existing literature, providing an understanding of how social and new media may contribute, on 
the one hand, to the expansion of the public sphere, public deliberation and debate, and to civil 
society, but at the same time, also contribute to the strengthening of forces which can be said to 
restrict or curtail the public sphere and civil society. “Diaploki 2.0” can potentially be applied to 
other countries with a similar media and social landscape as Greece—such as the countries of 
Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region or many countries in Latin America. From the 
perspective of social movements and the impact of social and new media, Greece can also serve 
as a useful comparison case with other countries and regions which have experienced 
“revolutions” and large-scale movements driven by social movement, such as Spain, the United 
States, and the Arab world. Finally, this study may help contribute to an understanding of the 
broader impact of social and new media within contexts where there are low levels of 
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institutional trust, where there is a protracted economic crisis or depression, and in contexts 
where the public sphere or civil society is perceived as not having strongly developed. 
8.5 – GAPS IN THE RESEARCH AND THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE 
 This was admittedly a vast research study, and with a multi-year research project of such 
a scale, it is inevitable that some notable events had to be omitted. This includes the July 2015 
referendum, which led to major demonstrations and rallies in Greece and significant activity on 
social media, especially once the referendum result was, in essence, overturned by the 
government. However, the referendum was declared very suddenly, with less than two weeks’ 
notice, and it occurred after the main bulk of the interviews for this study was conducted, as well 
as the electronic survey questionnaire, which was closed earlier in 2015. Therefore, the 
referendum unfortunately had to be omitted from this study. The social media activity associated 
with the referendum, including the #ThisIsACoup and #Oxi (“no”) hashtags offer fertile ground 
for research which can build upon this project. 
 The electronic survey research itself, in the interest of length, also omitted further 
questions which could have been asked regarding civil society and its development and impact in 
Greece, as well as questions on the formation of new political parties and the influence and 
impact of social media in fostering their creation. Questions could also have been included on 
respondents’ perceptions regarding the causes for the decline in protest activity, on the 
mainstream media and perceptions as to its level of concern for the feelings of its audience, and 
on the impact of trolling (for which only elected officials were asked). 
Other limitations of this study include its overall Athens-centric nature, a possible bias 
towards interview subjects that were active online and on social media (and a possible resulting 
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“insider” bias), the omission of representatives of regional government units in Greece from the 
interview process, and the growth of the refugee and migrant crisis, which has also led to a 
significant amount of discourse on social media. 
 Response from civil society organizations to the electronic questionnaire was low, and 
there are many possible reasons to account for this, including suspicion, inactivity, not checking 
e-mail regularly or at all, discomfort of one individual in speaking for an entire group or 
movement, and an inability to delegate the responsibility of completing the questionnaire to one 
individual. A future study could expand the sample to more regions or revise the criteria for 
selecting such organizations. Similarly, while Greece’s representatives in the European 
Parliament were selected in order for there to be a more manageable sample, a future study could 
provide questionnaires to the 300 members of the Greek Parliament, or perhaps to a randomly-
selected sample of members of the Greek Parliament, in order to ensure a larger sample size, as 
the small sample of the survey conducted for this study precluded broader, generalizable 
conclusions or a deeper statistical analysis of the results. At the same time, the long length of the 
survey questionnaire may have dissuaded some potential subjects from participating. 
 Greece is, in general, a country which is underrepresented in the English-language body 
of academic research across several fields. This means that there is great potential and fertile 
ground for future research which could be conducted on the Greek case. One possibility for 
research could focus on the social media use and news consumption habits of ordinary citizens 
(instead of privileged members of society) while ascertaining the extent to which their political 
preferences and voting behavior might be influenced by media consumption practices, both 
offline and online. For instance, have social media and non-mainstream information found online 
 457 
perhaps dissuaded some eligible voters from exercising their right to vote? “Unofficial” civil 
society organizations offer another intriguing possibility as case studies for future research, 
examining all aspects of their operation, their usage of social and new media tools, and their 
impact on civil society and the public sphere. The discrepancy which apparently exists between 
the credibility crisis suffered by the mainstream media and the habitual viewing of these outlets 
represents another intriguing research possibility, as does an examination of voter behavior and 
social media usage. A before-and-after content analysis of left-wing or “anti-memorandum” 
media presents another possibility, in order to determine whether, and to what extent, there was a 
“SYRIZA effect” in their news coverage and overall political stance. Finally, the recent large-
scale Macedonia rallies offer an opportunity to examine social media and to what extent social 
media were used as tool for organizing the rallies or publicizing them. A content analysis or 
discourse analysis between the coverage afforded to the Macedonia rallies by online-based media 
as compared to the mainstream media also presents interesting possibilities for research. Finally, 
future developments and a possible “generational resurgence” in Greece may warrant a look at 
the impact of “collective memory” and experience from participating in the public sphere, civil 













APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Title of project: From the Polis to Facebook: Social Media and the Development of a New 
Greek Public Sphere 
 
IRB Approval: 2012-11-0041 
 
Instructions to the interviewer: 
 Make the interviewee feel comfortable and feel free to engage in discussion and small 
talk to develop a level of comfort. 
 Explain the research project, what is being studied, the purpose of this research, and 
where information and excerpts from the interview will or will not be used. 
 Present the IRB consent form to the participant and ask them to review it carefully and to 
sign it if they agree to consent. 
 Ask the participant if they give permission for the interview to be recorded and for their 
full name to be used. 
 If participants do not wish to be identified by their full name, ask what alternate name 
they would like to be referred to as (such as, for example, their Twitter “handle”). 
 Inform the interviewee that they are free to stop the interview and to cease their 
participation in the study at any time. 
 Sign the consent form and provide a copy to the interviewee. 
 The interview is semi-structured. Not every question in the questionnaire needs to be 
asked, depending on your own judgment, the responses of the interviewee (which may 
provide answers to other questions that were intended to be asked), the area(s) of 
expertise of the interview subject, and the overall flow of the interview. 
 Feel free to insert probes, transition messages, and follow-up questions when deemed 
appropriate at any point in the interview, as well as to ask clarifying questions or to ask 
for examples, when needed. 
 












The questionnaire follows on the next page 
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APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE – INITIAL INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS AND 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
Each interview will be semi-structured and will also include questions tailored to the individual 
or organization in question. In addition, certain questions from the initial approved 
questionnaire may be repeated, to gauge any differences in opinion or perception that may exist 
compared to the initial interview. 
 
1. Thank you for participating in this study. To begin, share a few words about yourself 
and your (professional/journalistic/blogging/academic, etc.) background. 
2. (Optional) To continue, share a few words about (the entity which the interviewee 
works for, e.g. newspaper, blog, political party, professional media organization, 
think tank, etc.).  
3. How would you characterize the state of the media industry, journalism, and the 
Greek news industry in Greece at the present time? 
4. How has the media industry developed in Greece in the past several decades? 
5. Within this context, where has social media and new media fit in to the picture at the 
present time? 
6. Is social media and new media heavily used in Greece? If so, which medium(s) is/are 
most popular with the Greek people? 
7. What, in your opinion, accounts for the popularity of these particular mediums? 
8. Are social media and new media, in your opinion, heavily used as news sources by 
the Greek people? 
9. (If yes to above): How do you account for the popularity of social media, new media, 
and blogs in Greece, when at the same time, the percentage of the population with 
internet access is lower than in many other European countries? 
10. Why have blogs, in particular, become such a popular source for news and 
information in Greece? 
11. What factor(s) account for the popularity and success of these blogs? 
12. What has the content of these blogs consisted of, and how has that content different 
from the news coverage offered by the mainstream media? 
13. In looking at the development of blogs, and new and social media in Greece, what 
are some highlights in their development that you can pinpoint? 
14. How has the Greek media establishment reacted to the growth in popularity of these 
news sources and to the increased popularity of social media? 
15. Did the growth in the popularity of blogs and other new and social media lead any 
established media entities or any journalists to begin their own blogs and social 
media efforts? 
16. How has the Greek political establishment reacted to the growth in popularity of 
blogs, social, and new media? 
17. What impact has social and new media had on politics and on the political parties in 
Greece? 
18. What has the impact of social and new media been, overall, on journalism in Greece? 
19. How have social and new media, as well as blogs, impacted how the Greek people 
receive their news? 
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20. What has the impact of these new mediums of information been on political 
communication in Greece?  
21. What has the impact of social media, new media, and blogs been on the 
dissemination of information in general in Greece? 
22. One of the criticisms levied against some blogs is the fact that the identities of their 
bloggers are kept anonymous. Why have there been so many objections to 
anonymous blogging in Greece and what have the objections consisted of? 
23. Do you believe that anonymous blogging compromises the trustworthiness or 
credibility of these blogs? 
24. Do you believe that the Greek people, in general, consider the information that they 
receive from social media, new media, and blogs credible? 
25. Have there been proposals to pass legislation that would outlaw anonymous blogging 
or curtail blogging in any way? 
26. In general, has the government taken any action(s) against journalists, bloggers, or 
users of social media outlets? 
27. In your view, are social media and new media such as blogs replacing traditional 
media in Greece? 
28. Have traditional media, through the manner in which they cover and report the news, 
opened the door for these new “competitors”? 
29. Are most blogs and new media outlets, in your view, truly independent of the 
government and of existing power structures in the country? 
30. What has the role of social and new media been in terms of informing the public 
during the economic crisis in Greece over the past two-plus years? 
31. What role did social and new media play in Greece during the recent parliamentary 
elections in May and June of 2012? 
32. Are social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook heavily used by politicians and 
the political parties in Greece? 
33. (If yes to the above): in what manner does the political establishment in Greece 
utilize these new forms of communication? 
34. How would you define the concept of a public sphere? 
35. Is there a public sphere in Greece? Or spheres? How has this sphere(s) developed? 
36. Has such a public sphere (or spheres) existed historically in Greece? 
37. Has social media impacted or changed the existing public sphere(s), or contribute to 
the development of a new public sphere, or spheres? 
38. How has political and social discourse in Greece been impacted as a result of the 
development and growth in popularity of social and new media? 
39. How would you describe the state of civil society in Greece historically and at the 
present time? Did Greece possess a developed civil society historically, and does it 
possess a developed civil society sphere at the present time?  
40. Have social and new media, in your view, contributed to the development of civil 
society initiatives and organizations in Greece? 
41. Do you believe that blogs, social media, and new media have contributed, 
specifically, to the formation of an alternative public sphere in Greece? 
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42. Have there historically been alternative and community mediums operating in 
Greece? 
43. Have these mediums encountered any trouble with their operations and outreach to 
the public historically? 
44. Do you consider blogs, new media (such as internet radio) and social media as 
“alternative” mediums of communication? 
45. Has the existence and availability of social and new media enabled smaller 
communities, whether they are geographic communities or communities of interest, 
to develop in Greece? 
46. Have these new mediums (social and new media) enabled alternative and 
community-based media to develop further in Greece, compared with prior to the 
existence and wide availability of these online mediums? 
47. Would you consider the news blogs or any of the social or new media efforts in 
Greece as examples of “citizen journalism”? 
48. Did “citizen journalism” efforts exist prior to the Internet age in Greece?  
49. What impact do you believe social and new media might have in Greece in the 
future, in terms of serving as sources of news and information, and in terms of their 
contribution to the public sphere(s) and public discourse?  
50. Finally, is there anything that you would like to add before we conclude this 
interview? 
 
POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS MAY BE ASKED DEPENDING ON THE 
CONTEXT - EXAMPLES: 
 
Possible additional questions to ask bloggers: 
 
1. (To bloggers) Why did you begin blogging? 
2. (To bloggers) What, in your view, can bloggers accomplish that mainstream 
journalists and mass media outlets cannot? 
3. (To bloggers) Do you consider yourself a citizen journalist? 
4. (To bloggers) What is the mission/goal of your blog? 
5. (To bloggers) What are the biggest challenges you face, as a blogger?  
 
Sample Questionnaire for Boroume illustrative example: 
 
1. Thank you for participating in this study. To begin, share a few words about yourself 
and your (professional/journalistic/blogging/academic, etc.) background. 
2. To continue, share a few words about Boroume, its history, its mission, and its 
programming. 
3. Has Boroume been active on social media since its inception? 
4. Why did Boroume opt to have such a heavy social media presence? 
5. Strategy Boroume uses to employ social media in its efforts? 
6. How have social media tools helped Boroume develop as an organization? 
7. How have social media tools helped Boroume disseminate information to the public? 
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8. How have social media tools helped Boroume recruit volunteers? 
9. Has Boroume been influenced by any previous initiatives in Greece or abroad? 
10. Have there been initiatives similar to Boroume undertaken in Greece previously? 
11. How do you interact with your constituents through social media? The general 
public? 
12. Which social medium(s) does your organization use? 
13. Does your outreach and manner of usage differ from one social medium to another? 
14. Which social medium does your organization utilize the most, and why? 
15. How do you use social media to mobilize? To organize? To inform?  
16. Do you collaborate with other organizations like your own, through the use of social 
media? 
17. Have other non-profit organizations in Greece engaged with social media in a similar 
manner, to your knowledge? 
18. Can you share any examples of how social media has aided your organization’s 
efforts? 
19. How does Boroume use social media on a daily basis? 
20. How does social media assist Boroume in its mission? 
21. How would you define the concept of a public sphere? 
22. Is there a public sphere in Greece? Or spheres? How has this sphere(s) developed? 
23. Has such a public sphere (or spheres) existed historically in Greece? 
24. Has social media impacted or changed the existing public sphere(s), or contributed 
to the development of a new public sphere, or spheres? 
25. How has political and social discourse in Greece been impacted as a result of the 
development and growth in popularity of social and new media? 
26. How does Boroume, and its activity in the social media realm, contribute to the 
public sphere? 
27. How would you describe the state of civil society in Greece historically and at the 
present time? Did Greece possess a developed civil society historically, and does it 
possess a developed civil society sphere at the present time?  
28. Have social and new media, in your view, contributed to the development of civil 
society initiatives and organizations in Greece?  
29. How does Boroume, and its activity in the social media realm, contribute to civil 
society in Greece? 
30. Has your social media activity influenced, to your knowledge, other similar 
initiatives and efforts elsewhere in Greece? 
31. Has there been a response from the mainstream media to your organization’s efforts? 
From others in the social media realm? From the government and/or the political 
parties? 
32. How would you gauge the public’s attitude towards social media in Greece, as a 
source of news, community involvement, activism, etc. 




The additional questions which follow are for volunteers: 
 
34. How did you find out about Boroume for the first time? 
35. When you saw Boroume's presence on Facebook for the first time, what caught your 
attention about the organization? 
36. For how long did you follow Boroume on Facebook before you decided to get 
involved? 
37. From the moment that you contacted Boroume to get involved, what was the process 
like to actually begin to be involved as a volunteer? 
38. As a volunteer, what do you do at Boroume? 
39. Since you mentioned involvement in some of the web aspects of Boroume, are you 
involved at all in Boroume's social media efforts? 
 
Sample Questionnaire for enikos.gr illustrative example: 
 
1. Thank you for participating in this study. To begin, share a few words about yourself 
and your (professional/journalistic/blogging/academic, etc.) background. 
2. To continue, share a few words about enikos.gr.  
3. What was the idea behind enikos.gr? When was it developed? 
4. What void do you believe enikos.gr filled within the Greek media landscape? 
5. enikos.gr could be described as being a combination of traditional media and new 
media, with a well-known and experienced journalist. Would you consider enikos.gr 
traditional or new, and how do you straddle the line between the two? 
6. The layout of enikos.gr resembles many well known blogs in Greece. Was this 
purposeful on the part of enikos.gr? 
7. What is your organizational strategy in using social and new media? Which mediums 
do you use the most or least? Facebook? Twitter? 
8. In what way is enikos.gr’s web TV station an alternative to broadcast television 
programming, in your view? 
9. Are social media and new media, in your opinion, heavily used as news sources by 
the Greek people? 
10. Social media and new media such as blogs have become quite popular in Greece 
over the past several years. What accounts for their popularity in your view?  
11. Why have blogs, in particular, become such a popular source for news and 
information in Greece? 
12. Is the growing popularity of social media and new media as a news source a result of 
a decline in the perceived credibility of “traditional” media? 
13. Which types of social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) do you perceive as being 
the most popular with the Greek people? 
14. What, in your opinion, accounts for the popularity of these particular mediums? 
15. What factor(s) account for the popularity and success of news blogs in Greece? 
16. Did the success of Greek news blogs influence the decision to establish enikos.gr? 
17. What has the content of these blogs consisted of, and how has that content different 
from the news coverage offered by the mainstream media? 
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18. Do you consider the information that is found in the social and new media sphere 
more broadly as credible? 
19. In looking at enikos.gr in particular, do you believe that the general public finds it to 
be a credible source for news? 
20. In looking at the development of blogs, and new and social media in Greece, what 
are some highlights in their development that you can pinpoint? 
21. How has the Greek media establishment reacted to the growth in popularity of these 
news sources and to the increased popularity of social media? 
22. How has the Greek political establishment reacted to the growth in popularity of 
blogs, social, and new media? 
23. What impact has social and new media had on politics and on the political parties in 
Greece? 
24. What has the impact of social and new media been, overall, on journalism in 
Greece? 
25. How have social and new media, as well as blogs, impacted how the Greek people 
receive their news? 
26. What has the impact of social media, new media, and blogs been on the 
dissemination of information in general in Greece? 
27. One of the criticisms levied against some blogs is the fact that the identities of their 
bloggers are kept anonymous. Why have there been so many objections to 
anonymous blogging in Greece and what have the objections consisted of? 
28. Do you believe that anonymous blogging compromises the trustworthiness or 
credibility of these blogs? 
29. In your view, are social media and new media such as blogs replacing traditional 
media in Greece? 
30. Have traditional media, through the manner in which they cover and report the news, 
opened the door for these new “competitors”? 
31. Are most blogs and new media outlets, in your view, truly independent of the 
government and of existing power structures in the country? 
32. What has the role of social and new media been in terms of informing the public 
during the economic crisis in Greece? 
33. What role did social and new media play in Greece during the recent parliamentary 
elections in May and June of 2012? 
34. There have been high profile instances recently of journalists and bloggers being 
arrested for stories and items that they have published. Do you believe that 
journalism faces any dangers from the government in Greece at the present time? 
35. How would you define the concept of a public sphere? 
36. Is there a public sphere in Greece? Or spheres? How has this sphere(s) developed? 
37. Has such a public sphere (or spheres) existed historically in Greece? 
38. Has social media impacted or changed the existing public sphere(s), or contributed 
to the development of a new public sphere, or spheres? 
39. How has political and social discourse in Greece been impacted as a result of the 
development and growth in popularity of social and new media? 
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40. How would you describe the state of civil society in Greece historically and at the 
present time? Did Greece possess a developed civil society historically, and does it 
possess a developed civil society sphere at the present time?  
41. Have social and new media, in your view, contributed to the development of civil 
society initiatives and organizations in Greece?  
42. Has social media impacted or changed the existing public sphere(s), or contributed 
to the development of a new public sphere, or spheres? 
43. How has political and social discourse in Greece been impacted as a result of the 
development and growth in popularity of social and new media? 
44. Do you believe that blogs, social media, and new media have contributed, 
specifically, to the formation of an alternative public sphere in Greece? 
45. Do you consider enikos.gr to be an alternative to the existing mainstream media in 
Greece? If so, in what way? 
46. Do you believe enikos.gr has made a contribution to the public sphere (or spheres) in 
Greece, and if so, how? 
47. What do you know about your online users? Number of visits, age groups, where 
they come from, what other sites they read, etc. 
48. How does enikos.gr engage with its users? Are comments and feedback encouraged? 
Are they taken into account in news production? 
49. How many postings are made on enikos.gr per day? 
50. What is the average viewership of enikos.gr’s web TV station? 
51. Through which social medium(s) are your readers/viewers most engaged? 
52. How has enikos.gr made an impact on the Greek public sphere? Name specific 
instances. 
53. How has your coverage of major stories differed from the coverage afforded by the 
major media towards those same stories? 
54. In general, what can blogs and new/social media, in your view, accomplish that 
traditional mainstream media cannot? 
55. Do you consider enikos.gr to be a mainstream medium, an alternative medium, 
complementary to mainstream media? 
56. What impact do you believe social and new media might have in Greece in the 
future, in terms of serving as sources of news and information, and in terms of their 
contribution to the public sphere(s) and public discourse? 
57. How does enikos.gr plan to utilize new online technologies in the future? 
 
Sample Questionnaire for the Independent Greeks political party 
 
1. Thank you for participating in this study. To begin, share a few words about yourself 
and your (professional/journalistic/blogging/academic, etc.) background. 
2. To continue, share a few words about the Independent Greeks political party, how the 
party was founded, and its mission. 
3. How would you define the concept of a public sphere? 
4. Is there a public sphere in Greece? Or spheres? How has this sphere(s) developed? 
5. Has such a public sphere (or spheres) existed historically in Greece? 
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6. Has social media impacted or changed the existing public sphere(s), or contributed to 
the development of a new public sphere, or spheres? 
7. How has political and social discourse in Greece been impacted as a result of the 
development and growth in popularity of social and new media? 
8. How would you describe the state of civil society in Greece historically and at the 
present time? Did Greece possess a developed civil society historically, and does it 
possess a developed civil society sphere at the present time? 
9. Have social and new media, in your view, contributed to the development of civil 
society initiatives and organizations in Greece? 
10. What contribution does your political party make to the public sphere in Greece? 
What contributions has it made that were previously absent from the public sphere? 
11. What is the importance of social media in your party’s overall communication’s 
strategy? 
12. How does your party interact with the public through social and new media 
platforms? 
13. Does the feedback you receive from the public via social and new media platforms 
impact your party’s policies or its campaigning? 
14. How many people are involved in your party’s social and new media efforts? Is there 
a dedicated social and new media team? 
15. How would you compare your party’s activity on social and new media to those of 
the other parties in parliament? 
16. How would you describe the nature of political discourse in Greece today, and what 
has changed with the advent of the internet and social media? 
17. Do you believe that Greek society, as a whole, finds the internet and social media a 
more trustworthy source of news and information, including political news and 
information, compared to traditional mass media outlets? 
18. Do you believe that the mass media in Greece is suffering from a credibility crisis, 
and if so, why do you believe that this is the case? 
19. How has the mass media covered the activities of the Independent Greeks political 
party since its inception? 
20. The Independent Greeks became widely known in Greek society as the “party of 
Facebook,” as it was essentially founded via Facebook and because it was especially 
active on Facebook in the first months of its existence. What was your party’s 
strategy in using Facebook to engage with the public immediately after your launch? 
21. What were some specific ways in which the Independent Greeks engaged with the 
Greek public after the party’s inception? For instance, I recall that online polls were 
heavily utilized. 
22. How does party leader Panos Kammenos, who is known to be active on social media, 
utilize social mediums to communicate with the public? 
23. Do you believe that Mr. Kammenos’ often outspoken usage of social media tools to 
communicate with the public has helped the Independent Greeks attract voters and 
supporters? 
24. Are there other elected officials or public figures from the Independent Greeks who 
are particularly active users of social and new media? 
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25. (For elected officials/MPs): How do you personally use social and new media to 
interact with voters and the public? 
26. (For elected officials/MPs): Do you personally communicate with the public using 
these social media tools, or does an adviser or some other individual with expertise 
in social media utilize these tools on your behalf? 
27. (For elected officials/MPs): How much time during your day is dedicated to 
interacting with constituents via social media? 
28. What impact do you believe you/your party’s use of social media have had on the 
party’s popularity and public perception? 
29. Does your party have a specific policy for how MPs and its representatives can 
utilize social and new media? 
30. Are there any particular mediums which the Independent Greeks specifically prefers 
or finds to be most effective for your social media outreach efforts, and why? 
31. Can you highlight some specific ways in which social media has significantly 
benefited or impacted the party? 
32. How did the party utilize social and new media during the recent parliamentary 
elections in May and June of 2012? 
33. Did the party’s communications and social media strategy change between the two 
electoral contests? If so, what changed? 
34. Do you believe your party’s electoral success can be, at least in part, attributed to 
your presence on social and new media? 
35. How would you characterize the manner in which other major political parties in 
Greece have utilized social and new media in their communications and outreach 
efforts? 
36. Which political parties, in your view, make the most or the least effective usage of 
social and new media? 
37. Were the Independent Greeks influenced in any way from the manner in which social 
and new media have been utilized by political parties and electoral campaigns in 
other countries? 
38. How do the Independent Greeks plan to utilize new online technologies in the future, 
such as prior to the next electoral contest? 
 
Sample Questionnaire for Radiobubble illustrative example: 
 
1. Thank you for participating in this study. To begin, share a few words about yourself 
and your (professional/journalistic/blogging/academic, etc.) background. 
2. To continue, share a few words about Radiobubble, its history, its mission, and its 
programming. 
3. What makes Radiobubble different from other internet radio stations? 
4. What makes Radiobubble different from mainstream media outlets? 
5. How would you define the concept of a public sphere? 
6. Is there a public sphere in Greece? Or spheres? How has this sphere(s) developed? 
7. Has such a public sphere (or spheres) existed historically in Greece? 
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8. Has social media impacted or changed the existing public sphere(s), or contributed 
to the development of a new public sphere, or spheres? 
9. How has political and social discourse in Greece been impacted as a result of the 
development and growth in popularity of social and new media? 
10. How has Radiobubble contributed to the public sphere in Greece? 
11. Which social mediums are most heavily used by Radiobubble? 
12. How do you personally interact with your listeners using social media? Do you 
prefer any particular medium and why? 
13. Aside from your involvement with Radiobubble, how else do you use social and new 
media in your daily life? 
14. How does Radiobubble in general interact with its listeners and community using 
social media tools? 
15. Are the different social mediums used differently by Radiobubble? 
16. How do Radiobubble’s DJs incorporate social media into their programming? 
17. Do you consider social media and new media more broadly as credible sources of 
information? 
18. Do you believe the public considers these mediums credible? 
19. Who is Radiobubble’s audience? 
20. How has Radiobubble made an impact on this audience? 
21. What has the attitude of the political system towards mediums like Radiobubble 
been like? 
22. Have there been any attempts to censor or disrupt Radiobubble’s operations in any 
way? Any legislation that restricts your activities in any way? 
23. How would you describe the state of civil society in Greece historically and at the 
present time? Did Greece possess a developed civil society historically, and does it 
possess a developed civil society sphere at the present time?  
24. Have social and new media, in your view, contributed to the development of civil 
society initiatives and organizations in Greece?  
25. How has Radiobubble made contributions to civil society? 
26. What are some civil society efforts, if any, which have arisen out of Radiobubble’s 
efforts? 
27. How does someone become a member of Radiobubble and a programmer? 
28. Would you describe the Radiobubble café space as an example of the public sphere? 
Who are the patrons? What is typically discussed? 
29. What sorts of events does the station organize and how do they contribute to civil 
society or to the public sphere? 
30. Recent events in Greece: journalist arrests – journalism and free speech threatened? 
What role does a station like Radiobubble play in this environment? 
31. Foreign twitter feed: idea and philosophy behind this? 
32. Who is the audience for the English-language twitter feed? 
33. Why did Radiobubble create a twitter in English? 
34. How does Radiobubble respond to pressing social issues such as racism and 
violence, or to issues pertaining to the economic crisis? 
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35. How would you define citizen journalism, and is what you do at Radiobubble citizen 
journalism, in your view? 
36. How does Radiobubble plan to utilize new online technologies in the future? 
 
Sample Questionnaire for the Skai Media Group illustrative example: 
 
1. Thank you for participating in this study. To begin, share a few words about yourself 
and your (professional/journalistic/blogging/academic, etc.) background. 
2. To continue, share a few words about the Skai Media Group and the media outlets 
that it comprises. 
3. How do the Skai Media Group’s various media outlets position themselves within 
the Greek media landscape? 
4. What is your organizational strategy in using social and new media? Which mediums 
do you use the most or least? Facebook? Twitter? 
5. Are social media and new media, in your opinion, heavily used as news sources by 
the Greek people? 
6. Social media and new media such as blogs have become quite popular in Greece 
over the past several years. What accounts for their popularity in your view? 
7. Why have blogs, in particular, become such a popular source for news and 
information in Greece? 
8. Is the growing popularity of social media and new media as a news source a result of 
a decline in the perceived credibility of “traditional” media? 
9. Which types of social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) do you perceive as being 
the most popular with the Greek people? 
10. What, in your opinion, accounts for the popularity of these particular mediums? 
11. What factor(s) account for the popularity and success of news blogs in Greece? 
12. What has the content of these blogs consisted of, and how has that content different 
from the news coverage offered by the mainstream media? 
13. Do you consider the information that is found in the social and new media sphere 
more broadly as credible? 
14. How do news blogs compete with the operations of professional, commercial news 
operations such as those of the Skai Media Group? 
15. In looking at the Skai Media Group’s news outlets in particular, do you believe that 
the general public finds your news outlets to be a credible source for news and 
information? 
16. Do you believe that the mainstream media in Greece are suffering from a credibility 
crisis, and if so, why? 
17. What impact has social and new media had on the political landscape in Greece? 
18. What has the impact of social and new media been, overall, on journalism in 
Greece? 
19. How have social and new media, as well as blogs, impacted how the Greek people 
receive their news? 
20. What has the impact of social media, new media, and blogs been on the 
dissemination of information in general in Greece? 
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21. One of the criticisms levied against some blogs is the fact that the identities of their 
bloggers are kept anonymous. Why have there been so many objections to 
anonymous blogging in Greece and what have the objections consisted of? 
22. Do you believe that anonymous blogging compromises the trustworthiness or 
credibility of these blogs? 
23. In your view, are social media and new media such as blogs replacing traditional 
media in Greece? 
24. Have traditional media, through the manner in which they cover and report the news, 
opened the door for these new “competitors”? 
25. Are most blogs and new media outlets, in your view, truly independent of the 
government and of existing power structures in the country? 
26. What has the role of social and new media been in terms of informing the public 
during the economic crisis in Greece? 
27. What role did social and new media play in Greece during the recent parliamentary 
elections in May and June of 2012? 
28. There have been high profile instances recently of journalists and bloggers being 
arrested for stories and items that they have published. Do you believe that 
journalism faces any dangers from the government in Greece at the present time? 
29. How would you define the concept of a public sphere? 
30. Is there a public sphere in Greece? Or spheres? How has this sphere(s) developed? 
31. Has such a public sphere (or spheres) existed historically in Greece? 
32. Has social media impacted or changed the existing public sphere(s), or contributed 
to the development of a new public sphere, or spheres? 
33. How has political and social discourse in Greece been impacted as a result of the 
development and growth in popularity of social and new media? 
34. Has social media impacted or changed the existing public sphere(s), or contributed 
to the development of a new public sphere, or spheres? 
35. How has political and social discourse in Greece been impacted as a result of the 
development and growth in popularity of social and new media? 
36. Do you believe that blogs, social media, and new media have contributed, 
specifically, to the formation of an alternative public sphere in Greece? 
37. In what way do you believe that the Skai Media Group contributes to the Greek 
public sphere? 
38. What do you know about your online users? Number of visits, age groups, where 
they come from, what other sites they read, etc. 
39. How does the Skai Media Group engage with its online users? Are comments and 
feedback encouraged? Are they taken into account in news production? 
40. What other metrics can you share from Skai Media Group’s online presence? 
41. Through which social medium(s) are your readers/viewers most engaged? 
42. In general, what can blogs and new/social media, in your view, accomplish that 
traditional mainstream media cannot? 
43. How would you describe the state of civil society in Greece historically and at the 
present time? Did Greece possess a developed civil society historically, and does it 
possess a developed civil society sphere at the present time?  
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44. Have social and new media, in your view, contributed to the development of civil 
society initiatives and organizations in Greece?  
45. Describe the Skai Media Group’s civil society efforts, as part of your organization’s 
social responsibility efforts. 
46. How does the Skai Media Group utilize social and new media to promote and to 
disseminate information about these civil society initiatives? 
47. What impact do you believe social and new media might have in Greece in the 
future, in terms of serving as sources of news and information, and in terms of their 
contribution to the public sphere(s) and public discourse? 


































APPENDIX 3: Follow-up Questionnaire – Sample Questions 
 
Each interview will be semi-structured and will also include questions tailored to the individual 
or organization in question. In addition, certain questions from the initial approved 
questionnaire may be repeated, to gauge any differences in opinion or perception that may exist 
compared to the initial interview. 
 
General Follow-Up Interview Questions: 
 
1. How is the term “citizen” defined in Greece, in your view? What is a “citizen,” in the 
Greek context? 
2. In your opinion, are the problems and challenges ordinary citizens face on a daily basis in 
Greece reflected in the content of the conventional mass media in Greece (television, 
radio, newspapers)? 
3. In your view, have social media and online media done a better or a worse job in bringing 
the concerns and challenges Greek citizens face to the public eye? 
4. In your opinion, do ordinary Greek citizens have any impact on the content of the 
conventional mass media in Greece? In the shaping of legislation regulating media and 
broadcasting in Greece? 
5. Do you believe that free speech, especially on political issues, is effectively protected in 
Greece? 
6. In your belief, is there a “democratic deficit” in Greece? 
7. Who do you believe are the major influencers of the public sphere, public debate, and 
public discourse in Greece?  
 
Follow-up: Is their impact positive or negative, in your view? 
 
8. Does the conventional mass media in Greece, in your opinion, perform a role as a 
political or economic or social “watchdog” on behalf of the public? 
9. Do you believe the conventional mass media in Greece ever fulfilled the media 
“watchdog” role on behalf of the public, acting as the “fourth estate”?  
10. Do social or online media perform a role as a political or economic or social “watchdog” 
on behalf of the public, in your opinion, and if so, do you believe that they are more 
effective in this role than the conventional mass media? 
11. Do you believe that there are certain voices, political perspectives, or social groups which 
are systematically excluded from participation in public discourse and dialogue, by the 
conventional mass media in Greece (television, radio, newspapers)? 
12. How would you gauge the role of public opinion polling firms in Greece? In your view, 
do they operate in an objective and neutral manner? Are the results of public opinion 
polling, in your view, fair and objective? 
13. Do you believe that public opinion polling in Greece is politically tainted or biased? 
14. Do you believe there are other effective ways of measuring public opinion and public 
sentiment on matters of political, economic, or social importance in Greece? 
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15. Does social media or online media provide any effective ways of gauging public opinion 
in Greece, in your view? 
16. Do you believe that professional journalists in Greece operate according to the norms of 
journalistic objectivity and fairness? 
17. In your opinion, what role did the conventional media play prior to the January 2015 
parliamentary elections in Greece and SYRIZA’s subsequent rise to power? 
18. In your view, what role did social media and online media play prior to the January 2015 
parliamentary elections in Greece and SYRIZA’s subsequent rise to power? 
19. What differences existed, in your view, in the content and quality of political and public 
discourse regarding the elections, prior to the January 2015 parliamentary elections in 
Greece? 
20. In your opinion, did social and online media help or hurt SYRIZA in its rise to power, or 
do you believe they did not have an impact? 
21. In your view, how did the conventional mass media impact the ascension into parliament 
for the following political parties? a) To Potami, b) Independent Greeks, c) Centrists’ 
Union 
22. In your view, how did social media and online media impact the ascension into 
parliament for the following political parties? a) To Potami, b) Independent Greeks, c) 
Centrists’ Union 
23. In your view, which political party (or parties) in Greece makes most effective use of 
social media and online media tools? Which political party (or parties) is least effective, 
in your view? 
24. In your opinion, what role did the conventional media play prior to the September 2015 
parliamentary elections in Greece and SYRIZA’s repeat victory? 
25. In your view, what role did social media and online media play prior to the September 
2015 parliamentary elections in Greece and SYRIZA’s repeat victory? 
26. How has the SYRIZA-led government utilized or not utilized social, online, and other 
new media as part of its governance? 
27. In your view, have there been changes to the public sphere or in public discourse in 
Greece following SYRIZA’s ascension to power? 
28. In your opinion, what role did the conventional media play in influencing public opinion 
prior to the July 2015 referendum in Greece?  
 
Follow-up: Do you believe that the conventional media’s stance prior to the referendum 
impacted its credibility? 
 
29. In your view, what was the role of social media and online media in influencing public 
opinion and public debate prior to the July 2015 referendum? 
30. In your view, how did the shutdown of state broadcaster ERT and the subsequent launch 
of its replacement, NERIT, impact the public sphere and public discourse in Greece, and 
if so, how? Did the reopening of ERT in spring 2015, in turn, impact the public sphere 
and public discourse in Greece—and if so, how? 
 474 
31. Would you characterize ERT as a “state” broadcasting company or as a “public” 
broadcasting company, and why? What do you perceive is the difference between the two 
categorizations? 
32. In your belief, do social media or online media serve as effective alternatives to the 
conventional mass media system, or have they replicated it? 
33. In your view, have social media or online media contributed to an increased diversity of 
viewpoints present in the Greek public sphere  
34. Is there still a “digital divide” in Greece in your view, and if so, what is its impact? 
35. Demographically, which social groups are, in your opinion, most likely to get their news 
from television? From newspapers? From online sources? 
36. Do you believe there are any truly alternative sources of news and information in the 
Greek internet or blogosphere? If so, can you name some of these alternatives and why 
you believe they are “alternative” to conventional media outlets? 
37. In your opinion, why did the massive protest movement succeed in 2011 while other 
similar efforts at organizing mass gatherings have largely failed since then? 
38. What has been the role of social media and online media, in your view, in the growth and 
subsequent demise of these public social movements? 
39. In your view, have social media and online media contributed to the growth and 
development of the public sphere (or public spheres) in Greece in the past five years? 
40. In your opinion, have social media and online media contributed to the growth and 
development of civil society in Greece in the past five years? 
 




1. How has Boroume been using social media and new media and recent years, and what 
has changed in the past few years, since 2012-13 when we last spoke? 
2. Overall, how has your organization grown and changed during this time period? 
3. To what extent is social media still useful for your organization in recruiting volunteers? 
4. Beyond just Boroume, looking at the non-profit sector and civil society, what impact is 
social and new media having on the sector overall, and what has changed in recent years? 
5. Why do you believe certain social mediums, such as Twitter, are not considered relevant 
in Greece? 
6. Looking at society in general, and not just civil society, with everything that has been 
happening in Greece politically and otherwise, what role have social and new media been 
playing in the public sphere? 
7. In general, how would you say that the public sphere has evolved in Greece over the past 
few years, and in the midst of the economic crisis? 
8. There has long been a perception that civil society in Greece was not as developed as in 
other Western societies. Do you believe that this has changed and that civil society has 
developed in recent years in Greece? If it has been improving, is it as a result of the 
economic crisis? 
9. What do you believe is Boroume’s contribution to Greek civil society today? 
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10. In what areas do you believe there is still a gap, between the civil society of Greece and 
other Western societies? 
11. Would you say that there is still a suspicion or a lack of trust of ordinary Greeks towards 
the “third sector” in Greece at this time? 
12. Overall, what would you say that the impact and relevance of social media and new 
media is in general in Greek society, at this time? 
13. Do you believe that a high percentage of Greeks receive news and information about 
what is happening in their society, from social and new media? 





1. Describe the operations of enikos.gr today and the manner in which it uses social and 
new media tools in its day-to-day operations. 
2. What social and new media tools are utilized by enikos.gr today? Are other tools used 
aside from Facebook and Twitter? 
3. How has the usage of these social media tools by enikos.gr evolved in recent years, since 
the 2012-13 time period? 
4. How would you describe enikos.gr’s contribution to the Greek public sphere today, in 
your  
view? 
5. Does enikos.gr maintain a “blog format” in its operations, and if so, why have you chosen 
to maintain this format? 
6. In general, how would you say that the public sphere has evolved in Greece over the past 
few years, and in the midst of the economic crisis? 
7. What is enikos.gr’s current relationship with the other media endeavors of its founder, 
journalist Nikos Chatzinikolaou? 
8. How does enikos.gr differentiate itself from the other media outlets owned or operated by 
Mr. Chatzinikolaou? How does the news content of enikos.gr differ from the content 
found in these mediums? 
9. Do you believe that a majority of the Greek public now relies upon social and new 
(online) media in order to receive news and information? 
10. Do you believe that the Greek “traditional” media (e.g. television, radio, print) are 
suffering from a credibility crisis, on the part of the general public? 
11. How many people are involved in the social and new media efforts of enikos.gr? 
12. To what extent have social and new media contributed to the changes in Greece’s 
political landscape in recent years? 
13. Are news blogs still an influential or popular source of news and information in Greece 
today? What has changed in the past decade and what is its impact on the public sphere? 
14. Have online news portals supplanted blogs in popularity in Greece? 
15. How would you characterize the relationship between the traditional mass media in 
Greece with the dissemination of news and information via online means today? 
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16. Are there plans to relaunch Mr. Chatzinikolaou’s television program? Will this relaunch 
take place in a web TV format once again? 





1. Describe for us how the Independent Greeks utilize social and new media tools today. 
Which social media tools does your party use (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
Instagram)? Have there been any changes since the 2012-2014 time period? 
2. In general, how would you say that the public sphere has evolved in Greece over the past 
few years, and in the midst of the economic crisis? 
3. Are there differences in the ways in which each of these social media tools is utilized by 
the Independent Greeks? For instance, what might be the differences in how your party 
utilizes Facebook versus Twitter? 
4. Approximately how many friends/followers does the party have from each of the social 
media tools which are utilized? 
5. How did the Independent Greeks utilize social and new media tools prior to the January 
2015 elections, and prior to the September 2015 elections? Were there differences in how 
social and new media were utilized in these two electoral contests? 
6. Do you believe that social and new media tools helped or hurt your party’s campaign 
efforts prior to the January 2015 elections? Prior to the September 2015 elections? 
7. How did conventional media outlets (television, newspapers, radio) cover your party’s 
pre-election campaign efforts prior to the January 2015 and September 2015 elections? 
8. How has your party utilized social and new media tools as part of its participation in two 
successive coalition governments since January 2015? 
9. How has the manner in which the Independent Greeks utilize social media changed ever 
since the party became part of the coalition government? Overall, how has the manner in 
which the Independent Greeks have utilized social media changed today, as compared to 
when the party was not in government (in 2012-2014)? 
10. How would you gauge the stance of conventional media outlets towards your party 
during its tenure as part of the coalition government of Greece? 
11. How do the Independent Greeks plan to utilize social and new media in the next 
elections? What differences might be implemented compared to previous electoral 
contests? 
12. The Independent Greeks initially developed a reputation as the “party of Facebook”—as 
a political party that was born out of social media. Do you believe that this 
characterization is still applicable to your party in terms of how it operates today? 
13. How did the party’s early beginnings on social media, particularly Facebook, shape its 
political and policy platform? 
14. Does the party still engage in interactive communication with the public via social and 
new media? What are some examples? 
15. How do individual MPs and members of the party (such as party leader Panos 
Kammenos) utilize social and new media outlets today? Has anything changed in terms 
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of how they utilize social and new media tools, compared to when the party was not in 
government? 
16. Are there guidelines which the party has implemented in terms of how its elected officials 
can or cannot use social and new media? 
17. What differences may exist in terms of how the Independent Greeks utilize social and 
new media, as compared to your majority partner in the coalition government, SYRIZA? 
18. How many people are part of the party’s social and new media efforts? Is there a 
dedicated social and new media team? 
19. Overall, what do you believe the impact of social and new media is in Greece’s 
public/political sphere and public discourse today? Do you believe that there have been 
changes in the Greek public sphere in the past two years (since January 2015) as 
compared to the previous period, as a result of the impact of social and new media? 
20. Do you believe that a majority of the Greek public now relies upon social and new 
(online) media in order to receive news and information? 
21. How were social and new media utilized by the Independent Greeks in the two national 
electoral contests of 2015 (in January and September)? 
22. What was the contribution of your party’s social and new media efforts in helping to get 
the party elected into parliament and invited to form a coalition government with 
SYRIZA? 
23. How have the Independent Greeks utilized social media during the time that they have 
been a minority partner in the coalition government of Greece? Has the party changed or 
altered the manner in which it uses social media, now that it is a part of the national 
government? 
24. Looking to the future, how do you foresee social media and new media in your 




1. What is your specific role and involvement in Radiobubble today? 
2. In general, how would you say that the public sphere has evolved in Greece over the past 
few years, and in the midst of the economic crisis? 
3. What do you believe Radiobubble’s contribution to the Greek public sphere today is, and 
how does your usage of social and new media bolster this contribution? 
4. There has long been a perception that civil society in Greece was not as developed as in 
other Western societies. Do you believe that this has changed and that civil society has 
developed in recent years in Greece? If it has been improving, is it as a result of the 
economic crisis? 
5. Numerous civil society initiatives, such as Tutorpool and Hackacademy, were borne out 
of Radiobubble in recent years. Are these initiatives still active? Have new initiatives 
developed? 
6. How would you gauge Radiobubble’s contribution to Greek civil society today? 
7. In general, how would you say that the public sphere has evolved in Greece over the past 
few years, and in the midst of the economic crisis? 
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8. From what I understand, Radiobubble has experienced some difficulties in the recent 
period. What has changed in the manner in which the radio station now operates and is 
organized? 
9. Has there been a shift in emphasis away from the usage of social media on the part of 
Radiobubble, and if so, why is this the case? 
10. Has there been a reduction in news production on the part of Radiobubble, and if so, why 
is this the case? 
11. Does Twitter remain the primary social medium that is utilized by Radiobubble today? 
12. What types of content does Radiobubble upload and publish via online and social media 
platforms, and has anything changed in recent years? 
13. Does Radiobubble still represent an example of citizens’ journalism in your view? 
14. Radiobubble is now officially registered as a collective. Has anything changed in terms of 
the organizational structure of Radiobubble or its operations as a result? 
15. Radiobubble’s physical space has changed in recent years, from the café that it used to 
occupy, to a space that is not as publicly accessible. How has this change impacted 
Radiobubble, its operations, and its visibility to the public?  
16. Initially, Radiobubble gained popularity during the 2010-2012 time period, in part due to 
its Twitter feed. How does Radiobubble cover important news items and protests, and 
how have the recent electoral contests been covered? How did this coverage differ 
compared to other media outlets? 
17. There has arguably been a decline in protest activity in Greece in recent years. To what 
factors do you attribute this decline? 
18. How has Radiobubble reported on other hot-button or controversial issues in Greece in 
recent years, such as the migrant crisis, and how has this coverage differed, in your view, 
from the coverage provided by mainstream media outlets? 
19. Does Radiobubble still translate its Greek news content into other languages? 
20. Could you provide metrics as to how many people listen to the station, visit the website, 
and follow Radiobubble via different platforms? 
21. How does Radiobubble utilize Twitter hashtags in its news reporting and social media 
efforts today? From what I understand, aside from #rbnews, there is now a new hashtag 
that is in use by your station, #antireport. 
22. When did this separation between the two hashtags occur? 
23. Are there specific guidelines which Radiobubble maintains, for the proper usage of each 
hashtag? 
24. What are the differences in which different social mediums, such as Facebook as 
compared to Twitter, are used by Radiobubble? 
25. Are other social media tools used by Radiobubble, other than Twitter and Facebook? 
26. How many individuals are involved, in total, in Radiobubble’s efforts and operations 
today? How many individuals are specifically involved with Radiobubble’s news team? 
Has this number changed since the 2012-13 time period? 







1. Which social media and new media tools does Skai Media Group utilize today? Have 
there been any changes since the 2012-2014 time period? 
2. Which social media and new media tools are utilized the most/least by Skai Media 
Group, and are there differences in how each medium is used? (For example, how might 
Facebook be used differently from Twitter?) 
3. How do social and new media contribute to Skai Media Group’s overall communications 
strategy? 
4. Does Skai Media Group engage in interactive communication with the public via social 
and new media? (e.g. via comments, polls, hashtags, etc.) 
5. How do Skai Media Group’s specific media outlets (e.g. Skai TV, Skai Radio, Melodia 
FM, Sport FM, etc.) utilize social and new media in their own way? 
6. How many people are involved in Skai’s social and new media efforts? 
7. How do individual television or radio programs or personalities within the Skai Media 
Group utilize social and new media? 
8. How do Skai Media Group’s social/new media/online efforts differentiate themselves 
from what Skai offers via “traditional” media (e.g. television, radio, print)? 
9. Do you believe that a majority of the Greek public now relies upon social and new 
(online) media in order to receive news and information? 
10. Do you believe that the Greek “traditional” media (e.g. television, radio, print) are 
suffering from a credibility crisis, on the part of the general public? If so, what is Skai 
Media Group attempting to do to combat this credibility crisis and how does social/new 
media contribute to these efforts? 
11. Does Skai Media Group view the overall social/new media sphere (including, for 
instance, online news portals, blogs, citizen journalism, online radio, etc.) as 
“competition” to its own media outlets and its own social/new media presence? 
12. What do you believe is your organization’s/entity’s contribution to the Greek public 
sphere? How does your usage of social media and online media tools bolster this 
contribution? 
13. Skai Media Group is also involved in social responsibility initiatives such as “Oloi Mazi 
Mboroume.” In what way do you believe these social responsibility initiatives contribute 
to Greek civil society, and how do social and new media contribute to these efforts? 
14. Looking to the future, how do you foresee social media and new media in your 
organizational efforts? 
15. Overall, what role do you believe that social and new media play in terms of contributing 




















Chief editors of 
major 
newspapers64 
10 14 71.43% Editors 
Members of the 
European 
Parliament65 
7 21 33.33% Euro MPs 
Representatives 
of civil society 
organizations66 
6 51 11.76% Civil Society 
TOTALS 23 86 26.74% 
The above 
codes are used 






 Conducted online via the Limesurvey platform. 
 Survey period: December 1, 2014 – March 15, 2015 
 
                                               
64 Official circulation figures from the week of September 1-7, 2014 were used, including the six highest-circulating 
daily afternoon newspapers, the highest-circulating daily morning newspaper, the four highest-circulating Sunday-
only newspapers, and the highest-circulating weekly newspaper. In addition, daily broadsheet Kathimerini was also 
included in the sample, even though its circulation figures (which are comparable to the country’s most popular 
newspapers) were, until May 2017, were not included in the figures provided by the official “Europe” Greek press 
distribution agency, but only published in Sunday editions of Kathimerini. Tabloid newspaper Espresso, despite 
relatively high circulation figures, was not included, due to its focus on celebrity and lifestyle news. Circulation data 
can be found at http://content-mcdn.feed.gr/pegasus/Multimedia/pdf/PDP_20140901.pdf and http://content-
mcdn.feed.gr/pegasus/Multimedia/pdf/PWP_201436.pdf. 
65 Official results of the 2014 European parliamentary election in Greece are available at http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/may2014/e/public/index.html#{"cls":"main","params":{}}. 
66 The selection of organizations comprising this sample consisted of all relevant organizations which could be 
located in the two randomly selected Greek prefectures outside of the Attica (Athens) region, Korinthia and Evia, 
via the enallaktikos.gr, which following an investigation into various online catalogs, was found to offer the most 




A1: What is your age? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Male 45.8 52.0 38.0 45.44 
Female 50.0 45.7 42.5 46.00 
AVERAGE 46.7 49.3 39.5 45.61 
1st quartile (Q1): 28. 2nd quartile (Median): 46. 3rd quartile (Q3): 53. Maximum: 63. 
 
A2: State your gender 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Male 8 (80.0%) 4 (57.1%) 4 (66.7%) 16 (69.57%) 
Female 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (33.3%) 7 (30.43%) 
 
B. POLITICAL PREFERENCE 
 
B1: Which political party did you support/vote for in this year’s European parliamentary 
Elections? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 7 (30.43%) 
New Democracy - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
KKE 2 (20.0%) - - 2 (8.70%) 
Golden Dawn - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
Elia (PASOK) - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
To Potami 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
Other (EPAM) - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
Indepenedent 
Greeks 
- - - 0 (0.00%) 
DIMAR - - - 0 (0.00%) 
None - - 2 (33.3%) 2 (8.70%) 












B2: Which political party did you support/vote for in this year’s local and municipal 
elections in Greece? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 
Elia (PASOK) 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (13.04%) 
Independent 
candidate 
- 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
Golden Dawn - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
New Democracy - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
KKE 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
Other 
(ANTARSYA) 
- - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
To Potami - - - 0 (0.00%) 
None 1 (10.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 3 (13.04%) 
No answer 4 (40.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
B3: Which party did you vote for in the 2009 European parliamentary elections? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 2 (20.0%) - 3 (50.0%) 5 (21.74%) 
New Democracy - 3 (42.9%) - 3 (13.04%) 
PASOK 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (13.04%) 
Golden Dawn - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
KKE 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
None 1 (10.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 3 (13.04%) 
No answer 4 (40.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
B4: Which party did you vote for in the 2010 local/municipal elections in Greece? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 1 (10.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 3 (13.04%) 
New Democracy - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
PASOK 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
KKE 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
Golden Dawn - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
Independent 
candidate 
1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
DIMAR 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
None 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 




B5: Which party did you vote for in the national parliamentary elections of May 2012? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 3 (30%) 1 (14.3%) 3 (50.0%) 7 (30.43%) 
Elia (PASOK) 1 (10%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
Golden Dawn - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
New Democracy - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
KKE 1 (10%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
DIMAR 1 (10%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
Other (EPAM) - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
Other (LAOS) - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
None - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
No answer 4 (40%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
B6: Which party did you vote for in the national parliamentary elections of June 2012? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 3 (30%)  2 (33.3%) 5 (21.74%) 
New Democracy - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
Elia (PASOK) 1 (10%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
Golden Dawn - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
KKE 1 (10%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
DIMAR 1 (10%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
Other (EPAM)* - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
Other (LAOS) - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
Did not vote - - 2 (33.3%) 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 4 (40%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 


















C. PERSONAL USAGE OF SOCIAL AND NEW MEDIA TOOLS 
 
C1: Do you use any social media tools? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 8 (80.0%) 7 (100.0%) 5 (83.3%) 20 (86.96%) 
No - - - - 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
 
C2: Which social media tools do you use at least once per week? (select all that are 
applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Facebook 8 (80.0%) 7 (100.0%) 6 (100.0%) 21 (91.30%) 
Twitter 9 (90.0%) 4 (58.6%) 3 (50.0%) 16 (69.57%) 
YouTube 5 (50.0%) 4 (58.6%) 4 (66.7%) 13 (56.52%) 
Blogs 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) 3 (50.0%) 9 (39.13%) 
LinkedIn 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 7 (30.43%) 
Google+ 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (26.09%) 
Pinterest 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
Instagram 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
None 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
 
C3: Which social media tool do you use the most? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Facebook 4 (40.0%) 5 (71.4%) 4 (66.7%) 13 (56.52%) 
Twitter 4 (40.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 5 (21.74%) 
Blogs 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 
LinkedIn - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
 
C4: Do you use social media for getting news and information? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 9 (90.0%) 6 (85.7%) 4 (66.7%) 19 (82.61%) 
No 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 








C5: Do you use social media for writing or commenting on political, economic, or social 
issues? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 7 (70.0%) 6 (85.7%) 3 (50.0%) 16 (69.57%) 
No 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 
 
C6: ONLY If you answered yes for the previous question: which social media outlet do you 
use the most for the purposes of writing or commenting on political, economic, or social 
issues? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Facebook 4 (40.0%) 5 (71.4%) 3 (50.0%) 12 (52.17%) 
Twitter 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (13.04%) 
Blogs 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
C7: Have you ever used a social media tool to communicate with a mainstream media 
outlet, such as a newspaper, television station, or radio station? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (33.3%) 8 (34.78%) 
No 5 (50.0%) 4 (58.6%) 1 (16.7%) 10 (43.48%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 3 (50.0%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
C8: Have you used a social media tool to communicate with a politician, political party, or 
political candidate? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 4 (40.0%) 3 (42.9%) 3 (50.0%) 10 (43.48%) 
No 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 7 (30.43%) 
No answer 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
C9: What media outlets do you use for the purposes of getting news and information? 
(rank from most to least utilized) 
 
Rank 1: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Internet 6 (60.0%) 6 (85.7%) 4 (80.0%) 16 (72.73%) 
Newspapers 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (20.0%) 4 (18.18%) 
Television 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.55%) 
Radio 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.55%) 
No response - - 1 1 
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Rank 2: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Newspapers 3 (30.0%) 4 (42.9%) 1 (25.0%) 8 (38.10%) 
Television 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 5 (23.81%) 
Internet 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
Radio 1 (10.0%) - 1 (25.0%) 2 (9.52%) 
None - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (4.76%) 
 
Rank 3: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Newspapers 4 (44.4%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (31.58%) 
Television 4 (44.4%) 1 (16.7%) - 5 (26.32%) 
Radio - 2 (33.3%) 2 (50.0%) 4 (21.05%) 
Magazines - 2 (33.3%) 1 (25.0%) 3 (15.79%) 
Internet 1 (11.1%) - - 1 (5.26%) 
No response 1 1 2 4 
 
Rank 4: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Radio 3 (42.9%) 3 (50.0%) - 6 (37.50%) 
Magazines 3 (42.9%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (66.7%) 6 (37.50%) 
Television 1 (14.3%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (12.50%) 
Newspapers - 1 (14.3%) 1 (33.3%) 2 (12.50%) 
No response 3 1 3 7 
 
Rank 5: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Magazines 3 (50.0%) 3 (60.0%) - 6 (46.15%) 
Radio 3 (50.0%) - 1 (50.0%) 4 (30.77%) 
Television - 2 (40.0%) 1 (50.0%) 3 (23.08%) 
No response 4 2 4 10 
 
C10: Which of the following “non-traditional” media outlets do you use for the purposes of 
getting news and information? (select all that are applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Alternative print 
media 
4 (40.0%) 3 (42.9%) 5 (83.3%) 12 (52.17%) 
Internet radio 2 (20.0%) 4 (57.1%) 5 (83.3%) 11 (47.83%) 
Internet (web) TV 1 (10.0%) 4 (57.1%) 2 (33.3%) 7 (30.43%) 
Pirate radio - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
None 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 5 (21.74%) 
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C11: Do you follow the social media accounts of any politician or political candidate? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 5 (50.0%) 3 (42.9%) - 8 (34.78%) 
No 1 (10.0%) 3 (42.9%) 5 (83.3%) 9 (39.13%) 
No answer 4 (40.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
C12: If you answered yes to the previous question: which politician(s) or candidate(s) do 
you follow for any reason? (name up to 5) 
 
Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Alexis Tsipras (4) 
Evaggelos Venizelos (3) 
Adonis Georgiadis (2) 













No answers provided by 
6 respondents, one 
respondent listed two 
political parties instead 
of politicians/candidates 
None entered Alexis Tsipras (4) 
Evaggelos Venizelos (3) 
Adonis Georgiadis (2) 
Panos Kammenos (2) 






European People’s Party 
No answers provided by 
18 respondents in total. 
 
C13: Do you follow the social media accounts of any political parties? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 6 (60.0%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (16.7%) 11 (47.83%) 
No 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (33.3%) 7 (30.43%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 3 (50.0%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
C14: Which party/parties do you follow? (select all that are applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 5 (45.45%) 
New Democracy 4 (40.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 5 (45.45%) 
Elia (PASOK) 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (27.27%) 
To Potami 3 (30.0%) - - 3 (27.27%) 
DIMAR 3 (42.9%) - - 3 (27.27%) 
KKE 2 (20.0%) - - 2 (18.18%) 
Golden Dawn 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (18.18%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
1 (10.0%) - - 1 (9.09%) 
Other 
(ANTARSYA) 
- - 1 (16.7%) 1 (9.09%) 
 488 
D. TRUSTWORTHINESS AND PREVALENCE OF THE MASS MEDIA 
 
D1: Do you believe that social and new media have contributed to a decline in popularity of 
the mainstream media (newspapers, television stations, radio stations) in Greece? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 9 (90.0%) 6 (85.7%) 5 (83.3%) 20 (86.96%) 
No - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
No answer 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
 
D2: How would you evaluate the impact of social and new media in the decline in 
popularity of the mainstream media? (1 = small impact, 5 = large impact) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 2 (22.2%) - - 2 (9.52%) 
3 2 (22.2%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (20.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
4 5 (55.6%) 4 (57.1%) - 9 (42.86%) 
5 - 1 (14.3%) 4 (80.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 3.33 3.86 4.60 3.81 
Median 4 4 5 4 
Mode 4 4 5 4 
 
D3: How do you evaluate the trustworthiness of each of the following types of media in 
Greece? (1 = not credible, 5 = very credible) 
 
Television: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (10.0%) 4 (66.7%) 5 (83.3%) 10 (45.45%) 
2 6 (60.0%) - - 6 (27.27%) 
3 2 (20.0%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (18.18%) 
4 1 (10.0%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (9.09%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer - 1 - 1 (4.35%) 
Mean 2.30 1.83 1.33 1.91 
Median 2 1 1 2 








 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - 1 (16.7%) 2 (33.3%) 3 (13.64%) 
2 1 (10.0%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (33.3%) 4 (18.18%) 
3 5 (50.0%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (33.3%) 9 (40.91%) 
4 4 (40.0%) 2 (33.3%) - 6 (27.27%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer - 1 - 1 (4.35%) 
Mean 3.30 2.83 2.00 2.82 
Median 3 3 2 3 
Mode 3 3, 4 1, 2, 3 3 
 
Newspapers: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - 1 (16.7%) 4 (66.7%) 5 (22.73%) 
2 1 (10.0%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (18.18%) 
3 6 (60.0%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 8 (36.36%) 
4 - 2 (33.3%) - 2 (9.09%) 
5 3 (30.0%) - - 3 (13.64%) 
No answer - 1 - 1 (4.35%) 
Mean 3.50 2.33 1.50 2.73 
Median 3 2.5 1 3 
Mode 3 2, 4 1 3 
 
Magazines: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - 1 (16.7%) 4 (80.0%) 5 (25.00%) 
2 1 (10.0%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (20.0%) 4 (20.00%) 
3 6 (60.0%) 3 (50.0%) - 9 (45.00%) 
4 2 (20.0%) - - 2 (10.00%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 1 1 1 3 (13.04%) 
Mean 3.10 2.33 1.20 2.40 
Median 3 2.5 1 3 












 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
2 4 (40.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 8 (34.78%) 
3 4 (40.0%) 1 (14.3%) 3 (50.0%) 8 (34.78%) 
4 1 (10.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 5 (21.74%) 
5 - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
Mean 2.50 3.14 3.17 2.87 
Median 2 3 3 3 
Mode 2, 3 2 3 2, 3 
 
D4: Do you believe that mainstream media in Greece are suffering from a credibility crisis? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 9 (90.0%) 5 (71.4%) 6 (100.0%) 20 (86.96%) 
No 1 (10.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 3 (13.04%) 
 
D4A: ONLY if you answered yes to the previous question: to what extent is the mainstream 
media in Greece suffering from a credibility crisis? (1 = very little, 5 = very much) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (5.00%) 
3 1 (11.1%) 1 (20.0%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (15.00%) 
4 6 (66.7%) 2 (40.0%) 2 (33.3%) 10 (50.00%) 
5 2 (22.2%) 2 (40.0%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (30.00%) 
No answer 1 2 - 3 (13.04%) 
Mean 4.11 4.20 3.83 4.05 
Median 4 4 4 4 
Mode 4 4, 5 4, 5 4 
 
D5: In your opinion, do you believe that the internet is considered to be a more credible 
source of news and information for the majority of people in Greece? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 4 (40.0%) 4 (57.1%) 2 (33.3%) 10 (43.48%) 
No 5 (50.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 8 (34.78%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 





D6: Do you believe that the internet is now used more often than the mainstream media as 
a source of news and information by the majority of people in Greece? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 6 (60.0%) 5 (71.4%) 2 (33.3%) 13 (56.52%) 
No 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 3 (13.04%) 
No answer - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
 
D7: What percentage of news consumed by the average Greek citizen comes from online 
sources, in your opinion?  
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Mean 40.71% 50.83% 44.40% 45.11% 
No response 3 1 1 5 
Standard 
deviation 
   23.95 
Minimum 15 30 2 2 
1st quartile (Q1)    27.5 
2nd quartile 
(median) 
   42.5 
3rd quartile (Q3)    62.5 
Maximum 80 70 90 90 
 
D8: Do you believe that the mainstream media in Greece is biased in favor of certain 
political parties? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 9 (90.0%) 4 (57.1%) 4 (66.7%) 17 (73.91%) 
No - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know - 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
 
D9: Do you believe that the mainstream media in Greece are biased against certain political 
parties? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 9 (90.0%) 4 (57.1%) 4 (66.7%) 17 (73.91%) 
No - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know - 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 





D10: Which political parties do you believe that the mainstream media are biased in favor 
of at this time? (select all that are applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
New Democracy 7 (70.0%) 4 (57.1%) 4 (66.7%) 15 (65.22%) 
Elia (PASOK) 7 (70.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (33.3%) 12 (52.17%) 
To Potami 6 (60.0%) 3 (42.9%) 3 (50.0%) 12 (52.17%) 
SYRIZA 5 (50.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 9 (39.13%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
2 (20.0%) 1 (16.7%) - 3 (13.04%) 
KKE 2 (20.0%) 1 (16.7%) - 3 (13.04%) 
Golden Dawn 1 (10.0%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
None - 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
 
D11: Which political parties do you believe that the mainstream media are biased against at 
this time? (select all that are applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 5 (50.0%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (50.0%) 9 (39.13%) 
Golden Dawn 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) - 5 (21.74%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
3 (30.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 
KKE 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
DIMAR 2 (20.0%) - - 2 (8.70%) 
New Democracy 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
Other (EPAM) - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
None - 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 3 (13.04%) 
 
D12: Which political party or parties do you believe enjoy the most support amongst the 
users of social media in Greece? (select all that are applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 6 (60.0%) 4 (57.1%) 4 (66.7%) 14 (60.87%) 
Golden Dawn 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (33.3%) 8 (34.78%) 
To Potami 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 7 (30.43%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 
New Democracy 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 




1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
None 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
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D13: Do you believe that the discourse which takes place on social media is biased against 
any particular political parties? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 8 (80.0%) 4 (57.1%) 3 (50.0%) 15 (65.22%) 
No - 3 (42.9%) - 3 (13.04%) 
I don’t know - - 2 (33.3%) 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
 
D14: Which political party or parties do you believe have seen the biggest decline in 
support as a result of the coverage it has received on the social/new media? (select all that 
are applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
New Democracy 6 (60.0%) 4 (57.1%) 3 (50.0%) 13 (56.52%) 
Elia (PASOK) 4 (40.0%) 4 (57.1%) 3 (50.0%) 11 (47.83%) 
DIMAR 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 5 (21.74%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (13.04%) 
KKE - 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 3 (13.04%) 
Golden Dawn 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
To Potami - 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
None 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
 
D15: Do you believe that Facebook users in Greece are biased towards any one particular 
political party out of the following? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 7 (30.43%) 
Golden Dawn 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
New Democracy - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
To Potami - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
None 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
I don’t know 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 







D16: Do you believe that Twitter users in Greece are biased towards any one particular 
political party out of the following? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 7 (30.43%) 
Golden Dawn - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
None 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
I don’t know 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (33.3%) 8 (34.78%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 
 
D17: Which age group do you believe is most reliant upon the internet and social media for 
news and information? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
18-24 1 (10.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 3 (13.04%) 
25-34 7 (70.0%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (16.7%) 12 (52.17%) 
35-44 1 (10.0%) - 4 (66.7%) 5 (21.74%) 
45-54 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
55-64 - - - - 
65+ - - - - 
No answer - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
 
D18: Which age group do you believe is most reliant upon mainstream media for news and 
information? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
18-24 - - - - 
25-34 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
35-44 - - - - 
45-54 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
55-64 6 (60.0%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (16.7%) 11 (47.83%) 
65+ 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) 4 (66.7%) 9 (39.13%) 









D19: How would you rate the overall quality of the online and social media presence of the 
mainstream media outlets in Greece? (1 = very low quality, 5 = very high quality) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 2 (9.52%) 
2 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (50.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
3 7 (70.0%) 4 (57.1%) - 11 (52.38%) 
4 - 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 2 (9.52%) 
5 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.76%) 
No answer - - 2 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 3.33 2.71 2.25 2.90 
Median 3 3 2 3 
Mode 3 3 2 3 
 
D20: How would you rate the level of integration of new media tools by Greece’s 
mainstream media outlets? (1 = not at all integrated, 5 = very well integrated) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (10.0%) - 1 (20.0%) 2 (9.09%) 
2 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (20.0%) 5 (22.73%) 
3 4 (40.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (20.0%) 8 (36.36%) 
4 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (40.0%) 6 (27.27%) 
5 - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.55%) 
No answer - - 1 1 (4.35%) 
Mean 2.70 3.43 2.80 2.95 
Median 3 3 3 3 
Mode 3 3 4 3 
 
D21: Do you believe that Greece’s mainstream media has, in general, reacted positively or 
negatively to the growth in popularity of social media and new media? (1 = very negatively, 
5 = very positively) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - 2 (50.0%) 2 (9.52%) 
2 4 (40.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (28.57%) 
3 4 (40.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (25.0%) 8 (38.10%) 
4 1 (10.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 3 (14.29%) 
5 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (9.52%) 
No answer - - 2 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 2.90 3.43 1.75 2.86 
Median 2.5 3 1.5 3 
Mode 2, 3 3 1 3 
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D22: Do you believe that the social and new media presence of Greece’s mainstream media 
outlets has made those outlets more credible than they were previously? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%) - 5 (21.74%) 
No 6 (66.7%) 3 (42.9%) 3 (50.0%) 12 (52.17%) 
I don’t know - 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 
No answer 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
 
D23: How would you rank the overall fluency of journalists at Greece’s mainstream media 
outlets, with new and social media tools? (1 = very poor, 5 = excellent) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - 2 (50.0%) 2 (10.53%) 
2 3 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) - 4 (21.05%) 
3 5 (55.6%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (50.0%) 9 (47.37%) 
4 1 (11.1%) 3 (50.0%) - 4 (21.05%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 1 1 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 2.78 3.33 2.00 2.79 
Median 3 3.5 2 3 
Mode 3 4 1, 3 3 
 
D24A: Overall, how would you characterize the impact of social media on the quality of 
journalism in Greece, from all sources? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 2 (22.2%) - 1 (33.3%) 3 (15.79%) 
3 2 (22.2%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (33.3%) 6 (31.58%) 
4 2 (22.2%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (33.3%) 6 (31.58%) 
5 3 (33.3%) 1 (14.3%) - 4 (21.05%) 
No answer 1 - 3 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 3.67 3.71 3.00 3.58 
Median 3.5 4 3 3.5 








D24B: Overall, how would you characterize the impact of social media on the quality of 
journalism in Greece, from all sources? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (6.67%) 
2 3 (50.0%) - - 3 (20.00%) 
3 1 (16.7%) 4 (66.7%) 3 (100.0%) 8 (53.33%) 
4 2 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) - 3 (20.00%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 4 1 3 8 
Mean 2.83 2.83 3.00 2.87 
Median 2.5 3 3 3 
Mode 2 3 3 3 
 
D25: Do you believe that the mainstream media in Greece, through the manner in which 
they cover and report the news, have led people to search for alternative sources of news 
and information on the internet? (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (11.1%) - - 1 (4.76%) 
2 - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.76%) 
3 2 (22.2%) - - 2 (9.52%) 
4 1 (11.1%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (40.0%) 6 (28.57%) 
5 5 (55.6%) 3 (42.9%) 3 (60.0%) 11 (52.38%) 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 4.00 4.14 4.60 4.19 
Median 5 4 5 5 

















D26: Name three online-only Greek media outlets that first come to mind (only list outlets 
which operate exclusively online) 
 




































































No answers provided by 
9 respondents 
















E. IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND NEW MEDIA ON POLITICS 
 
E1: According to your own perception, to what extent have social media tools such as 
Facebook and Twitter been implemented and used by Greek politicians and political 
parties in their daily operations? (1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 - - - - 
3 3 (37.5%) 2 (28.6%) 3 (60.0%) 8 (40.00%) 
4 4 (50.0%) 5 (71.4%) 2 (40.0%) 11 (55.00%) 
5 1 (12.5%) - - 1 (5.00%) 
No answer 2 - 1 3 (13.04%) 
Mean 3.75 3.71 3.40 3.65 
Median 4 4 3 4 
Mode 4 4 3 4 
 
E2: Order the following social media platforms according to how commonly you believe 
they are used by politicians in Greece (rank only from 1-3, with 1 being the most popular, 2 
being second most popular, and 3 being third-most popular) 
 
Rank 1: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Facebook 4 (44.4%) 4 (57.1%) 2 (50.0%) 10 (50.00%) 
Twitter 5 (55.6%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (50.0%) 9 (45.00%) 
Blogs - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (5.00%) 
No answer 1 - 2 3 
 
Rank 2: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Facebook 5 (55.6%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (50.0%) 9 (45.00%) 
Twitter 1 (11.1%) 3 (43.9%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (25.00%) 
YouTube 2 (22.2%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (15.00%) 
Blogs 1 (11.1%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 3 (15.00%) 
No answer 1 - 2 3 
 
Rank 3: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
YouTube 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (29.41%) 
Twitter 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 4 (23.53%) 
Blogs - 2 (33.3%) 1 (25.0%) 3 (17.65%) 
Google+ 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (11.76%) 
LinkedIn - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (5.88%) 
Facebook - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (5.88%) 
Instagram 1 (14.3%) - - 1 (5.88%) 
No answer 3 1 2 6 
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E3: Overall, do you believe that the Greek government has a positive or a negative view of 
the internet, new media, and social media? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (11.1%) - 2 (40.0%) 3 (15.00%) 
2 1 (11.1%) - - 1 (5.00%) 
3 5 (55.6%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (40.0%) 8 (40.00%) 
4 1 (11.1%) 4 (66.7%) 1 (20.0%) 6 (30.00%) 
5 1 (11.1%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (10.00%) 
No answer 1 1 1 3 (13.04%) 
Mean 3.00 4.00 1.75 3.15 
Median 3 4 3 3 
Mode 3 4 1, 3 3 
 
E4: Overall, do you believe that the Greek government has a positive or a negative view of 
bloggers? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (12.5%) - 3 (60.0%) 4 (21.05%) 
2 6 (75.0%) - 2 (40.0%) 8 (42.11%) 
3 1 (12.5%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (10.53%) 
4 - 4 (66.7%) - 4 (21.05%) 
5 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (5.26%) 
No answer 2 1 1 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 2.00 4.00 1.75 2.47 
Median 2 4 1 2 
Mode 2 4 1 2 
 
E5A: Overall, how would you rank the influence of new media and social media on the 
quality of governance in Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (5.00%) 
2 4 (44.4%) - - 4 (20.00%) 
3 3 (33.3%) 5 (71.4%) 2 (50.0%) 10 (50.00%) 
4 2 (22.2%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (25.00%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 1 - 2 3 (13.04%) 
Mean 2.78 3.29 2.75 2.95 
Median 3 3 3 3 




E5B: Overall, how would you rank the influence of new media and social media on the 
quality of governance in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (16.7%) - 1 (25.0%) 2 (13.33%) 
2 2 (33.3%) 1 (20.0%) - 3 (20.00%) 
3 3 (50.0%) 2 (40.0%) 2 (50.0%) 7 (46.67%) 
4 - 1 (20.0%) 1 (25.0%) 2 (13.33%) 
5 - 1 (20.0%) - 1 (6.67%) 
No answer 4 2 2 8 (34.78%) 
Mean 2.33 3.40 2.75 2.80 
Median 2.5 3 3 3 
Mode 3 3 3 3 
 
E6A: Overall, how would you rank the impact of new and social media on government 
transparency in Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (5.26%) 
2 - 2 (28.6%) 1 (25.0%) 3 (15.79%) 
3 3 (37.5%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (31.58%) 
4 5 (62.5%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 7 (36.84%) 
5 - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (10.53%) 
No answer 2 - 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 3.63 3.43 2.50 3.32 
Median 4 3 2.5 3 
Mode 4 2, 3, 5 1, 2, 3, 4 4 
 
E6B: Overall, how would you rank the impact of new and social media on government 
transparency in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (6.67%) 
2 - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (6.67%) 
3 4 (66.7%) 3 (60.0%) 1 (25.0%) 8 (53.33%) 
4 2 (33.3%) 1 (20.0%) 1 (25.0%) 4 (26.67%) 
5 - 1 (20.0%) - 1 (6.67%) 
No answer 4 2 2 8 (34.78%) 
Mean 3.33 3.60 2.50 3.20 
Median 3 3 2.5 3 




E7: Overall, how would you rank the impact of new and social media on the transparency 
of Greece's political parties? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (12.5%) - 1 (25.0%) 2 (10.53%) 
2 - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (5.26%) 
3 5 (62.5%) 4 (57.1%) 2 (50.0%) 11 (57.89%) 
4 2 (25.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 4 (21.05%) 
5 - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (5.26%) 
No answer 2 - 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 3.00 3.57 2.25 3.05 
Median 3 3 2.5 3 
Mode 3 3 3 3 
 
E8: How would you evaluate the overall impact of new and social media in influencing the 
electoral results of the parliamentary elections of 2012? (1 = no influence, 5 = extremely 
significant influence) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 4 (44.4%) 1 (14.3%) - 5 (23.81%) 
3 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%) 5 (100.0%) 10 (47.62%) 
4 2 (22.2%) 3 (42.9%) - 5 (23.81%) 
5 - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.76%) 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 2.78 3.57 3.00 3.10 
Median 3 4 3 3 
Mode 2 4 3 3 
 
E9: Which political party or parties do you believe have benefited the most from new 
media and social media? (select all that are applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 7 (70.0%) 5 (71.4%) 3 (50.0%) 15 (65.22%) 
To Potami 6 (60.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 9 (39.13%) 
Golden Dawn 4 (40.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 8 (34.78%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
4 (40.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
New Democracy 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
DIMAR 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 




1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 
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E10: Which political party or parties do you believe benefited the most from new media 
and social media prior to the parliamentary elections of May 2012? (select all that are 
applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 5 (50.0%) 5 (71.4%) 1 (16.7%) 11 (47.83%) 
Golden Dawn 4 (40.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 8 (34.78%) 
New Democracy 3 (30.0%) 4 (57.1%) - 7 (30.43%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
3 (30.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 5 (21.74%) 
Elia (PASOK) 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (13.04%) 
DIMAR 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
Other (EPAM) 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
None - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 
 
E11: Which political party or parties do you believe benefited the most from new media 
and social media prior to the parliamentary elections of June 2012? (select all that are 
applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 6 (60.0%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (16.7%) 11 (47.83%) 
Golden Dawn 4 (40.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 8 (34.78%) 
New Democracy 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) - 6 (26.09%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
2 (20.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 
DIMAR 2 (20.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
Elia (PASOK) 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
Other (EPAM)* 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 3 (50.0%) 5 (21.74%) 















E12: Which political party or parties do you believe have benefited the least from new 
media and social media? (select all that are applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
KKE 7 (70.0%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (16.7%) 12 (52.17%) 
New Democracy 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
Elia (PASOK) 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
DIMAR 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 4 (17.39%) 
Golden Dawn 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (13.04%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
- 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
SYRIZA - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
To Potami - 1 (14.3%)  1 (4.35%) 
Other (EPAM) - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
E13: Which political party or parties do you believe have benefited the least from new 
media and social media prior to the parliamentary elections of May 2012? (select all that 
are applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
KKE 7 (70.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 11 (47.83%) 
Elia (PASOK) 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) - 6 (26.09%) 
New Democracy 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 5 (21.74%) 
DIMAR 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 4 (17.39%) 
Golden Dawn 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (13.04%) 
SYRIZA - 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
- 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
Other (EPAM) - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
Other (LAOS) - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 














E14: Which political party or parties do you believe benefited the least from new media 
and social media prior to the parliamentary elections of June 2012? (select all that are 
applicable) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
KKE 7 (70.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (33.3%) 12 (52.17%) 
Elia (PASOK) 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) - 6 (26.09%) 
New Democracy 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 4 (17.39%) 
DIMAR 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 4 (17.39%) 
Golden Dawn 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (13.04%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
Other (LAOS) - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 3 (42.9%) 3 (50.0%) 7 (30.43%) 
 
E15: Which political party do you believe makes the most effective use of social and new 
media in its operations? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 4 (40.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (33.3%) 9 (39.13%) 
To Potami - - 2 (33.3%) 2 (8.70%) 
Golden Dawn 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
New Democracy - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
Independent 
Greeks 




1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 
 
E16: Which political party do you believe makes the least effective use of social and new 
media in its operations? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
New Democracy 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 7 (30.43%) 
KKE 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 5 (21.74%) 
DIMAR 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
To Potami - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
Golden Dawn 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
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E17: Do you believe that the outcome of the 2012 parliamentary elections would have been 
different had social & new media not existed? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (13.04%) 
Probably Yes 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
Probably No 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (26.09%) 
No 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
No answer 3 (30.0%) - 3 (50.0%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
E18: In your opinion, how effective was the usage of social media in the campaigns of 
candidates in the 2012 parliamentary elections? (1 = very ineffective, 5 = very effective) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 4 (50.0%) 2 (33.3%) - 6 (35.29%) 
3 3 (37.5%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (66.7%) 6 (35.29%) 
4 1 (12.5%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%) 4 (23.53%) 
5 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (5.88%) 
No answer 2 1 3 6 (26.09%) 
Mean 2.63 3.33 3.33 3.00 
Median 2.5 3.5 3 3 
Mode 2 2, 4 3 2, 3 
 
E19: In your opinion, how effective was the usage of social media tools by candidates and 
political parties participating in this year’s European parliamentary elections in Greece? (1 
= very ineffective, 5 = very effective) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 1 (12.5%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (11.11%) 
3 5 (62.5%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (33.3%) 8 (44.44%) 
4 2 (25.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (66.7%) 6 (33.33%) 
5 - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (11.11%) 
No answer 2 - 3 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 3.13 3.71 3.67 3.44 
Median 3 4 4 3 






E20: In your opinion, how effective was the usage of social media tools by candidates and 
political parties participating in this year’s local and municipal elections in Greece?  
(1 = very ineffective, 5 = very effective) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 3 (37.5%) 1 (16.7%) - 4 (22.22%) 
3 5 (62.5%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (50.0%) 9 (50.00%) 
4 - 3 (50.0%) 1 (25.0%) 4 (22.22%) 
5 - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (5.56%) 
No answer 2 1 2 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 2.63 3.33 3.75 3.11 
Median 3 3.5 3.5 3 
Mode 3 4 3 3 
 
E21: In your opinion, have the internet. new media, and social media given the public the 
opportunity to find out more information about candidates in this year’s elections in 
Greece, compared to the past? (1 = not at all, 5 = very much so) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 1 (12.5%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (10.53%) 
3 2 (25.0%) - 1 (25.0%) 3 (15.79%) 
4 5 (62.5%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (25.0%) 10 (52.63%) 
5 - 2 (28.6%) 2 (50.0%) 4 (21.05%) 
No answer 2 - 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 3.50 4.00 4.25 3.84 
Median 4 4 4.5 4 
Mode 4 4 5 4 
 
E22A: How would you gauge the impact of new media and social media on the quality and 
level of campaigning for this year’s European parliamentary elections in Greece? (1 = not 
significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 2 (25.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (15.79%) 
3 3 (37.5%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (50.0%) 8 (42.11%) 
4 3 (37.5%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (50.0%) 7 (36.84%) 
5 - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (5.26%) 
No answer 2 - 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 3.13 3.43 3.50 3.32 
Median 3 3 3.5 3 
Mode 3, 4 3 3, 4 3 
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E22B: How would you gauge the impact of new media and social media on the quality and 
level of campaigning for this year’s European parliamentary elections in Greece? (1 = very 
negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (12.50%) 
3 4 (66.7%) 3 (50.0%) 2 (50.0%) 9 (56.25%) 
4 1 (16.7%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (50.0%) 5 (31.25%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 4 1 2 7 (30.43%) 
Mean 3.00 3.17 3.50 3.19 
Median 3 3 3.5 3 
Mode 3 3 3, 4 3 
 
E23A: How would you gauge the impact of new media and social media on the quality and 
level of campaigning for this year’s local and municipal elections in Greece? (1 = not 
significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 3 (37.5%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (26.32%) 
3 3 (37.5%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (25.0%) 8 (42.11%) 
4 2 (25.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (26.32%) 
5 - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (5.26%) 
No answer 2 - 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 3.38 3.14 3.50 3.11 
Median 3 3 3.5 3 
Mode 2, 3 3 2, 3, 4, 5 3 
 
E23B: How would you gauge the impact of new media and social media on the quality and 
level of campaigning for this year’s local and municipal elections in Greece? (1 = very 
negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 3 (50.0%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (37.50%) 
3 3 (50.0%) 3 (50.0%) 1 (25.0%) 7 (43.75%) 
4 - 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 2 (12.50%) 
5 - - 1 (25.0%) 1 (6.25%) 
No answer 4 1 2 7 (30.43%) 
Mean 2.50 2.83 3.50 2.88 
Median 2.50 3 3.5 3 
Mode 2, 3 3 2, 3, 4, 5 3 
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E24A: How would you gauge the impact of new media and social media on the 
transparency maintained by the political parties and candidates participating in this year’s 
European parliamentary elections in Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 2 (25.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (33.3%) 5 (27.78%) 
3 3 (37.5%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (33.3%) 5 (27.78%) 
4 3 (37.5%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (33.3%) 7 (38.89%) 
5 - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (5.56%) 
No answer 2 - 3 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 3.13 3.43 3.00 3.22 
Median 3 4 3 3 
Mode 3, 4 4 3 4 
 
E24B: How would you gauge the impact of new media and social media on the 
transparency maintained by the political parties and candidates participating in this year’s 
European parliamentary elections in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (33.3%) 3 (20.00%) 
3 3 (50.0%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%) 7 (46.67%) 
4 2 (33.3%) 2 (33.3%) - 4 (26.67%) 
5 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (6.67%) 
No answer 4 1 3 8 (34.78%) 
Mean 3.17 3.50 2.67 3.20 
Median 3 3.5 3 3 
Mode 3 3, 4 3 3 
 
E25A: How would you gauge the impact of new and social media on the transparency of 
the political parties and candidates participating in this year’s local/municipal elections in 
Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 2 (25.0%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%) 5 (29.41%) 
3 3 (37.5%) - 1 (33.3%) 4 (23.53%) 
4 3 (37.5%) 3 (50.0%) - 6 (35.29%) 
5 - 1 (16.7%) 1 (33.3%) 2 (11.76%) 
No answer 2 1 3 6 (26.09%) 
Mean 3.13 3.50 3.33 3.29 
Median 3 4 3 3 
Mode 3, 4 4 2, 3, 5 4 
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E25B: How would you gauge the impact of new and social media on the transparency of the 
political parties and candidates participating in this year’s local/municipal elections in 
Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 2 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (33.3%) 5 (31.25%) 
3 3 (50.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (66.7%) 7 (43.75%) 
4 1 (16.7%) 2 (28.6%)  - 3 (18.75%) 
5 - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (6.25%) 
No answer 4 - 3 7 (30.43%) 
Mean 2.83 3.29 2.67 3.00 
Median 3 3 3 3 
Mode 3 2, 3, 4 3 3 
 
E26: Which political party or parties do you believe benefited the most from new and social 
media in this year’s European parliamentary elections? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 7 (70.0%) 4 (57.1%) 3 (50.0%) 14 (60.87%) 
To Potami 5 (50.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 9 (39.13%) 
Golden Dawn 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 5 (21.74%) 
New Democracy 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 4 (17.39%) 
Elia (PASOK) 2 (20.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
Other (EPAM) 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
 
E27: Which political party or parties do you believe benefited the most from new and social 
media in this year’s local and municipal elections in Greece? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 7 (70.0%) 4 (57.1%) 2 (33.3%) 13 (56.52%) 
New Democracy 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 5 (21.74%) 
Golden Dawn 1 (10.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 
Elia (PASOK) 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
To Potami 2 (20.0%) - - 2 (8.70%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
None - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 




E28: Which political party do you believe was helped the most by social and new media in 
this year's European parliamentary elections? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
SYRIZA 5 (50.0%) 4 (57.1%) - 9 (39.13%) 
Golden Dawn 1 (10.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 3 (13.04%) 
To Potami - - 2 (33.3%) 2 (8.70%) 
Independent 
Greeks 
1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 3 (50.0%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
E29: Which political party do you believe was hurt the most by social and new media in 
this year’s European parliamentary elections? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
New Democracy 3 (30.0%) 3 (42.9%) - 6 (26.09%) 
KKE 2 (20.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 
Elia (PASOK) - 3 (42.9%) - 3 (13.04%) 
Golden Dawn 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
DIMAR - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
None 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 3 (50.0%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
E30: Which political party do you believe was hurt the most by social and new media in 
this year's local and municipal elections in Greece? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
New Democracy 4 (40.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 6 (26.09%) 
KKE 2 (20.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 
Elia (PASOK) - 3 (42.9%) - 3 (13.04%) 
Golden Dawn - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
None 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 3 (50.0%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
E31: Do you believe that social media and new media impacted the final outcome of this 
year's European parliamentary elections in Greece?  
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
Probably Yes 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 4 (17.39%) 
Probably No 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
No 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 3 (50.0%) 5 (21.74%) 
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E32: Do you believe that social media and new media impacted the final outcome of this 
year's local and municipal elections in Greece?  
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 3 (30.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 5 (21.74%) 
Probably Yes - 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 
Probably No 4 (40.0%) 3 (42.9%) - 7 (30.43%) 
No 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 3 (50.0%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
E33: Do you believe that the usage of new and social media tools by this year's candidates 
for all electoral contests increased compared to the level of usage prior to the 2012 
parliamentary elections?  
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 7 (70.0%) 6 (85.7%) 4 (66.7%) 17 (73.91%) 
No - - - - 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 



























F. IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND NEW MEDIA ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
F1A: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media to the public 
sphere in Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 3 (33.3%) - - 3 (14.29%) 
3 2 (22.2%) 4 (57.1%) 4 (80.0%) 10 (47.62%) 
4 4 (44.4%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (20.0%) 8 (38.10%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 3.11 3.43 3.20 3.24 
Median 3 3 3 3 
Mode 4 3 3 3 
 
F1B: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media to the public 
sphere in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 4 (66.7%) 1 (16.7%) - 5 (29.41%) 
3 2 (33.3%) 4 (57.1%) 5 (100.0%) 11 (64.71%) 
4 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (5.88%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 4 1 1 6 (26.09%) 
Mean 2.33 3.00 3.00 2.76 
Median 2 3 3 3 
Mode 2 3 3 3 
 
F2: Do you believe that new media and social media have made a positive or a negative 
contribution to the public sphere in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (11.1%) - - 1 (4.76%) 
2 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (40.0%) 7 (33.33%) 
3 3 (33.3%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (20.0%) 7 (33.33%) 
4 1 (11.1%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (40.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
5 1 (11.1%) - - 1 (4.76%) 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 2.78 3.00 3.00 2.90 
Median 3 3 3 3 
Mode 2, 3 3 2, 4 2, 3 
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F3: How would you gauge the contribution of mainstream media to the public sphere in 
Greece historically (in the post-junta period)? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - 2 (50.0%) 2 (10.53%) 
2 - 2 (33.3%) 1 (25.0%) 3 (15.79%) 
3 3 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) - 4 (21.05%) 
4 1 (11.1%) 2 (33.3%) - 3 (15.79%) 
5 5 (55.6%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 7 (36.84%) 
No answer 1 1 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 4.22 3.33 2.25 3.53 
Median 5 3.5 1.5 3 
Mode 5 2, 4 1 3 
 
F4A: How would you gauge the contribution of mainstream media to the public sphere in 
Greece today? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (11.1%) - 1 (25.0%) 2 (10.00%) 
2 1 (11.1%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (10.00%) 
3 4 (44.4%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (50.0%) 9 (45.00%) 
4 2 (22.2%) 3 (42.9%) - 5 (25.00%) 
5 1 (11.1%) - 1 (25.0%) 2 (10.00%) 
No answer 1 - 2 3 (13.04%) 
Mean 3.11 3.29 4.00 3.15 
Median 3 3 3 3 
Mode 3 3, 4 3 3 
 
F4B: How would you gauge the contribution of mainstream media to the public sphere in 
Greece today? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (25.0%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (50.0%) 4 (28.57%) 
2 2 (50.0%) 1 (16.7%) - 3 (21.43%) 
3 1 (25.0%) 3 (50.0%) 2 (50.0%) 6 (42.86%) 
4 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (7.14%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 6 1 2 9 (39.13%) 
Mean 2.00 2.67 2.00 2.29 
Median 2 3 2 2.5 




F5A: How would you gauge the level of development of public dialogue and discourse in 
Greece in the post-junta era? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 2 (22.2%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (75.0%) 6 (31.58%) 
2 - 2 (33.3%) - 2 (10.53%) 
3 4 (44.4%) 2 (33.3%) - 6 (31.58%) 
4 3 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (26.32%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 1 1 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 2.89 2.50 1.75 2.53 
Median 3 2.5 1 3 
Mode 3 2, 3 1 1, 3 
 
F5B: How would you gauge the level of development of public dialogue and discourse in 
Greece in the post-junta era? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (14.3%) 1 (20.0%) 2 (50.0%) 4 (25.00%) 
2 2 (28.6%) 1 (20.0%) - 3 (18.75%) 
3 2 (28.6%) 3 (60.0%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (37.50%) 
4 2 (28.6%) - 1 (25.0%) 3 (18.75%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 3 2 2 7 (30.43%) 
Mean 2.71 2.40 2.25 2.50 
Median 3 3 2 3 
Mode 2, 3, 4 3 1 3 
 
F6: How would you gauge the quality and level of public dialogue/discourse in Greece 
today? (1 = very poorly developed, 5 = very well developed) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 2 (22.2%) 4 (57.1%) 3 (60.0%) 9 (42.86%) 
2 7 (77.8%) - - 7 (33.33%) 
3 - 2 (28.6%) 1 (20.0%) 3 (14.29%) 
4 - 1 (14.3%) 1 (20.0%) 2 (9.52%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 1.78 2.00 2.00 1.90 
Median 2 1 1 2 




F7: Rank the following social media outlets according to their popularity in Greece, based 
on your own perception (rank the top 5 only). 
 
Rank 1: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Facebook 4 (40.0%) 6 (85.7%) 3 (75.0%) 13 (68.42%) 
Twitter 1 (10.0%) - 1 (25.0%) 2 (10.53%) 
YouTube 2 (20.0%) - - 2 (10.53%) 
Blogs 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (10.53%) 
No answer 2 - 2 4 
 
Rank 2: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Twitter 2 (20.0%) 4 (57.1%) 2 (50.0%) 8 (42.11%) 
Facebook 4 (40.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (31.58%) 
Blogs 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (15.79%) 
YouTube - 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 2 (10.53%) 
No answer 2 - 2 4 
 
Rank 3: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
YouTube 3 (30.0%) 2 (33.3%) 3 (75.0%) 8 (44.44%) 
Twitter 4 (40.0%) 2 (33.3%) - 6 (33.33%) 
Blogs - 2 (33.3%) 1 (25.0%) 3 (16.67%) 
LinkedIn 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (5.56%) 
No answer 2 1 2 5 
 
Rank 4: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Blogs 1 (10.0%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (50.0%) 4 (26.67%) 
Twitter 1 (10.0%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 3 (20.00%) 
YouTube 1 (10.0%) 2 (33.3%) - 3 (20.00%) 
Google+ 1 (10.0%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (13.33%) 
Instagram 1 (10.0%) - 1 (25.0%) 2 (13.33%) 
LinkedIn - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (6.67%) 










 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Google+ 1 (10.0%) 1 (25.0%) 1 (33.3%) 3 (25.00%) 
Instagram 3 (30.0%) - - 3 (25.00%) 
LinkedIn 1 (10.0%) 1 (25.0%) - 2 (16.67%) 
Blogs - 1 (25.0%) 1 (33.3%) 2 (16.67%) 
YouTube - 1 (25.0%) - 1 (8.33%) 
Pinterest - - 1 (33.3%) 1 (8.33%) 
 
F8: Which social media outlet do you believe is the most popular in Greece for the purposes 
of discussing political issues at the present time? (select one) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Facebook 3 (30.0%) 4 (57.1%) 2 (33.3%) 9 (39.13%) 
Twitter 4 (40.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 7 (30.43%) 
Blogs 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
I don’t know - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 3 (13.04%) 
 
F9: How would you gauge the impact of social media and new media in exposing the 
following issues to the public? (For each: 1 = no impact, 5 = very significant impact) 
 
Murder of Pavlos Fyssas   4.53 
Shutdown of ERT    4.50 
Indignants’ protest movement  4.39 
Kiling of Alexandros Grigoropoulos  4.28 
Skouries mining controversy   4.17 
Golden Dawn arrests    3.94 
Arrest of journalist Kostas Vaxevanis    3.88 
Manolada controversy   3.74 
Arrest of blogger Geron Pastitsios  3.61 
 
Killing of Alexandros Grigoropoulos: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 1 (12.5%) - - 1 (5.56%) 
3 2 (25.0%) - - 2 (11.11%) 
4 3 (37.5%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (33.33%) 
5 2 (25.0%) 4 (66.7%) 3 (75.0%) 9 (50.00%) 
No answer 2 1 2 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 3.75 4.67 4.75 4.28 
Median 4 5 5 4.5 
Mode 4 5 5 5 
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Indignants’ protest movement: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 - - - - 
3 2 (25.0%) 1 (20.0%) 1 (20.0%) 4 (22.22%) 
4 1 (12.5%) 2 (40.0%) - 3 (16.67%) 
5 5 (62.5%) 2 (40.0%) 4 (80.0%) 11 (61.11%) 
No answer 2 2 1 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 4.38 4.20 4.60 4.39 
Median 5 4 5 5 
Mode 5 4, 5 5 5 
 
Arrest of blogger Geron Pastitsios: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (5.56%) 
2 1 (12.5%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (11.11%) 
3 1 (12.5%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (75.0%) 5 (27.78%) 
4 4 (50.0%) 1 (16.7%) - 5 (27.78%) 
5 2 (25.0%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (27.78%) 
No answer 2 1 2 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 3.88 3.33 3.50 3.61 
Median 4 3.5 3 4 
Mode 4 5 3 3, 4, 5 
 
Arrest of journalist Kostas Vaxevanis: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - 1 (20.0%) - 1 (5.88%) 
2 1 (12.5%) - - 1 (5.88%) 
3 2 (25.0%) 1 (20.0%) - 3 (17.65%) 
4 3 (37.5%) 2 (40.0%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (35.29%) 
5 2 (25.0%) 1 (20.0%) 3 (75.0%) 6 (35.29%) 
No answer 2 2 2 6 (26.09%) 
Mean 3.75 3.40 4.75 3.88 
Median 4 4 5 4 










Skouries mining controversy: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (5.56%) 
2 - - - - 
3 1 (12.5%) 2 (33.3%) - 3 (16.67%) 
4 3 (37.5%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (27.78%) 
5 4 (50.0%) 2 (33.3%) 3 (75.0%) 9 (50.00%) 
No answer 2 1 2 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 4.38 3.50 4.75 4.17 
Median 4.5 3.5 5 4.5 
Mode 5 3, 5 5 5 
 
Manolada controversy: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (5.26%) 
2 1 (11.1%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (10.53%) 
3 3 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 5 (26.32%) 
4 2 (22.2%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (25.0%) 4 (21.05%) 
5 3 (33.3%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (50.0%) 7 (36.84%) 
No answer 1 1 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 3.78 3.33 4.25 3.74 
Median 4 3.5 4.5 4 
Mode 3, 5 5 5 5 
 
Shutdown of ERT: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 - 1 (16.7%) - 1 (5.56%) 
3 1 (12.5%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (11.11%) 
4 2 (25.0%) - - 2 (11.11%) 
5 5 (62.5%) 4 (66.7%) 4 (100.0%) 13 (72.22%) 
No answer 2 1 2 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 4.50 4.17 5.00 4.50 
Median 5 5 5 5 










Murder of Pavlos Fyssas: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 - - - - 
3 2 (22.2%) 1 (16.7%) - 3 (15.79%) 
4 2 (22.2%) 1 (16.7%) - 3 (15.79%) 
5 5 (55.6%) 4 (66.7%) 4 (100.0%) 13 (68.42%) 
No answer 1 1 2 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 4.33 4.50 5.00 4.53 
Median 5 5 5 5 
Mode 5 5 5 5 
 
Golden Dawn arrests: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 1 (12.5%) - 1 (25.0%) 2 (11.11%) 
3 1 (12.5%) 2 (33.3%) - 3 (16.67%) 
4 4 (50.0%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (50.0%) 7 (38.89%) 
5 2 (25.0%) 3 (50.0%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (33.33%) 
No answer 2 1 2 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 3.88 4.17 3.75 3.94 
Median 4 4.5 4 4 
Mode 4 5 4 4 
 
F10: In your opinion, was the coverage provided by social and new media for each of the 
following issues more thorough and credible compared to the coverage provided by the 
mainstream media? 
 
Killing of Alexandros Grigoropoulos: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 5 (50.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (33.3%) 10 (43.48%) 
No 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
Indignants’ protest movement: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 6 (60.0%) 3 (42.9%) 3 (50.0%) 12 (52.17%) 
No 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 4 (17.39%) 
I don’t know - 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 




Arrest of blogger Geron Pastitsios: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 6 (60.0%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (16.7%) 9 (39.13%) 
No 1 (10.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 5 (21.74%) 
I don’t know 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) 3 (50.0%) 7 (30.43%) 
 
Arrest of journalist Kostas Vaxevanis: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 6 (60.0%) - 4 (66.7%) 10 (43.48%) 
No - 3 (42.9%) - 3 (13.04%) 
I don’t know 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) - 4 (17.39%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
Skouries mining controversy: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 8 (80.0%) 1 (14.3%) 4 (66.7%) 13 (56.52%) 
No - 3 (42.9%) - 3 (13.04%) 
I don’t know - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
Manolada controversy: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 6 (60.0%) 1 (14.3%) 3 (50.0%) 10 (43.48%) 
No 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
I don’t know - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (26.09%) 
 
Shutdown of ERT: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 6 (60.0%) 3 (42.9%) 3 (50.0%) 12 (52.17%) 
No 2 (20.0%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (16.7%) 6 (26.09%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
Murder of Pavlos Fyssas: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 5 (50.0%) 2 (28.6%) 3 (50.0%) 10 (43.48%) 
No 3 (30.0%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (16.7%) 8 (34.78%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
Golden Dawn arrests: 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 4 (40.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 8 (34.78%) 
No 4 (40.0%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (16.7%) 9 (39.13%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 3 (50.0%) 6 (26.09%) 
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F11: How would you gauge the impact of social media and new media in inspiring protest 
movements in Greece in recent years? (1 = no influence, 5 = extremely significant influence) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (11.1%) - - 1 (5.00%) 
2 - - - - 
3 2 (22.2%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (50.0%) 7 (35.00%) 
4 2 (22.2%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (30.00%) 
5 4 (44.4%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (25.0%) 6 (30.00%) 
No answer 1 - 2 3 (13.04%) 
Mean 3.89 3.71 3.75 3.80 
Median 4 4 3.5 4 
Mode 5 3, 4 3 3, 4 
 
F12: In your opinion, what was the impact of social media and new media in inspiring the 
Syntagma Square indignants’ protest movement in 2011? (1 = no influence, 5 = extremely 
significant influence) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 1 (11.1%) - - 1 (4.76%) 
2 1 (11.1%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (9.52%) 
3 1 (11.1%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (40.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
4 1 (11.1%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (20.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
5 5 (55.6%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (40.0%) 8 (38.10%) 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 3.89 3.57 4.00 3.81 
Median 5 4 4 4 
Mode 5 4 3, 5 5 
 
F13: Do you believe that a movement such as the protest of the indignants in Syntagma 
Square would have been possible without the usage of new media and social media? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 2 (20.0%) - - 2 (8.70%) 
Probably Yes 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (17.39%) 
Probably No 5 (50.0%) 6 (85.7%) 2 (33.3%) 13 (56.52%) 
No - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 







G. THE BLOGOSPHERE 
 
G1: Do you believe that, generally, blogs are a credible source of news and information? (1 
= not at all credible, 5 = very credible) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 4 (44.4%) - 1 (20.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
2 3 (33.3%) 5 (71.4%) 1 (20.0%) 9 (42.86%) 
3 2 (22.2%) 1 (14.3%) 3 (60.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
4 - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.76%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 1.78 2.43 2.40 2.00 
Median 2 2 3 2 
Mode 1 2 3 2 
 
G2: Do you believe that blogs have contributed to a decline in popularity of mainstream 
media in Greece? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 3 (30.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 7 (30.43%) 
Probably Yes 4 (40.0%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (16.7%) 9 (39.13%) 
Probably No 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 4 (17.39%) 
No 1 (10.0%) - - 1 (4.35%) 
No answer 1 (10.0%) - 1 (16.7%) 2 (8.70%) 
 
G3: Do you believe that blogs have made a positive or negative impact on the quality of 
news and information received by the Greek public? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 2 (22.2%) - - 2 (9.52%) 
2 2 (22.2%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (20.0%) 6 (28.57%) 
3 4 (44.4%) 3 (42.9%) 1 (20.0%) 8 (38.10%) 
4 - 1 (14.3%) 3 (60.0%) 4 (19.05%) 
5 1 (11.1%) - - 1 (4.76%) 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 2.56 2.71 3.40 2.81 
Median 3 3 4 3 






G4: Do you support the continuation of anonymous blogs and postings on the Internet?  
(1 = under no circumstances, 5 = always, under all circumstances) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 3 (33.3%) 3 (50.0%) - 6 (30.00%) 
2 1 (11.1%) - 1 (20.0%) 2 (10.00%) 
3 1 (11.1%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (20.0%) 3 (15.00%) 
4 1 (11.1%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (10.00%) 
5 3 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (60.0%) 7 (35.00%) 
No answer 1 1 1 3 (13.04%) 
Mean 3.00 2.50 4.00 3.10 
Median 3 2 5 3 
Mode 1, 5 1 5 5 
 
G5: Do you believe that the publication of anonymous blogs or news articles on the Internet 
should be outlawed? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes - 2 (28.6%) - 2 (8.70%) 
No 6 (60.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 10 (43.48%) 
Only under certain 
circumstances 
2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (26.09%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 5 (21.74%) 
 
G6: Do you believe that anonymity diminishes the trustworthiness of a blog or news article 
on the Internet? (1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 2 (22.2%) - 2 (40.0%) 4 (19.05%) 
2 2 (22.2%) 1 (14.3%) - 3 (14.29%) 
3 2 (22.2%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (40.0%) 6 (28.57%) 
4 1 (11.1%) 2 (28.6%) - 3 (14.29%) 
5 2 (22.2%) 2 (28.6%) 1 (20.0%) 5 (23.81%) 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 2.89 3.71 2.60 3.10 
Median 3 4 3 3 








G7: As a whole, do you believe that blogs and new media outlets, in your view, are truly 
independent of the government and of existing power structures in the country? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes 1 (10.0%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (8.70%) 
No 8 (80.0%) 6 (85.7%) 3 (50.0%) 17 (73.91%) 
I don’t know - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
No answer 1 (10.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 3 (13.04%) 
 
G8: Would you consider news blogs in Greece representative examples of “citizen 
journalism”? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Yes - 1 (14.3%) - 1 (4.35%) 
Probably Yes 2 (20.0%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (26.09%) 
Probably No 3 (30.0%) 4 (57.1%) 1 (16.7%) 8 (34.78%) 
No 4 (40.0%) - - 4 (17.39%) 
I don’t know - - 1 (16.7%) 1 (4.35%) 
No answer 1 (10.0%) - 2 (33.3%) 3 (13.04%) 
 
G9: To what extent do you believe blogs have promoted and encouraged “citizen 
journalism” in Greece? (1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 2 (22.2%) - - 2 (9.52%) 
2 1 (11.1%) 3 (42.9%) - 4 (19.05%) 
3 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%) 2 (40.0%) 7 (33.33%) 
4 2 (22.2%) 2 (28.6%) 3 (60.0%) 7 (33.33%) 
5 1 (11.1%) - - 1 (4.76%) 
No answer 1 - 1 2 (8.70%) 
Mean 2.89 3.33 3.60 3.05 
Median 3 3 4 3 













G10: How many news blogs do you read regularly (at least once per week)? 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
Mean 7.25 2.25 26.25 10.75 
No response 2 3 2 7 
Standard 
deviation 
   23.68 
Minimum 15 0 0 0 
1st quartile (Q1)    0.25 
2nd quartile 
(median) 
10   3.5 
3rd quartile (Q3)    10 
Maximum 80 6 100 100 
 
G11: Name up to three (3) news blogs which you read regularly 
 
























































H. CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
H1: In your opinion, how well developed was the civil society sphere in Greece in the post-
junta period? (1 = not at all developed, 5 = extremely well developed) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 2 (28.6%) - 2 (40.0%) 4 (22.22%) 
2 1 (14.3%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (40.0%) 5 (27.78%) 
3 1 (14.3%) 4 (66.7%) 1 (20.0%) 6 (33.33%) 
4 3 (42.9%) - - 3 (16.67%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 3 1 1 5 (21.74%) 
Mean 2.71 2.67 2.25 2.44 
Median 3 3 2 2.5 
Mode 4 3 1, 2 3 
 
H2: In your opinion, is the civil society sphere in Greece well developed today? (1 = not at 
all developed, 5 = extremely well developed) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 2 (28.6%) 1 (14.3%) 2 (40.0%) 5 (26.32%) 
2 3 (42.9%) 2 (28.6%) - 5 (26.32%) 
3 2 (28.6%) 4 (57.1%) 2 (40.0%) 8 (42.11%) 
4 - - 1 (20.0%) 1 (5.26%) 
5 - - - - 
No answer 3 - 1 4 (17.39%) 
Mean 2.00 2.43 2.40 2.26 
Median 2 3 3 2 
Mode 2 3 1, 3 3 
 
H3: How would you gauge the impact of social and new media tools in fostering the growth 
or development of civil society initiatives in Greece? (1 = no influence, 5 = extremely 
significant influence) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - - - 
2 1 (12.5%) 1 (14.3%) - 2 (10.00%) 
3 2 (25.0%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (40.0%) 7 (35.00%) 
4 3 (37.5%) 3 (42.9%) 2 (40.0%) 8 (40.00%) 
5 2 (25.0%) - 1 (20.0%) 3 (15.00%) 
No answer 2 - 1 3 (13.04%) 
Mean 3.75 3.29 3.80 3.60 
Median 4 3 4 4 
Mode 4 3, 4 3, 4 4 
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H4: How would you gauge the impact of social and new media tools in fostering the growth 
or development of civil society initiatives in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
 Editors Euro MPs Civil Society TOTAL 
1 - - -  
2 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) - 2 (11.76%) 
3 2 (33.3%) 3 (50.0%) 2 (40.0%) 7 (41.18%) 
4 2 (33.3%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (40.0%) 6 (35.29%) 
5 1 (16.7%) - 1 (20.0%) 2 (11.76%) 
No answer 4 1 1 6 (26.09%) 
Mean 3.50 3.17 3.80 3.47 
Median 3.5 3 4 3 

































I. QUESTIONS FOR NEWSPAPER EDITORS (JOURNALISTS) 
 




Yes 6 (60.0%) 
No 2 (20.0%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 
 
Breakdown: 
Facebook 6 (60.0%) 
Online video 6 (60.0%) 
Twitter 5 (50.0%) 
User comments 5 (50.0%) 
RSS feed 5 (50.0%) 
YouTube 4 (40.0%) 
Blogs 1 (10.0%) 
Google+ 1 (10.0%) 
 
I2: Which of the following social media tools is most used by your newspaper? (select one) 
 
Facebook 3 (30.0%) 
Twitter 3 (30.0%) 
None 1 (10.0%) 
No answer 3 (30.0%) 
 
I3: Which social media outlets do you use as part of your professional work as a journalist? 
(select all that are applicable) 
 
Twitter 8 (80.0%) 
Facebook 7 (70.0%) 
YouTube 5 (50.0%) 
Google+ 4 (40.0%) 
Blogs 2 (20.0%) 
LinkedIn 2 (20.0%) 
Instagram 1 (10.0%) 
 
I4: Which social media outlet do you use the most as part of your professional work as a 
journalist? (select one) 
 
Twitter 4 (40.0%) 
Facebook 3 (30.0%) 
Blogs 1 (10.0%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 
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I5A: How would you gauge the impact of social media and new media on the quality of 
your newspaper’s journalism? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
1 1 (12.5%) 
2 - 
3 3 (37.5%) 
4 1 (12.5%) 
5 3 (37.5%) 
No answer 2 
Mean 3.63 
Median 3.5 
Mode 3, 5 
 
I5B: How would you gauge the impact of social media and new media on the quality of 




3 3 (50.0%) 
4 1 (16.7%) 
5 2 (33.3%) 





I6A: How would you gauge the impact of social media and new media on your ability to 
perform your job as a journalist? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
1 - 
2 1 (12.5%) 
3 2 (25.0%) 
4 2 (25.0%) 
5 3 (37.5%) 










I6B: How would you gauge the impact of social media and new media on your ability to 
perform your job as a journalist? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
1 - 
2 1 (16.7%) 
3 2 (33.3%) 
4 2 (33.3%) 
5 1 (16.7%) 
No answer 4 
Mean 3.50 
Median 3.50 
Mode 3, 4 
 
I7: Does your newspaper require you to maintain a social media presence as a journalist? 
 
Yes - 
No 9 (90.0%) 
No answer 1 (10.0%) 
 
I8: Do you interact with the public/with your readers via social media, as part of your 
journalistic capacity? 
 
Yes 8 (80.0%) 
No 1 (10.0%) 
No answer 1 (10.0%) 
 
I9: Do you believe that the newspaper where you are employed is experiencing a credibility 
crisis? 
 
Yes 4 (40.0%) 
No 5 (50.0%) 
No answer 1 (10.0%) 
 
I10: Which Internet tools are used by the newspaper where you are employed? (select all 
that apply) 
 
Online .pdf edition of newspaper 7 (70.0%) 
Exclusive online content 6 (60.0%) 
Online newsletter 5 (50.0%) 
Online video/web TV 4 (40.0%) 
Internet radio  2 (20.0%) 
None of the above 1 (10.0%) 
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I11A: How would you gauge your newspaper's impact on the Greek public sphere and on 
public discourse in Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
1 - 
2 1 (11.1%) 
3 2 (22.2%) 
4 4 (44.4%) 
5 2 (22.2%) 





I11B: How would you gauge your newspaper's impact on the Greek public sphere and on 




3 2 (33.3%) 
4 2 (33.3%) 
5 2 (33.3%) 





I12A: How would you gauge the impact of the online presence of your newspaper on the 
Greek public sphere and on public discourse in Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = very 
significant) 
 
1 2 (22.2%) 
2 - 
3 4 (44.4%) 
4 1 (11.1%) 
5 2 (22.2%) 









I12B: How would you gauge the impact of the online presence of your newspaper on the 





3 3 (50.0%) 
4 2 (33.3%) 
5 1 (16.7%) 





I13: How would you rate the overall quality of your newspaper's online and social media 
presence? (1 = very poor, 5 = very good) 
 
1 1 (11.1%) 
2 2 (22.2%) 
3 4 (44.4%) 
4 - 
5 2 (22.2%) 





I14: Does your newspaper maintain a dedicated staff exclusively for its online and social 
media presence? 
 
Yes 8 (80.0%) 
No 1 (10.0%) 













I15A: How would you gauge the impact of the online presence of your newspaper on the 
poltical sphere and political discourse in Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
1 2 (22.2%) 
2 1 (11.1%) 
3 1 (11.1%) 
4 3 (33.3%) 
5 2 (22.2%) 





I15B: How would you gauge the impact of the online presence of your newspaper on the 
poltical sphere and political discourse in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
1 - 
2 1 (16.7%) 
3 3 (50.0%) 
4 1 (16.7%) 
5 1 (16.7%) 





I16: How would you gauge the reach and popularity of your newspaper's online and social 
media presence, amongst the public? (1 = extremely limited, 5 = very widespread) 
 
1 1 (11.1%) 
2 4 (44.4%) 
3 1 (11.1%) 
4 2 (22.2%) 
5 1 (11.1%) 










I17: In your opinion, is self-censorship on the part of professional journalists common in 
Greek journalism today? 
 
Yes 5 (50.0%) 
Probably Yes 4 (40.0%) 
Probably No - 
No - 
I don’t know - 
No answer 1 (10.0%) 
 
I18A: In your opinion, how and to what extent have social and new media contributed to 
self-censorship on the part of professional journalists in Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = 
very significant) 
 
1 2 (28.6%) 
2 1 (14.3%) 
3 2 (28.6%) 
4 2 (28.6%) 
5 - 
No answer 3 
Mean 2.57 
Median 3 
Mode 1, 3, 4 
 
I18B: In your opinion, how and to what extent have social and new media contributed to 
self-censorship on the part of professional journalists in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = 
very positive) 
 
1 1 (16.7%) 
2 - 
3 3 (50.0%) 
4 2 (33.3%) 
5 - 





I19: Do you consider social and new media an important means of generating visitors and 
readers to your newspaper? 
 
Yes 7 (70.0%) 
No 1 (10.0%) 
No answer 2 (20.0%) 
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I20: In your estimation, what percentage of page views for your newspaper's website 
originate from links posted on social media? 
 
Mean 45.71% 
Standard deviation 17.61 
Minimum 20 
1st quartile (Q1) 30 
2nd quartile (median) 50 
3rd quartile (Q3) 60 
Maximum 70 
Mode 30, 60 
No answer 3 
 
I21A: How significant do you anticipate the role of new media and social media will be in 





3 2 (22.2%) 
4 4 (44.4%) 
5 3 (33.3%) 





I21B: How significant do you anticipate the role of new media and social media will be in 




3 2 (28.6%) 
4 4 (57.1%) 
5 1 (14.3%) 









J. QUESTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT/ POLITICIANS 
 
J1: Which party do you belong to/represent? 
 
New Democracy 2 (28.6%) 
Golden Dawn 2 (28.6%) 
SYRIZA 1 (14.3%) 
No answer 2 (28.6%) 
Note: above answers as identified by the respondents themselves. 
 
J2: Were you previously a candidate in any of the following types of electoral 
contests? (select all that are applicable) 
 
I was never a candidate prior to this year’s elections 4 (57.1%) 
May 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections 1 (14.3%) 
June 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections 1 (14.3%) 
 
J3: Which party were you a member of in your previous electoral campaign? 
 
Golden Dawn 2 (28.6%) 
New Democracy 1 (14.3%) 
Other (LAOS) 1 (14.3%) 
I was not a candidate in any previous election 1 (14.3%) 
No answer 2 (28.6%) 
 
J4: Do you maintain an official social media account (or accounts) as part of your position 
as a member of the European Parliament? 
 
Yes 6 (85.7%) 
No - 
No answer 1 (14.3%) 
 
J5: On which social media outlets do you maintain an official account, as part of your 
position as a member of European Parliament? (select all that are applicable) 
 
Facebook 6 (85.7%) 
Twitter 3 (42.9%) 
YouTube 3 (42.9%) 
LinkedIn 2 (28.6%) 
Google+ 2 (28.6%) 
Instagram 1 (14.3%) 
Other 1 (14.3%) 
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J6: Did you use one or more social media outlets as part of your electoral campaign this 
year? 
 
Yes 6 (85.7%) 
No - 
No answer 1 (14.3%) 
 
J7: Which social media outlets did you use as part of your electoral campaign, in this year's 
elections? (select all that apply) 
 
Facebook 5 (71.4%) 
Twitter 2 (28.6%) 
YouTube 2 (28.6%) 
LinkedIn 1 (14.3%) 
Blogs 1 (14.3%) 
None 1 (14.3%) 
 
J8: Which social media outlet did you use the most as part of your electoral campaign for 
this year's elections? (select one) 
 
Facebook 4 (57.1%) 
Twitter 1 (14.3%) 
None 1 (14.3%) 
No answer 1 (14.3%) 
 
J9: How would you gauge the impact of your social media presence during your electoral 




3 2 (40.0%) 
4 2 (40.0%) 
5 1 (20.0%) 
No answer 2 
Mean 3.80 
Median 4 
Mode 3, 4 
 
J10: Which social media outlet do you use the most today, as part of your position as a 
member of the European Parliament? (select one) 
 
Facebook 4 (57.1%) 
Blogs 1 (14.3%) 
No answer 2 (28.6%) 
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J11A: How would you gauge the impact of social media on your work as a member of the 




3 2 (40.0%) 
4 2 (40.0%) 
5 1 (20.0%) 
No answer 2 
Mean 3.80 
Median 4 
Mode 3, 4 
 
J11B: How would you gauge the impact of social media on your work as a member of the 




3 2 (50.0%) 
4 1 (25.0%) 
5 1 (25.0%) 





J12: Do you use and post on your official social media accounts personally, or do you utilize 
an adviser or other staffer for such purposes? 
 
I maintain exclusive control over my social media accounts 1 (14.3%) 
Another adviser or staffer maintains exclusive control over my social 
media accounts 
1 (14.3%) 
Both (I control my social media accounts alongside an adviser or staffer) 2 (28.6%) 
No answer 3 (42.9%) 
 
J13: Do you maintain interaction with your voters and the general public via your social 
media accounts? 
 
Yes 5 (71.4%) 
No - 




J14: Have social media tools aided you in your ability to communicate with your 
constituents and the general public? 
 
Yes 5 (71.4%) 
No - 
No answer 2 (28.6%) 
 
J15: Do you believe that trolling is a problem which significantly impacts the quality of 
online political discourse in Greece? 
 
Yes 5 (71.4%) 
No - 
No answer 2 (28.6%) 
 
J16A: How would you gauge the impact and prevalence of trolling with regards to the 




2 1 (20.0%) 
3 2 (40.0%) 
4 1 (20.0%) 
5 1 (20.0%) 





J16B: How would you gauge the impact and prevalence of trolling with regards to the 
political dialogue which takes place on the internet in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very 
positive) 
 
1 2 (50.0%) 
2 1 (25.0%) 
3 1 (25.0%) 
4 - 
5 - 







J17: Does your political party maintain an official social media presence? 
 
Yes 5 (71.4%) 
No - 
No answer 2 (28.6%) 
 
J18: On which social media platforms does your political party maintain an official 
presence? (select all that apply) 
 
Facebook 4 (57.1%) 
Twitter 4 (57.1%) 
YouTube 4 (57.1%) 
Blogs 3 (42.9%) 
Google+ 1 (14.3%) 
Other 1 (14.3%) 
 
J19: Which social media platform is used the most by your political party? (select one) 
 
Facebook 2 (28.6%) 
Blogs 2 (28.6%) 
Twitter 1 (14.3%) 
Other 1 (14.3%) 
No answer 1 (14.3%) 
 
J20: Did your political party use social media as part of its pre-election campaigning this 
year? 
 
Yes 6 (85.7%) 
No - 
No answer 1 (14.3%) 
 
J21A: How would you characterize the impact of social media on your party’s electoral 




2 1 (20.0%) 
3 2 (40.0%) 
4 - 
5 2 (40.0%) 
No answer 2 
Mean 3.60 
Median 3 
Mode 3, 5 
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J21B: How would you characterize the impact of social media on your party’s electoral 
performance in the two parliamentary elections of 2012? (1 = very negative, 5 = very 
positive) 
 
1 1 (25.0%) 
2 - 
3 2 (50.0%) 
4 - 
5 1 (25.0%) 





J22A: How would you characterize the impact of the social media on this year’s European 
parliamentary elections in Greece? (1 = not significant, 5 = very significant) 
 
1 - 
2 1 (20.0%) 
3 1 (20.0%) 
4 1 (20.0%) 
5 2 (40.0%) 





J22B: How would you characterize the impact of the social media on this year’s European 
parliamentary elections in Greece? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
1 - 
2 1 (25.0%) 
3 1 (25.0%) 
4 1 (25.0%) 
5 1 (25.0%) 
No answer 3 
Mean 3.50 
Median 3.5 





J23: Which social media tools were used by your political party as part of its campaign 
efforts for this year’s European parliamentary elections? (select all that are applicable) 
 
Facebook 6 (85.7%) 
YouTube 5 (71.4%) 
Twitter 4 (57.1%) 
Blogs 2 (28.6%) 
LinkedIn 1 (14.3%) 
Google+ 1 (14.3%) 
Other 1 (14.3%) 
 
J24: Which social media tool was used the most by your political party as part of its 
campaign efforts for this year’s European parliamentary elections? (select one) 
 
Facebook 2 (28.6%) 
Blogs 2 (28.6%) 
Twitter 1 (14.3%) 
Other 1 (14.3%) 
No answer 1 (14.3%) 
 
J25: How many hours per day, on average, do you dedicate for the maintenance of your 
online presence and your social media accounts?  
 
None - 
Less than 1 hour 1 (14.3%) 
1-2 hours 3 (42.9%) 
2-4 hours 1 (14.3%) 
More than 4 hours - 

















J26: In which way(s) do you use social and new media tools to communicate with your 
constituents and with the public at large? (select all that apply) 
 
Answering messages from your constituents 6 (85.7%) 
Publicizing news about yourself and your political activity 6 (85.7%) 
Publicizing articles you have written 6 (85.7%) 
Publicizing press releases 5 (71.4%) 
Replying to comments or tweets on social media 5 (71.4%) 
Political commentary 5 (71.4%) 
Posting multimedia: photos, video, audio, podcasts, etc. 5 (71.4%) 
Publication/distribution of newsletter 4 (57.1%) 
Communication with other members of the European Parliament 4 (57.1%) 
Communication with other members of your political party 3 (42.9%) 
Communication with journalists 3 (42.9%) 
Reposting news about your political party 3 (42.9%) 
Following other politicians’ social media accounts 3 (42.9%) 
Following other political parties’ social media accounts 3 (42.9%) 
Posting non-political content about yourself 3 (42.9%) 
Communication with European Union officials 2 (28.6%) 
Communication with international officials 2 (28.6%) 
Reposting articles/websites from other sources 2 (28.6%) 
Following social media accounts of journalists or media outlets 2 (28.6%) 
Communication with other politicians in Greece 1 (14.3%) 
 
J27: Does your political party maintain an official policy for how its members of 
parliament and other officials can conduct themselves on the Internet and on social media 
accounts? 
 
Yes 2 (28.6%) 
No 2 (28.6%) 
No answer 3 (42.9%) 
 
J28: Will you be a candidate in the next European parliamentary elections? 
 
Yes 2 (28.6%) 
No - 
I don’t know 3 (42.9%) 







J29: Do you plan to run as a candidate in the next national parliamentary elections? 
 
Yes - 
No 2 (28.6%) 
I don’t know 3 (42.9%) 
No answer 2 (28.6%) 
 
J30: Do you plan to increase your usage of new media and social media tools in the next 
electoral contest that you will participate in? 
 
Yes 4 (57.1%) 
No - 
No answer 3 (42.9%) 
 
J31: Does the feedback that you receive from the public via the Internet and social media 
impact your positions or your political work? (1 = never, 5 = very often) 
 
1 - 
2 2 (40.0%) 
3 2 (40.0%) 
4 - 
5 1 (20.0%) 
No answer 2 
Mean 3.00 
Median 3 
Mode 2, 3 
 
J32: Did you make changes in the way you incorporated social and new media into your 
campaigning in this year's elections, compared to the previous electoral contest? 
 
Yes 1 (14.3%) 
No 1 (14.3%) 
Not applicable 2 (28.6%) 
No answer 3 (42.9%) 
 
J33: Do you/did you consider social media to be an official part of your pre-election 
campaign in this year's European parliamentary elections? 
 
Yes 6 (85.7%) 
No - 
No answer 1 (14.3%) 
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J34: Do you believe that your political party more heavily emphasized social media in its 
campaigning this year, compared to its campaigning prior to the 2012 elections? 
 
Yes 5 (71.4%) 
No - 
No answer 2 (28.6%) 
 
J35A: How significant do you anticipate the role of new media and social media will be in 





3 1 (16.7%) 
4 4 (66.7%) 
5 1 (16.7%) 





J35B: How significant do you anticipate the role of new media and social media will be in 
the Greek political landscape in the next few years? (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) 
 
1 - 
2 1 (20.0%) 
3 2 (40.0%) 
4 1 (20.0%) 
5 1 (20.0%) 
















K. QUESTIONS FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF CIVIL SOCIETY/CITIZENS’ 
MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
 
K1: Which social media tools are used by your organization/movement? (select all which 
are applicable) 
 
Facebook 5 (83.3%) 
Twitter 4 (66.7%) 
Blogs 3 (50.0%) 
Google+ 3 (50.0%) 
YouTube 2 (33.3%) 
LinkedIn 2 (33.3%) 
Forums and message boards 1 (16.7%) 
 
K2: In which way(s) do you use social and new media tools to communicate with your 
members/volunteers and the public at large? (Select all that are applicable) 
 
Publicizing your meetings and events 5 (83.3%) 
Publicizing news about your movement/organization 4 (66.7%) 
Posting multimedia: photos, video, audio, podcasts, etc. 4 (66.7%) 
Organizing your meetings and events 3 (50.0%) 
Commentary on relevant issues 3 (50.0%) 
Republishing news and content from other websites 3 (50.0%) 
Communication and interaction with the public 2 (33.3%) 
Holding online meetings or chats 1 (16.7%) 
Recruiting new members or volunteers - 
Fundraising or requesting donations - 
 
K3A: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media tools in your 





3 1 (20.0%) 
4 1 (20.0%) 
5 3 (60.0%) 







K3B: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media tools in your 





4 2 (40.0%) 
5 3 (60.0%) 





K4A: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media tools for the 
purposes of recruiting new members or volunteers to your organization or movement?  





4 2 (40.0%) 
5 3 (60.0%) 





K4B: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media tools for the 
purposes of recruiting new members or volunteers to your organization or movement?  





4 3 (60.0%) 
5 2 (40.0%) 








K5A: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media tools in your 






4 2 (40.0%) 
5 3 (60.0%) 





K5B: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media tools in your 






4 2 (40.0%) 
5 3 (60.0%) 





K6A: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media tools in terms 
of your ability to interact and communicate with the general public? (1 = not significant, 5 





4 2 (40.0%) 
5 3 (60.0%) 







K6B: How would you gauge the contribution of new media and social media tools in terms 






4 2 (40.0%) 
5 3 (60.0%) 





K7: Was your organization or movement established, in whole or in part, via the social 
media? 
 
Yes (if yes, mention which in comment box) 2 (33.3%) 
No 2 (33.3%) 
No answer 2 (33.3%) 




K8: Have social media tools helped your movement/organization communicate with or 
coordinate action with other citizens' groups, movements or similar organizations? 
 
Yes 5 (83.3%) 
No - 
No answer 1 (16.7%) 
 
K9A: How significant do you anticipate the role of new media and social media will be in 
the operations of your movement or organization in the next few years? (1 = not significant, 





4 2 (40.0%) 
5 3 (60.0%) 





K9B: How significant do you anticipate the role of new media and social media will be in 
the operations of your movement or organization in the next few years? (1 = very negative, 





4 2 (40.0%) 
5 3 (60.0%) 





K10: What year was your organization/group established? 
 
2012 3 (50.0%) 
No answer 3 (50.0%) 
 
K11: Was the establishment of your organization/group influenced or inspired by the 
protests of the Indignants in 2011? 
 
Yes 2 (33.3%) 
No 2 (33.3%) 
















APPENDIX 5: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
All Questions Are Optional - Όλες οι Ερωτήσεις Είναι Προεραιτικές 
 
A. ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΗ - Α. INTRODUCTION: 
 
1. Ποια είναι η ηλικία σας; What is your age? ________________ 
2. Γράψτε το φύλλο σας State your gender ________________ 
3. Πόλη κατοικίας City of residence ________________ 
4. 
Επιλέξτε σε ποια κατηγορία 
ανήκετε: 
Please select the category 
you belong to 
a) Ευρωβουλευτής – Member 
of European Parliament 
b) Συντάκτης εφημερίδας – 
Newspaper editor 
c) Μέλος κινήματος/ομάδας 
πολιτών – Member of civil 
society organization 
 
Β. ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΥΠΟΣΤΗΡΙΞΗ - B. POLITICAL PREFERENCE: 
 
1. Ποιο κόμμα υποστηρίξατε στις φετινές 
εκλογές του Ευρωπαϊκού κοινοβουλίου; 
1. Which political party did you support/vote 
for in this year's European Parliamentary 
elections? 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 10) Κανένα / None 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE      
6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
  
2. Ποιο κόμμα υποστηρίξατε στις φετινές 
εκλογές της τοπικής αυτοδιοίκησης; 
2. Which political party did you support/vote 
for in this year's local and municipal elections 
in Greece? 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   9) Ανεξάρτητο ή συνδυασμό / Independent or coalition 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 10) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     11) Κανένα / None 









3. Ποιο κόμμα ψηφίσατε στις εκλογές του 2009 
για το Ευρωπαϊκό κοινοβούλιο; 
3. Which party did you vote for in the 2009 
European parliamentary elections? 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    8) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Κανένα / None 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Δεν θυμάμαι / I don't recall 
  
4. Ποιο κόμμα ψηφίσατε στις εκλογές για την 
τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση του 2010; 
4. Which party did you vote for in the 2010 
local/municipal elections in Greece? 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  7) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    8) Ανεξάρτητο ή συνδυασμό / Independent or coalition  
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 10) Κανένα / None 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     11) Δεν θυμάμαι / I don't recall 
6) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR  
  
5. Ποιο κόμμα ψηφίσατε στις εθνικές 
βουλευτικές εκλογές του 2012 (1η 
αναμέτρηση); 
5. Which party did you vote for in the national 
parliamentary elections of 2012 (1st election)? 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    8) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Κανένα / None 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Δεν θυμάμαι / I don't recall 
 
6. Ποιο κόμμα ψηφίσατε στις εθνικές 
βουλευτικές εκλογές του 2012 (2η 
αναμέτρηση); 
6. Which party did you vote for in the national 
parliamentary elections of 2012 (2nd election)? 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    8) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Κανένα / None 

















Γ. ΠΡΟΣΩΠΙΚΗ ΧΡΗΣΗ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΩΝ ΔΙΚΤΥΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΝΕΩΝ ΤΕΧΝΟΛΟΓΙΩΝ -  
C. PERSONAL USAGE OF SOCIAL AND NEW MEDIA TOOLS: 
 
1. Χρησιμοποιείτε κάποιο εργαλείο κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης; 
1. Do you use any social media tools? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
2. Ποια εργαλεία κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιείτε τουλάχιστον μία φορά την 
εβδομάδα; (επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
2. Which social media tools do you use at least 
once per week? (select all that are applicable) 
1) Facebook     7) pinterest 
2) Twitter     8) Instagram 
3) YouTube     9) Μπλογκ - Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     10) Άλλο / Other: _________________________ 
5) Google+     11) Κανένα / None 
6) Reddit 
 
3. Ποιο εργαλείο κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιείτε περισσότερο; (επιλέξτε ένα) 
3. Which social media tool do you use the 
most? (select one) 
1) Facebook     7) pinterest 
2) Twitter     8) Instagram 
3) YouTube     9) Μπλογκ - Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     10) Άλλο / Other: _________________________ 
5) Google+     11) Κανένα / None 
6) Reddit 
 
4. Χρησιμοποιείτε τα εργαλεία κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης για να ενημερώνεστε για την 
επικαιρότητα; 
4. Do you use social media for getting news and 
information? 
 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
5. Χρησιμοποιείτε τα εργαλεία κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης για να γράφετε ή να σχολιάζετε για 
πολιτικά, οικονομικά ή κοινωνικά θέματα; 
5. Do you use social media for writing or 
commenting on political, economic, or social 
issues? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
6. Αν απαντήσατε ναι στην προηγούμενη 
ερώτηση, ποιο εργαλείο χρησιμοποιείτε 
περισσότερο για να γράφετε ή να σχολιάζετε 
αυτά τα θέματα; (επιλέξτε ένα) 
6. If you answered yes for the previous 
question, which social media outlet do you use 
the most for the purposes of writing or 
commenting on political, economic, or social 
issues? (select one) 
1) Facebook     7) pinterest 
2) Twitter     8) Instagram 
3) YouTube     9) Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     10) Άλλο / Other: _________________________ 





7. Έχετε χρησιμοποιήσει ποτέ κάποιο εργαλείο 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης για να επικοινωνήσετε 
με κάποιο συμβατικό μέσο ενημέρωσης 
(εφημερίδα, τηλεοπτικός σταθμός, 
ραδιοφωνικός σταθμός); 
7. Have you ever used a social media tool to 
communicate with a mainstream media outlet, 
such as a newspaper, television station, or 
radio station? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
8. Έχετε χρησιμοποιήσει ποτέ κάποιο εργαλείο 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης για να επικοινωνήσετε 
με κάποιον πολιτικό, υποψήφιο για πολιτικό 
αξίωμα, ή κάποιο πολιτικό κόμμα; 
8. Have you used a social media tool to 
communicate with a politician, political party, 
or political candidate? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
9. Ποια μέσα ενημέρωσης/επικοινωνίας 
χρησιμοποιείτε για να ενημερώνεστε για την 
επικαιρότητα; (rank from 1-5 from most to least 
utilized) 
9. What media outlets do you use for the 
purposes of getting news and information? 
(rank from 1-5 from most to least utilized) 
___ Τηλεόραση / Television   ___ Διαδίκτυο / Internet 
___ Ραδιόφωνο / Radio    ___ Άλλο / Other: ________________________ 
___ Εφημερίδες / Newspapers   ___ Κανένα / None 
___ Περιοδικά / Magazines 
 
10. Ποια από τα ακόλουθα "εναλλακτικά" 
μέσα ενημέρωσης/επικοινωνίας χρησιμοποιείτε 
για να ενημερώνεστε για την επικαιρότητα; 
(επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
10. Which of the following "non-traditional" 
media outlets do you use for the purposes of 
getting news and information? (select all that 
are applicable) 
1) Διαδικτυακό ραδιόφωνο / Internet radio  5) Εναλλακτικά έντυπα / Alternative print media 
2) Διαδικτυακή τηλεόραση / Internet television 6) Άλλο / Other: __________________________ 
3) Blogs      7) Κανένα / None 
4) Πειρατικό ραδιόφωνο / Pirate radio 
 
11. Παρακολουθείτε κάποιον λογαριασμό 
πολιτικού προσώπου ή υποψηφίου στα 
κοινωνικά δίκτυα;  
11. Do you follow the social media accounts of 
any politician or political candidate? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
12. Αν απαντήσατε ναι στην προηγούμενη 
ερώτηση, ποίον πολιτικό/ποιούς πολιτικούς 
παρακολουθείτε για οποιονδήποτε λόγο;  
(Ονομάστε μέχρι 5) 
12. If you answered yes to the previous 
question, which politician(s) or candidate(s) do 











13. Παρακολουθείτε κάποιον λογαριασμό 
πολιτικού κόμματος στα κοινωνικά δίκτυα; 
13. Do you follow the social media accounts of 
any political parties? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
14. Αν απαντήσατε ναι στην προηγούμενη 
ερώτηση, ποιο/α κόμμα/τα παρακολουθείτε;  
(επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
14. If you answered yes to the previous 
question, which party/parties do you follow? 
(select all that are applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Δεν με αφορά / Not applicable 
 
Δ. ΕΝΤΥΠΩΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΞΙΟΠΙΣΤΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΧΡΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ ΜΑΖΙΚΗΣ 
ΕΝΗΜΕΡΩΣΗΣ/ΕΠΙΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΣ - D. TRUSTWORTHINESS AND PREVALENCE OF THE MASS 
MEDIA 
 
1. Πιστεύετε πως τα κοινωνικά δίκτυα και τα 
νέα μέσα ενημέρωσης/επικοινωνίας έχουν 
συμβάλλει σε πτώση της χρήσης των 
συμβατικών μέσων ενημέρωσης (εφημερίδες, 
τηλεοπτικοί σταθμοί, ραδιοφωνικοί σταθμοί) 
στην Ελλάδα; 
1. Do you believe that social and new media 
have contributed to a decline in popularity of 
the mainstream media (newspapers, television 
stations, radio stations) in Greece? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
2. Αν απαντήσατε ναι στην προηγούμενη 
ερώτηση, πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επιρροή 
των κοινωνικών δικτύων και των νέων μέσων 
στην πτώση της χρήσης των συμβατικών 
μέσων ενημέρωσης; 
2. If you answered yes to the previous question, 
how would you evaluate the impact of social 
and new media in the decline in popularity of 
the mainstream media? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (μικρή επιρροή)   (μέγαλη επιρροή) 
   (small impact)   (large impact) 
 
3. Πως αξιολογείτε την αξιοπιστία των 
ακόλουθων μέσων ενημέρωσης/επικοινωνίας 
στην Ελλάδα; 
3. How do you evaluate the trustworthiness of 
each of the following types of media in Greece? 
    (αναξιόπιστο)       (πολύ αξιόπιστο) 
    (not credible)           (credible) 
1) Τηλεόραση / Television   1 2 3 4 5 
2) Ραδιόφωνο / Radio   1 2 3 4 5 
3) Εφημερίδες / Newspapers  1 2 3 4 5 
4) Περιοδικά / Magazines   1 2 3 4 5 







4. Πιστεύετε πως υπάρχει κρίση εμπιστοσύνης 
του κοινού ως προς τα συμβατικά μέσα 
ενημέρωσης στην Ελλάδα; 
4. Do you believe that mainstream media in 
Greece are suffering from a credibility crisis? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
4α) Αν ναί, σε τι βαθμό; - If yes, to what extent? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ελάχιστα)   (πάρα πολύ) 
   (very little)   (very much) 
 
5. Πιστεύετε πως το διαδίκτυο θεωρείται πιο 
αξιόπιστο μέσο για την ενημέρωση από την 
πλειοψηφία του πληθυσμού της Ελλάδας; 
5. In your opinion, do you believe that the 
Internet is considered to be a more credible 
source of news and information for the 
majority of people in Greece? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
6. Πιστεύετε πως το διαδίκτυο πλέον 
χρησιμοποιείται περισσότερο από τα 
συμβατικά μέσα ενημέρωσης για ειδήσεις, από 
την πλειοψηφία του πληθυσμού της Ελλάδας; 
6. Do you believe that the Internet is now used 
more often than the mainstream media as a 
source of news and information by the 
majority of people in Greece? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
7. Ποιο πιστεύετε ότι είναι το ποσοστό των 
ειδήσεων που ο μέσος Έλληνας λαμβάνει από 
διαδικτυακές πηγές; 
7. What percentage of news consumed by the 
average Greek citizen comes from online 
sources, in your opinion?  
____ 
 
8. Πιστεύετε πως τα συμβατικά μέσα 
ενημέρωσης υποστηρίζουν κάποια 
συγκεκριμένα πολιτικά κόμματα; 
8. Do you believe that the mainstream media in 
Greece is biased in favor of certain political 
parties? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
9. Πιστεύετε πως τα συμβατικά μέσα 
ενημέρωσης λειτουργούν εναντίον κάποιων 
συγκεκριμένων πολιτικών κομμάτων; 
9. Do you believe that the mainstream media in 
Greece are biased against certain political 
parties? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
10. Ποια κόμματα πιστεύετε πως τα συμβατικά 
μέσα ενημέρωσης υποστηρίζουν αυτή τη 
στιγμή; (επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
10. Which political parties do you believe that 
the mainstream media are biased in favor of at 
this time? (select all that are applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 







11. Ποια κόμματα πιστεύετε πως τα συμβατικά 
μέσα ενημέρωσης λειτουργούν εναντίων αυτή 
τη στιγμή; (επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
11. Which political parties do you believe that 
the mainstream media are biased against at 
this time? (select all that are applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
 
12. Ποια κόμματα πιστεύετε πως έχουν 
κερδίσει περισσότερο την υποστήριξη των 
χρηστών κοινωνικών δικτύων; (επιλέξτε όλα 
όσα ισχύουν) 
12. Which political party or parties do you 
believe enjoy the most support amongst the 
users of social media in Greece? (select all that 
are applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
 
13. Πιστεύετε πως ο δημόσιος διάλογος που 
γίνεται στα κοινωνικά δίκτυα είναι κατά 
κάποιων συγκεκριμένων πολιτικών κομμάτων; 
13. Do you believe that the discourse which 
takes place on social media is biased against 
any particular political parties? 
1) Ναι / Yes   2) Όχι / No   3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
14. Ποια κόμματα πιστεύετε πως έχουν υποστεί 
τις μεγαλύτερες απώλειες στην υποστήριξη 
τους από κοινό, εξαιτίας των κοινωνικών 
δικτύων /νέων μέσων; (επιλέξτε όλα όσα 
ισχύουν) 
14. Which political party or parties do you 
believe have seen the biggest decline in support 
as a result of the coverage it has received on 
the social/new media? (select all that are 
applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
      11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
15. Πιστεύετε πως η σφαίρα των χρηστών του 
Facebook στην Ελλάδα υποστηρίζει 
περισσότερο κάποιo από τα ακόλουθα 
κόμματα; (επιλέξτε ένα) 
15. Do you believe that Facebook users in 
Greece are biased towards any one particular 
political party out of the following? (select one) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 10) Όχι - Κανένα Κόμμα Δεν Υποστηρίζεται /  
5) KKE/ KKE     No, there isn't a bias towards any party 





16. Πιστεύετε πως η σφαίρα των χρηστών του 
Twitter στην Ελλάδα υποστηρίζει περισσότερο 
κάποιo από τα ακόλουθα κόμματα; (επιλέξτε 
ένα) 
16. Do you believe that Twitter users in Greece 
are biased towards any one particular political 
party out of the following? (select one) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 10) Όχι - Κανένα Κόμμα Δεν Υποστηρίζεται /  
5) KKE/ KKE     No, there isn't a bias towards any party 
6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami    11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
17. Ποια ηλικιακή ομάδα πιστεύετε πως 
χρησιμοποιεί περισσότερο το διαδίκτυο για 
ενημέρωση; (επιλέξτε ένα) 
17. Which age group do you believe is most 
reliant upon the internet and social media for 
news and information? (select one) 
1) 18-24      5) 55-64 
2) 25-34      6) 65+ 
3) 35-44      7) Καμία διαφορά / No difference 
4) 45-54      8) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
18. Ποια ηλικιακή ομάδα πιστεύετε πως 
χρησιμοποιεί περισσότερο τα συμβατικά μέσα 
ενημέρωσης για ειδήσεις; (επιλέξτε ένα) 
18. Which age group do you believe is most 
reliant upon mainstream media for news and 
information? (select one) 
1) 18-24      5) 55-64 
2) 25-34      6) 65+ 
3) 35-44      7) Καμία διαφορά / No difference 
4) 45-54      8) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
19. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την ποιότητα της 
παρουσίας των συμβατικών μέσων 
ενημέρωσης στο διαδίκτυο και στα κοινωνικά 
δίκτυα; 
19. How would you rate the overall quality of 
the online and social media presence of the 
mainstream media outlets in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (χαμηλής ποιότητας)  (υψηλής ποιότητας) 
   (low quality)   (high quality) 
 
20. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε το βαθμό στον 
οποίον τα συμβατικά μέσα ενημέρωσης στην 
Ελλάδα έχουν ενσωματώσει τα νέα και 
κοινωνικά μέσα στις προσπάθειες τους; 
20. How would you rate the level of integration 
of new media tools by Greece's mainstream 
media outlets? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (χαμηλή ενσωμάτωση)  (υψηλή ενσωμάτωση) 








21. Πιστεύετε πως τα συμβατικά μέσα 
ενημέρωσης στην Ελλάδα έχουν αντιδράσει 
θετικά ή αρνητικά στην έλευση των 
κοινωνικών δικτύων και νέων μέσων; 
21. Do you believe that Greece's mainstream 
media has, in general, reacted positively or 
negatively to the growth in popularity of social 
media and new media? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητικά)   (πολύ θετικά) 
   (very negatively)   (very positively) 
 
22. Πιστεύετε η παρουσία των συμβατικών 
μέσων ενημέρωσης στα νέα μέσα και στα 
κοινωνικά δίκτυα έχει αυξήσει την αξιοπιστία 
τους σε σχέση με πριν; 
22. Do you believe that the social and new 
media presence of Greece's mainstream media 
outlets has made those outlets more credible 
than they were previously? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
23. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την εξειδίκευση των 
Ελλήνων δημοσιογράφων στα συμβατικά μέσα 
ενημέρωσης με τις νέες τεχνολογίες και τα νέα 
μέσα; 
23. How would you rank the overall fluency of 
journalism at Greece's mainstream media 
outlets, with new and social media tools? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου καλή)   (πολύ καλή) 
   (very poor)   (excellent) 
 
24. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επιρροή των 
νέων μέσων και των εργαλείων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην ποιότητα της δημοσιογραφίας 
στην Ελλάδα συνολικά; 
24. Overall, how would you characterize the 
impact of social media on the quality of 
journalism in Greece, from all sources? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου σημαντική)  (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (not significant)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
25. Πιστεύετε πως τα συμβατικά μέσα 
ενημέρωσης στην Ελλάδα έχουν οδηγήσει το 
κοινό στην αναζήτηση εναλλακτικών πηγών 
ενημέρωσης στο διαδίκτυο; 
25. Do you believe that the mainstream media 
in Greece, through the manner in which they 
cover and report the news, have led people to 
search for alternative sources of news and 
information on the Internet? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (διαφωνώ απόλυτα)  (συμφωνώ απόλυτα) 
   (completely disagree)  (completely agree) 
 
26. Ονομάστε τα πρώτα τρία Ελληνικά 
διαδικτυακά μέσα ενημέρωσης που μπορείτε 
να σκεφτείτε (μέσα που λειτουργούν μόνο στο 
διαδίκτυο). 
26. Name three online-only Greek media 
outlets that first come to mind (Only list outlets 






Ε. ΕΠΙΡΡΟΗ ΤΩΝ ΝΕΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ ΣΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ- E. IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND NEW MEDIA 
ON POLITICS 
 
1. Κατά την αντίληψη σας, οι Έλληνες 
πολιτικοί και τα πολιτικά κόμματα σε ποιό 
βαθμό έχουν ενσωματώσει τα εργαλεία 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης, όπως το Facebook και 
το Twitter, στην καθημερινή τους δουλειά; 
1. According to your own perception, to what 
extent have social media tools such as 
Facebook and Twitter been implemented and 
used by Greek politicians and political parties 
in their daily operations? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου)   (πάρα πολύ) 
   (not at all)   (very much) 
 
2. Κατατάξτε τα ακόλουθα εργαλεία 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης ανάλογα με το πόσο 
συχνά πιστεύετε ότι χρησιμοποιούνται από 
πολιτικά πρόσωπα και τα πολιτικά κόμματα 
στην Ελλάδα (μόνο τα πρώτα τρία, με το 1 να είναι 
για το πιο δημοφιλή, το 2 για το 2ο πιο δημοφιλή, 
κλπ.) 
2. Order the following social media platforms 
according to how commonly you believe they 
are used by politicians in Greece (rank only 
from 1-3, with 1 being the most popular, 2 being 
second most popular, and 3 being third-most 
popular). 
- Facebook (___)     - YouTube  (___) 
- Twitter  (___)     - Instagram  (___) 
- Google+  (___)     - pinterest  (___) 
- LinkedIn (___)     - blogs  (___) 
- Reddit (___) 
 
3. Συνολικά, πιστεύετε πως η κυβέρνηση έχει 
αρνητική ή θετική αντίληψη προς το 
διαδίκτυο, τα νέα μέσα, και τα μέσα 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης;   
3. Overall, do you believe that the Greek 
government has a positive or a negative view of 
the internet, new media, and social media? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
4. Συνολικά, πιστεύετε πως η κυβέρνηση έχει 
αρνητική ή θετική αντίληψη προς τους 
μπλόγκερς (bloggers);   
4. Overall, do you believe that the Greek 
government has a positive or a negative view of 
bloggers? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
5. Συνολικά, πως θα αξιολογούσατε την 
επιρροή των νέων μέσων και των μέσων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στην ποιότητα 
διακυβέρνησης στην Ελλάδα; 
5. Overall, how would you rank the influence 
of new media and social media on the quality 
of governance in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ ασύμαντη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (very insignificant)  (very significant) 
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6. Συνολικά, πως θα αξιολογούσατε την 
επιρροή των νέων μέσων και των μέσων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης όσον αφορά την 
διαφάνεια στην διακυβέρνηση της Ελλάδας;  
6. Overall, how would you rank the impact of 
new and social media on government 
transparency in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ ασύμαντη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (very insignificant)  (very significant) 
 
7. Συνολικά, πως θα αξιολογούσατε την 
επιρροή των νέων μέσων και των μέσων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης όσον αφορά την 
διαφάνεια στα πολιτικά κόμματα της Ελλάδας;  
7. Overall, how would you rank the impact of 
new and social media on the transparency of 
Greece's political parties? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
8. Κατά πόσο πιστεύετε πως η ύπαρξη των 
νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης επηρέασαν τα αποτελέσματα των 
βουλευτικών εκλογών του 2012;  
8. How would you evaluate the overall impact 
of new and social media in influencing the 
electoral results of the parliamentary elections 
of 2012? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καμία επιρροή)   (εξαιρετικά μεγάλη επιρροή) 
   (no influence)   (extremely significant influence) 
 
9. Ποια πολιτικά κόμματα πιστεύετε ότι έχουν 
επωφεληθεί περισσότερο από τα νέα μέσα και 
τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης;  (επιλέξτε όλα 
όσα ισχύουν) 
9. Which political party or parties do you 
believe have benefited the most from new 
media and social media? (select all that are 
applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
      11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
10. Ποια πολιτικά κόμματα πιστεύετε ότι είχαν 
επωφεληθεί περισσότερο από τα νέα μέσα και 
τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης πριν από τις 
βουλευτικές εκλογές του Μαίου του 2012; 
(επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
10. Which political party or parties do you 
believe benefited the most from new media and 
social media prior to the parliamentary 
elections of May 2012? (select all that are 
applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    8) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Κανένα / None 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
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11. Ποια πολιτικά κόμματα πιστεύετε ότι είχαν 
επωφεληθεί περισσότερο από τα νέα μέσα και 
τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης πριν από τις 
βουλευτικές εκλογές του Ιουνίου του 2012; 
(επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
11. Which political party or parties do you 
believe benefited the most from new media and 
social media prior to the parliamentary 
elections of June 2012? (select all that are 
applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    8) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Κανένα / None 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know   
 
12. Ποια πολιτικά κόμματα πιστεύετε ότι έχουν 
επωφεληθεί λιγότερο από τα νέα μέσα και τα 
μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης; (επιλέξτε όλα όσα 
ισχύουν) 
12. Which political party or parties do you 
believe have benefited the least from new 
media and social media? (select all that are 
applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
      11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
13. Ποια πολιτικά κόμματα πιστεύετε ότι είχαν 
επωφεληθεί λιγότερο από τα νέα μέσα και τα 
μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης πριν από τις 
βουλευτικές εκλογές του Μαίου του 2012; 
(επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
13. Which political party or parties do you 
believe benefited the least from new media and 
social media prior to the parliamentary 
elections of May 2012? (select all that are 
applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 10) Κανένα / None 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
14. Ποια πολιτικά κόμματα πιστεύετε ότι είχαν 
επωφεληθεί λιγότερο από τα νέα μέσα και τα 
μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης πριν από τις 
βουλευτικές εκλογές του Ιουνίου του 2012; 
(επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
14. Which political party or parties do you 
believe benefited the least from new media and 
social media prior to the parliamentary 
elections of June 2012? (select all that are 
applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 10) Κανένα / None 








15. Ποιο πολιτικό κόμμα πιστεύετε ότι κάνει 
την πιο αποτελεσματική χρήση των νέων 
μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής δικτύωσης; 
(επιλέξτε ένα) 
15. Which political party do you believe makes 
the most effective use of social and new media 
in its operations? (select one) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
      11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
16. Ποιο κόμμα πιστεύετε ότι κάνει την πιο 
αναποτελεσματική χρήση των νέων μέσων και 
μέσων κοινωνικής δικτύωσης; (επιλέξτε ένα) 
16. Which political party do you believe makes 
the least effective use of social and new media 
in its operations? (select one) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
      11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
17. Πιστεύετε πως τα αποτελέσματα των 
βουλευτικών εκλογών του 2012 θα ήταν 
διαφορετικά εάν δεν υπήρχαν τα νέα μέσα και 
τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης; 
17. Do you believe that the outcome of the 2012 
parliamentary elections would have been 
different had social & new media not existed? 
1) Ναι / Yes     3) Μάλλον όχι / Probably no 
2) Μάλλον ναι / Probably yes   4) Όχι / No 
      5) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
18. Κατά την άποψη σας, πόσο 
αποτελεσματική ήταν η χρήση των εργαλείων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης από τους υποψήφιους 
στις βουλευτικές εκλογές του 2012; 
18. In your opinion, how effective was the 
usage of social media in the campaigns of 
candidates in the 2012 parliamentary 
elections? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ ασήμαντη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (very ineffective)   (very effective) 
 
19. Κατά την άποψη σας, πόσο 
αποτελεσματική ήταν η χρήση των εργαλείων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης από τους υποψήφιους 
και τα πολιτικά κόμματα στις φετινές 
Ευρωεκλογές στην Ελλάδα; 
19. In your opinion, how effective was the 
usage of social media tools by candidates and 
political parties participating in this year's 
European parliamentary elections in Greece?  
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ ασήμαντη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 






20. Κατά την άποψη σας, πόσο 
αποτελεσματική ήταν η χρήση των εργαλείων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης από τους υποψήφιους 
και τα πολιτικά σχήματα στις φετινές εκλογές 
την τοπικής αυτοδιοίκησης στην Ελλάδα; 
20. In your opinion, how effective was the 
usage of social media tools by candidates and 
political parties participating in this year's 
local and municipal elections in Greece?  
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ ασήμαντη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (very ineffective)   (very effective) 
 
21. Κατά την άποψη σας, τα νέα μέσα και μέσα 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης έδωσαν φέτος την 
δυνατότητα στο κοινό να μάθει περισσότερες 
πληροφορίες, σε σχέση με το παρελθόν, για 
τους υποψηφίους στις εκλογές στην Ελλάδα; 
21. In your opinion, have the internet. new 
media, and social media given the public the 
opportunity to find out more information 
about candidates in this year's elections in 
Greece, compared to the past? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (σίγουρα όχι)   (σίγουρα ναι) 
   (not at all)   (very much so) 
 
22. Πως θα χαρακτηρίζατε την επίδραση των 
κοινωνικών δικτύων και των νέων μέσων στο 
επίπεδο του προεκλογικού διαλόγου που 
διατήρησαν οι υποψήφιοι στις φετινές εκλογές 
για το Ευρωπαϊκό κοινοβούλιο στην Ελλάδα; 
22. How would you gauge the impact of new 
media and social media on the quality and level 
of campaigning for this year's European 
parliamentary elections in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ ασήμαντη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (very insignificant)  (very significant) 
 
23. Πως θα χαρακτηρίζατε την επίδραση των 
κοινωνικών δικτύων και των νέων μέσων στο 
επίπεδο του προεκλογικού διαλόγου που 
διατήρησαν οι υποψήφιοι στις φετινές εκλογές 
για την τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση στην Ελλάδα; 
23. How would you gauge the impact of new 
media and social media on the quality and level 
of campaigning for this year's local and 
municipal elections in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ ασήμαντη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 








24. Πως θα χαρακτηρίζατε την επίδραση των 
κοινωνικών δικτύων και νέων μέσων στην 
διαφάνεια των κομμάτων και των υποψηφίων 
στις φετινές εκλογές για το Ευρωπαϊκό 
κοινοβούλιο στην Ελλάδα; 
24. How would you gauge the impact of new 
media and social media on the transparency 
maintained by the political parties and 
candidates participating in this year's 
European parliamentary elections in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ ασήμαντη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (very insignificant)  (very significant) 
 
25. Πως θα χαρακτηρίζατε την επίδραση των 
κοινωνικών δικτύων και νέων μέσων στην 
διαφάνεια των κομμάτων και υποψηφίων στις 
φετινές εκλογές για την τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση; 
25. How would you gauge the impact of new 
and social media on the transparency of the 
political parties and candidates participating in 
this year's local/municipal elections in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ ασήμαντη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (very insignificant)  (very significant) 
 
26. Ποια πολιτικά κόμματα πιστεύετε ότι 
βοηθηθήκαν περισσότερο από τα νέα μέσα και 
τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στις φετινές 
Ευρωεκλογές; (επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
26. Which political party or parties do you 
believe benefited the most from new and social 
media in this year's European parliamentary 
elections? (select all that are applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
      11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
 
27. Ποια πολιτικά κόμματα πιστεύετε 
βοηθηθήκαν περισσότερο από τα νέα μέσα και 
τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στις φετινές 
εκλογές για την τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση; 
(επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
27. Which political party or parties do you 
believe benefited the most from new and social 
media in this year's local and municipal 
elections in Greece? (select all that are 
applicable) 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 




28. Ποιο πολιτικό κόμμα πιστεύετε ότι είχε το 
μεγαλύτερο όφελος από τα κοινωνικά δίκτυα 
και τα νέα μέσα στις φετινές εκλογές για το 
Ευρωπαϊκό κοινοβούλιο; (επιλέξτε ένα) 
28. Which political party do you believe was 
helped the most by social and new media in 
this year's European parliamentary elections? 
(select one)  
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
      11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
29. Ποιο πολιτικό κόμμα πιστεύετε ότι 
ζημιώθηκε περισσότερο από τα κοινωνικά 
δίκτυα και τα νέα μέσα στις φετινές εκλογές 
για το Ευρωπαϊκό κοινοβούλιο; (επιλέξτε ένα) 
29. Which political party do you believe was 
hurt the most by social and new media in this 
year's European parliamentary elections? 
(select one)  
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None  
      11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
30. Ποιο πολιτικό κόμμα πιστεύετε ότι 
ζημιώθηκε περισσότερο από τα κοινωνικά 
δίκτυα και τα νέα μέσα στις φετινές εκλογές 
για την τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση; (επιλέξτε ένα) 
30. Which political party do you believe was 
hurt the most by social and new media in this 
year's local and municipal elections in Greece? 
(select one)  
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
3) Ελιά (ΠΑΣΟΚ) / Elia (PASOK)   8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     10) Κανένα / None 
      11) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
31. Πιστεύετε πως τα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης και τα νέα μέσα επέδρασαν στο 
τελικό αποτέλεσμα των φετινών εκλογών για 
το Ευρωπαϊκό κοινοβούλιο; 
31. Do you believe that social media and new 
media impacted the final outcome of this year's 
European parliamentary elections in Greece?  
1) Ναι / Yes     3) Μάλλον όχι / Probably no 
2) Μάλλον ναι / Probably yes   4) Όχι / No 
      5) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
32. Πιστεύετε πως τα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης και τα νέα μέσα επέδρασαν το 
τελικό αποτέλεσμα των φετινών εκλογών για 
την τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση; 
32. Do you believe that social media and new 
media impacted the final outcome of this year's 
local and municipal elections in Greece?  
1) Ναι / Yes     3) Μάλλον όχι / Probably no 
2) Μάλλον ναι / Probably yes   4) Όχι / No 




33. Πιστεύετε πως έγινε περισσότερη χρήση 
των νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης από τους υποψηφίους όλων των 
φετινών εκλογικών αναμετρήσεων σε σχέση με 
τις εκλογές του 2012; 
33. Do you believe that the usage of new and 
social media tools by this year's candidates for 
all electoral contests increased compared to the 
level of usage prior to the 2012 parliamentary 
elections?  
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
 
Z. ΕΠΙΡΡΟΗ ΤΩΝ ΝΕΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ ΣΤΗΝ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑ ΣΦΑΙΡΑ - F. IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND NEW 
MEDIA ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
1. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε το επίπεδο της 
επίδρασης των νέων μέσων και των μέσων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στην δημόσια σφαίρα 
στην Ελλάδα; 
1. How would you gauge the contribution of 
new media and social media to the public 
sphere in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καμία επιρροή)   (εξαιρετικά μεγάλη επιρροή) 
   (no influence)   (extremely significant influence) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
2. Πιστεύετε πως τα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης και τα νέα μέσα έχουν συμβάλλει 
θετικά ή αρνητικά στην δημόσια σφαίρα στην 
Ελλάδα; 
2. Do you believe that new media and social 
media have made a positive or a negative 
contribution to the public sphere in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
3. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση των 
παραδοσιακών μέσων ενημέρωσης στην 
Ελληνική δημόσια σφαίρα σε ιστορικό επίπεδο 
(εποχή της μεταπολίτευσης); 
3. How would you gauge the contribution of 
mainstream media to the public sphere in 
Greece historically (in the post-junta period)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
4. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση των 
παραδοσιακών μέσων ενημέρωσης στην 
Ελληνική δημόσια σφαίρα σήμερα; 
4. How would you gauge the contribution of 
mainstream media to the public sphere in 
Greece today? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καμία επιρροή)   (εξαιρετικά μεγάλη επιρροή) 





5. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την ποιότητα και το 
επίπεδο ανάπτυξης του δημοσίου διαλόγου 
στην Ελλάδα στην εποχή της μεταπολίτευσης; 
5. How would you gauge the level of 
development of public dialogue and discourse 
in Greece in the post-junta era? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ φτωχό)   (πολύ ανεπτυγμένο) 
   (very poor)   (very well-developed) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ φτωχό)   (πολύ ανεπτυγμένο) 
   (very poor)   (very well-developed) 
 
6. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε το επίπεδο του 
δημοσίου διαλόγου στην Ελλάδα σήμερα; 
6. How would you gauge the quality and level 
of public dialogue/discourse in Greece today? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ φτωχό)   (πολύ ανεπτυγμένο) 
   (very poor)   (very well-developed) 
 
7. Αξιολογήστε τα ακόλουτα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης σύμφωνα με την δημοτικότητα 
τους στην Ελλάδα, όπως την αντιλαμβάνεται 
(αξιολογήστε μόνο τα πρώτα 5). 
7. Rank the following social media outlets 
according to their popularity in Greece, based 
on your own perception (rank the top 5 only). 
__ Facebook     __ Reddit 
__ Twitter     __ Instagram 
__ YouTube     __ Blogs 
__ LinkedIn     __ Άλλο / Other: _________________________ 
__ Google+     __ Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
__ pinterest 
 
8. Ποιο μέσο κοινωνικής δικτύωσης πιστεύετε 
ότι είναι το ποιο δημοφιλή για την συζήτηση 
πολιτικών θεμάτων σήμερα στην Ελλάδα; 
8. Which social media outlet do you believe is 
the most popular in Greece for the purposes of 
discussing political issues at the present time? 
1) Facebook     6) pinterest 
2) Twitter     7) Reddit 
3) YouTube     8) Instagram 
4) LinkedIn     9) Blogs 
5) Google+     10) Άλλο / Other: _________________________ 











9. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση των 
νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην διάδοση των ακόλουθων 
θεμάτων στο ευρύ κοινό; 
9. How would you gauge the impact of social 
media and new media in exposing the following 
issues to the public? 
     (καμία επιρροή)       (πολύ μεγάλη επιρροή) 
         (no impact)      (very significant impact) 
1) Δολοφονία A. Γρηγορόπουλου / 
Killing of Α. Grigoropoulos  1 2 3 4 5 
2) Κίνημα των αγανακτισμένων / 
Indignants' protest movement  1 2 3 4 5 
3) Arrest of blogger Geron Pastitsios / 
Σύλληηψη του Γέρον Παστίτσιου  1 2 3 4 5 
4) Arrest of journalist Kostas Vaxevanis / 
Σύλληηψη του δημοσιογράφου Κώστα 1 2 3 4 5 
Βαξεβάνη     
5) Διαμαρτυρία για την λειτουργία των 
ορυχίων στις Σκουριές / Skouries mining 1 2 3 4 5 
controversy 
6) Μανωλάδα / Manolada controversy 1 2 3 4 5 
7) Κλείσιμο ΕΡΤ / Shutdown of ERT 1 2 3 4 5 
8) Δολοφονία Παύλου Φύσσα /  
Murder of Pavlos Fyssas   1 2 3 4 5 
9) Συλλήψεις Χρυσής Αυγής / 
Golden Dawn arrests   1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. Πιστεύετε πως η κάλυψη των ακόλουθων 
γεγονότων από τα νέα μέσα και τα μέσα 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης ήταν ποιο αξιόπιστη 
και επαρκή σε σχέση με την κάλυψη από τα 
παραδοσιακά μέσα ενημέρωσης; 
10. In your opinion, was the coverage provided 
by social and new media for each of the 
following issues more thorough and credible 
compared to the coverage provided by the 
mainstream media? 
1) Δολοφονία Γρηγορόπουλου / 
Killing of Grigoropoulos   a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No   c) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
2) Κίνημα των αγανακτισμένων / 
Indignants' protest movement  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No   c) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
3) Σύλληψη του Γέρον Παστίτσιου / 
Arrest of blogger Geron Pastitsios  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No   c) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
4) Σύλληψη του δημοσιογράφου Κώστα 
Βαξεβάνη / Arrest of journalist Kostas a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No   c) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
Vaxevanis 
5) Διαμαρτυρία για την λειτουργία των 
ορυχίων στις Σκουριές / Skouries gold a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No   c) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
mining controversy 
6) Μανωλάδα / Manolada   a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No   c) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
7) Κλείσιμο ΕΡΤ / Shutdown of ERT a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No   c) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
8) Δολοφονία Παύλου Φύσσα /  
Murder of Pavlos Fyssas   a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No   c) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
9) Συλλήψεις Χρυσής Αυγής / 
Golden Dawn arrests   a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No   c) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
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11. Κατά την άποψη σας, κατά πόσο έχουν 
επιδράσει τα νέα μέσα και τα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης τα κινήματα διαμαρτυρίας τα 
τελευταία χρόνια στην Ελλάδα; 
11. How would you gauge the impact of social 
media and new media in inspiring protest 
movements in Greece in recent years? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καμία επιρροή)   (εξαιρετικά μεγάλη επιρροή) 
   (no influence)   (extremely significant influence) 
 
12. Κατά την άποψη σας, κατά πόσο είχαν 
συμβάλλει τα νέα μέσα και τα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην δημιουργία του κινήματος 
των αγανακτισμένων το 2011;  
12. In your opinion, what was the impact of 
social media and new media in inspiring the 
Syntagma Square indignants' protest 
movement in 2011? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καμία επιρροή)   (εξαιρετικά μεγάλη επιρροή) 
   (no influence)   (extremely significant influence) 
 
13. Πιστεύετε πως θα μπορούσε να οργανωθεί 
το κίνημα των αγανακτισμένων χωρίς την 
συμβολή των νέων μέσων και των μέσων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης; 
13. Do you believe that a movement such as the 
protest of the indignants in Syntagma Square 
would have been possible without the usage of 
new media and social media? 
1) Ναι / Yes   2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
μάλλον ναι, μάλλον όχι 
 
 
H. Η ΜΠΛΟΓΚΟΣΦΑΙΡΑ - G. THE BLOGOSPHERE 
 
1. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την αξιοπιστία ή μη 
των blogs ως πηγή έγκυρης ενημέρωσης; 
1. Do you believe that, generally, blogs are a 
credible source of news and information? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (not at all credible)  (very credible) 
 
2. Πιστεύετε πως τα μπλογκ έχουν συμβάλλει 
στην μείωση της απήχησης των παραδοσιακών 
μέσων ενημέρωσης στην Ελλάδα; 
2. Do you believe that blogs have contributed 
to a decline in popularity of mainstream media 
in Greece? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
μάλλον ναι/όχι 
 
3. Πιστεύετε πως τα μπλογκ έχουν επηρεάσει 
θετικά ή αρνητικά το επίπεδο ενημέρωσης του 
κοινού στην Ελλάδα; 
3. Do you believe that blogs have made a 
positive or negative impact on the quality of 
news and information received by the Greek 
public? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 






4. Πιστεύετε πως πρέπει να διατηρηθεί το 
δικαίωμα ανωνυμίας των μπλογκ και των 
δημοσιεύσεων στο διαδίκτυο; 
4. Do you support the continuation of 
anonymous blogs and postings on the Internet? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (σε καμία περίπτωση)  (σε κάθε περίπτωση) 
   (under no circumstances)  (always, under all circumstances) 
 
 
5. Πιστεύετε πως πρέπει να απαγορευθεί δια 
νόμου η ανωνυμία στα μπλογκ και στις 
ενημερωτικές ιστοσελίδες στο διαδίκτυο; 
5. Do you believe that the publication of 
anonymous blogs or news articles on the 
Internet should be outlawed? 
1) Ναι / Yes     3) Μόνο υπό προυποθέσεις / only under certain 
2) Όχι / No     circumstances 
 
6. Πιστεύετε πως η ανωνυμία μειώνει την 
αξιοπιστία κάποιου μπλογκ ή κάποιας 
δημοσίευσης στο διαδίκτυο; 
6. Do you believe that anonymity diminishes 
the trustworthiness of a blog or news article on 
the Internet? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου)   (πάρα πολύ) 
   (not at all)   (very much) 
 
7. Πιστεύετε ότι, στο σύνολο τους, τα μπλογκ 
και οι ενημερωτικές ιστοσελίδες λειτουργούν 
ανεξάρτητα από πολιτικά και κυβερνητικά 
συμφέροντα; 
7. As a whole, do you believe that blogs and 
new media outlets, in your view, truly 
independent of the government and of existing 
power structures in the country? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
8. Θα χαρακτηρίζατε τα μπλογκ, στο σύνολο 
τους, ως παράδειγμα δημοσιογραφίας των 
πολιτών; 
8. Would you consider news blogs in Greece 
representative examples of "citizen 
journalism"? 
1) Ναι / Yes 2) Μάλλον ναι / Probably yes 3) Μάλλον όχι / Probably no  4) Όχι / No 
 
9. Σε ποιο βαθμό πιστεύετε ότι τα μπλογκ 
έχουν προωθήσει και έχουν συμβάλλει στην 
ανάδειξη της δημοσιογραφίας των πολιτών 
στην Ελλάδα; 
9. To what extent do you believe blogs have 
promoted and encouraged "citizen 
journalism" in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου)   (πάρα πολύ) 
   (not at all)   (very much) 
 
10. Πόσα ενημερωτικά blog διαβάζεται σε 
τακτική βάση (τουλάχιστον μία φορά την 
εβδομάδα); 
10. How many news blogs do you read 
regularly (at least once per week)? 
_______ 
 
11. Ονομάστε μέχρι τρια ενημερωτικά blog που 
παρακολουθείτε.  







Θ. ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ ΠΟΛΙΤΩΝ - H. CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
1. Κατά την άποψη σας, η κοινωνία πολιτών 
πόσο είχε αναπτυχθεί στην εποχή της 
μεταπολίτευσης στην Ελλάδα; 
1. In your opinion, how well-developed was the 
civil society sphere in Greece in the post-junta 
period? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου ανεπτυγμένη)  (πολύ ανεπτυγμένη) 
   (not at all developed)  (extremely well developed) 
 
 
2. Κατά την άποψη σας, η κοινωνία πολιτών 
έχει αναπτυχθεί επαρκώς στην Ελλάδα 
σήμερα; 
2. In your opinion, is the civil society sphere in 
Greece well-developed today? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου ανεπτυγμένη)  (πολύ ανεπτυγμένη) 
   (not at all developed)  (extremely well developed) 
 
3. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση των 
νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην ανάπτυξη της κοινωνίας 
πολιτών στην Ελλάδα; 
3. How would you gauge the impact of social 
and new media tools in fostering the growth or 
development of civil society initiatives in 
Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καμία επιρροή)   (εξαιρετικά μεγάλη επιρροή) 
   (no influence)   (extremely significant influence) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 





I. ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΥΣ ΣΥΝΤΑΚΤΕΣ (ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΓΡΑΦΟΥΣ) - I. QUESTIONS FOR 
NEWSPAPER EDITORS (JOURNALISTS) 
 
1. Η εφημερίδα σας χρησιμοποιεί τα ακόλουθα 
μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης και νέα μέσα; 
1. Does your newspaper utilize the following 
social and new media tools? 
1) Facebook  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No  
2) Twitter  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
3) Google+  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
4) LinkedIn  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
5) pinterest  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
6) Instagram  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
7) Reddit  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
8) Μπλογκ / Blog a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
9) Podcast  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
10) Video  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
11) Σχόλια / Comments a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
12) RSS feed  a) Ναι / Yes b) Όχι / No 
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2. Ποιο μέσο κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιεί η εφημερίδα σας περισσότερο; 
2. Which social media outlet is most used by 
your newspaper? 
1) Facebook     6) Google+ 
2) Twitter     7) pinterest 
3) YouTube     8) Instagram 
4) LinkedIn     9) Μπλογκ - Blog 
5) Reddit     
 
3. Ποια μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιείτε στα πλαίσια της 
επαγγελματικής/δημοσιογραφικής σας 
απασχόλησης; (επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
3. Which social media outlets do you use as 
part of your professional work as a journalist? 
(select all that are applicable) 
1) Facebook     6) Google+ 
2) Twitter     7) pinterest 
3) YouTube     8) Instagram 
4) LinkedIn     9) Μπλογκ - Blog 
5) Reddit 
 
4. Ποιο μέσο κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιείτε περισσότερο, στα πλαίσια της 
επαγγελματικής/δημοσιογραφικής σας 
απασχόλησης; 
4. Which social media outlet do you use the 
most as part of your professional work as a 
journalist? 
1) Facebook     6) Google+ 
2) Twitter     7) pinterest 
3) YouTube     8) Instagram 
4) LinkedIn     9) Μπλογκ - Blog 
5) Reddit 
 
5. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση των 
νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην ποιότητα της δημοσιογραφίας 
της εφημερίδας σας; 
5. How would you gauge the impact of social 
media and new media on the quality of your 
newspaper's journalism? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 













6. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση των 
νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην δυνατότητα να εξασκήσετε το 
επάγγελμα σας σαν δημοσιογράφος; 
6. How would you gauge the impact of social 
media and new media on your ability to 
perform your job as a journalist? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
7. Η εφημερίδα στην οποία εργάζεστε σας 
υποχρεώνει να διατηρείτε παρουσία στα μέσα 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης; 
7. Does your newspaper require you to 
maintain a social media presence as a 
journalist? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
8. Έχετε επικοινωνία με το κοινό μέσω των 
κοινωνικών δικτύων, στα πλαίσια της 
δημοσιογραφικής σας ιδιότητας; 
8. Do you interact with the public/with your 
readers via social media, as part of your 
journalistic capacity? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
9. Πιστεύετε πως η εφημερίδα στην οποία 
εργάζεστε αντιμετωπίζει κρίση εμπιστοσύνης 
από το κοινό; 
9. Do you believe that the newspaper where 
you are employed is experiencing a credibility 
crisis? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
10. Ποια διαδικτυακά εργαλεία 
χρησιμοποιούνται από την εφημερίδα σας; 
10. Which Internet tools are used by the 
newspaper where you are employed? 
1) Διαδικτυακό ραδιόφωνο / Internet Radio  5) Online newsletter 
2) .pdf έκδοση της εφημερίδας / .pdf online issue 6) Άλλο / Other: __________________________ 
3) Διαδικτυακό βίντεο / Online Video  7) Κανένα / None of the above 
4) Αποκλειστικό υλικό / Exclusive online content  
 
11. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση της 
εφημερίδας σας στην δημόσια σφαίρα και στον 
δημόσιο διάλογο της χώρας; 
11. How would you gauge your newspaper's 
impact on the Greek public sphere and on 
public discourse in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existant)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 









12. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση της 
διαδικτυακής παρουσίας της εφημερίδας σας 
στην δημόσια σφαίρα και στον δημόσιο 
διάλογο της χώρας; 
12. How would you gauge the impact of the 
online presence of your newspaper on the 
Greek public sphere and on public discourse in 
Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
13. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την συνολική 
ποιότητα της παρουσίας της εφημερίδας σας 
στο διαδίκτυο και στα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης; 
13. How would you rate the overall quality of 
your newspaper's online and social media 
presence? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ κακή)   (πολύ καλή) 
   (very poor)   (very good) 
 
14. Η εφημερίδα σας διατηρεί ξεχωριστό 
προσωπικό για την παρουσία σας στο 
διαδίκτυο και στα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης; 
14. Does your newspaper maintain a dedicated 
staff exclusively for its online and social media 
presence? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
15. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση της 
διαδικτυακής παρουσίας της εφημερίδας σας 
στα πολιτικά δρώμενα και στον πολιτικό 
διάλογο της Ελλάδας; 
15. How would you gauge the impact of the 
online presence of your newspaper on the 
poltical sphere and political discourse in 
Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existant)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
16. Πως θα χαρακτηρίζατε την απήχηση που 
έχει η διαδικτυακή παρουσία της εφημερίδας 
σας, στο ευρύ κοινό; 
16. How would you gauge the reach and 
popularity of your newspaper's online and 
social media presence, amongst the public? 
1 2 3 4 5 
    (πολύ μικρή)   (πολύ μεγάλη) 
            (extremely limited)   (very widespread) 
 
17. Η αυτο-λογοκρισία των επαγγελματιών 
δημοσιογράφων αποτελεί πρόβλημα στην 
Ελληνική δημοσιογραφία σήμερα, κατά την 
άποψη σας; 
17. In your opinion, is self-censorship on the 
part of professional journalists common in 
Greek journalism today? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 3) I don't know  μάλλον ναι/οχι 
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18. Κατά την άποψη σας, με ποίο τρόπο έχουν 
επιδράσει τα νέα μέσα και τα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης την αυτο-λογοκρισία των 
επαγγελματιών δημοσιογράφων στην Ελλάδα; 
18. In your opinion, how have social and new 
media contributed to self-censorship on the 
part of professional journalists in Greece? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου)   (πάρα πολύ) 
   (not at all significantly)  (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητικά)   (πολύ θετικά) 
   (very negatively)   (very positively) 
 
19. Θεωρείτε ότι τα κοινωνικά δίκτυα και τα 
νέα μέσα είναι σημαντικός παράγοντας στην 
αναδημοσίευση και προώθηση των άρθρων 
της εφημερίδας σας; 
19. Do you consider social and new media an 
important means of generating visitors and 
readers to your newspaper? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
20. Κατά την αντίληψη σας, ποιο ποσοστό των 
επισκεπτών της ιστοσελίδας της εφημερίδας 
σας προέρχεται από συνδέσμους των άρθρων 
σας που έχουν αναρτηθεί στα κοινωνικά 
δίκτυα; 
20. In your estimation, what percentage of 
pageviews for your newspaper's website 
originate from links posted on social media? 
_____ 
 
21. Πόσο σημαντική υπολογίζετε πως θα είναι 
η συμβολή των νέων μέσων και των μέσων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στην λειτουργία της 
δημοσιογραφίας στην Ελλάδα τα επόμενα 
χρόνια; 
21. How significant do you anticipate the role 
of new media and social media will be in the 
journalistic realm in Greece in the next few 
years? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου)   (πάρα πολύ) 
   (not significant)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητικά)   (πολύ θετικά) 
   (very negatively)   (very positively) 
 
 
Κ. ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΕΣ/ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ - J. QUESTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT/POLITICIANS 
 
1. Σε ποιο κόμμα ανήκετε; 1. Which party do you belong to/represent? 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 10) Κανένα (ανεξάρτητος/η)/None (independent) 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     11) Δεν ήμουν υποψήφιος/α στο παρελθόν /  
6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami    I was not a candidate in any previous election 
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2. Ήσασταν στο παρελθόν υποψήφιος/α... 
(επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
2. Were you previously a candidate in: (select 
all that are applicable) 
1) Εκλογές Ευρωπαϊκού κοινοβουλίου / European parliamentary elections  
2) Εκλογές τοπικής αυτοδιοίκησης / Local or municipal elections 
3) Βουλευτικές εκλογές του 2012 / 2012 parliamentary elections 
4) Προηγούμενες βουλευτικές εκλογές (πριν το 2012) / Previous parliamentary elections (pre-2012) 
5) Άλλη θέση / other position: __________________________________________________________ 
6) Δεν ήμουν ποτέ ξανά υποψήφιος πριν τις φετινές εκλογές / I was never a candidate prior to this year's elections 
 
3. Στην προηγούμενη εκλογική αναμέτρηση 
στην οποία πήρατε μέρος, με ποιο κόμμα 
ήσασταν υποψήφιος/α; 
3. Which party were you a member of in your 
previous electoral campaign? 
1) Νέα Δημοκρατία / New Democracy  7) ΔΗΜΑΡ / DIMAR 
2) ΣΥΡΙΖΑ / Syriza    8) Χρυσή Αυγή / Golden Dawn 
3) ΠΑΣΟΚ / PASOK    9) Άλλο / Other: __________________ 
4) Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες / Independent Greeks 10) Κανένα (ανεξάρτητος/η)/None (independent) 
5) ΚΚΕ / KKE     11) Δεν ήμουν υποψήφιος/α στο παρελθόν /  
6) Το Ποτάμι / To Potami    I was not a candidate in any previous election 
 
4. Έχετε λογαριασμό σε κάποιο μέσο 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης με την πολιτική/ 
βουλευτική σας ιδιότητα; 
4. Do you maintain an official social media 
account (or accounts) as part of your position 
as a member of the European parliament? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
5. Σε ποια μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
διατηρείτε λογαριασμό με την πολιτική/ 
βουλευτική σας ιδιότητα; 
5. On which social media outlets do you 
maintain an official account, as part of your 
position as a member of European parliament? 
1) Facebook     7) pinterest 
2) Twitter     8) Instagram 
3) YouTube     9) Μπλογκ - Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     10) Άλλο / Other: _________________________ 
5) Google+     11) Κανένα / None 
6) Reddit 
 
6. Χρησιμοποιήσατε κάποιο μέσο κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην φετινή προεκλογική σας 
εκστρατεία; 
6. Did you use one or more social media outlets 
as part of your electoral campaign this year? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
7. Ποια μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιήσατε στην προεκλογική σας 
εκστρατεία στις φετινές εκλογές; (επιλέξτε όλα 
όσα ισχύουν) 
7. Which social media outlets did you use as 
part of your electoral campaign, in this year's 
elections? (select all that apply) 
1) Facebook     7) pinterest 
2) Twitter     8) Instagram 
3) YouTube     9) Μπλογκ - Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     10) Άλλο / Other: _________________________ 




8. Ποιο μέσο κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιήσατε περισσότερο στην 
προεκλογική σας εκστρατεία στις φετινές 
εκλογές; 
8. Which social media outlet did you use the 
most as part of your electoral campaign for 
this year's elections? 
1) Facebook     7) pinterest 
2) Twitter     8) Instagram 
3) YouTube     9) Μπλογκ - Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     10) Άλλο / Other: _________________________ 
5) Google+     11) Κανένα / None 
6) Reddit 
 
9. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση της 
παρουσίας σας στα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην φετινή προεκλογική σας 
εκστρατεία; 
9. How would you gauge the impact of your 
social media presence during your electoral 
campaign this year? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
10. Ποιο μέσο κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιείτε περισσότερο σήμερα, στην 
πολιτική σας ιδιότητα; 
10. Which social media outlet do you use the 
most today, as part of your position as a 
member of the European parliament? 
1) Facebook     6) pinterest 
2) Twitter     7) Instagram 
3) YouTube     8) Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     9) Άλλο / Other: __________________________ 
5) Google+     10) Κανένα / None 
 
11. Πως θα χαρακτηρίζατε την συμβολή των 
μέσων κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στην δουλειά 
σας σαν Ευρωβουλευτής;  
11. How would you gauge the impact of social 
media on your work as a member of the 
European parliament? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου)   (πάρα πολύ) 









12. Γράφετε/κάνετε αναρτήσεις εσύ στους 
επίσημους λογαριασμούς σας στα μέσα 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης, ή έχετε κάποιο άλλο 
άτομο που χειρίζεται τους λογαριασμούς σας;  
12. Do you use and post on your official social 
media accounts personally, or do you utilize an 
adviser or other staffer for such purposes? 
1) Χειρίζομαι μόνος/μόνη μου τους λογαριασμούς μου / I maintain exclusive control over my accounts 
2) Άλλο άτομο χειρίζεται τους λογαριασμούς μου αποκλειστικά / Another adviser or staffer maintains exclusive 
control over my accounts 
3) Και τα δύο / Both 
4) Not applicable 
 
13. Έχετε άμεση επαφή με τους ψηφοφόρους 
σας και το ευρύ κοινό μέσω των λογαριασμών 
σας στα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης;  
13. Do you maintain interaction with your 
voters and the general public via your social 
media accounts? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
3) Δεν με αφορά / Not applicable 
 
14. Τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης έχουν 
βοηθήσει στην επικοινωνία και επαφή σας με 
τους ψηφοφόρους και το ευρύ κοινό;  
14. Have social media tools aided you in your 
ability to communicate with your constituents 
and the general public? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
3) Δεν με αφορά / Not applicable 
 
15. Θεωρείτε πως το trolling είναι σοβαρό 
πρόβλημα που πλήττει τον πολιτικό διάλογο 
που διεξάγεται μέσω διαδικτύου στην Ελλάδα;  
15. Do you believe that trolling is a problem 
which significantly impacts the quality of 
online political discourse in Greece? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
3) Δεν γνωρίζω / Not sure 
 
16. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση και 
την έκταση του φαινομένου του trolling στο 
Ελληνικό διαδίκτυο, όσον αφορά τον πολιτικό 
διάλογο;  
16. How would you gauge the impact and 
prevalence of trolling with regards to the 
political dialogue which takes place on the 
internet in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
17. Το κόμμα σας διατηρεί επίσημη παρουσία 
στα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης;  
17. Does your political party maintain an 
official social media presence? 










18. Σε ποια μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
διατηρεί επίσημη παρουσία το κόμμα σας;  
(επιλέξτε όλα όσα ισχύουν) 
18. On which social media platforms does your 
political party maintain an official presence? 
1) Facebook     6) pinterest 
2) Twitter     7) Instagram 
3) YouTube     8) Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     9) Άλλο / Other: __________________________ 
5) Google+     10) Κανένα / None 
 
19. Ποιο μέσο κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιείται περισσότερο από το κόμμα 
σας;  
19. Which social media platform is used the 
most by your political party? 
1) Facebook     6) pinterest 
2) Twitter     7) Instagram 
3) YouTube     8) Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     9) Άλλο / Other: __________________________ 
5) Google+     10) Κανένα / None 
 
20. Ενσωμάτωσε το κόμμα σας τα νέα μέσα και 
τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στις 
προεκλογικές του προσπάθειες φέτος;  
20. Did your political party use social media as 
part of its pre-election campaigning this year? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
21. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση των 
μέσων κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στο εκλογικό 
αποτέλεσμα του κόμματος σας στις δύο 
βουλευτικές εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις του 2012;  
21. How would you characterize the impact of 
social media on your party's electoral 
performance in the two parliamentary 
elections of 2012? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
22. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την επίδραση των 
μέσων κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στα 
αποτελέσματα των φετινών εκλογών για το 
Ευρωπαϊκό κοινοβούλιο στην Ελλάδα;  
22. How would you characterize the impact of 
the social media on this year's European 
parliamentary elections in Greece? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 






23. Ποια μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιήσε το κόμμα σας στα πλαίσια της 
προεκλογικής σας εκστρατείας για τις φετινές 
Ευρωπαϊκές εκλογές; (επιλέξτε όλα όσα 
ισχύουν) 
23. Which social media tools were used by your 
political party as part of its campaign efforts 
for this year's European parliamentary 
elections? (select all that are applicable) 
1) Facebook     6) pinterest 
2) Twitter     7) Instagram 
3) YouTube     8) Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     9) Άλλο / Other: __________________________ 
5) Google+     10) Κανένα / None 
 
24. Ποιο μέσο κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιήσε περισσότερο το κόμμα σας στα 
πλαίσια της προεκλογικής σας εκστρατείας για 
τις φετινές Ευρωπαϊκές εκλογές;  
24. Which social media tool was used the most 
by your political party as part of its campaign 
efforts for this year's European parliamentary 
elections?  
1) Facebook     6) pinterest 
2) Twitter     7) Instagram 
3) YouTube     8) Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     9) Άλλο / Other: __________________________ 
5) Google+     10) Κανένα / None 
 
25. Πόσες ώρες την ημέρα αφιερώνετε στην 
διαδικτυακή σας παρουσία και στην παρουσία 
σας στα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης, κατά 
μέσο όρο;   
25. How many hours per day, on average, do 
you dedicate for the maintenance of your 
online presence and your social media 
accounts?  
1) Δεν αφιερώνω χρόνο / None   4) 2-4 ώρες / 2-4 hours 
2) 0-1 ώρες / 0-1 hours    5) Περισσότερες από 4 ώρες / More than 4 hours 


























26. Με ποίους τρόπους χρησιμοποιείται τα νέα 
μέσα και τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης για 
την επικοινωνία σας με τους ψηφοφόρους και 
το ευρύ κοινό; 
26. In which way(s) do you use social and new 
media tools to communicate with your 
constituents and with the public at large? 
1) Δημοσίευση newsletter / Publication of newsletter 
2) Επικοινωνία με άλλους βουλευτές / Communication with other members of parliament 
3) Επικοινωνία με άλλα μέλη του κόμματος σας / Communication with other members of your party 
communication with other politicians in Greece 
4) Επικοινωνία με στελέχη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης / Communication with European Union officials 
5) Επικοινωνία με πολιτικά πρόσωπα άλλων χωρών / Communication with other international officials 
6) Δημοσίευση δελτίων τύπου / Posting press releases 
7) Επαφή με ψηφοφόρους / Answering constituent messages 
8) Απαντώντας σε σχόλια στους λογαριασμούς κοινωνικής δικτώσης / Replying to comments or tweets on social 
media 
9) Σχολιασμό της πολιτικής επικαιρότητας / Political commentary 
10) Δημοσίευση ειδήσεων που αφορούν το πολιτκό σας έργο / Publicizing news about you and your political 
activity 
11) Δημοσίευση άρθρων που έχετε συντάξει / Publicizing articles you've written 
12) Αναδημοσίευση άρθρων/ συνδέσμων από άλλες ιστοσελίδες / Reposting articles/websites from other sources 
13) Επικοινωνία με δημοσιογράφους / Communication with journalists 
14) Προεκλογική εκστρατεία και προσέλκυση ψηφοφόρων / Campaigning and attracting new voters 
15) Αναδημοσίευση ειδήσεων για το κόμμα σας / Reposting news about your political party 
16) Δημοσίευση οπτικοακουστικού υλικού / Posting multimedia: photos, video, audio, podcasts, etc. 
17) Παρακολούθηση λογαριασμών άλλων πολιτικών προσώπων / Following other politicians 
18) Παρακολούθηση λογαριασμών άλλων πολιτικών κομμάτων / Following other political parties 
19) Παρακολούθηση λογαριασμών μέσων ενημέρωσης ή δημοσιογράφων / Following journalists and media outlets 
20) Δημοσίευση υλικού που αφορούν δικές σας μη-πολιτικές δραστηριότητες / Posting non-political content about 
yourself 
21) Άλλο / Other: ____________________________________________________________________ 
22) Κανένα από τα παραπάνω / None of the above 
 
27. Το κόμμα σας έχει κάποιος επίσημους 
κανονισμούς που αφορούν την συμπεριφορά 
των βουλευτών και στελεχών τους στο 
διαδίκτυο και στα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης; 
27. Does your political party maintain an 
official policy for how its members of 
parliament and other officials can conduct 
themselves on the Internet and on social media 
accounts? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
28. Θα θέσετε υποψηφιότηταστια στις 
επόμενες εκλογές για το Ευρωπαϊκό 
κοινοβούλιο; 
28. Will you be a candidate in the next 
European parliamentary elections? 
1) Ναι / Yes    2) Όχι / No  3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
29. Σκοπεύετε να θέσετε υποψηφιότητα στις 
επόμενες βουλευτικές εκλογές; 
29. Do you plan to run as a candidate in the 
next national parliamentary elections? 





30. Σκοπεύετε να κάνετε περισσότερη χρήση 
των νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην επόμενη προεκλογική σας 
εκστρατεία; 
30. Do you plan to increase your usage of new 
media and social media tools in the next 
electoral contest that you will participate in? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 3) I don't know 
 
31. Η επαφή που έχετε με τους ψηφοφόρους 
σας και το ευρύ κοινό μέσω διαδικτύου 
επηρεάζει τις πολιτικές σας θέσεις ή το 
πολιτικό σας έργο; 
31. Does the feedback that you receive from the 
public via the Internet and social media impact 
your positions or your political work? 
1 2 3 4 5 
          (ποτέ)   (πολύ συχνά) 
         (never)    (very often) 
 
32. Κάνατε αλλαγές στον τρόπο χρήσης των 
νέων μέσων και των εργαλείων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στις φετινές εκλογές, σε σχέση με 
την χρήση σας στην προηγούμενη σας 
εκλογική αναμέτρηση; 
32. Did you make changes in the way you 
incorporated social and new media into your 
campaigning in this year's elections, compared 
to the previous electoral contest? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 3) Not applicable 
 
33. Θεωρείτε πως τα μέσα κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης ήταν επίσημο κομμάτι της 
προεκλογικής σας καμπάνιας στις φετινές 
Ευρωεκλογές; 
33. Do you/did you consider social media to be 
an official part of your pre-election campaign 
in this year's European Parliamentary 
Elections? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
 
34. Θεωρείτε πως το κόμμα σας ενσωμάτωσε 
περισσότερο τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
στις φετινές του προεκλογικές καμπάνιες, σε 
σχέση με τις εκλογές του 2012; 
34. Do you believe that your political party 
more heavily emphasized social media in its 
campaigning this year, compared to its 
campaigning prior to the 2012 elections? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 3) Δεν ξέρω / I don't know 
 
35. Πόσο σημαντική υπολογίζετε πως θα είναι 
η συμβολή των νέων μέσων και των μέσων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στην λειτουργία της 
πολιτικής στην Ελλάδα τα επόμενα χρόνια; 
35. How significant do you anticipate the role 
of new media and social media will be in the 
Greek political landscape in the next few 
years? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (καθόλου)   (πάρα πολύ) 








Λ. ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΕΚΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΥΣ ΚΙΝΗΜΑΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΩΝ - K. QUESTIONS FOR 
REPRESENTATIVES OF CIVIL SOCIETY/CITIZENS' MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
 
1. Ποια μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης 
χρησιμοποιεί η οργάνωση/το κίνημα σας; 
1. Which social media tools are used by your 
organization/movement? 
1) Facebook     6) pinterest 
2) Twitter     7) Instagram 
3) YouTube     8) Μπλόγκ - Blogs 
4) LinkedIn     9) Φόρουμ - Forums and message boards 
5) Google+     10) Άλλο / Other: _________________________ 
6) Reddit     11) Κανένα / None 
 
2. Με ποίους τρόπους χρησιμοποιείται τα νέα 
μέσα και τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης για 
την επικοινωνία σας με τα μέλη σας και το 
κοινό; 
2. In which way(s) do you use social and new 
media tools to communicate with your 
members/volunteers and the public at large? 
1) Δημοσίευση ειδήσεων για το κίνημα/την οργάνωση σας / Publicizing news about your movement/organization 
2) Δημοσίευση συνεδριάσεων / Publicizing your meetings and events 
3) Οργάνωση συνεδριάσεων / Organizing your meetings and events 
4) Διεξαγωγή διαδικτυακών συνεδριάσεων ή συζητήσεων / Holding online meetings or chats 
5) Σχολιασμός της επικαιρότητας / Commentary on relevant issues 
6) Αναδημοσίευση άρθρων και υλικού από άλλες ιστοσελίδες / Republishing news and content from other 
websites/sources 
7) Προσέγγιση νέων μελών ή εθελοντών / Recruiting new members or volunteers 
8) Επικοινωνία με το ευρύ κοινό / Communication and interaction with the public 
9) Δημοσίευση οπτικοακουστικού υλικού / Posting multimedia: photos, video, audio, podcasts, etc. 
donations 
10) Άλλο / Other: ____________________________________________________________________ 
11) Κανένα από τα παραπάνω / None of the above 
 
3. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την συμβολή των 
νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην ανάπτυξη της οργάνωσης/του 
κινήματος σας; 
3. How would you gauge the contribution of 
new media and social media tools in your 
organization's/movement's growth and 
development? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 










4. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την συμβολή των 
νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης όσον αφορά την απόκτηση νέων 
μελών/εθελοντών από την οργάνωση/το κίνημα 
σας; 
4. How would you gauge the contribution of 
new media and social media tools for the 
purposes of recruiting new members or 
volunteers to your organization or movement? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
5. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την συμβολή των 
νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης στην καθημερινή λειτουργία της 
οργάνωσης/του κινήματος σας; 
5. How would you gauge the contribution of 
new media and social media tools in your 
movement's or organization's day-to-day 
operations and activities? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
6. Πως θα αξιολογούσατε την συμβολή των 
νέων μέσων και των μέσων κοινωνικής 
δικτύωσης όσον αφορά την επικοινωνία σας 
και την επαφή σας με το ευρύ κοινό; 
6. How would you gauge the contribution of 
new media and social media tools in terms of 
your ability to interact and communicate with 
the general public? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
7. Η οργάνωση ή το κίνημα σας, 
δημιουργήθηκε μερικώς ή ολικώς μέσα από 
κάποιο μέσο κοινωνικής δικτύωσης; 
7. Was your organization or movement 
established, in whole or in part, via the social 
media? 
1) Ναι / Yes     2) Όχι / No 
Αν ναι, ποιο; / If yes, which? ___________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Τα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης σας έχουν 
βοηθήσει να επικοινωνείτε με άλλες ομάδες 
πολιτών, άλλα κινήματα, ή άλλες παρόμοιες 
οργανώσεις; 
8. Have social media tools helped your 
movement/organization communicate with or 
coordinate action with other citizens' groups, 
movements or similar organizations? 





9. Πόσο σημαντική υπολογίζετε πως θα είναι η 
συμβολή των νέων μέσων και των μέσων 
κοινωνικής δικτύωσης στην λειτουργία του 
κινήματος σας/της οργάνωσης σας τα επόμενα 
χρόνια; 
9. How significant do you anticipate the role of 
new media and social media will be in the 
operations of your movement or organization 
in the next few years? 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (ανύπαρκτη)   (πολύ σημαντική) 
   (non-existent)   (very significant) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
   (πολύ αρνητική)   (πολύ θετική) 
   (very negative)   (very positive) 
 
10. Ποια χρονιά ιδρύθηκε η οργάνωση/ομάδα 
σας; 




11. Η ίδρυση της οργάνωσης/ομάδας σας 
εμπνεύστηκε από το κίνημα των 
αγανακτισμένων το 2011; 
11. Was the establishment of your 
organization/group influenced or inspired by 
the protests of the Indignants in 2011? 
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